

LABOR

IN THE

**RUSSIAN
REVOLUTION**


FACTORY COMMITTEES AND TRADE UNIONS ■ 1917-1918



This important new work discusses labor politics during the 1917 revolution. It examines a critical period in the evolution of the Russian labor movement—from the February revolution to mid-summer 1918—during which the movement experienced a profound transformation, losing its pluralistic character and becoming essentially a centralized one-party institution.

In interpreting labor politics, this study focuses on labor functionaries as a distinct group within the labor movement and traces the impact of their institutional agendas and group interests on labor policies. As a result, Dr. Shkliarevsky greatly enriches our understanding of a key issue in the shaping of the revolution.

For a note on the author, please see the back flap.



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2019 with funding from
Kahle/Austin Foundation

Labor in the Russian Revolution

Labor in the Russian Revolution

**Factory Committees and Trade Unions,
1917-1918**



**by
Gennady Shkliarevsky**

**St. Martin's Press
New York**

© Gennady Shkliarevsky 1993

All rights reserved. For information, write:
Scholarly and Reference Division,
St. Martin's Press, Inc., 175 Fifth Avenue,
New York, N.Y. 10010

First published in the United States of America 1992
Printed in the United States of America

ISBN 0-312-09119-2

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data to follow

Shkliarevsky, Gennady

Labor in the Russian Revolution : factory committees and trade
unions, 1917-1918 / Gennady Shkliarevsky.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 0-312-09119-2

1. Labor movement—Russia—History—20th century.

2. Trade unions—Russia—History—20th century.

3. Russia—Politics and government—1904-1914. I. Title.

HD8530.2.S55 1993

322'.2'0947090041—dc20

92-38982

CIP

Contents

Acknowledgments	vii
Note on Dates and Transliteration	ix
Abbreviations	x
Introduction	xi
CHAPTER 1 Workers' Control and the Radicalization of the Factory Committees	1
CHAPTER 2 Dynamics of the Revolution: Factory Committees and the Mobilization of Workers	31
CHAPTER 3 The Radicalization of the Trade Unions	65
CHAPTER 4 The Struggle for Control of Industry	99
CHAPTER 5 "Red Guard Attack Against Capital".	131
CHAPTER 6 The End of Pluralism in the Labor Movement	159
CONCLUSION	191
Notes	203
Selected Bibliography	265
Index	278

To Lena & Dima

Acknowledgments

Over the years that I have been involved with this project many people in one way or another have helped me in my work. My first thanks should rightfully go to Walter Sablinsky, who directed my dissertation and was a constant source of inspiration and support. Provocative discussions with him greatly stimulated my interest in the subject. He selflessly shared with me his knowledge of Russian history, and provided thoughtful advice and sound criticism that were very important in the early stages of this project.

Few people have done more for the successful completion of this project than my friend and colleague John C. Fout. His advice, encouragement, and generosity in sharing his time and broad expertise will always be remembered with deep gratitude. Discussions with Bernard Tieger of the labor experiences in the West have helped to focus my thesis.

Thomas T. Hammond and Woodford McClellan deserve a word of gratitude for their insightful comments and criticisms during the early stage of the project, as does the anonymous reader for St. Martin's Press for the useful suggestions that have been incorporated into the final text. I am also thankful to my colleagues in the history department of Bard College for their encouragement and support. Maura Tantillo generously offered her remarks and editorial suggestions, which certainly have been very helpful. All other merits and shortcomings of this book are, in accordance with the existing academic standards, invariably my own.

I would like to thank two institutions that supported my research: the University of Virginia for assistance during the initial stages; and Bard College, which provided funds to finance my trip to the Hoover Institution Archives. Over the years that I have worked on this project, I have used the services of libraries at the University of Virginia, Harvard University, Columbia University, Stanford University, Bard College, as well as the Hoover Institution Archives and Library, the New York Public Library, and the Library of Congress. Their staff was invariably friendly, efficient, and helpful. My special thanks go to the following people: the staff of the Hoover Institution Library and Archives, particularly Mr. Ronald Bulatoff and Ms. Hilja Kukk; Mr. David Tipple and Ms. Jane Hryshko, of the Bard College Library; and finally, Ms. Angelika

Powell, Ms. Margaret O'Bryant, Ms. Irene Norvelle, of the University of Virginia Library. Last but certainly not least, my warmest thanks go to Ms. Larisa Iakovlevna Fedulina, of the Central State Archives of St. Petersburg, who made it possible for me to use the archives and provided expert assistance and advice on the sources dealing with the history of Russian labor during the revolution.

I am deeply grateful to my wife, Elena Filchagina, and my son, Dima, who shared with me all the trials and tribulations in connection with this project. They have helped me in more ways than one to complete this project.

*Gennady Shkliarevsky
Bard College, Annandale-on-Hudson, 1992*

Note on Dates and Transliteration

Dates prior to the change of calendar in Russia early in 1918 are given according to the Julian calendar; dates according to the Gregorian calendar are used thereafter.

The system of transliteration used in this study follows the guidelines of the Library of Congress, omitting only diacritical marks when they visibly overload the text. These guidelines have not been applied in those cases (names such as Trotsky) when a different spelling has been traditionally used.

Abbreviations

ARCWC	All-Russian Council of Workers' Control
CC	Central Committee
CCFC	Central Council of Petrograd Factory Committees
CPC	Council of People's Commissars
NS	Narodnye sotsialisty (Populist Socialist party)
PSS	V. I. Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii (Complete Works)
SR	Socialist Revolutionary party
TsGA SPb	Tsentral'nyi Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Sankt-Peterburga (Central State Archive of St. Petersburg)
VOSR	Velikaia Oktiabr'skaia sotsialisticheskaia revoliutsiia: dokumenty i materialy (Great October Socialist Revolution: Documents and Materials)
VSNKh	Vysshi sovetskii narodnogo khoziaistva (Supreme Council of National Economy)
VTsIK	Vserossiiskii Tsentral'nyi ispolnitel'nyi komitet (All- Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets)
VTsSPS	Vserossiiskii Tsentral'nyi sovetskii professional'nykh soiuзов (All-Russian Central Council of Trade Unions)

Introduction

Over years of research, Western scholarship on Russian revolutionary labor history has generated an impressive array of interpretations that explain labor policies during the 1917 revolution. Despite significant differences, these interpretations generally perceive the radicalization of the labor movement as proceeding essentially from below, from the workers. Earlier studies viewed labor policies as a product of instinctive impulses, arising from the culture and psychology of the Russian lower classes no longer restrained by the traditional political order.¹ More recent contributions have described these policies in terms of workers' nascent attitudes, rooted in class antagonisms of the bourgeois socioeconomic order, which were exacerbated by the adverse circumstances of the war and economic dislocation.²

The interpretation that emphasizes workers' attitudes in explaining labor policies attributes this influence to several factors. First of all, there were powerful social bonds that united labor activists and workers. Many labor organizers came from workers' midst, had worked at one time or continued to work at the factory bench, and, as a result, were close to workers and sensitive to their needs. Second, the general proworker orientation of labor organizations also effected close ties between workers and labor activists. Finally, workers could exert direct pressure on labor leaders through elections.

This conception of the relationship between the leaders and the led in labor organizations implies that policies of these organizations can be properly understood primarily in the context of workers' attitudes. For this reason, interpretations of labor's role in the revolution have focused on social factors that shaped these attitudes: workers' living and working conditions, their conflicts with employers and relations with the privileged strata in general, divisions within the working class, workers' political sympathies, and the culture of the Russian working class. This approach has enormously expanded our knowledge of Russia's social landscape during the revolutionary period; it has also enhanced our understanding of the explosive social forces that fueled revolutionary events.

However, the focus on social conditions and the attitudes of workers leaves unanswered many critical questions related to labor's

revolutionary politics. For example, if labor policies were supposedly determined primarily by the attitudes of workers, why did the policies of the two principal labor organizations—the factory committees and the trade unions—often diverged and were sometimes even diametrically opposed to each other? Instances of such disagreements occurred repeatedly throughout the revolution: factory committees turned against the Provisional Government much earlier than did the trade unions; the two organizations had major disagreements on the issue of workers' control; and in the wake of the October takeover, the trade unions supported the idea of an all-socialist government while the factory committees rejected it and opted for the establishment of a dictatorial regime. Finally, rather than cooperate with each other, factory committees and trade unions, more often than not, engaged in a bitter rivalry. The trade unions demanded that they should be the dominant organization in the labor movement and the factory committees should be subordinated to them, while the factory committees wanted to maintain their independent status.³ Studies of Russian revolutionary labor have not adequately explained these conflicts.

Another problem that remains unresolved is the tensions and even conflicts between labor organizations and rank-and-file workers in the post-October period. If, as many studies have suggested, labor policies were largely determined by workers' attitudes, there should not have been any significant disagreement between the two. The evidence, however, is to the contrary. In the spring of 1918, there was a surge of anti-Bolshevik sentiments among rank-and-file workers, motivated primarily by economic demands. These sentiments fueled the anti-Bolshevik shop steward movement (extraordinary shop steward assemblies) organized by the Mensheviks and SRs in January 1918. Another indication of anti-Bolshevik moods among workers was the moderate socialists' victories in elections to local soviets throughout Russia held in the spring of 1918. These successes led at least one researcher to conclude that "the triumphal march of 'soviet power' existed only in Lenin's rhetoric and in the imagination of his apologists."⁴

Yet the policies pursued by labor organizations at the time did not reflect this growing opposition to the Bolshevik regime among workers. Rather, the opposite was the case: labor organizations were more supportive of the idea of the Bolshevik dictatorship than they had ever been during the pre-October period. This support steadily grew, leading eventually

to the complete incorporation of labor organizations into the dictatorial system run by the Bolshevik party. In promoting the Bolshevik dictatorship, members of factory committees and the Red Guards went so far as to use force against workers opposed to Bolshevik rule, thus helping the government to suppress shop-floor democracy and strengthen its hold over workers. Although initially after the October takeover the trade unions opposed the idea of dictatorship and supported an agreement among socialist parties, they eventually reversed their position in January of 1918 in favor of Lenin's dictatorial solution. As part of their support, they cooperated with the government in creating a system of economic management whose one purpose was to keep the workers in check.

These facts have not been sufficiently explained in the literature on Russian revolutionary labor. Some studies simply neglect them and concentrate on the pre-October period when conflicts within the labor movement were less obvious. Others tamper with facts in order to preserve their basic conception. Maurice Brinton and Steven Smith have argued, for example, that labor leaders, particularly in the factory committee movement, articulated workers' libertarian approach toward economic regulation and were opposed to the dictatorial style of Bolshevik rule, particularly in economic management.⁵ This explanation disregards the fact that factory committees were an important instrument of the Bolshevik dictatorship in the economic sphere. The Central Council of Factory Committees in Petrograd (CCFC), for example, inspired and directed the suppression of the shop-floor democracy; it also proposed the creation of the Supreme Council of the National Economy (VSNKh), which became a crucial agency of the Bolshevik government for controlling the economy.

Still others—for instance, William Rosenberg—dismiss conflicts between workers and labor leaders as uncharacteristic of the working class as a whole. Rosenberg argued that labor organizations' cooperation with Lenin's government reflected workers' support for the Bolshevik dictatorship. In a polemical exchange several years ago, he criticized Vladimir Brovkin for overemphasizing the extent of workers' opposition to the Bolshevik regime. Stressing the common social background of workers and worker-members of the Bolshevik party, Rosenberg objected to the distinction between the party and the workers implied by Brovkin's analysis. Rosenberg wrote: "One cannot sensibly refer to workers on one hand and Bolsheviks on the other in this [post-October] period

as if they were socially quite distinct.” He further explained that workers and “‘Bolshevik authorities’ reluctant to hold new soviet elections or to raise the bread ration” belonged to the same class.⁶ Rosenberg’s argument leads one to believe that conflicts between rank-and-file workers and labor leaders in the Bolshevik camp were on the whole rare and largely due to the unfortunate circumstances of the civil war and economic dislocation that produced tensions within the working class, rather than to some deeper causes.

Despite Rosenberg’s insistence that conflicts between the leaders and the led in the labor movement were mere excesses due to wartime economic dislocation and that their significance and extent should not be exaggerated, they beg a more substantive explanation than the one that Rosenberg offers. References to common social origin do not diminish the severity of conflicts between workers and Bolshevik authorities; adverse conditions do not explain the nature of these conflicts. These conflicts require a rethinking of the current approach in interpreting labor policies. Can labor functionaries be really identified with workers?

Two renowned sociologists, Robert Michels and Max Weber, discussed the relationship between the leaders and the led in class-oriented organizations and mass movements. In his classical work *Political Parties*, published in 1915, Robert Michels exploded the myth of an organic relationship in class-oriented organizations in general, and in labor organizations in particular. His findings suggested that labor functionaries formed a distinct group with interests different from those of rank-and-file workers. Summarizing his observations, Michels wrote:

The “representative,” proud of his indispensability, readily becomes transformed from a servitor of the people into their master. The leaders, who have begun by being under obligations to their subordinates, become in the long run the lords of these. . . .⁷

Max Weber also observed significant differences between the leaders and the led in mass political parties and organizations. In his seminal book, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, Weber argued that even in the most class-oriented parties, the functionaries formed a distinct group that had its specific interests different from those of their constituencies. Weber summarized: “In all these types [of parties], even those which are most purely an expression of class interests, the interests, both ideal and material of the party organization, in power,

office, and remuneration, always play an important part, along with other factors." Weber did not mean that labor leaders were completely insensitive to the interests of their electorate, but that they took these interests into account "only so far as their neglect would endanger [their own] electoral prospects."⁸

The view that labor leaders formed a distinct group is not entirely new in the scholarship on Russian revolutionary labor. John Keep, in his important study of mass mobilization during the 1917 revolution, drew an important distinction between labor activists and political parties. He wrote:

. . . most [labor] activists at the enterprise level were not zealots inspired by a utopian vision but ordinary individuals brought close to desperation by the collapse of the economy and obliged to look after themselves as best they might.⁹

Another Western historian of the 1917 revolution, Marc Ferro, drew a distinction between labor functionaries and workers. In his study on the social history of the revolution, he has argued that in late 1917 labor functionaries began to form closed, self-perpetuating elites; he specifically refers to instances when factory committees prevented workers from replacing their members or when they failed to convene the necessary quorum of plant workers to make important decisions.¹⁰ Summarizing his observations, Ferro writes:

From the minutes of the assemblies it is clear that the committee members did not, for some time, separate from their class: they spent part of the day in the factories or barracks, and another part in the committee. Later, when they began to get a payment out of subscriptions, they were no longer wholly workers or soldiers, but leaders who fought . . . for their fellow-citizens. . . . In time, they split off more and more from their original social group, and their way of life became different from that of their former comrades.¹¹

Ferro attributes the formation of labor oligarchies and their separation from workers to the exigencies of the revolution, more specifically to the struggle for hegemony in which labor organizations became involved during the revolutionary period. This struggle required the consolidation and promotion of labor institutions which, in turn, led to their bureaucratization and separation from workers.¹²

Steven Smith has also discussed the bureaucratization of the

labor hierarchy and its growing distancing from rank-and-file workers after the October revolution. In his view, an uneasy balance between bureaucratic and democratic tendencies was always characteristic for the labor movement. According to Smith, the eventual predominance of the bureaucratic tendencies largely depended on the political and economic situation that developed after October. Smith writes:

The balance between democracy and bureaucracy in the labor movement depended on the economic and political condition in society at large. So long as these conditions were favourable to the revolutionary goals which the labour leaders had set themselves, then democratic elements overrode bureaucratic elements, i.e., the conditions were such that the popular forces could check the effectivity of bureaucratic forces. Once these conditions changed radically, as they did after October, bureaucratic elements came to the fore. . . .¹³

The above examples show that at least some Western historians of revolutionary labor in Russia see labor functionaries as a distinct group within the labor movement. However, no attempt has been made so far to provide a systematic interpretation of labor policies which would take this fact into account. This study seeks to fill in this gap.

One can suggest several reasons why labor functionaries constituted a distinct group in the labor movement. In order to perform their role of leadership, labor activists had to form a cohesive entity capable of acting in a concerted and coordinated manner. The performance of their function also required of labor leaders a special training and a degree of knowledge and political sophistication much higher than those possessed by ordinary workers, to whom the former often referred as "dark masses." Scholars of Russian labor would find it difficult to think of labor functionaries, even in lower echelons of the labor hierarchy, as workers, to say nothing of such luminaries as David Riazanov, Alexander Shliapnikov, or Vladimir Shmidt. In his introduction to the English translation of the autobiography of Semen Ivanovich Kanatchikov—one of many unobtrusive figures in the Russian labor movement—Reginald Zelnik, an authority on the history of Russian labor, writes that he sees Kanatchikov more as a writer than a worker.¹⁴ The role of leadership, group identification, as well as a higher level of education and political experience, which distinguished labor functionaries from workers, had a profound effect on their consciousness. Since they viewed reality through the prism of this consciousness, it could not but influence their political choices.

Detailed research militates against simplistic approaches to the labor movement. On close analysis, the movement reveals a very complex internal structure. It consisted of several major organizations that were in many respects different from each other. The trade unions—at least initially—organized workers by trade. They saw their principal function as the protection of workers' rights and the improvement of the conditions of their life and work, and directed workers' activities to that end. The factory committees organized workers by enterprises, irrespective of their trade or skill. Their main function was not so much protection of workers' rights and improvement of their welfare (although these were certainly not excluded from their agenda) as intervention into production management. They called this function *rabochii kontrol'*, or "workers' control," as it came to be known in Western historiography.¹⁵ There were also other types of workers' organizations—workers' militia and the Red Guards, for example. Each of these organizations was created for a special purpose and performed its specific function(s); it had its own organizational structure and pursued its own objectives. These specific institutional differences also could not but affect political choices of labor organizations and should be taken into account in explaining their policies.

The emphasis on group identity and institutional concerns in explaining labor policies should not suggest that they were the only relevant factors. Labor organizations did not evolve in a vacuum. The complex background of the revolutionary period certainly had an effect on them. Workers' attitudes were certainly one factor which labor functionaries had to take into account. But were they the most important factor?

If indeed one is to hypothesize that labor policies prior to the October takeover were determined primarily by workers' attitudes, then why did this influence disappear after October? If workers could indeed control the course pursued by labor organizers through elections and direct pressure, then why did this mechanism of control break down in the post-October period? Why did workers allow the Bolshevik government to turn labor organizations, which had been a powerful tool in workers' struggle for the improvement of their conditions, into its own weapon against workers?

Ferro's or Smith's explanation of this change by the exigencies of the revolutionary period essentially suggests that the nature of the rela-

tionship between workers and labor organizers fundamentally changed in the course of the revolution. However, references to larger economic and political circumstances (Smith) or the need to consolidate the movement (Ferro) circumvent one very important issue related to this shift. It is hard to imagine that the separation of labor organizations from workers would have been possible if there had been no potential for such separation in their prior relations. What was this potential and why did it exist?

No study of the revolution can avoid discussing political issues, and this text is no exception. That labor policies were intimately connected with political developments needs no proof: on one hand, actions by labor organizations had important political ramifications, and on the other, political developments were critically important to labor organizations. One can say that labor issues were, in fact, political issues. In addition, many labor organizers were members of political parties; the struggle between various political factions was an integral part of the labor scene. However, the specific relationship between political and labor policies needs to be further explored since there are still many questions which are either unanswered or have been given contradictory answers. For example, what was the connection between the issue of economic regulation (workers' control) and broad political issues of power? What was the Bolshevik position on economic management? Why did Lenin and his followers initially support a very libertarian approach to workers' control by the factory committees, only to abandon it later and subordinate its main proponents, the factory committees, to the trade unions? Some believe—as does Steven Smith—that after the October takeover Lenin sought to transfer production management at the factory level to workers and their organizations. According to Smith, Lenin's position on workers' control reflected his strong belief in the creativity and initiative of the masses and was "profoundly optimistic about the potential inherent in such self-activity."¹⁶ The turnabout, in Smith's view, was a pragmatic response on Lenin's part to deteriorating economic conditions. Others disagree with this assessment of Lenin's attitude to workers' control. They think that Lenin was far more moderate in his plans for economic restructuring: he and his supporters did not seek to change capitalist production relations but merely to establish supervision by labor organizations over owners' activities.¹⁷ Their view is that the subsequent turnabout in Lenin's eco-

nomic policy was basically consistent with his generally statist views and ideological commitments.

Many other issues have also caused disagreements and remained unresolved. For example, what was the true meaning of the “Decree on Workers’ Control” and who was its author? Why did labor organizations shift their position on the question of power, first advocating an all-socialist democratic government and then siding with Lenin? How was Lenin’s government, which critically depended on the support of labor organizations, able with such relative ease to suppress their independence? Why did labor organizations allow the government to do so? The timing of policy shifts is another problem that few studies, if any, have addressed. Why did Lenin change his attitude to the factory committees in the spring of 1918, rather than at any other time? The above are just a few of the questions that this volume will explore.

The study will discuss primarily two types of workers’ organizations—the factory committees and the trade unions. It will trace their history over the period of approximately one year, from the beginning of the revolution to midsummer 1918. This period represents a distinct stage in the evolution of the Russian labor movement. It starts with the overthrow of the Russian autocracy and the reemergence of labor in the political arena. By the end of this period, the movement underwent significant changes:

1. The factory committees, once a proud and powerful movement, lost their independence. In the course of 1917, the factory committee movement enjoyed a great deal of autonomy in its formal organization and policies pursued by its leadership. It successfully rivaled another major working-class organization, the trade unions, in competing for workers’ loyalties. By the spring of 1918, the factory committees were subordinated to the trade unions and turned into their local agents; their top leadership was either disbanded or coopted into state agencies of economic regulation. This, as well as other similar developments (for example, the disbandment of the Red Guards), marked a significant stage in the evolution of the Russian labor movement by putting an end to its organizational pluralism.

2. The labor movement as a whole became essentially a single-party institution. Throughout most of 1917, the movement largely pre-

served its multiparty composition, involving the entire gamut of major socialist parties. By the spring of 1918, the moderate socialists, who competed with the Bolsheviks for control over trade unions and factory committees, no longer played an important role in either of these organizations. Their exodus took place in two stages: first, they lost control of the factory committees (spring-summer 1917), and then departed from the trade unions (winter 1918). This departure marked the end of political pluralism within the labor movement.

Both changes—organizational and political—signified the triumph of the principle of monopoly on power (*edinovlastie*). The elimination of pluralism in the labor movement was a turning point in the history of Russian labor. It greatly facilitated the subsequent integration of the once powerful and independent labor organizations into the state apparatus under party control. In many respects, the elimination of pluralism in the labor movement paralleled and had a feedback effect upon the process of consolidation and centralization of power carried out by the Bolshevik leadership in all spheres of national life. Therefore, in a very important sense, this study will contribute to a better understanding of the emergence and the early evolution of the Soviet political system.

The sources for this study included a number of printed document collections, contemporary newspapers, and memoirs. In addition, the study also used hitherto unpublished materials from the Boris I. Nikolaevsky Collection at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, and from the Central State Archive of St. Petersburg (TsGa SPb). The latter archive was particularly important in providing materials that document the use of force against workers by the Bolshevik regime.

In its organization, the study will largely follow the chronology of the revolution. However, it will digress, when necessary, from the chronological account to provide a detailed discussion and analysis of specific issues. Several chapters open with a brief description of political developments that occurred during the period under consideration to help readers. These general descriptions conveniently provide the backdrop for the discussion of specific issues related to labor policies.

Chapters 1, 2, and 3 will address the sources of conflict between labor organizations and the Provisional Government and the part these

organizations played in the government's overthrow. Chapter 4 will discuss the formulation and the substance of the policy of workers' control. Special attention will be paid to the rivalries within the labor movement—between the factory committees and the trade unions, and among various political factions within the labor movement—that critically affected the formulation of the policy of workers' control; it will also discuss the substance of the “Decree on Workers' Control.” Chapter 4 will deal with the actual implementation of workers' control after the overthrow of the Provisional Government. Particular attention will be paid to the “Red Guard attack against capital”—a policy launched by the Bolshevik government and implemented by the factory committees during the first months of Soviet power. In this connection, the study will specifically discuss issues related to the post-October period, such as: conflicts between the factory committees and the trade unions over the implementation of the “Decree on Workers' Control,” and the relationship between the issues of industrial organization and the organization of political power. In addition, this chapter will deal with the formation of the first Bolshevik agency of economic management, the Supreme Council of National Economy (VSNKh), which was a key institution in extending the arm of the Bolshevik dictatorship to the economy.

Chapter 5 will deal with workers' unrest during the early months of the Bolshevik regime. It will also discuss the government's policies in suppressing this unrest and the role played by the labor organizations in implementing these policies. Chapter 6 will discuss the elimination of political and organizational pluralism in the labor movement. In this connection, it will deal with several important events and issues. It will cover events that led to the exodus of the moderate socialists from the trade unions and the attempts by the moderate socialists to create an alternative labor movement (the extraordinary shop steward assemblies), which they wanted to use for pressuring the Bolshevik regime to make political concessions. It will also discuss the suppression of factory committee independence and the emergence of the trade unions as the organizations with exclusive control over the entire labor movement. The last chapter will summarize the arguments and draw conclusions.



1

Workers' Control and the Radicalization of the Factory Committees

THE EMERGENCE OF THE FACTORY COMMITTEE MOVEMENT

The general mobilization of the Russian armed forces on July 30, 1914, marked the country's entry into the First World War. The entry seemed to have consolidated the position of the Russian monarchy, which made persistent but often futile efforts to solidify its rule since the revolution of 1905, by uniting the population behind the tsar against a common enemy. The surge of patriotism and anti-German sentiments caused by the opening of hostilities prompted numerous demonstrations of loyalty to the crown with genuflections and offerings of prayer for the tsarist family.

It was not long, however, before the trials of the war laid open the problems that plagued Nicholas II's administration throughout his entire reign: government inefficiency and corruption, rising urban and rural unrest, and political opposition to the government. What was even more important, the war revealed the old breach between the Russian autocracy and society;¹ it showed that a majority of the Russian people viewed the autocracy as the source of the country's misfortunes and were in favor of overthrowing the existing order. Summarizing the public attitude toward the autocracy, S. O. Zagorsky, a liberal economist who witnessed the 1917 revolution and who can hardly be suspected of sympathizing with the old regime, wrote:

During the war the necessary unanimity between the public and the authorities by no means prevailed. The public regarded the Government as an institution that was alien, and might even be hostile. . . . The estrangement that existed between the authorities and the public was a permanent cause of the

distrust and sometimes the hostility with which the government decrees were met, even when the measures decreed were in themselves right and necessary.²

The distrust and hostility toward the old regime reached its peak at the end of February 1917 when mass demonstrations in Petrograd advanced the demand for the overthrow of the three-hundred-year-old dynasty. Neither the army nor the police force proved to be capable or willing to reestablish order in the capital and in the quick succession of abdications by the tsar and his brother, Grand Duke Michael, the old regime collapsed. It was replaced by the so-called dual power system consisting of the Provisional Government and the newly re-created soviets of workers', peasants', and soldiers' deputies, wherein the government held formal authority but the real power was in the hands of the soviets—the most popular mass organization in the country.

The Provisional Government started on a positive note, removing many of the restrictions and inequities imposed by the old regime and promising to resolve the most urgent issues which concerned the nation—to bring peace, stop economic dislocation, give land to the peasants, and establish a democratic republic in Russia. However, this promising start quickly turned into a rout for the government. Shortly after the government assumed power, the developments in Russia showed that the country's new rulers might have a much harder time delivering on their promises than they had originally expected or planned. They did not bring peace, carry out a redistribution of land, or solve the economic crisis. There was widespread unrest as a result. As early as the end of March, rural disturbances began to disrupt Russia.³ A diplomatic note, issued by the government's minister of foreign affairs, Paul Miliukov, on April 18, which reaffirmed Russia's commitment to the war effort and a "decisive victory," brought about the first major political crisis. When the content of the note became known a few days later, thousands of workers and soldiers demonstrated in the streets of Petrograd, causing major disturbances and casualties.⁴

In the wake of the April crisis, the tenuous coalition between the moderate socialists and the liberals, on which the system of dual power was based, began to crack. Two prominent liberals, Miliukov and Alexander Guchkov, the minister of war, disappointed and frustrated over the trend of the government policies, resigned their positions. Their departure led to the reorganization of the first cabinet of the Provisional Government. In an attempt to bolster the coalition, the moderate socialists decided to take a step which only a few weeks earlier they would

have condemned: they joined the Provisional Government. The new cabinet, which was announced on May 5, included six socialists, among them such soviet luminaries and erstwhile leaders of the moderate socialist bloc as Victor Chernov and Iraklii Tsereteli.⁵ It was in this atmosphere of instability and general unrest that the labor movement reemerged on the Russian political scene.

The February Revolution revived the factory committee movement, which had slumbered under the oppressive rule of tsarism after its first great heyday during the 1905 revolution.⁶ Despite some gains during that revolution, factory committees did not secure a firm legal foundation for their existence and activities. After the revolutionary tide subsided, the tsarist administration launched a repressive campaign against the factory committees that contributed to the decline of the movement during the Stolypin era. Due to the government's policies, many factory committees were closed down by the management or ceased to exist. Such was the fate, for example, of factory committees at the Semianikovskii plant in St. Petersburg (which had functioned for three years prior to its closure), the Patronnyi and the Brothers' Leont'ev plant (St. Petersburg), the R.O.P. & T. plant, and the Julius factory in Odessa.⁷

The idea of worker representation at the enterprise level was revived toward the end of tsarist rule by the moderate socialists. At the Second All-Russian Congress of War-Industries Committees, held in 1916, the Workers' Group of the Central War-Industries Committee, which consisted mostly of the Mensheviks, introduced the legislation that envisaged the reestablishment of factory elders at industrial enterprises in accordance with the law of June 10, 1903. Although in the summer of 1916 the Central War-Industries Committee sent out instructions on the introduction of factory elders, this move was largely ineffective due to repressive policies of the tsarist government. In January 1917, the Workers' Group issued a call to Petrograd workers to "consolidate their forces" and, among other things, to "elect factory committees."⁸ However, the only result that this call produced was the arrest of the entire Workers' Group on January 26, 1917.

The organization of factory committees began when the February strikes that led to the overthrow of the monarchy were still in progress. In many instances factory committees were organized even before local soviets came into existence. Recollecting those turbulent days, V. Perazich, a Bolshevik leader of the Petrograd textile union, wrote in his memoirs:

Even before the restoration of the union [of the textile workers], which was disbanded shortly before the [February] revolution, there appeared . . . factory committees, or, as they were also called, councils of elders. In many factories they appeared even before [the organization of local] soviets of workers' deputies.⁹

On March 1, for example, the meeting of the factory committee already took place at the Petrograd Kabel'nyi plant. The agenda of the meeting included the organization of the plant's militia and the food-supply problem.¹⁰ On March 2, the workers of the First Petrograd Power Station organized "a commission of internal regulation," which assumed the management of the plant.¹¹ Beginning on March 3, all orders at the Orudiinyi armaments plant were issued by the "provisional executive commission" elected by workers. On the same day, the factory committee began to function at the San Galli plant.¹² The Patronnyi (munitions) and the Okhtenskii (gunpowder) plant resumed their operation after the strike under the management of the factory committee. On March 7 the factory committee began to function at the Arsenal plant. These are only a few examples from this early period.

In a period of just several months, from March to June 1917, the movement grew dramatically. According to one estimate, the movement included close to 2 million workers by the end of May, or three quarters of all workers employed in Russian industry.¹³ Factory committees functioned in all major economic centers and became a familiar part of the Russian industrial scene.¹⁴ The highest percentage of workers involved in the factory committee movement was in Petrograd. For example, delegates to the First Conference claimed to represent 337,464 workers from Petrograd and its suburbs, out of the total of 417,000 workers employed in the area, or close to 80 percent.¹⁵

Most members of these newly elected committees were workers who were not affiliated with any political party. V. Perazich indicated in his memoirs that a majority of factory committees in March consisted of "non-affiliated members."¹⁶ The committee of the Putilov plant was very typical in this regard. Thirteen out of the twenty-two members elected to the first factory committee did not belong to any political party.¹⁷ However, although in a minority, party members seem to have played a leading role in organizing and running factory committees. For example, the first chairman of the Putilov plant committee was the Bolshevik A. Vasil'ev. Moderate socialists dominated the factory committees at the Obukhovskii plant, the Trubochnyi plant, the Aivaz plant, and the Novyi Lessner plant.¹⁸

The liberal regime established in the aftermath of the February upheaval, and embodied in the rule of the Provisional Government, created conditions that made possible this spectacular growth of the factory committee movement. Yet, only a few months after their reemergence, the factory committees turned against this very regime. The First Factory Committee Conference in Petrograd at the end of May spelled out the movement's support for ending the rule of the Provisional Government and transferring power to the soviets. From that time, the factory committee opposition became a major factor in destabilizing the rule of the Provisional Government and eventually contributing to its final demise. The conflict over workers' control played a very important role in shaping this course of the factory-committee movement.

THE EVOLUTION OF WORKERS' CONTROL

There was hardly any function that the factory committee considered more important than participation in management, or the so-called workers' control. This function constituted their *raison d'être* and distinguished them from any other type of workers' organizations. Workers' control had a long history that goes as far back as the emergence of workers' representation at the enterprise level. In 1820, workers of the Frianovo textile mill demanded that their elders have the right to oversee the implementation of factory regulations and payment of wages to the workers. A special decree by the Senate approved the rules for the elders (as workers' representatives were called) at that mill. In addition to the above responsibilities, the rules provided for an active role of the elders in running the factory: they were to ensure that workers had sufficient supplies to perform their work.¹⁹

Few factories in nineteenth-century Russia held elections of elders. The rigid autocratic order and the opposition of owners and management made their existence very precarious. Even when the government made attempts to legitimize workers' representation at the factory level—for example, the famous law "On the Establishment of Factory Elders at Industrial Enterprises" promulgated on June 10, 1903—government legislation remained largely unenforceable.²⁰ One should note the government's inconsistency in dealing with workers' representation at the factory level. On one hand, the government made the existence and the functioning of workers' representatives very difficult, but on the other, it helped to set up such representations. Sergei Zubatov, the Moscow chief of police, tried to introduce workers' committees as part

of his plan to pacify workers. In one of his meetings with Moscow industrialists, Zubatov argued that "the industrial estate could help to implement the Okhrana's aim by agreeing to negotiate with factory committees chosen by workers." According to Zubatov's plan, the police would select members of these committees and would supervise their activities.²¹ Such attempts by the government certainly helped to keep alive in workers' consciousness the idea of their representation at the factory level.

The 1905 revolution provided a major impetus to the development of workers' representation at the factory level. Inspired by the general drive for a broad democratization of Russian society and the introduction of constitutional order, labor activists, many of whom were associated with major socialist parties, tried to create factory committees and give them an active role in production management. They saw the need for rules and regulations defining such participation as a part of the national revolutionary agenda. They sought a kind of factory constitution that would limit the autocratic power of the management, just as the national constitution would limit the autocratic power of the tsar.

In January of 1905, workers of the Putilov plant approved a list of demands that included the right of the plant's committee to determine, together with the management, piece rates and investigate complaints by individual workers. One demand stipulated that the plant administration could not dismiss workers without the committee's approval.²² The demand for establishing a permanent elected workers' committee with very similar powers was later included in the famous petition which workers took to the tsar on January 9.²³ Labor activists circulated these demands at the Baltiiskii shipyard, the Morozov textile mills in Ivanovo-Voznesensk, and the Kashin factory in Kostroma.

Normative rules for workers' representations at the factory level proposed by factory committees at the oil fields in Baku provide an idea as to the extent of factory committees' demands. According to these rules, the committee should have the following rights:

- 1) to discuss and make decisions concerning all proposals made by workers, the management, or trade unions;
- 2) to resolve conflicts among workers and between workers and the administration;
- 3) . . . to conduct negotiations with the administration, create internal regulations which would correspond to workers' wishes, represent workers' interests when the administration creates or changes such regulations, establish the procedure for paying wages, determine the permissible deductions from [workers']

wages, discuss every incident of dismissing a worker by the administration, see to it that the hiring of new workers did not violate the order of seniority, discuss incidents of violation of internal regulations by workers and management, et cetera.²⁴

The demand for workers' control was revived shortly after the reemergence of factory committees on the Russian industrial scene. Intervention in management was one of the first steps of the newly organized committees. The most common form of intervention during that period was the removal of managers who had abused workers in the past, could not maintain good relations with them, or were simply distrusted by workers. The abuse of workers had been quite common in the prerevolutionary period given the generally low cultural level of managers, the inadequate system of legal protection for workers, the weakness of labor organizations, and the extent of discretionary powers over workers exercised by owners and the authorities. It is not surprising, therefore, that as soon as the autocratic system, which made these abuses possible, was overthrown, many factory committees with workers' support vigorously pursued the removal of unpopular managers.

Early in March 1917, for example, representatives of the Petrograd tobacco factories passed a resolution demanding that managers "unacceptable to workers" be dismissed.²⁵ Shortly after its election, the factory committee at the First Petrograd Power Station removed from the plant members of the Special Administration of the Petrograd Branch of the 1886 Electric Light Company. The committee's resolution stated:

The factory committee has expressed its distrust toward the members of the Special Administration as henchmen of the old government. Recognizing their harmfulness from the economic and uselessness from the technical point of view, [the committee] has decided to remove them and to ask the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies to authorize this decision.²⁶

On March 5, the committee of the Treugol'nik plant dismissed several foremen. On March 8, the workers of the Putilov plant's brick shop removed the foreman, A. S. Spasskii, because he was rude to the workers and made arbitrary demands for overtime work. The workers of the Tenteleevskii chemical plant dismissed sixteen foremen as "unacceptable." The workers of the Trubochnyi plant removed fourteen members of the management, including the director. In April the workers of the turnery at the Armaturnyi plant requested the dismissal of the foreman, F. Romashevich, because he had spied on the workers, subjected them

to unfair fines, harassed them, and took bribes.²⁷ During March and April seventy members of the management were dismissed from the Treugol'nik plant, forty-nine from the Admiralteiskii plant, and thirty from the Putilov plant. At the Baranovskii plant, 25 out of 150 management employees were dismissed.²⁸ It is important to know that the removal of managers was by no means limited to Petrograd alone.

It is worth noting that the removal of managers was particularly widespread at state-owned, rather than private enterprises. This fact suggests that the hatred of the old regime and the brutal treatment of workers by managers prior to the revolution (which was particularly severe at state enterprises) were important factors in these removals.

Another common form of intervention was the supervision over the management's policy of hiring and dismissing workers and employees. On March 13, for example, the committee of the Kabel'nyi plant adopted a special resolution on hiring and dismissing workers. The resolution stated that all job applications must be approved by the committee and that no worker could be dismissed without the committee's approval.²⁹ A joint meeting of the committees of the Petrograd tobacco factories put forward a similar demand. Paragraph 9 of their resolution stated that workers could be hired or dismissed only with the consent of the factory committee.³⁰ On March 13, the committee of the Gerliakh and Pul'st factory in Khar'kov assumed control over the employment and dismissal policy.³¹ The workers' committee at the Nevskaiia factory in Petrograd included in its resolution of March 7 a paragraph that stipulated that only the committee could appoint foremen and managers.³² In addition to the specific forms of intervention described above, demands by factory committees also included control over the wage policy, working hours, and overtime work.

Initially, factory committees did not have a common policy for overseeing management. Demands were advanced in a sporadic manner, without much plan or foresight. However, it was not long before factory committees began to integrate individual demands into a comprehensive policy that aimed at institutionalizing workers' control at the enterprise level. According to V. M. Levin, a leader in the factory committee movement, factory committees at many state enterprises introduced comprehensive supervision over the management when the strikes that overthrew the autocracy were still in progress.³³

On March 7, the factory committee of the Peter the Great Arsenal weapons plant adopted a resolution in which it announced its decision to supervise the activities of the management. The resolution said: "The

collective [i.e., the factory committee] is an internal regulatory agency at the enterprise. Any order from the management concerning internal regulations must have its [the collective's] sanction."³⁴ The resolution indicated as well that the management had already recognized as supervisory agencies some of the specialized commissions set up by the committee.

On the same day, the committee at the Sestroretskii weapons plant constituted itself as a supervisory body at the plant. According to its resolution, the factory committee was to approve all orders issued by the management. It ruled that a joint commission consisting of an equal number of members appointed by the Provisional Government and by the factory committee was to manage the plant.³⁵ Also on March 7, the committee of the Izhevskii weapons plant informed the Petrograd Soviet that it was in control of "the political and economic life of the enterprise."³⁶ On March 11, the committee of the Petrograd Kabel'nyi (cable) plant assumed broad supervisory functions that included overseeing elections to the plant's arbitration board, overtime work, employment and dismissal policy, wage policy, vacations, and health protection.³⁷ By mid-March supervision over the management was carried out by committees at the Petrograd Radio and Telegraph plant, the Tul'skii arms plant, the Petrograd plant of military medical equipment, and the Petrograd Oruzheinyi weapons factory.³⁸

The absence of a strong central authority and appropriate legislation created favorable conditions for unilateral actions on the part of factory committees. Direct action was the principal method of implementing workers' control. Events at the Izhorskii weapons plant in the spring of 1917 provide a good illustration of this point. According to S. I. Littauer (a manager of the Lev'ianskie plants in the Urals), after the tsar's abdication, a committee of fifty members, including six engineers, seized the Izhorskii plant. Before long, however, the management was reinstalled on the condition that it would recognize the committee as an organization that had the right to supervise the management's activities.³⁹ On March 8, the director of the plant, I. Beliaev, issued the following statement:

Henceforth, until the appropriate general legislation concerning the management of the Naval Administration enterprises is issued, the committee of elected representatives of the plant's workers and employees is recognized as a supervisory body which, however, should not obstruct the regular work activities; the committee will have the following functions:

a) the committee has the right to supervise financing without impeding financial operations conducted under the guidance of the plant's director and the appropriate [branch of the] management;

- b) the committee has the right to check prices on orders which are taken by the plant;
- c) the management can change internal regulations only with the consent of the committee;
- d) the committee has the right to discuss with the management various conflicts which may arise between the latter and the plant's workers.⁴⁰

On March 13, the committee established an eight-hour working day, introduced internal regulations for workers, including measures against absenteeism and tardiness, and set up the plant's security-guard system. It also provided guidelines and wage scales for overtime work.⁴¹ By March 14, the factory committee had established a commission for coordinating the work of its various sections, and a commission for raising productivity.⁴² The latter commission operated in contact with the plant's deputy director and could request information from shop managers regarding the fulfillment of orders. This commission also supervised employment and dismissal of workers and employees.⁴³

Factory committees' interventions in management quickly became a common phenomenon in Russian industry, and by the beginning of summer, a *de facto* workers' control existed at many industrial enterprises. By early June, the geography of workers' control included many Russian cities; the enterprises where it existed employed 2.6 million workers, or about 75 percent of Russia's industrial proletariat.⁴⁴

WORKERS' CONTROL AND THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

It would be an understatement to say that workers' control was a major phenomenon on the Russian industrial scene. It was, in fact, probably one of the most important developments brought about by the revolution. The significance of workers' control extended far beyond industry or, for that matter, the economy as a whole. Its popularity, as well as broad economic and political implications, turned workers' control into a major political issue; certainly one to be taken very seriously. Given the importance of this issue, the government had to come to an understanding with the factory committees regarding their interventions in production and provide some legal framework for their participation in management. Yet the Provisional Government chose to oppose the legalization of workers' control—a move that had very serious consequences for the government.

In explaining the reasons for the government's unwillingness to accept workers' control, the literature on revolutionary labor has traditionally

emphasized the opposition to this policy from management and owners. While on the whole the latter were certainly not elated about committees' intervention into their activities (although there were some exceptions), it is necessary to point out that during the revolutionary upheaval, employers and their organizations were hardly in the position to dictate their conditions. By far the most influential group in Russian politics during the early period of the revolution was the erstwhile soviet leaders—the moderate socialists. It is in their policies that one should look for an explanation of the government's rejection of workers' control.

Numerous studies have dealt with the political perspective of the moderate socialist bloc and there is no need to provide a detailed discussion of it in this volume.⁴⁵ A brief overview, though, may be helpful. Just like all Russian socialists, including the Bolsheviks, the moderate socialists believed that Russia was not ready for socialism; it needed a period of bourgeois development before a socialist transformation would be in order. However, in contrast to the Bolsheviks, the moderate socialists insisted that cooperation with the bourgeoisie and its political spokesmen, the liberals, was an absolutely necessary prerequisite for a successful completion of the Russian revolution. This perspective was embodied in the so-called coalition policy that led to the formation of the ill-fated dual power system where, as was explained at the beginning of this chapter, the Provisional Government had the formal authority and could rule only with the support of the Soviet, which held the real political power.

In accordance with their political perspective, the moderate socialists tried to avoid any steps that might have antagonized the liberals and business circles and precluded their cooperation. Workers' control was certainly a new and controversial policy. It was not clear what effect it might have on the economy, or how the liberals and capitalists would respond to it. Moreover, conscious of the provisional nature of the post-February regime, the moderate socialists did not want to introduce drastic, long-term measures that, in their view, should be more appropriately dealt with by a permanent government. They decided to be cautious and adopt, for the time being, a conservative approach. Thus, the doctrinal considerations of the moderate socialists played a very important role in their rejection of workers' control.

Guided by these considerations, the moderate socialist leaders of the Petrograd Soviet concluded, as early as March 10, the famous agreement with the Petrograd Society of Factory and Plant Owners. This agreement made no provisions for factory committees' oversight of the management.

The functions of factory committees outlined in this agreement were: 1) representation of workers before management, the government, and public agencies; 2) formulation of workers' opinions on social and economic issues; and 3) resolution of conflicts among workers. Special "arbitration boards" were to resolve conflicts between the management and workers. These boards would be created at every enterprise and have an equal number of representatives from workers and management. In case the board could not settle a dispute, it would be submitted to the Central Arbitration Board consisting, in equal numbers, of representatives from the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' Deputies and the Petrograd Society of Factory and Plant Owners. The agreement stressed that only arbitration boards (and not some exclusively workers' organization, such as the factory committee) could have the final word in the dismissal of management employees.⁴⁶

The agreement fell far short of what many factory committees were actually doing at the time and naturally did not meet their approval. Since there was no real authority in Russia that could enforce the provisions of this agreement, the factory committees, utilizing workers' discontent, persisted in their efforts to expand their supervisory functions through direct action.

In the absence of any other labor legislation, the agreement of March 10 became the guiding document for future labor legislation related to factory committees. It was concluded in good faith by both sides; it offered important concessions to workers and defined their rights and the rights of factory committees vis-à-vis managers. It was signed by the leaders of the most influential workers' organization, the soviets. Emboldened by the support of the most influential bloc among socialist parties, employers and their organizations insisted on the strict implementation of this agreement.

Since the agreement did not make any provisions for committees' participation in management, managers viewed such interventions as illegal, unauthorized actions and felt that it was their responsibility to prevent them. The April 7 meeting of the Petrograd Society of Factory and Plant Owners decided to take steps toward terminating the factory committees' encroachments on managers' prerogatives. In a strongly worded statement, the meeting directed members of the society to observe strictly the provisions of the agreement of March 10 and to resist committees' demands.⁴⁷

The Provisional Government followed the guidelines of the March 10 agreement with regard to workers' control. Why should it not have fol-

lowed this agreement? It represented a consensus between the leaders of both the business community and workers and was signed by the most authoritative organizations representing these two groups. In enforcing the provisions of this agreement, the government, conscious of its own vulnerability, chose to use persuasion rather than force. In its April 3 resolution, the Provisional Government directed the minister of trade and industry to draft an appeal that would urge to terminate unauthorized dismissals of technical and managerial personnel, and also explain the due process for settling workers' disputes with management.⁴⁸

Such appeals, however, fell on deaf ears. Factory committees, emboldened by their initial successes, continued to use direct action in carrying out their intervention in production. When the persuasion failed, the government decided to take more drastic legislative measures in dealing with unauthorized interventions. On April 9, a commission of the Labor Department of the Ministry of Trade and Industry discussed factory committees and their self-styled role in supervising managers. One result of this meeting was the draft decree on factory committees.⁴⁹ Two weeks later, on April 23, the Provisional Government promulgated the "Decree on Workers' Committees at Industrial Enterprises," which was based on this draft and which articulated the government's position on workers' control.

It was not surprising that in preparing this decree, the government adopted the approach outlined in the agreement of March 10. In their view of the factory committees and their role, both the draft and the decree were remarkably similar to the agreement of March 10. Just like the agreement, the draft and the decree saw the primary function of the committees in representing workers before the management, the government, and public organizations. Their other responsibilities included "cultural and educational activities among workers of the enterprise and other activities designed to improve their [workers'] lives."

The functions of the factory committees listed in the government's decree were in many ways similar to those of the trade unions. They had the right to negotiate workers' wages, work hours, and internal work rules and regulations. But, contrary to the insistence of the factory committees, the decree contained no provisions for committees' intervention in management's activities. The decree gave the committees no rights to have access to sensitive information concerning enterprise finances, production orders, and output; nor were they to have any input into the management's employment policy, or to dispute layoffs. The conspicuous avoidance of workers' control was a clear indication of the government's

disapproval. There were also no provisions which would allow factory committees to resolve disputes between the management and workers—only arbitration boards were to have such authority.⁵⁰

Clearly, the role which the government envisaged for the factory committees was vastly different from the one that the committees envisioned for themselves. If the factory committees had accepted the decree, they would have had to give up the very function that gave them their identity—participation in management. In this case, they would have had no distinct role to play in the labor movement, since their functions would have largely duplicated those of the trade unions. The factory committees would have become redundant and would most certainly have had to subordinate themselves to the trade unions. To accept the decree would have been a *de facto* suicide for the factory committees. Consequently, to preserve their independence, factory committees had to resist the decree and fight the government.

The emphasis on the conflict over participation in management does not suggest that workers' antagonism to the privileged strata and their desire to improve their conditions were unimportant in the factory committees' struggle against the Provisional Government. On the contrary, factory committees greatly relied on workers' support of their opposition. However, while recognizing that many workers supported the factory committees in their demand for participation in management, expecting many benefits for themselves if this policy were implemented, one should also recognize that this demand originated with the factory committees and was essentially institutional in origin. Its primary objective was the preservation of the factory committees' main function and existence.

In contrast to the approach that emphasizes workers' attitudes in explaining the rift between the factory committees and the Provisional Government, the emphasis on institutional concerns of the factory committees suggests that political and ideological constraints, not just social antagonisms, played a very important role in this development. In opposing workers' control, the moderate socialists equated the establishment of supervision over the management with the abolition of private property and argued that, as such, it was incompatible with the current stage in Russia's socioeconomic development. In his speech at the First Factory Committee Conference the Menshevik minister of trade and industry, M. I. Skobelev, said: "We are going through a bourgeois stage of the revolution. At this time, the transfer of enterprises into the hands of the people does not promote the revolution."⁵¹

However, the available evidence does not support this contention. Before turning to this evidence, one should note that the correct translation of the Russian word *kontrol'* is "supervision," "checking," or "oversight," rather than "control" as it is usually translated. The semantic meaning of this word in Russian does not imply taking something over.

From the first incidents of factory committees' intervention in management, the principal goal of these interventions was to end the monopoly of the owners and management in running enterprises, and not to take over these enterprises. Factory committee members viewed the demand for factory committees' participation in management as an effort to ensure workers' representatives a voice in running enterprises, a sort of democratization of industrial relations.⁵²

Interventions of factory committees in management after the tsar's overthrow also suggest such general orientation of this policy. It is worth noting that early instances of factory committees' interventions occurred more often at state, rather than private, enterprises; it was not before mid-March that workers' control spread to the private sector. The mass removal of managers at state-owned plants after the overthrow of the tsar was probably motivated more by their treatment of workers prior to the revolution, which was particularly brutal at state enterprises, than by a desire to take over enterprises.

Summarizing his assessment of workers' control in his speech at the First All-Russian Factory Committee Conference in October 1917, Iurii Larin, a Bolshevik labor leader, thus characterized this policy:

After the Russian working class got rid of the tsarist autocracy, it would have been unnatural if workers did not try to get rid of the autocracy of the boss [*khoziain*] at their factory. The idea of [workers'] control is a transfer of democratic ideas into the economic field.⁵³

Another Bolshevik labor leader, Semen Lozovskii, gave a very similar assessment of the movement for workers' control in his speech at the First All-Russian Congress of Trade Unions in January of 1918.⁵⁴

Some Western scholars agree with this assessment. Ronald Suny, for example, concluded that

Rather than some visceral hostility to the bosses or an anarchist appetite for overturning authority, the actual practice of factory committees was to restructure the organization of the factory regime more *democratically*.⁵⁵

Even Soviet authors admitted that these early attempts at supervising the management reflected more the hatred of the tsarist government

and its officials than the desire to expropriate owners. One Soviet historian pointed out that the removal of managers after the overthrow of the tsar was part and parcel of the revolutionary struggle against the old regime.⁵⁶

Direct seizures of enterprises by factory committees (which is the only type of action that can be properly classified as an attempt to abolish private property) were very uncommon. When they did occur, they usually lasted a few days at the most. Factory committees quickly realized that in order to run enterprises they needed special skills—technical know-how, managerial experience, knowledge of the market, et cetera. Since they had no such expertise, factory committee activists often reinstated the former management, which continued to run enterprises, albeit under the committee's supervision. A typical example of such seizure was the events at the Izhorskii plant that were discussed earlier in this chapter.⁵⁷ One could also mention other cases of such short-term seizures: the Moscow plant of heavy guns (March 2), the weapons plants in Motovilikha (mid-March),⁵⁸ and the Erikson factory in Moscow.⁵⁹

There were even fewer long-term seizures of enterprises. According to one estimate, thirty-five instances were reported during the period from February to July 1917. Of these, only six occurred at large enterprises: the Brenner plant in Petrograd, the AMO plant in Moscow, the plant of I. I. Gena in Odessa, the Ocherskii and Sos'venskii plants in the Urals, and the Sudzhenskii mines. The rest took place at enterprises with less than four hundred workers.⁶⁰ While these numbers are not insignificant, they certainly do not suggest the existence of a broad movement for the abolition of private property.

Factory committees did not see interventions in management as attempts to take over enterprises, and in fact opposed takeovers. Numerous resolutions of factory committee forums stated the movement's opposition to this policy. These resolutions specifically instructed factory committees not to assume responsibility for organizing production.⁶¹ This function was to remain a prerogative of employers. Factory committees on the whole complied with these directives. As V. M. Levin stated at the end of August, factory committees "do not employ the tactic of seizures" and instances of such takeovers were an exception rather than a rule.⁶²

The Bolsheviks, the party that had the strongest influence in the factory committee movement, would not, and never did, condone the policy of seizing enterprises. In fact, even Lenin himself opposed takeovers. I. Ia. Ivanov, a worker from the Mikhel'son plant in Petrograd, remem-

bered Lenin's negative reaction to the seizure of that plant by its committee. Lenin's advice to workers' delegates who visited him was that they should try to establish workers' control at their plant and fight for the transfer of power to the soviets, rather than attempt to run their plant themselves.⁶³

That workers' control was a radical policy is indisputable, but to identify it with the abolition of private property, as the moderate socialists did, would be a gross misrepresentation. In fact, the available evidence indicates that in many instances, factory committees played a very constructive role and helped managers to operate their enterprises. They maintained labor discipline; combatted absenteeism and tardiness; assumed responsibility for guarding enterprises; helped to get raw materials, funds, and machinery; assisted in raising productivity and enhancing production; and helped in general to improve workers' welfare (organized day-care centers for workers' children, schools, libraries, et cetera). In some instances they restrained wildcat strikes, which plagued Russian industry. Because of these activities, some opponents of factory committee independence even charged that the factory committees became agents of the employers (as the Bolshevik Riazanov put it, *tolkachi*, literally "pushers"), watchdogs who disciplined workers, and that they were "smeared" by their association with the management.⁶⁴

Supervision by the factory committees often helped to improve the management. Business expertise, practices, and the general culture of Russian business people were quite poor. Conditions that existed under the autocratic regime (guaranteed state orders, a lack of competition, police protection, prohibition of strikes) did little to improve them. As a result, Russian managers and entrepreneurs were often corrupt and incompetent. The overthrow of the tsarist regime deprived incompetent Russian managers of protection and their inadequacies became obvious.⁶⁵ For example, A. I. Il'iashevich, a member of the War-Industries Committee for the Perm' region, complained in his report to the Perm' Committee for Public Security about the incompetent managers at the plants in the Gornoblagodatskii area.⁶⁶

The growing economic dislocation made incompetent managers particularly vulnerable. In order to compensate for their lack of expertise, they often resorted to illegal business practices, speculation, and profiteering. One of the most notorious of these cases was an incident at the Rykatkin plant in Petrograd. The government investigation of the owner of the plant, V. I. Rykatkin, uncovered numerous violations. For example, Rykatkin took orders from the government, received money in advance,

and never filled these orders but pocketed the money instead. He speculated with raw materials and fuel received from the government to fulfill these orders as well. Supervision by factory committees helped to prevent such abuses. For example, in the case of Rykatkin, the plant's committee blew the whistle, which started the government inquiry. When Rykatkin tried to remove an undesirable foreman by accusing him of stealing raw materials, the factory committee conducted an investigation and discovered the stolen property at Rykatkin's residence. The plant requested that the government should sequester the factory and put the committee in charge of management.⁶⁷

Some owners and managers did not see factory committees' intervention as attempts to replace the management. There were instances when they accepted factory committees' participation in running enterprises. The case of the Izhorskii plant, discussed earlier in this chapter, is a good case in point. Also, the management of the Putilov plant agreed to include twelve representatives of the plant's committee into the eighteen-member management board.⁶⁸

To conclude, factory committees' intervention in management was, to be sure, a radical policy, but it did not presuppose the abolition of private property or the removal of the management. Contrary to the arguments made by the moderate socialists, this policy was compatible with the socioeconomic relations that existed in Russia in the aftermath of the February Revolution. The political logic dictated that the moderate socialists, who were a major force in shaping the post-February order, should have tried to find appropriate forms for factory committees' participation in management. Their political strength would certainly allow them to do so. Their attempts would most certainly have been opposed by liberals and organizations of industrialists, but it is unlikely that this opposition would have been very effective, given their weak political base.

Ideological constraints, which precluded them from taking power and terminating the policy of coalition with the liberals, prevented the moderate socialists from understanding the political necessity of integrating the factory committees into the existing order, in which case factory committees might have played a constructive role in stabilizing the economy. Ideology, not the "objective conditions" of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, as the moderate socialists insisted, made the conflict between the Provisional Government and factory committees inevitable. Instead of assisting the government in preserving and developing the post-February pluralist order, factory committees became a major enemy of

this order. There was no better ally for the factory committees in their struggle against the government than the Bolshevik party. Ideologically opposed to any cooperation with the liberals, the party was committed (certainly since Lenin's return from abroad in April) to the overthrow of the Provisional Government, which was an institution symbolizing this cooperation.

THE BOLSHEVIZATION OF THE FACTORY-COMMITTEE MOVEMENT

The Bolshevik party entered the revolutionary period as a political outsider. The party's strength among the Russian population in general was minuscule compared with that of the moderate socialists. The influence in the working-class organizations was a particular concern for the Bolsheviks. Except for two Petrograd plants (the Rozenkrants factory and the Novyi Lessner plant), the Bolsheviks did not get much support among workers during the first elections to the Petrograd Soviet. For example, workers of the Putilov plant on March 1 elected only ten Bolsheviks out of the total forty delegates. Generally, radical socialists (Bolsheviks, SR Maximalists, and Mezhrayontsy) did not do very well in the March elections. Their delegates constituted less than 10 percent of the nearly six hundred members of the Petrograd Soviet.⁶⁹

Many participants of the 1917 revolution noted that in the wake of the tsar's overthrow the influence of the Bolsheviks among workers was relatively small. Ivan Gaza, a Bolshevik labor leader from the Putilov plant, remembered that "a significant number of the Putilov workers, as well as workers at other plants, were influenced during that period [March] by the Mensheviks and the SRs." He also noted that the membership of the SR party in the Petergof district—a major working-class district where the Putilov plant was located—"had swollen to three thousand members."⁷⁰

In his book on the February Revolution, Tsuyoshi Hasegawa makes an interesting argument that visibility, rather than political creed, affected workers' votes during the early elections. Moderate socialists, who prior to the overthrow actively participated in various legal organizations, such as war-industries committees, had a great deal more exposure than did the Bolsheviks, who concentrated primarily on illegal work.⁷¹ There may have also been an additional political reason for the popularity of the moderate socialists during the early period of the revolution. The war gave rise to nationalistic and even chauvinistic sentiments among the Russian people, including workers. Many of them supported the war

effort. In fact, one reason for the widespread dislike of the monarchy was its poor conduct of the war. The moderate socialists' support for the war was one reason for their popularity during the early months of the revolution. Even the Bolsheviks recognized this fact. At the all-Russian conference of the Bolshevik party in April, Bolshevik S. Bagdat'ev gave the following explanation for the poor showing of the party in the first elections to the soviets: "We could not exercise leadership in the current revolution because this bourgeois-democratic revolution could only be carried under the banner of defensism."⁷²

The influence of moderate socialists among workers translated into a dominant position for the Menshevik-SR bloc in many working-class organizations, including, initially, even the factory committees. According to V. Perazich, a Bolshevik leader in the textile workers' union, in March, the leadership in most factory committees consisted, for the most part, of "non-affiliated members who were influenced by the Mensheviks and SRs."⁷³ The moderate socialists dominated, for example, the factory committee of the Obukhovskii plant; it was not until the June 14 elections that five Bolsheviks were elected to the thirty-two-member committee. Of forty-two factory committee members at the Trubochnyi plant only two were Bolsheviks. The moderate socialists had a majority in the committees of such major Petrograd enterprises as the Aivaz and Nobel plants. They even dominated the committee of the Novyi Lessner plant where the Bolsheviks had a large party organization.⁷⁴

By the end of spring, however, the moderate socialists began to lose control over the factory committee movement. One very important reason for the decline in their influence was their position on workers' control. As indicated earlier, the moderate socialists took a generally conservative approach to restructuring production relations. The agreement of March 10 between the moderate socialist leaders of the Petrograd Soviet and the Petrograd Society of Factory and Plant Owners discouraged intervention by workers' committees in management.⁷⁵ The moderate socialists wholeheartedly supported the government's decree of April 23. On May 11, the labor department of the Petrograd Soviet issued the exemplary "Rules for the Factory Committee," which were very close to the government's decree. The committee functions outlined in the rules were limited to representing workers before the administration, resolving problems among workers, creating internal regulations for enterprises, and supervising workers' compliance with these regulations. Like the government's decree, the rules made no mention of the committees' intervention in production management.⁷⁶

Although the rejection of workers' control would severely diminish the role of factory committees, Menshevik and SR activists in the factory committee movement embraced this position. In March, they held several factory committee conferences of the Naval Administration enterprises (a stronghold of the moderate socialists) at which they tried to promote their views regarding the role of factory committees. For example, the resolution of March 18 adopted by a congress of Naval Administration factory committees fully confirmed the agreement of March 10 between the Petrograd Soviet and the Petrograd Society of Factory and Plant Owners. It contained the following provisions concerning the functions of the factory committees: the representation of workers before the government and public organizations, the formulation of workers' opinions on social and economic issues, the mediation in disputes among workers, and the representation of workers before their management. The resolution made no mention of any supervision of the management by factory committees.⁷⁷

Later in March, the moderate socialists made attempts—some of them successful—to expand their influence to factory committees other than those that functioned at the Naval Administration plants. They organized several joint conferences in which factory committees of the Main Artillery Administration (a stronghold of the Bolsheviks) took part. As V. Zof, a member of the Organizational Bureau of the Artillery Administration Plants' Conference, recalled, in preparation for a joint conference, fifteen factory committee representatives from both the Naval and the Artillery Administrations held a joint meeting early in March. The agenda included the discussion of supervision over the management. The moderates prevailed both at this meeting and at the conference, held later in March. Both forums did not support the committees' intervention in management.⁷⁸

However, despite these and other successes, the moderates were unable to sway the entire factory committee movement over to their side. Not only did they fail to expand their influence, but, as a result of their attitudes toward workers' control, their position in the factory committee movement steadily declined through April and May. For example, out of twenty-two members elected to the factory committees at the Putilov plant in early April only three were moderate socialists (one Menshevik and two SRs). By comparison, Bolsheviks had five members and anarchists—who generally sided with the Bolsheviks on matters related to workers' control—had one.⁷⁹ Only at the Naval Administration plants did the moderates still manage to retain some influence. In

mid-May, a conference of factory committees from these plants approved the decree of April 23.⁸⁰ This was the last major victory for the moderates in the factory committee movement. By the beginning of the summer, they were no longer serious contenders for the leadership in the movement which increasingly fell under Bolshevik sway.

In contrast to the moderate socialists, the Bolsheviks had no doctrinal reservations that would preclude them from supporting factory committees' intervention in management. Like the moderate socialists, the Bolsheviks also believed that Russia was not ready for a socialist transformation. However, the political conclusions that they drew from this assessment were completely different from those of the Mensheviks and SRs. The Bolsheviks did not consider that bourgeois parties must participate in the creation of a new political order. In fact, according to the Bolshevik perspective, the party of the working class should reject the very idea of cooperation with the so-called bourgeois parties (i.e., the liberals); it should take all power and complete the revolution single-handedly. After completing the radical democratic revolution, the new government should start preparing a socialist transformation of the country. Thus in contrast to the moderate socialists, the Bolsheviks had no compunction about prospects of alienating the "bourgeoisie."

There were considerations other than doctrinal which made workers' control not only an acceptable but a desirable policy for the Bolsheviks. As underdogs, they saw in this policy a promise of certain political advantages—the support of a powerful working-class organization. In view of its poor showing after the February Revolution, the Bolshevik party desperately needed to improve its political standing. Party functionaries realized that they had to start making bold moves to enhance their position. They began to look for issues which could help the party to broaden its appeal and increase its influence. Workers' control was just such an issue. Finally, workers' control appealed to the Bolsheviks with its spirit of bold social experimentation. It opened wide vistas for the socialist transformation of society that animated many party members during the revolutionary period.

The initiative of including workers' control in the party's program belonged to the Bolshevik activists in the factory committee movement, and not the top leaders of the party. On March 13, three days after the promulgation of the agreement between the Petrograd Soviet and the Petrograd Society of Factory and Plant Owners and long before any of the recognized party leaders began even to talk about workers' control, factory committee representatives (a majority of whom were Bolsheviks

or Bolshevik sympathizers) from the twelve Artillery Administration plants, employing almost one hundred thousand workers, convened a conference that became a permanent central organization for all the plants of the Main Artillery Administration. The agenda of the conference included such important questions as an eight-hour working day, a wage increase, and, of course, supervision of management. The resolution on workers' control defined the tasks of the factory-committee movement as "the protection of labor interests before the plant management and supervision over its activities." The resolution stressed that factory committees had the right "to dismiss those members of the management who could not maintain good relations with workers." While recognizing the right of the committees to participate in administering enterprises, the resolution emphasized that workers' control did not mean that factory committees should assume responsibility for "technological and managerial aspects of organizing production," at least not until "the time of complete socialization of production."⁸¹

The conference also adopted "Draft Regulations for Organizing Workers Employed at State Enterprises," which was written by a Bolshevik, K. N. Samoilova, secretary of the Bureau and the Main Committee of the Representatives of the Main Artillery Administration Plants. This document reiterated that the main task of factory committees was to supervise the management's activities in the "administrative, economic, and technological spheres." According to these rules, "all orders concerning internal regulations (namely, working hours, wages, the policy of hiring and dismissing workers and employees, vacations, et cetera) must be issued by the plant's committee." Managers could be hired only with the committees' consent. Factory committee representatives should be admitted to meetings of the plant's managers and to various economic and technical commissions; they should also have access to all documents related to the operation of the enterprise. No document could be circulated at the enterprise without a preliminary review by the committee.⁸²

The approach to workers' control outlined in both the resolution and the draft differed from the one adopted by the moderate socialists. It envisaged a more active and independent role for the factory committees and was certainly more in line with the general attitudes prevalent in the movement. Once the Bolsheviks took this approach, their popularity in the movement began to grow and they were able to expand their influence beyond the enterprises of the Artillery Administration. In mid-April, for example, the Bolsheviks scored a major victory at a conference of state enterprises that was attended by factory committee

representatives of the Artillery, Naval, Postal, Financial, Transport, and Commissariat Administrations. The conference adopted "Draft Regulations for Organizing Workers at State Enterprises," which was based on the draft endorsed by the March conference of Artillery Administration enterprises.⁸³ Although the Bolsheviks suffered a setback at a factory-committee conference of the Naval Administration enterprises in mid-May (which approved the government's decree on factory committees of April 23),⁸⁴ their influence continued to grow throughout the spring.

Initially, top Bolshevik leaders, including Lenin, showed little interest in factory committees or workers' control. They seemed to have been totally unaware of this issue's enormous potential and implications. Their main preoccupation was the party's political course. In his writings and public statements of that period, Lenin never even once referred to factory committees as organizations for supervising production. For example, in his major position document, the "April Theses," Lenin assigned this function to the soviets.⁸⁵ At the April conference of the Bolshevik party, Lenin modified his position only slightly. He acknowledged the existence of the movement for workers' control and called upon the party to support it.⁸⁶ However, he still did not mention factory committees by name. In his speech on April 29, defending his "Resolution on the Current Situation," Lenin clearly indicated that he viewed the soviets as the organizations for supervising production and distribution.⁸⁷

It was the party's left wing, and not Lenin, that first began to advocate support for factory committees and their interventions in management. One such left-wing stronghold in the party was the Bolshevik organization in Petrograd's Vyborgskii district. In his speech at the April conference, a leader of this organization, S. Bagdat'ev, championed "illegal activities" at the grass-roots level as a means toward a "gradual overthrow of the government."⁸⁸ A. S. Bubnov, a Bolshevik leader from Ivanovo-Voznesensk, in his speech at the same conference specifically referred to factory committees' interventions in management as examples of such "illegal activities." He stressed that the party should support factory committees' demand to supervise the management since this policy was, in his own words, "a correct course of action" for the party.⁸⁹ The conference's resolution pertaining to the organization of production reflected the influence of the left-wingers. It called upon the party "to organize and intensify illegal activities directed toward . . . implementing economic measures [such as] supervision over production and distribution."⁹⁰

It was only in mid-May that references to "control by workers themselves" appeared in Lenin's own writings.⁹¹ In his article "The Inevitable

Catastrophe and How to Combat It," published in *Pravda* on May 16, Lenin mentioned, for the first time, factory committees by name. He included them in the list of organizations that should supervise production. He wrote: "This decree [on control over production] should give the right of supervision not only to the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies, but also to workers' councils [sic] at every large enterprise."⁹²

By the end of May, Lenin was not only supportive of factory committees' activities but even made an attempt to seize the initiative in directing the movement for workers' control. He drafted "The Resolution on the Economic Measures for Combating Dislocation," which was intended specifically for the upcoming First Conference of the Petrograd Factory Committees. The draft stressed that workers' representatives should constitute three fourths of the membership in all agencies of economic regulation; the other members should be technical specialists and managers. Factory committees were the first on his list of organizations that should send their representatives; the list also included central and local soviets and trade unions (in that order).⁹³ Lenin insisted that the Bolsheviks should be directly involved in economic matters; the resolution demanded the right of supervision for "all major democratic and socialist parties."⁹⁴

Also in May, the Bolshevik central press began to show interest in factory committees and workers' control.⁹⁵ On May 20, for example, the Moscow Bolshevik newspaper *Sotsial-demokrat*, in an editorial entitled "What Shall We Do?" ("Kak byt'?"), explained to its readers that strikes were not sufficient for preventing economic dislocation. They only aggravated the economic situation and gave capitalists reasons to blame workers for the collapse of the economy. The only way out, the editorial emphasized, was to continue production under "workers' supervision."⁹⁶

Workers' control was such an important issue that the Bolsheviks decided to use it in their campaign for the reelection of delegates to soviets. The campaign was launched at the beginning of May with the publication of the "Draft Mandate to the Bolshevik Delegates Elected to the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies." Among many important issues the draft dealt with the supervision over production and distribution. "The Provisional Government," charged the draft,

. . . cannot successfully combat economic dislocation. It protects the profits of capitalists and privileges of landlords. It does not want to allow workers to supervise production and distribution of products—the only measure which can alleviate dislocation.⁹⁷

The campaign was a success. With the help of factory committees, the Bolsheviks improved their standing considerably in local and central soviets. The May 18 issue of the Kadet newspaper *Rech'* noted with apprehension that, as a result of the reelection campaign, the composition of the Workers' Section of the Petrograd Soviet might soon "change drastically in favor of the Bolsheviks."⁹⁸ In addition to the Bolshevik stance on war and land distribution, workers' control and support by factory committees were, undoubtedly, a key to the Bolshevik success.

Probably the most spectacular demonstration of the strengthening alliance between factory committees and the Bolshevik party was the First Conference of the Petrograd Factory Committees, held on May 30–June 5, 1917. The conference, which was organized by the factory committee of the Putilov plant and the Organizational Bureau of the Main Artillery Administration enterprises,⁹⁹ was attended by 499 delegates representing 337,464 workers from Petrograd and its suburbs.¹⁰⁰ It was the first factory committee forum of such magnitude and attracted a great deal of attention, especially in left-wing circles. Many prominent socialist politicians attended the conference, including Lenin, Zinov'ev (Lenin's supporter and close associate), and the Menshevik Minister of Labor M. I. Skobelev.

Workers' control and related issues were at the center of debate at the conference. The two principal positions which emerged in these debates were those of the Bolsheviks and the moderate socialists. Their positions differed on two major points: the transfer of power to the soviets and the role of factory committees in economic regulation. The Mensheviks insisted that the system for regulating the country's economy should be organized within the framework of the current political order; that is, in contrast to the Bolsheviks, they did not see any need for the transfer of power to the soviets as a necessary precondition for establishing an effective control over production and distribution. They stipulated, however, that organizations representing workers, peasants, and soldiers, as well as cooperatives, should have a majority in regulatory agencies.

The moderate socialists rejected the notion that factory committees should play an independent role in regulating the economy and supported the subordination of factory committees to the trade unions. Paragraph 5 of their draft resolution on economic regulation (written by Mensheviks F. A. Cherevanin, S. Dalin, V. Groman, and Ia. Brukhovetskii) stated:

In the sphere of the economic policy of the working class, factory committees are agents of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies; as regards [the issues related

to] the labor movement, they should gradually become agencies of the trade unions.¹⁰¹

The Bolsheviks generally accepted the Menshevik concept that control over the economy should be organized by the state, but they rejected the latter's insistence that the Provisional Government should set up the system for supervising capitalist owners and management. They emphasized that the system of economic regulation could operate successfully only if the soviets would take power. In his response to the speech by the Menshevik B. V. Avilov, Lenin charged that the Menshevik approach to economic regulation obscured the Marxist conception of state as a class institution. "During the revolution," he said, "more than at any other time, it is necessary to analyze the very essence of the state: whose interests it will protect and how it should be organized so that it would defend interests of the toilers."¹⁰² The Bolshevik draft resolution on combatting the economic dislocation, written by Lenin, stated that a systematic implementation of economic regulation required the transfer of power to the soviets.¹⁰³

Like the Menshevik draft, the Bolshevik one envisaged that workers' representatives should constitute a majority in regulatory agencies. The Bolshevik draft, however, was more specific in this respect. It demanded a two-thirds majority (a little less than the three-fourths originally set by Lenin). It made no mention of cooperatives—a stronghold of the moderate socialists. In contrast to the Mensheviks, the Bolsheviks did not object to the factory committees having an independent role in economic regulation. Matvei Zhivotov, a radical Bolshevik leader in the factory committee movement, argued strongly against the subordination of factory committees to the trade unions. In his view, the two organizations should cooperate but under no conditions should the factory committees give up their independence. In his forceful speech during the debates on the role of factory committees in the labor movement, he voiced a vaguely disguised threat and offered no concessions:

If the trade unions will not heed [*otmakhnutsia*] their [factory committees'] line in the political sphere, then our paths [will] diverge. Insofar as the labor movement's economic struggle is concerned, the factory committees will cooperate with the unions as much as will be possible.¹⁰⁴

The Bolshevik draft resolution on combatting economic dislocation indicated that in the future system of economic regulation, the factory committees should play a part at least equal to that of the trade unions.¹⁰⁵

Not all Bolsheviks agreed with this view of the role of factory committees. Many prominent Bolshevik trade unionists objected to the idea of factory committees being independent of the trade unions and insisted on their subordination to the latter. David Riazanov argued that the role of factory committees in supervising the operation of their enterprises was, as he put it, "ephemeral" and they could not successfully protect workers against the employers. Factory committees, Riazanov concluded, could only be primary cells for the trade unions, and as such, they should have no independent central organizations.¹⁰⁶ Another prominent Bolshevik, Vladimir Schmidt, a representative of the Central Trade Union Bureau at the conference, was more conciliatory in tone, but not in substance. While agreeing, in words only, that factory committees should have an equal role in exercising control with that of the trade unions, in the substantive part of his proposal he insisted that they should be subordinated to the Central Trade Union Bureau.¹⁰⁷ Although indicative of differences within the Bolshevik camp, these views were not characteristic of the Bolshevik majority.

As one might expect, the Bolsheviks easily prevailed over their opponents. Activists of the factory committee movement certainly were not thrilled by the prospect of losing their independence. The moderates' stance on factory committee independence was probably the single most important reason for the defeat of their plan. With slight modifications, the Bolshevik draft resolution "On Combatting Economic Dislocation" won by a solid majority of 297 votes, with twenty-two opposed and forty-four abstentions.¹⁰⁸

The Bolsheviks also won on another important issue—the tasks of the factory committees. In his keynote report, Bolshevik V. M. Levin, a member of the Organizational Bureau, outlined a very extensive role for the factory committees. A draft resolution that Levin presented at the end of his speech listed the following tasks: participation in converting industry to peacetime production; raising productivity; providing fuel, machinery, and raw materials for enterprises; obtaining production orders; supervising the maintenance of adequate sanitary conditions; disciplining workers; and improving workers' welfare. Levin also reiterated the familiar theme of factory committee independence. In his view, the committees, and not just the trade unions, should direct strikes.¹⁰⁹ Although the final resolution on this issue is not available, there are reasonable grounds to believe that it was not significantly different from Levin's draft. Delegates on the whole approved Levin's speech and included him in the editorial commission that was given the task of working out the final wording of the resolution.¹¹⁰

The discussion of the relationship between the factory committees and the trade unions most vividly showed just how critically important the issue of factory committee independence had become for the delegates. An overwhelming majority of them spoke in favor of preserving the autonomy of the factory committees within the labor movement. They stressed a positive role for factory committees in maintaining production, advancing workers' interests, and protecting the revolution. The conference's decision to create the central organization for the Petrograd factory committees demonstrated their wish to preserve the movement's independence. A resolution to this effect stressed that this central organization should work in close contact with the Central Trade Union Bureau and that both organizations should agree on particular forms of their cooperation. However, the resolution conspicuously omitted any mention of even a possibility of subordinating factory committees to trade unions.¹¹¹

The decisions of the conference clearly demonstrated the importance of the corporate interests in determining the policy of the factory committees. The Bolsheviks' support of factory committee independence gave them a tremendous advantage over their opponents, the moderate socialists, and helped them to win the movement over to their side. By an overwhelming majority, the conference approved the list of candidates for the newly created Central Council of (Petrograd) Factory Committees (CCFC), which was proposed by the Bolshevik-controlled Organizational Bureau. Nineteen out of the twenty-five elected members were Bolsheviks.¹¹² Among them were such prominent figures as Alexander Shliapnikov, Matvei Zhivotov, Vlas Chubar', V. M. Levin, Pavel Amosov, and A. K. Gastev. Bolshevik Nikolai Derbyshev, chairman of the Petrograd printers' union, became the first chairman of the CCFC.¹¹³ The leadership of the factory-committee movement was now firmly in the hands of the Bolsheviks.



2

Dynamics of the Revolution: Factory Committees and the Mobilization of Workers

The formal entry of the moderate socialists into the Provisional Government at the beginning of the summer did not improve the situation in the country. The new cabinet, just like the one that preceded it, proved to be incapable of fulfilling the promises to resolve the war issue, give land to the peasantry, and improve the economic situation. The coalition was not producing the intended results and support for it continued to decline.

As a way of consolidating their position and strengthening support for the coalition policy, the moderate socialist leaders of the Soviet convened the First All-Russian Congress of Soviets on June 3. The congress indeed proved to be supportive of the moderate socialists but its predominant mood was drastically at odds with the one that prevailed among the workers and soldiers of Petrograd. Apprehensive of this mood, the moderate socialist leaders did everything in their power to foil a mass demonstration organized by the Bolsheviks and set for June 10.¹ However, this maneuver only temporarily deflected the pressure from the opponents of the coalition but did not eliminate it. The June 18 demonstration that the moderates organized for the purpose of neutralizing the damaging effects of the June 10 crisis proved to be a major manifestation of support for the Bolshevik program among the lower classes in the capital.²

The failure of the moderate socialists to stabilize the political and economic situation in the country became all too obvious during the events that shook the capital on July 3-4, the so-called July Days. Triggered by the collapse of the second cabinet of the Provisional Government, with the resignation of four more Constitutional Democrats (Kadets) on instructions from their party,³ and the unqualified fiasco of the Brusilov

offensive that had begun on June 18 and quickly bogged down in the Carpathian mountains,⁴ unrest flared up in the capital with unprecedented force. It rocked the country but failed to topple the government.

A period that, at least outwardly, had the appearance of stability set in after the July Days. Haunted by accusations of conspiring with the Germans (the notorious "German conspiracy," which allegedly involved the transfer of large sums from the German General Staff to the coffers of the Bolshevik party), the Bolsheviks were in retreat. The party agitators were harassed, newspapers closed, leaders arrested or in hiding. However, the lull that followed the events in July was short-lived. The processes that were undermining the existing order persisted unchecked behind a facade of relative stability. The economic dislocation, a lack of progress on the war and peace issue, and rural and ethnic unrest underscored the bankruptcy of the coalition policy and the continued erosion of the system of dual power punctuated by new political crises. The gradual disassociation of the Liberals from the government (Prince Lvov's departure on July 8 and the exodus of four other Kadet members on August 28) dramatized this dangerous evolution.⁵

Persistent attempts by the government to consolidate its position—such as the State Conference that took place in Moscow in mid-August—did not succeed, and by the end of the summer the situation in the country again grew ominous with the increased polarization of Russia's political forces. Amidst growing chaos and political unrest, General Lavr Kornilov decided to take the initiative. He wanted to stabilize the situation by bringing loyal troops to the capital at the end of August. This so-called coup was more a product of misunderstanding and miscommunication between the general and the Provisional Government than a predetermined effort on the part of Kornilov to transfer power to the army and bring the tsar back to the throne. However, it visibly demonstrated the danger of a right-wing coup and invigorated the left-wing forces in defense of the revolution. It also revealed that the system of dual power was beyond salvation and shifted the political balance in favor of the transfer of power to the soviets.⁶

Thus the political background against which the factory committee politics evolved in the course of the summer remained tense and turbulent. In this volatile political situation they had to deal with everyday problems related to production, but most importantly, they needed to survive. Despite these difficult conditions, they performed remarkably well. Not only did they succeed in strengthening their own position during the trials and tribulations of the summer, but they helped enormously their political allies, the Bolsheviks, to achieve major gains.

INITIAL SUCCESSES

The First Conference of the Petrograd Factory Committees had a profound impact on the movement for workers' control as it helped consolidate the movement. Following the conference, their central organization in Petrograd, the Central Council of the Petrograd Factory Committees (CCFC), emerged as the all-Russian center for the entire movement. Its authority was recognized by factory committees throughout the country. On June 19, for example, the factory committee conference of the Main Artillery Administration enterprises—one of the most powerful factory committee organizations in the capital—decided to merge its organization with the CCFC.⁷ The First Factory Committee Conference also helped to coordinate and enhance activities of the factory committees, and the conference's resolutions provided them with a concrete program of action. As a result, supervision over the management by factory committees became more centralized and better coordinated. Guided by the conference's decisions, delegates of fourteen enterprises of the Main Artillery Administration in Petrograd decided on June 19 to introduce supervision over production at the administration's enterprises. They elected six representatives to supervise managers in the Main Artillery Administration itself.⁸

Factory committees also increased their involvement in political activities on behalf of the Bolshevik party. They were a very effective tool in promoting the party's agenda. They assisted the Bolshevik campaign for the reelection to the soviets and helped the party to organize demonstrations in support of its cause. For example, factory committees played an important role in preparing the demonstration scheduled by the Bolsheviks for June 10. When, for tactical reasons, the Bolshevik leaders decided to cancel it, factory committees were among the first organizations they consulted regarding this decision.⁹

In mid-June, when the moderate socialist leaders of the Soviet decided to organize a demonstration in support of the decisions by the First Congress of Soviets, the factory committees were instrumental in turning this demonstration (which took place on June 18) into a show of support for the Bolshevik program.¹⁰ The CCFC was among the signatories of a leaflet issued in preparation for that demonstration by the Petrograd Bolshevik Committee.¹¹ Nikolai Sukhanov (Himmer), a Menshevik Internationalist and a member of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet, remembered that the official Soviet slogans were submerged in the mass of Bolshevik slogans, among which the most prominent was "All Power to the Soviets."¹²

After the factory committee movement consolidated its organizational structure and clearly defined its objectives, committees began to rally workers for their implementation. The general situation in the country was propitious for spreading antigovernment propaganda among workers. Economic decline, political instability, defeats in the war, and the continued renegeing on promises by the government aggravated many workers. The all-too-obvious weaknesses of the government—its inefficiency and lack of authority—certainly did not help in enhancing its reputation among workers. However, without direction by the factory committees, workers' spontaneous dissatisfaction with the government would not have amounted to a great deal. Following the conference, the factory committees set out to translate this spontaneous discontent into tangible political and economic goals. Factory committees performed this task brilliantly.

In June, resolutions adopted by meetings of workers organized by factory committees became more pointed in their criticism of the government; the demands they spelled out were more concrete and foreshadowed the destruction of the existing order. On June 15, for example, a meeting of workers in Moscow's Basmannyi district passed a resolution approving the decisions of the First Conference of the Petrograd Factory Committees. The resolution demanded the establishment of workers' control, the transfer of power to the soviets, and the arming of workers.¹³ A meeting of workers at the Putilov shipyard, held on June 18, produced a similar resolution endorsing the goals set by the conference.¹⁴ A June 25 meeting of Petrograd workers directed factory committees and trade unions to assume control over industrial enterprises.¹⁵ The growing movement for workers' control and the transfer of power to the soviets among workers was not limited to the capital. In its telegram to the First Congress of Soviets, a meeting of delegates representing workers employed at the Auerbach and Co. coal and mercury mines in the Ekaterinoslav province demanded that the congress should outline immediate steps for the improvement of the economic situation by way of introducing workers' control and the transfer of power to the soviets.¹⁶

A steady decline in popularity of the moderate socialists also testified to the factory committees' success in rallying workers against the post-February political order and its proponents. One could see the result of factory committees' efforts reflected in the negative attitude of workers to the decisions of the First Congress of Soviets. On their visits to Petrograd plants, delegates to the congress (which was dominated by

moderate socialists and whose decisions reflected their objectives) reported that many workers were hostile toward them. In their conversations with the delegates, workers and members of factory committees often charged that delegates were bribed by capitalists and landowners, and that only Lenin and the Bolsheviks were the true representatives of the working people; many workers would state their determination to disobey the congress's decisions.¹⁷ According to the report of the Menshevik Lepskii, who visited the Putilov plant with a group of delegates, the plant's committee told the visitors that workers "do not consider the Congress' decisions binding on themselves and do not intend to obey them. The plant will obey only its own organizations."¹⁸

The Bolshevik reelection campaign, which started in May, also picked up momentum after the First Conference of the Factory Committees. On June 7, for example, the workers of the Vol'ta plant in Revel' recalled their two SR delegates from the city soviet and elected two Bolsheviks instead.¹⁹ The workers of the Dvigatel' plant in Revel' took the same step on June 10.²⁰ S. M. Gessen, a member of the Petrograd Bolshevik Committee and secretary of the Narva District Committee, in his speech at the June 20 extraordinary meeting of the Petrograd Committee, gave the following summary of the reelection campaign in that district:

In the Narva district the mood has drastically changed in our favor. Reelections which were won by the Bolsheviks prove this. The Putilov plant, which determines the mood of the entire district, has definitely taken our side. The militant mood of the Putilov plant has deep economic reasons. The question of a pay increase is very acute there.²¹

As a result of the reelection campaign the weight of the Bolsheviks in the Petrograd Soviet, and especially in its Workers' Section, increased drastically.²²

THE JULY DEBACLE

These early successes, however, were also fraught with disaster. The political objectives pursued by the Bolsheviks were contradictory. In accordance with their political program, adopted at the party conference in April, the party criticized the coalition policy and spread propaganda against the Provisional Government. At the same time, however, the party restrained workers from taking any drastic, militant actions against this government. The resolution "On the Attitude Toward the Provisional Government" adopted at the April Conference of the Bolshevik

party and particularly the resolution approved by the Bolshevik CC on April 22, which condemned as adventuristic any attempt to advance the slogan "Down with the Provisional Government," directed the party to abstain from any drastic steps toward overthrowing the Provisional Government until such time "when the Soviets adopt our policy," i.e., when the Bolsheviks would have a majority in these organizations.²³ Factory committees followed the party's lead in pursuing this dubious course. While inciting workers against the government, they also helped to prevent strikes, which in the atmosphere of general tension could easily turn into a hostile move against the government.

When the Putilov workers began to press for wage increases at the end of June and a clash with the management, which could involve several major enterprises, was imminent, leaders of the factory committee movement did their best to discourage the strike. On June 23-25, factory committee delegates from Petrograd enterprises met at the Putilov plant. According to the well-known Bolshevik leader Ia. M. Sverdlov, representatives of the Bolshevik CC at this meeting insisted that such a strike was untimely and advised to refrain from it.²⁴ Delegates from factory committees supported this proposal. On their initiative, the meeting adopted a resolution demanding a pay increase, the introduction of workers' control, and the transfer of power to the soviets. Despite its radical rhetoric, however, the resolution conspicuously omitted any mention of a strike.²⁵ Resolutions that were very similar in spirit and content were also adopted at the June 25 meeting of factory committee delegates in Petrograd and a meeting of the factory committees of the Petrograd heavy-industry enterprises (June 22).²⁶ The fact that the strike eventually did not materialize was, in no small degree, due to the efforts of factory committees.

In the charged atmosphere of political turmoil it was very difficult to pursue the ambiguous political course outlined by the Bolshevik party. The Bolshevik leaders had a difficult time explaining their political line even to their own rank and file, to say nothing about the workers. The tide of discontent that arose as a result of the radical propaganda conducted by the Bolsheviks and their supporters had to create problems for the party, which agitated for the transfer of power to the soviets, yet was unprepared to undertake such a step. The July uprising was a good case in point. Oblivious to the subtleties of the course pursued by the Bolsheviks and their allies, workers interpreted the militant rhetoric used by the party and factory committees in the only language they could understand—the language of political action. If, as they were told,

the government was bad, then it should be overthrown. Many Bolshevik activists in the party's lower echelons who could not, or did not want to, understand the fine print of the Bolshevik program supported such militancy. As one researcher noted:

... it seems that the movement [at the beginning of July] was in part an outgrowth of months-long Bolshevik anti-government propaganda and agitation, that rank-and-file Bolsheviks from Petrograd factories and military regiments played a leading role in its organization, and that the leadership of the Military Organization [of the Bolshevik party] and part of the Petersburg Committee probably encouraged it against the wishes of Lenin and the Central Committee.²⁷

On July 3 and 4, armed workers and soldiers went out into the streets of Petrograd, demanding the transfer of power to the soviets. Due to the lack of leadership and a concrete program, the demonstrations quickly deteriorated into random shootings and riots. The Provisional Government brought out loyal troops and the movement was suppressed.²⁸

The literature on the 1917 revolution abounds in analyses of the events that occurred in Petrograd on July 3-4, and there is no need to discuss them here. It is worth mentioning, however, that although the party's objectives and the extent of the Bolshevik involvement in the July events is still a debatable issue, the available facts indicate that the Bolshevik leaders did not prepare these demonstrations, nor approve of them when they occurred. The Bolshevik leadership all along denied their complicity in any preparations for a takeover in July. In 1918 Zinov'ev said at a meeting of the Petrograd Soviet:

Our party was accused of organizing the conspiracy on July 3. . . . A year has passed since then; we live in different conditions. Now there is no need to conceal what happened. We state, as we stated a year ago: our party had no part in preparing that "conspiracy." It did its best to contain any action at that time.²⁹

In his memoirs, Iakov Sverdlov, another member of the Bolshevik CC, confirmed Zinov'ev's statement.³⁰ Alexander Rabinowitch, in his study of the July crisis, convincingly showed that the Bolshevik leaders were in fact against any militant actions at that time. Only after long and heated deliberations did the top echelon of the party assume the leadership in these demonstrations, doing its best to restrain the rebellious workers and soldiers. Rabinowitch also pointed out that even if the party had ambitious hopes concerning the demonstrations, it was indecisive, vacillating, and on the whole unprepared for a seizure of power.³¹ The party

as a whole and many of its prominent leaders, including Lenin, Zinov'ev, and Trotsky, called for "self-restraint, determination, and vigilance," and not the overthrow of the government.³²

The reason for this ambiguous policy during that critical period is clear enough. The party leadership did not want to unseat the government since the party still *did not have a majority in the soviets* at that time, and, therefore, had no plans for such an overthrow. However, a failure to join the demonstrations would undoubtedly undermine the party's credibility. The Bolshevik leaders tried to make the best of this difficult situation. They tried to restrain the demonstrations and turn them into a propaganda campaign, which would enhance their image and help them gain more votes in the soviets.

The factory committees essentially followed the Bolshevik perspective. Although numerous resolutions that they initiated were very radical in tone, they offered little practical direction for political action. They were not battle calls for overthrowing the government; rather, they were appeals to the soviets, controlled by the moderates, to take power and introduce workers' control. Such resolutions were passed, for example, by a workers' meeting at the Putilov plant (July 3), by the factory committee of the Baltiiskii plant (July 4), and by workers of the Sestroretskii plant.³³ Similar demands were advanced on July 3 by the Workers' Section of the Petrograd Soviet, which was dominated by Bolshevik supporters.³⁴

During the late afternoon of July 4, ninety delegates from fifty-four Petrograd enterprises gathered in the Taurida Palace to meet with the Soviet leaders. In their fiery speeches, they stressed the need for the introduction of workers' control and the transfer of power to the soviets.³⁵ Factory-committee leaders reiterated a similar call at a joint meeting of the Central Bureau of Trade Unions, the CCFC, and trade union boards held on July 6-7 to discuss the crisis. The meeting unanimously adopted a resolution proposed by N. A. Skrypnik, a Bolshevik leader of the factory committee movement. The resolution appealed to "the workers' and peasants' democracy [that is, the soviets] . . . [to] lead the revolution to a victorious conclusion."³⁶

There seemed to be something pathetic about these appeals to the moderate socialist leaders of the Soviet to fulfill what was essentially the Bolshevik program. Only naïve people could have expected the Mensheviks and SRs to do that. And the Bolsheviks were anything but naïve. They should have understood that if they wanted to remove the government, they should start and lead the uprising. The confusion of

the July Days was a direct result of the ambiguous political course adopted by the party in April. As the Bolshevik moderate Lev Kamenev had predicted earlier at the April conference, this course proved to be fraught with serious dangers and led the party to a disaster.³⁷ The July events surpassed Kamenev's worst predictions.

If the Bolsheviks and their supporters succeeded in turning the July demonstrations into their propaganda campaign, it was a costly one to be sure. Militant activities provoked by the Bolshevik rhetoric infuriated the moderates and conservatives. They held the party responsible for disorders and casualties in connection with the July events. At the same time, the Bolsheviks' unwillingness to act vigorously in pursuit of their proclaimed political objective—the transfer of power to the soviets—disoriented many workers, soldiers, and sailors who took part in the demonstrations; their faith in the party was shaken. They could no longer understand what the party actually wanted.

As a result of this confusion and frustration, the support for the Bolshevik party rapidly declined, even among workers. Workers' meetings held in the wake of the July events frequently adopted anti-Bolshevik resolutions (e.g., a meeting at the Nevskii shipbuilding plant on July 5); sometimes Bolshevik speakers were even beaten and badgered (for example, at the Obukhovskii plant).³⁸

This decline in the party's appeal left it absolutely defenseless in the face of a rising tide of reaction and anti-Bolshevik sentiment. The conservatives used the senseless tragedy that had unfolded in the streets of Petrograd during the July Days and revived the charges that implicated the Bolsheviks in the "German conspiracy." While July events were still unfolding in the streets of Petrograd, the Ministry of Justice released documents that supposedly proved that Lenin and his associates were German agents. Several days later, two journalists for a small newspaper, *Zhivoe slovo* (*The Living Word*), made allegations that implicated several Bolsheviks, including Lenin, in a spy network that stretched all the way to the German General Staff. The accusers charged that large sums of money received from the German General Staff had supposedly financed the Bolshevik party and press.³⁹ Although these allegations were based on less than reliable information, many Bolshevik leaders were arrested and persecuted; a number of them, including Lenin, had to go into hiding in fear for their lives. Bolshevik papers, among them *Pravda*, were shut down and had to change their names constantly in order to continue publication.

Had it not been for the moderate socialists (including, among others,

Kerensky), who, on the whole, remained loyal to their democratic commitments and did not side with the rising reaction, the Bolshevik party could have been wiped out. According to Miliukov, on July 7 Minister of Justice Kerensky revoked the order to arrest Trotsky and Iu. Steklov, a member of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet. Three days later Kerensky officially deprived the authorities of the Petrograd Military District of the right to arrest Bolsheviks; and the next day he ordered General Polovtsev, the commander of the Petrograd Military District, to stop disarming the Bolsheviks.⁴⁰ Trotsky also acknowledged that many moderate Soviet leaders stood up in support of the Bolsheviks against the accusations. On July 10, the Moscow Soviet passed a resolution directing the publication of a manifesto "in which it shall be declared that the accusations of espionage against the Bolshevik faction is a slander and a plot of the counterrevolution."⁴¹ Despite his many differences with the Bolsheviks, I. Tsereteli, a Menshevik and a member of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet, opposed strict measures proposed by Kornilov for restoring order in Russia. At the Moscow State Conference in August of 1917 he said: "If this is the price we have to pay for a return to peace and order, it would be the peace of the cemetery and would mean the loss of all Russia."⁴² The moderate socialists helped to save the Bolshevik party from total destruction.

The decline of Bolshevik influence in the wake of the July crisis was short-lived. Only a few weeks after this debacle, the Bolsheviks made a spectacular comeback. In no small degree, this reversal was due to the efforts by the factory committees.

THE FACTORY COMMITTEES AND THE BOLSHEVIK POLITICAL COMEBACK

The post-February political order survived the July ordeal. However, the stability that the regime temporarily enjoyed in the wake of the crisis was very precarious: the causes which moved the demonstrators to voice their discontent were not addressed and the situation in the country continued to deteriorate. Not only did the Provisional Government find solutions to old economic problems, it created new ones.

In response to the continued economic deterioration factories began to pare their labor force and even to close some enterprises. Even an incomplete list of enterprises closed in July and August, provided by the newspaper *Torgovo-promyshlennaia gazeta*, was very extensive. In Petrograd alone forty-three enterprises closed during that period; among them were the Promet plant (4,000 workers), the Semenov plant (1,000),

and the Zhelezoprokatnyi plant (1,800). On August 5, the government-appointed management of the Putilov plant announced a substantial reduction in the plant's labor force.⁴³ The newspaper *Novaia zhizn'* reported the closure of a number of big enterprises in Moscow, including such giants as the Bogorodsko-Glukhovskaia factory (11,400 workers), the Pokrovskaia factory (5,500), the Tsindel' factory (2,000), and the Dinamo plant (3,000).⁴⁴

These deteriorating economic conditions and particularly the closure of enterprises created an opportunity for the Bolsheviks and helped them to regain popularity among workers. Their alliance with the factory committees and support for workers' control was a key to their success. Antagonized by the government's continued unwillingness to give them a role in managing enterprises, factory committees pointed to layoffs and closures to argue the need for their participation in management. They insisted that instead of closing enterprises and dismissing workers, production should be continued under their supervision. Moreover, in disregard of the existing legislation, factory committees began to introduce such supervision through "direct action" (*iavochnym poriadkom*). Resolutions to this effect were adopted by factory committees throughout the country.⁴⁵

When enterprises lacked finances or supplies to continue operation, factory committees appealed to each other for help. Events at the G. G. Brenner machine-building plant in Petrograd provide a good example of how factory committees cooperated under these difficult conditions. By July 10, the plant's factory committee established its supervision over the management. When the latter announced that there was no money in the plant's bank account, the committee asked the factory committee of the Putilov plant to help provide the necessary resources.⁴⁶ Soon thereafter the committee received the necessary funds and raw materials from the Putilov and the Treugol'nik plants.⁴⁷ Such efforts proved to workers who faced the prospect of losing their job the effectiveness of workers' control.

Since the factory committees' interventions in management were not sanctioned by the government or approved by the Soviet, entrepreneurs and management, who were opposed to workers' control to begin with, resisted these attempts. As early as July 12, for example, the management of a joint-stock leather company protested factory committees' interference in the hiring and dismissal of workers, the supply of raw materials, and the distribution of finished products between the company's enterprises.⁴⁸ Demands to put an end to factory committees' interventions were voiced by the directorate of the Bogoslovskii mining

region enterprises (July 25-26), the management of the joint-stock company of the Mitavskii metal-working industry enterprises (August 10),⁴⁹ and the directorate of the Apalachevskii mining plants (August 18).⁵⁰

Major organizations of Russian industrialists supported the demands of the management to curtail the activities of factory committees. On July 21, for example, the Department of Metal-Working Industry of Factory and Plant Owners' Society for the Moscow industrial region issued a circular, recommending that its members should stop paying wages to factory committee members for the time they were engaged in the committee work.⁵¹ The influential Petrograd branch of the society put forward a similar demand on July 29.

For some time, the Provisional Government, which after the July Days was controlled by a moderate socialist majority,⁵² refrained from taking active steps against factory committees' intervention in management. It tried to make some concessions to them, without giving in to their principal demand for participation in management. Leaders of the factory committee movement were invited, for example, to send their representatives to the Central Control Commission under the Central Committee for the Reestablishment and Maintenance of Normal Operation of Industrial Enterprises; the Industrial Conference (*zavodskoe soveshchanie*), a branch of the Defense Conference; district supply commissions; and district commissions for the distribution of metal.⁵³

However, these initiatives failed. The factory committees refused to participate in the above agencies and to recognize their authority under the pretext that they did not have a two-thirds majority of representatives from the soviets, trade unions, and factory committees, as demanded in the resolution of the First Conference of the Petrograd Factory Committees.⁵⁴ The real reason, however, was obviously the government's continued unwillingness to accommodate the factory committees' demand for participation in management. Factory committees also scoffed at the government's invitations to take part in reconciliation boards—organizations set up by the government for mediating conflicts between management and workers.

Having failed in its attempts to placate the factory committees, the government began to take steps toward the curtailment of their activities. On August 2, Prime Minister Kerensky ordered the Military Administration to enforce the decree of April 23 at its enterprises. The management tried to implement the government orders. On August 17, for example, the manager of the Okhtenskii gunpowder plant demanded that the plant's factory committee should "give up attempts to intervene

into the technical, economic, and administrative spheres of the plant's operation, which according to the law, is the domain of the management."⁵⁵ However, this and other attempts to restrain factory committees failed miserably. As one Soviet scholar aptly pointed out, such orders were suspended in midair: the management had no means of enforcing them.⁵⁶

The continued opposition of the government and business community to workers' control sustained the factory committees' hostility toward the current political order; it strengthened their conviction that the only way to legitimize their participation in production was to overthrow the Provisional Government and the political order it embodied. This simple logic of survival prompted the factory committees to resume their agitation against the government very shortly after the July debacle. They continued to advance the Bolshevik cause by explaining to workers the connection between their deteriorating conditions, the need for establishing workers' control, and the transfer of power to the soviets.

Their agitation fell on fertile ground. Enterprise closures and the reduction of the labor force were extremely unpopular among workers. The failure to bring peace and stability added to workers' frustration with the government. As a result, many workers responded favorably to the efforts by the factory committees to revitalize radicalism among workers. Thus factory committees strengthened in the minds of many workers a vital link between their grievances and larger political issues, between the desire to improve their economic situation and the overthrow of the government. Demands for the introduction of workers' control and the transfer of power to the soviets resurfaced in the resolutions of workers' meetings. Such demands were put forward by the workers of sixteen enterprises in Tsaritsyn (July 12), a workers' meeting at the Ivanovo-Voznesensk textile factory (July 14), a conference of factory committees in Ekaterinodar (July 21), and the Putilov workers (July 22).⁵⁷

With the growing support for the slogan "all power to the soviets," the Bolshevik comeback was soon to follow. A special resolution to stop the persecution of the Bolshevik party was adopted by a conference of Moscow factory committees held on July 23-28.⁵⁸ The Putilov workers included a similar demand (along with the demands for peace, land, and workers' control) in their resolution of July 22.⁵⁹ Special resolutions to this effect were also adopted by a meeting of trade unions' and factory committees' representatives in Minsk (July 25), workers of the N. K. Geisler and Co. plant in Petrograd (July 24), and workers of the tube-rolling mills in Ekaterinoslav (July 26).⁶⁰ In a little less than a month, the

attitude toward the Bolsheviks drastically changed, even at the enterprises where following the July Days attitudes toward the Bolsheviks had been hostile. A good example of such change was the Obukhovskii and the Nevskii plants in Petrograd. Not only had the workers at these plants adopted anti-Bolshevik resolutions in the wake of July events, but Bolshevik speakers who had tried to address the workers had even been badgered and beaten. At the end of July, the Nevskii plant workers adopted resolutions demanding that the persecution of the Bolshevik party be stopped immediately; and the Obukhovskii plant workers greeted Bolshevik speakers—Georgii Ordzhonikidze and Vladimir Volodarskii—with stormy applause.⁶¹

Efforts of factory committees in rallying workers around the Bolshevik cause led to an increased incidence of Bolshevik victories in various elections held at the end of July and the beginning of August. For example, at the end of July workers of the Franko-Russkii plant elected twenty-one Bolsheviks to the Petrograd and district soviets. The Bolsheviks won a victory in the elections to the Sestroretskii district soviet. The Bolshevik S. S. Zorin, a worker of the Sestroretskii plant, became the chairman of this soviet. In August the workers of the Patronnyi plant sent a Bolshevik delegate and seven Bolshevik candidate delegates to the Petrograd Soviet.⁶² By the beginning of August, eighteen out of a total thirty-one Putilov delegates to the Petergofskii district soviet were Bolsheviks (only nine were Mensheviks and SRs, and four were not affiliated with any party).⁶³ Numerous workers' meetings began to demand the reelection of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet—a critical step in changing the political orientation of the Soviet. Such a demand was put forward by workers of the Russko-Baltiiskii motor plant (August 11), the Putilov turbine shop (August 12), and the Voenno-Podkovnyi plant.⁶⁴

Summarizing the change in attitudes toward the Bolshevik party among workers, the newspaper *Novaia zhizn'* observed in its August 3 issue:

Many [people] hoped that during the past several weeks after the July 3-5 events there would be a drastic change in workers' attitude [toward political parties]. The change has occurred, but in whose favor?

. . . The last elections of delegates to the medical insurance fund of the Novyi and Saryi Lessner plants gave the following results: out of one hundred elected representatives, fifteen are SRs, five Mensheviks, and eighty Bolsheviks. Until these elections the Bolsheviks had less than half of the delegates. At the Erikson plant, out of sixty representatives [elected by the plant

workers] seven are Mensheviks, fourteen SRs, and thirty-eight Bolsheviks.

At the Treugol'nik plant out of one hundred representatives sixty to seventy are Bolsheviks; earlier the SRs dominated there.

Re-elections to the soviets give similar results.⁶⁵

Efforts by the factory committees helped the Bolsheviks improve their standing in municipal organizations. Factory committees urged workers to nominate Bolshevik candidates for the elections to the city dumas held in August. For example, a meeting of eight thousand Putilov workers, held on August 16, adopted a resolution calling on Petrograd workers to vote for the Bolshevik slate in the upcoming elections to the Petrograd Duma.⁶⁶ The elections marked a resounding victory for the Bolsheviks. As a reflection of their rising popularity, 33.5 percent of the electorate, many of whom were workers, voted for the Bolsheviks as compared to 19.4 percent in the elections held in May. In the six workers' districts—Vasil'evskii Island, Petrogradskii, Nevskii, Narvskii, Vyborgskii, and Petergofskii—the percentage was as high as 41.6.⁶⁷

THE SECOND FACTORY COMMITTEE CONFERENCE

At the end of July the leadership of the factory committee movement decided to convene the Second Conference of the Petrograd Factory Committees. One important reason for convening the conference was to clarify the political course of the movement in the wake of the July crisis. Such clarification was particularly necessary in view of the disarray in the Bolshevik ranks that resulted from the July debacle.

Despite its disastrous effects on the party's political fortune, Lenin did not relinquish his drive for exclusive political rule of his party. On the contrary, he reasserted his commitment to this objective. Despite the continued popularity of the slogan "power to the soviets," Lenin, contrary to common sense, called on the Bolshevik party to abandon this slogan and to launch the struggle against the "counterrevolutionary and treacherous Soviets." He also urged the party to seize power through an armed uprising.⁶⁸

Lenin's calls for an uprising were a sign of desperation. It is hard to see a concrete program of political action in them. They did not answer what Lenin himself called the fundamental question of any revolution: who should get the power? Lenin desperately searched for an answer to this question. In private, he even entertained the idea that the Bolsheviks should seize power in the name of the factory committees,⁶⁹ which showed the extent of his despair. Despite their popularity among

workers, factory committees' base among the Russian population at large was very narrow. Attempts to transfer power to them would not be supported by a majority of the Russian population and would inevitably be doomed to failure.

The political logic and the party's contemporary experience militated against Lenin's position. The popularity of the soviets by far exceeded that of any other mass organization, including the factory committees. Given this popularity, the abandoning of support for the soviets would have been suicidal for the party, and the Bolsheviks decided against taking this course. The political line adopted at the Sixth Congress of the Bolshevik party, held on July 26-August 3, did not reflect Lenin's insistence on an armed uprising; it directed the party to defend "all mass organizations, . . . and first and foremost the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies" and to gain influence in these organizations.⁷⁰ The conflicting directives coming from the party leadership were one reason for convening the new factory committee conference. The movement had to clarify its own political course.

Another reason for convening the factory committee conference was to formulate their responses to the government's economic policies. As has been mentioned earlier, the economic decline continued throughout July. In response to this decline, employers and the government began to close enterprises and reduce the labor force. In addition, there were widely circulated rumors, which later proved to be correct, that the government intended to evacuate enterprises from Petrograd to the provinces—a move that would have serious political consequences since it would deplete the working class in the capital and thus reduce the pressure on the government. The factory committee movement had to find proper responses to these developments.

The Second Conference of the Petrograd Factory Committees took place on August 7-12. Over three hundred delegates from 249 factory committees attended the conference. They represented 387,600 workers employed in Petrograd and its vicinities.⁷¹ As one could expect, the political and economic policies of the factory committee movement was the major concern of the delegates.

Bolsheviks and their supporters dominated the conference. Even before the conference started, the CCFC sent to the Bolshevik CC a letter expressing its full support of the Bolshevik program.⁷² The Bolshevik CC delegated Vladimir Miliutin, the main spokesperson on the economic policy at the Sixth Congress of the Bolshevik Party, to deliver a keynote address on the economic situation and workers' control at the

conference and to direct its entire work.⁷³ However, this overwhelming dominance by the Bolsheviks did not rid the conference of bitter political strife; only this time the struggle developed between the moderates and the radicals within the Bolshevik camp.

The radicals described the contemporary situation as a "state of war between the workers and the bourgeoisie." They accused the capitalists and management of intentionally sabotaging the economy in order to preserve their profits and control over enterprises. Their fiery rhetoric called upon workers to launch an attack against the bourgeoisie and its hirelings. The principal objective of this attack should be, the radicals emphasized, the establishment of the rule of the proletariat supported by the poorest peasantry and the introduction of the "true workers' control." A careful reading of speeches by the radicals reveals that they saw the factory committees as spearheading the struggle against the current political and economic order. They generally downplayed the role of such major mass organizations as the soviets or the trade unions. For example, Pavel Amosov, a member of the CCFC, stated in his speech that the CCFC supported by factory committees should take upon itself the task of leading the struggle against the existing order.⁷⁴

In contrast to the radicals, the moderate Bolsheviks tended to see objective conditions (the inadequate development of the country's productive forces, the lack of fuel, raw materials, and metal, to name just a few), rather than the evil intent of the government and the bourgeoisie, as the main source of the current economic decline. A radical Bolshevik, K. N. Samoilova, noted this difference in her criticism of the speech by a moderate Bolshevik, Iurii Larin. She said that Larin had "insufficiently stressed the conscious disorganization of industry when industrialists consciously disrupt the production."⁷⁵

Like the radicals, the moderate Bolsheviks also called upon the workers of Russia to take the initiative in resolving the political and economic crisis faced by the country. They also emphasized the need to stop the war and to introduce workers' control.⁷⁶ However, in contrast to the radicals, the moderates did not see the factory committees as the organizations that should take the leadership in accomplishing these tasks, and they certainly rejected any notion that the factory committee movement should take, if only nominally, state power. As one moderate Bolshevik, Lozovskii, put it, the role of the factory committees in resolving the country's problems "will not be an exclusive or even a leading one."⁷⁷ Even in the area of workers' control, the moderate Bolsheviks saw the role of factory committees as being subordinate to that of the soviets and

the trade unions.⁷⁸ The words of the Bolshevik Riazanov succinctly, even if somewhat starkly, summarized the moderate position on this issue: "Factory committees . . . should not get in the way [*putat'sia v nogakh*] of political parties and trade unions."⁷⁹ Conspicuously, speeches by the moderates did not contain ritualistic calls for attacks against the bourgeoisie.

The conference largely went along with the moderates. By an overwhelming majority of 198 votes, with thirteen votes against and eighteen abstentions, it adopted the resolution "On the Current Situation and Workers' Control," which was drafted by the moderate Bolshevik Miliutin.⁸⁰ In assessing the causes of the current economic crisis, the resolution emphasized objective conditions—"the discrepancy between the level of productive forces and the demands imposed by the imperialist war"—rather than the willful sabotage of the capitalists alone, as the radicals would have it. The moderates considered that the sabotage merely exacerbated the situation produced by objective causes. As a way of improving the economic situation, the resolution proposed a gradual introduction of centralized economic regulation and the nationalization of enterprises in a number of industries—a policy that did not significantly differ from that advocated by the Provisional Government. The introduction of the "true workers' control" would be the first step in that direction. According to the resolution, the implementation of this control should be the responsibility of state agencies for economic regulation. The resolution pointed out that representatives from the soviets, trade unions, and factory committees (in that order)—rather than just the factory committees as the radicals demanded—should constitute a majority in agencies for economic regulation; it indicated that these agencies should also include "representatives of educated technical personnel." Clearly, the "true workers' control," as described in the resolution, implied a much more balanced representation in regulatory agencies than that proposed by the radicals.

It would be wrong, however, to interpret that resolution as a statement of support for the Provisional Government. The resolution insisted on "the transfer of power into the hands of the proletariat and the poorest peasantry" as a necessary condition for enhancing the country's productive forces, and urged the factory committees to help develop local initiative in that direction. There could be no doubt, however, that moderate Bolsheviks interpreted this formula differently than did Lenin; in their understanding, it meant the transfer of power to the soviets, while for Lenin, as has been noted earlier, it meant the establishment of the Bolshevik political monopoly. At the time when Lenin insisted on

abandoning the slogan "power to the soviets," the resolution stated its unambiguous support for the soviets, which were to provide leadership in implementing the policies outlined in the resolution.⁸¹

Among other important documents adopted by the conference was the "Factory Committee Statute." It defined the functions and composition of factory committees, outlined their relationship with other workers' organizations, and established the procedure for electing their members. In this statute, just as in the resolution discussed earlier, one could see the influence of the moderate Bolsheviks. According to the statute, the factory committees could not assume an independent role either in politics or in defending workers' economic rights. The statute stressed that in political policies, factory committees should be guided by decisions of the soviets ("political organizations of the working class"); insofar as the improvement of workers' welfare was concerned, the factory committees were to be guided by decisions of the trade unions.

The tasks of the factory committees lay entirely in the sphere of organizing production. According to the statute, they were responsible for organizing and supervising production at the enterprise level. For that purpose, individual factory committees should provide internal regulations concerning working hours, wages, the policy for hiring and dismissing personnel, vacations, et cetera; it should also enforce safety regulations, improve workers' welfare (organization of schools, nurseries, libraries, et cetera), and last, but not least, determine the composition of the enterprise management. The factory committee had the right to dismiss managers who could not maintain good relations with workers; administrative personnel should be hired only with the consent of the factory committee.⁸²

These functions would undoubtedly violate the provisions of the decree of April 23. The authors of the statute were aware of its revolutionary nature. They noted that the statute had not been approved by the government and advised factory committees to carry out the statute's provisions "on the basis of ordinary revolutionary right, upon which rests the very existence of the factory committees."⁸³

The Second Conference demonstrated once again strong ties between the factory committees and the Bolshevik party. It would be wrong, however, to assume that the factory committees blindly followed the party's lead and that those who controlled the party also controlled the factory committee movement. The conference, in fact, showed that the relationship between the party and the factory committees was essentially political in nature: the factory committees accepted only those policies

proposed by the party leadership that served their own interests. One example that illustrates this point was the position adopted by the conference on the relationship between the factory committees and the trade unions. The Bolshevik moderates—who at that time controlled the party and, as we have seen earlier, dominated the conference on major policy issues—advocated a subordination, in one form or another, of the factory committees to the unions, which certainly ran counter to the interests of the factory committees.

In the “Factory Committee Statute” they tried to circumvent the controversy by including the clause about a possible subordination of factory committees to trade unions in some distant future. The conference rejected the moderates’ position on the relationship between the factory committees and trade unions. In its resolution, it confirmed the decision, adopted earlier in June at the First Factory Committee Conference, which emphasized an independent role of the factory committees in the sphere of economic management and supported their autonomy from the trade unions.⁸⁴

The generally less radical tenor of this conference in comparison to the First Conference was deceptive. On the surface, its condemnation of the rule by the Provisional Government was less vehement than at the First Conference, only because the rift between the factory committee movement and the government was very deep; its antigovernment attitudes were so profound that they did not have to be reiterated in every document adopted by the conference. The conference’s resolutions oriented the movement toward an uncompromising struggle against the Provisional Government. In the words of some participants, the factory committees “assumed a battle formation” for an impending clash with the government and only waited for an appropriate moment to begin their assault.⁸⁵

THE FACTORY COMMITTEES ON THE OFFENSIVE

As a result of the deterioration of the economic and political situation in Russia, the position of the Provisional Government continued to erode throughout July and August. Numerous resolutions condemning it and demanding the transfer of power to the soviets testified to the declining authority of the government.⁸⁶ With the gradual departure of the Kadet ministers from the government, it became increasingly isolated from both the left and the right. The resulting insecurity prompted the government to reassert its authority; it had to convince itself, and others,

that it was still in charge. Industry was one sphere where the government particularly wanted to strengthen its control. It had to discipline the factory committees and make them obey the law. At the end of August the government attempted a decisive move against them.

The move was preceded by political maneuvering that aimed at weakening the radicals in the capital, including the radicals in the factory committee movement. One step in that direction was the government's decisions to evacuate some Petrograd enterprises to the provinces. In a decree to this effect and a supplement to it, promulgated on August 8 and August 25 respectively, the government explained the necessity of that step by growing supply problems in the capital. The decree directed the minister of internal affairs to move some enterprises from Petrograd to the provinces, where food and raw materials were more easily obtained. However, the supply problem was not the only reason for evacuating enterprises. The government also wanted to use this opportunity to remove its radical opponents. The decree indicated that the minister should use the relocation of enterprises for removing "individuals who present a counterrevolutionary danger" from the capital.⁸⁷ Anyone opposed to the government could fall under this vague definition. According to available sources, the introduction to the draft of this decree (which was not included in the official, published version) stated that the real reason for the evacuation was to get rid of "the elements who create danger of repeating the July 3-5 events." When the draft was discussed at the Judiciary Conference, it was decided to indicate as the reason for the evacuation only supply problems and "to make no mention of the danger from dark elements."⁸⁸

Factory committees watched these maneuvers with apprehension. Quite justifiably, they viewed them as hostile attempts designed to weaken their position by reducing the number of workers in the capital; it was no surprise, therefore, that they decided to resist these moves by the government. On August 9, for example, the factory committee of the Vulkan plant in Petrograd adopted a resolution urging workers to obstruct the government's efforts to evacuate industrial enterprises from "revolutionary centers" and the dismissal of workers. The resolution accused the government of trying to "pulverize revolutionary forces."⁸⁹

The opposition of the factory committees to the relocation of industrial enterprises undermined the authority of the government and threatened to destabilize further the economic situation. In response to this opposition, the government decided to discipline the factory committees and to restrict their self-styled prerogatives which, in the government's

view, contradicted the existing legislation, and more specifically the Decree of April 23. It chose to apply its disciplinary action to terminate factory committees' control over the policy of hiring and dismissing workers and to prevent the committees from holding meetings during and after work hours on enterprise premises.

Both prerogatives were very important to factory committees. Employers and the management resisted their implementation. Tensions between them and factory committees over these issues had been rising for some time and threatened to turn into an open conflict. These tensions particularly heightened after the Second Conference of the Petrograd Factory Committees. Increased interventions by factory committees, spurred by layoffs and closures of enterprises as well as the directives approved by the conference, evoked harsh responses from owners and management. On August 21, for example, the Commission of Internal Regulations of the Petrograd Society of Factory and Plant Owners refused to recognize the "Factory Committee Statute" adopted by the Second Factory Committee Conference.⁹⁰ An all-Russian conference of entrepreneurs' organizations, held in August, also demanded that directives be issued to end factory committees' intervention in production.⁹¹

Complementary to the decree of April 23 and in support of the employers' position, the ministry of labor promulgated on August 22 and 28 two ill-fated documents that became known as the "Skobelev circulars"—after the name of the Menshevik minister of labor, M. I. Skobelev, who signed them. The circular of August 22 dealt with factory committees' interventions in the policy of hiring and dismissing workers. This document reaffirmed the management's complete control in this area. It stated that managers could dismiss any worker except members of the factory committee; the latter could be dismissed only by a reconciliation board or a court of arbitration. The circular prohibited the dismissal of management personnel by workers or their organizations and a violation of the circular's provisions was to be treated as a criminal offense.⁹²

The circular of August 28 prohibited factory committees from assembling during work hours. It said that workers should hold their meetings exclusively on their own free time. This provision applied to general meetings of workers and employees (which certainly could interrupt the work at an enterprise) and also to meetings of factory committees, which usually involved few people and could hardly disrupt production. In cases of violation of the circular's provisions, the government authorized the management to fine workers in the amount commensurate with the loss of work time. The document also stipulated that workers' meetings

could take place on the premises of an enterprise during and after work hours only with the consent of the management.⁹³

When the government promulgated the circulars, employers came out strongly in support of the government's effort to enforce the law. In their resolutions passed during that period, they refused to recognize regulations issued by factory committees; they also claimed that the right to hire and dismiss personnel was a special prerogative of the management, not the factory committees; finally, they frequently insisted that the law did not require them to pay factory committee members for their work on the committee. The August 23 circular issued by the directorate of the Amalgamated Union of Industrialists—an organization of textile producers, formed in the spring of 1917—illustrates the position of employers' organizations:

Undoubtedly, the law does not give factory committees any right to control the hiring and dismissal of workers and employees.

The entrepreneur is not obliged to make special allocations to the committee as a whole, or to its presidium [factory committee].

The worker committees should not convene during work hours.⁹⁴

The conference of employers in Odessa, held on August 29, also recommended that employers in that area should enforce their own regulations and ignore the statute of the factory committees.⁹⁵

Simultaneously with the effort to discipline the factory committees, the government and employers tried to disarm the Red Guards, workers' paramilitary units that were often organized with the help of factory committees and that served for the protection of the latter. Orders issued by the Provisional Government and the Petrograd military authorities empowered entrepreneurs and management to disband these detachments and to capture their military caches. The problem with these orders was that entrepreneurs and management had absolutely no means of enforcing them, and their typical response was similar to that of factory and plant owners in the Vyborgskii district, who simply informed the government that the disarming of workers was a responsibility of "military authorities who issue such orders, and not of the management."⁹⁶

Attempts by the government and employers to foil the factory committees' intervention in management occurred at a very bad time for the government. In view of the government's progressive paralysis, many right-wing politicians began to entertain the idea of establishing a military dictatorship as a way of restoring order and stability in the country. They increasingly viewed General Lavr Kornilov, commander-in-chief of

the Russian army, as the one individual who could effect this change. Emboldened by numerous declarations of support by right-wing politicians and overtures from the government, on August 24 and 25 General Kornilov issued orders to the units of the Third Cavalry Corps and the so-called Savage Division (recruited from the mountain tribes in the Caucasus) to march on the capital and place it under martial law.

As the troops advanced on Petrograd, Prime Minister Kerensky, who had earlier been in contact with General Kornilov regarding the possibility of using the military for ending unrest and reestablishing order, grew increasingly apprehensive of Kornilov's intentions with regard to the Provisional Government and Russia's floundering democracy. He dismissed Kornilov and gave orders to organize the defense of the capital. The Petrograd Soviet supported the government and issued appeals to the population to defend the capital. The appeals struck a responsive cord among workers and soldiers of Petrograd who rallied against the Kornilov coup. As a result of this support, the coup was eventually foiled and its leaders apprehended.⁹⁷

The coup had a profound impact on the course of the revolution. It demonstrated how fragile the rule of the Provisional Government was; it further destabilized the political situation and diverted the government's efforts from resolving other urgent tasks. Last but not least, in order to rout the coup, the government had to turn for support to, and arm, the very forces it tried to restrain—the left-wing opponents of the post-February political order. This circumstance tremendously strengthened the government's adversaries on the left, including the factory committees.

Factory committees actively participated in foiling the attempted coup by Kornilov. The CCFC was among the signatories of the appeal issued by the Bolshevik CC on August 27 that called upon all Petrograd workers and soldiers to join forces in the struggle against counterrevolution. The appeal noted that the Provisional Government was very unstable and "disintegrated at the first move by the Kornilov counterrevolution," and demanded the creation of a new power. In part, it said:

The salvation of the nation, the salvation of the revolution, lies in the revolutionary energy of the masses of proletarians and soldiers. We can trust only our own strengths, our own discipline, our own organization. In the resolute struggle for the salvation of the revolution and its gains, we will follow the power which will take entirely upon itself, without any conditions and selflessly, the realization of the demands of the masses of proletarians, soldiers, and peasants. Only such power will prevent the assault of counterrevolution and will save the revolution despite the spinelessness, vacillations, and hesitations of the wavering part of the democracy.⁹⁸

On August 29, the CCFC organized a meeting of representatives from major Petrograd enterprises. The agenda of the meeting included such questions as the organization of Petrograd's defense and the arming of workers.⁹⁹ On September 1, the CCFC published an appeal to Petrograd workers urging them to organize for the defense of the capital and to provide security for their enterprises.¹⁰⁰

Following the lead of their central organization, factory committees began to rally workers for the defense of the capital. Numerous plants and factories adopted resolutions condemning Kornilov's attempted coup. They blamed the government and its supporters for the policies that led to the current crisis and demanded decisive steps in organizing a rebuff to counterrevolutionary attempts and fulfilling the revolution's objectives—peace, land, and workers' control. A call to arm workers also became quite common at that time.¹⁰¹ Many resolutions stipulated that factory committees should be in charge of arming workers and organizing Red Guard detachments.

The campaign by the factory committees was a successful one. S. G. Uralov, a Bolshevik leader in the factory-committee movement, wrote in his memoirs that six hours after the issuance of the August 27 Bolshevik appeal the factory committees mobilized thousands of workers.¹⁰² During the entire Kornilov episode, the factory committee of the Putilov plant alone organized and armed ten detachments, a total of eight thousand workers.¹⁰³ Red Guard detachments were organized practically at all major Petrograd enterprises. According to Soviet historian Kovalenko, the total number of workers recruited to the Petrograd Red Guards during that period exceeded twenty-five thousand; many of them were recruited with the help of factory committees.¹⁰⁴

The two episodes—the attempt to discipline the factory committees and Kornilov's attempted coup—had no connection whatsoever. Kornilov's actions threatened as much the government as it did the labor organizations. Yet as soon as the news of Kornilov's march reached the capital, the factory committees, infused by the government's recent attacks, drew a connection between the two developments and accused the government of collusion with counterrevolutionaries. For example, during the Kornilov crisis the factory committee of the Langezippen and Co. machine-building plant adopted a resolution that contained the following passage:

Taking into account [the fact] that Skobelev's senatorial explanation [circulars] was issued during the Kornilov march, we should point out that the ministry

of "labor defense" has turned, in fact, into the ministry for defending the interests of capital, and acts hand in hand with the Riabushinskiis to create famine in the country, so that its "bony hand" could strangle the Russian revolution.¹⁰⁵

The September 14 meeting of workers and employees at the United Cable Plants condemned the government's attempts to evacuate major industrial enterprises from the capital and demanded the establishment of workers' control and the transfer of power to the soviets. Only these steps, the participants in the meeting stressed, "can make life normal."¹⁰⁶

Attempts to suppress the factory committees were the center of attention at the Third Conference of the Petrograd Factory Committees, which opened on September 10, shortly after the Kornilov episode. The conference on the whole had a much more radical tenor than the Second Conference, and reflected a further drift to the left, which had been occurring in the factory committee movement since the beginning of August. By focusing on "Skobelev's circulars" and attempts to relocate industrial enterprises from Petrograd, the conference clearly indicated what caused this shift. It unambiguously identified actions against the factory committees with counterrevolution and with Kornilov's attempted coup. For example, the resolutions "On the Attack Against Factory Committees and on the Policy of the Labor Ministry" and "On the Evacuation of Petrograd Industry" unequivocally stressed that in the current situation, characterized by the consolidation of counterrevolution and the impending economic collapse, "the attack against factory committees is an attack against the revolution." They further described attempts to discipline the factory committees as "a counterrevolutionary plot against the working class which helps military counterrevolutionary plots of propertied classes"—an obvious allusion to the Kornilov attempted coup.¹⁰⁷ They also demanded that the circulars of August 22 and 28 be rescinded and that the prerogatives of the factory committees, "which they enjoy now on the basis of ordinary revolutionary right," be legalized. Addressing more specifically the rulings of the circulars, the resolution "On the Attack Against the Factory Committees" stressed that factory committee members should be paid full wages for their work on the committee.¹⁰⁸

Just like the Second Conference, this conference also stressed the need for political change. This time, however, there was a much greater sense of urgency in the conference's calls for changing the political order. It emphasized that in order to resolve the country's difficulties, "counter-revolutionary elements" should be removed from state power.¹⁰⁹ It urged

the government to stop vacillating helplessly "between the two sides—the revolutionary side and the side of rebellious counterrevolution," as it had been doing during the Kornilov crisis, and to fulfill the demands for peace, land, and workers' control.¹¹⁰

The Kornilov coup helped in foiling the government's efforts directed against the factory committees. By identifying the policies of the government toward the factory committees with counterrevolution, the conference tried to put the government on the defensive and clearly succeeded in doing so. P. N. Kolokol'nikov, a deputy minister of labor who represented the government at the conference, did not even dare to speak about the limiting of factory committee interventions in management. Instead, he engaged in a rather lengthy and awkward explanation designed to prove that the circulars did not mean what they said. He told the conference that the circulars did not take from workers "the right [sic] of supervising management," nor did they supersede the existing agreements between managers and factory committees. The circulars, stated Kolokol'nikov, simply "do not impose new obligations on employers, and workers should win [sic] new rights for themselves."¹¹¹ The utterly unconvincing explanation and invitations to further encroachments by the committees on the management did not change the attitude of the delegates to the government; they only underscored the government's vulnerability and dramatized the need for political change.

The Kornilov episode also helped the factory committees in another very important way. It weakened the supporters and strengthened its opponents of the post-February political order in the soviets. In the wake of the attempted coup, a decisive shift in favor of the transfer of power to the soviets occurred in the Petrograd Soviet. On August 31, in the atmosphere of general agitation caused by Kornilov's march on the capital, the Petrograd Soviet for the first time adopted a resolution which was clearly Bolshevik in spirit. The resolution "On Power" included major demands in the Bolshevik political program. It denounced the policy of coalition with the Kadets and other bourgeois parties advocated by the Menshevik-SR bloc. It stressed that the irresponsible attitude of the Provisional Government could no longer be tolerated and called for creating a new center of power that would include "representatives of the revolutionary proletariat and peasantry." This new power should proclaim immediately a democratic republic in Russia, give land to peasants, introduce workers' control, and bring peace to Russia.¹¹² A similar resolution was adopted by the Moscow Soviet.

Thus the position of factory committees at the end of August significantly improved. For the first time since the beginning of the revolution

the opponents of the Provisional Government were in control of the two most influential soviets in the country. Their support for workers' control tremendously strengthened the factory committees. Moreover, the organization of Red Guards at plants and factories, which reached its peak during Kornilov's attempted coup, provided an additional protection for factory committees against any future encroachments.

In the weeks that followed the Kornilov incident, opponents of the government continued to strengthen their position in the soviets, and factory committees. They again raised the issue of reelections to the soviets at many industrial enterprises and helped Bolshevik candidates to win in these reelections.¹¹³ On September 22, the newspaper *Rabochii put'* informed its readers of the Bolshevik victory in the election to the Petrograd Soviet held at the Obukhovskii plant. With the help of the local committee, the Bolsheviks won the September 26 election at the Dinamo plant. The elections to the Petrograd and district soviets held in the Kolomenskii district on September 27 also brought victory to the Bolshevik party.¹¹⁴ Bolshevik organizations at major Petrograd enterprises grew tremendously in size. At the Putilov plant the number of Bolsheviks increased from 150 workers in March to nearly 4,000 in October.¹¹⁵

EVENTS IN THE INDUSTRIAL SOUTH

Petrograd and Moscow were not the only areas where factory committees helped to rally workers against the government. Their role in the provinces was equally important. Events that took place in the Industrial South during the summer and fall of 1917 demonstrate the important role played by the factory committees in molding workers' attitudes and shaping the course of the revolution.

The Russian Industrial South was located in the territory of the contemporary Ukraine. It included eight industrial districts—Khar'kov, Ekaterinoslav, Lugansk, Iuzov, Taganrog, Aleksandrovsk-Grushevsk, Rostov, and Krivoi Rog. Together, these districts comprised two major industrial regions in Russia, the Donets and Krivoi Rog basins. The political and economic importance of this area was enormous. Not only did it have the largest concentration of workers outside Petrograd and Moscow, but it was a major supplier of resources for these two industrial centers and, therefore, developments in that area had a profound effect on the two capitals and the rest of Russia.

Conflicts in the south began in June when, following the decisions of the First Congress of Soviets of the Krivoi Rog and Donets basins, which

took place from April 26 to May 5 in Khar'kov,¹¹⁶ workers at enterprises of that area submitted demands for higher wages to their employers.¹¹⁷ Due to its slow start at the beginning of the revolution, the trade union movement had little influence in that area. For example, as late as October, the delegates to the conference of the Donets-Krivoi Rog mining-industry workers, held in Khar'kov on October 2-5, testified to the weakness of the trade union movement in the Industrial South.¹¹⁸ The slow start of the trade union movement enabled the factory committees to grasp the initiative and lead workers in their efforts to improve their conditions. As a result, conflicts over wages in the Industrial South were probably more acute than in those areas where they were handled by the unions, which (at least until late summer) were not opposed to the government and usually conducted wage negotiations in an orderly and constructive manner. In fact, these conflicts resembled a veritable civil war more than wage disputes.

Infused by the continued opposition on the part of the state and employers to their participation in running enterprises, factory committees used wage disputes for inciting workers against the government and managers. From the very beginning the negotiations took a very unconstructive turn. Instead of trying to achieve a compromise with employers in an orderly manner, factory committees presented them with ultimatums and incited workers to exact concessions by force.

On June 24, the committees of the Berestovskaia mine and the Sulinskii metal plant (the Ekaterinoslav province), on behalf of workers employed at these enterprises, demanded a fifty percent wage increase. The management refused to meet this demand. Negotiations proceeded in a very unconstructive manner. Workers tried to intimidate the managing director of the mine, Deter, by threatening that they would put a sack over his head and beat him. Only after Deter promised that he would go to Khar'kov to inform the company officials about workers' demands, did the enraged mob let him go.¹¹⁹

Similar incidents occurred at other enterprises in the area. The June 28 issue of the newspaper *Torgovo-promyshlennaia gazeta* reported arrests of managers by the mob that took place at the Brothers Iakovenko and the Pervozvanskii company mines. The factory committees used force to remove the management at the Rykovskii and the Bogodukhovskii mines. Violence raged on a broad scale throughout the Makeevskii, Iuzovskii, and Mushkerovskii districts. In some instances (for example, at the Franco-Russian company mine) workers managed to force the administration to accept wage increases.¹²⁰ According to the

report of the Khar'kov Regional Union of Factories and Plants, dated August 15, the situation in Khar'kov was also very serious. Threats and the actual use of force against the management occurred at numerous enterprises in the area.¹²¹

Attempts to resolve peacefully the issue of wage increases were rare, and when they did take place they usually ended unsuccessfully due to the atmosphere of intolerance in which negotiations generally proceeded.¹²² In response to the pressure from factory committees and agitated workers, employers threatened to close enterprises. Such threats were issued by the Union of Donbass Mining Enterprises (June 28), the directorate of the Taganrog metal company (July 20), and the directorates of the Gilferikh Sade agricultural machinery plant in Khar'kov (August) and the Khar'kov locomotive plant (August).¹²³ These announcements resulted in even greater violence and chaos. According to the August 15 telegram of the Khar'kov Regional Union of Factories and Plants, threats and the use of force against the management continued unabated. In response to violence, owners began to close enterprises.¹²⁴ The July 26 issue of *Torgovo-promyshlennaia gazeta* reported the closure of 154 coal and anthracite mines in the area. By the beginning of September, almost 200 mines in the Donets basin were closed and nearly one hundred thousand workers were out of work.¹²⁵

A chain of brutal reactions ensued. Workers responded to the closure of enterprises with more arrests, greater harassment, and even murders of managers. According to the report by N. N. Savin, a deputy chairman of the Main Economic Committee, the situation was particularly strained in the Khar'kov region where four major plants—the Khar'kov locomotive plant, the power plant of the Universal Electric Company, the Gerliakh and Pul'st machine-building plant, and the Gel'ferikh-Sade agricultural-machinery plant—were on the verge of closure. Managers had to flee from the Gel'ferikh-Sade plant and the factory committee operated the plant on its own, selling the plant's equipment in order to pay wages.¹²⁶ On September 20, the committee of the Khar'kov locomotive plant arrested the plant's director and the entire management team. Next day the committee stopped the delivery of a finished locomotive.¹²⁷

The situation in the Donets basin was hardly any better. According to a telegram from the Council of Congress of Mining Enterprises to the Provisional Government, arrests, assaults, and battery of managers took place at the Russkii Antratsit company mine, the Mikhailovskii mines, and many other enterprises throughout the Donets basin.¹²⁸ The October 13 issue of the newspaper *Russkoe Slovo* reported numerous incidents of

arrests, battery, and even killings of managers during September and the beginning of October. At the Lys'venskii metal plant, the engineer Lepchukov was shot in the back and killed. A worker of the Union metal plant in Makeevka twice shot at the manager of the plant's foundry. Arrests, harassments, beatings, and notorious "wheelings in the barrow" (*vyvoz na tachke*) of managers took place at the Sulinskii metal plant, the Nikopol'-Mariupol' company metal plant, the Aleksandrovskii metal plant, and the Novorossiiskii company metal plant.¹²⁹

By the end of September, the situation in the Industrial South deteriorated to such an extent that the Special Council for Fuel requested that troops should be dispatched to that region.¹³⁰ This measure, however, only provoked stronger resistance. Local soviets became involved and demanded a withdrawal of the cossack contingents from the area, threatening with a general strike that could completely paralyze the entire Donets and Krivoi Rog area. On September 29 a joint meeting of the Bokovo-Khrustal'skii and Shestovo-Kartushinskii district soviets passed a resolution that said that if armed cossacks did not leave the area before October 10, workers would go on strike. The resolution also added that if force were used against workers, they would "employ all forms of extreme terror." Similar resolutions were passed by workers at numerous enterprises throughout the Donets-Krivoi Rog area.¹³¹

Concessions were not made and the strike began on October 10. In view of an impending paralysis of Russia's entire industry should the strike continue for any significant period, the Provisional Government decided to take a more resolute approach. On October 11, representatives of the Council of Mining Enterprises in the Industrial South discussed a telegram sent by the minister of labor, K. A. Gvozdev, which proposed the creation of a "reconciliation commission" with the right of compulsory arbitration in the dispute. At first, the chairman of the council, Baron N. F. Von Ditmar, rejected the government's proposal, but after the council received information about new strikes in the area, the participants decided to accept the government's initiative and to send its representatives to the reconciliation commission.¹³²

In addition to this move, the Main Economic Council recommended that the government should dispatch a special commissar with extraordinary powers to the Donets basin. The bureau of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet (VTsIK) approved this proposal a few days later at a joint meeting with workers' representatives from the Donets basin and a deputy minister of trade and industry, A. S. Orlov.

Evidently, by that time, the mood among workers in the Industrial

South shifted in favor of a compromise. Delegates from the Donets basin indicated that workers were exhausted by strikes and disturbances and would welcome the initiative of the government. As one delegate, Silin, put it, "workers of the Donets basin do not reject a strong authority which will deal [evenhandedly] with both the right and the left." Another delegate indicated that workers would accept a strong authority which "works in contact not only with industrialists but also with workers' organizations."¹³³ The meeting approved the extraordinary powers of a special commissar who could make his own decisions in case the disputing sides could not arrive at a compromise, could use military force to secure law and order in the area, and could arrest and punish those responsible for violence and disruption of order.¹³⁴ During the night session on October 18 the Provisional Government appointed the deputy minister Orlov as the extraordinary commissar with special powers to put an end to the unrest in the Donets basin area.¹³⁵ The decision, however, came too late. In a few days, the Bolsheviks overthrew the Provisional Government.

The events in the Industrial South had a serious impact on the course of the revolution and the fate of the Provisional Government. The country's economy, which already suffered from the lack of fuel and metal, was paralyzed even more by the disruption of production in the area. The dwindling supply of resources from that area directly and indirectly contributed to workers' unrest in other parts of the country. Disturbances in the Donets and Krivoi Rog basins were a source of political embarrassment for the government and showed its inability to provide leadership and control the situation in that vital region.

As this chapter has shown, the Provisional Government paid dearly for its failure to nurture a constructive relationship with the factory committee movement. Antagonized by the government's refusal to recognize them as legitimate participants in managing enterprises, the factory committees turned against the political order that emerged after the February Revolution. In pursuing their goals, factory committees proved to be a very valuable ally to the major political opponent of the Provisional Government, the Bolshevik party. They rallied workers in support of the Bolshevik program, helped the party to survive through its most trying times, and were instrumental in its political comeback after the July debacle.

In their struggle against the Provisional Government, the factory committees demonstrated their awesome power in mobilizing workers and directing their elemental discontent. They helped to foment workers'

discontent throughout the country. Moscow and Petrograd, the Central Industrial Region, the Urals mining region, the Industrial South were just some of the major areas engulfed by workers' unrest. Thus, the factory committees became a major destabilizing factor that contributed to the collapse of the post-February political order.



3

The Radicalization of the Trade Unions

THE EVOLUTION OF THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT

In Russia, associations that combined workers by trade (rather than place of employment, as factory committees did) go back to the mutual-aid societies that appeared in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, primarily in Russia's western provinces. A mere handful of such organizations existed throughout most of the century; but as the industrialization gained momentum in the wake of Alexander II's great reforms, their number began to grow. This growth was very modest and the movement's survival was never easy under autocratic rule. Constant police surveillance and persecutions restricted trade-union activism and hindered the expansion of the movement.¹

The downfall of the autocratic regime produced a real boom in the trade union movement. Following the tsar's abdication, many Russian papers carried announcements calling upon workers to form their trade organizations or to join existing ones.² The initiative in organizing unions usually came either from former trade-union activists (as was the case, for example, with the Petrograd printers' union)³ or from Social Democratic organizations.⁴ Workers responded very favorably to these initiatives.⁵

In contrast to the factory committees, Russian trade unions initially focused on the protection of workers' rights and the amelioration of their conditions, not participation in management, as their main function. For example, a normative trade union statute, adopted at the meeting of the Petrograd Central Trade Union Bureau on March 25, stressed that "the objective of a union is the improvement of the material well-being of its members, as well as the protection of political rights of [union] members and the organization as a whole."⁶ An appeal of the Central Trade Union

Bureau for the Central Industrial Region, issued on March 17, also stressed "the protection and the improvement of [their] working conditions" as the primary goal of the unions.⁷ Many other trade union organizations emphasized similar objectives in their statements from that period.⁸ As the trade union movement evolved and the economic situation in the country deteriorated later in the spring, and particularly after the Third All-Russian Trade Union Conference in June, the movement's leadership began to consider expanding the role of unions to that of participation in organizing and regulating production.⁹

In a very short period, the drive to organize trade unions produced spectacular results. During the first two weeks in March, nearly thirty unions were reestablished in Petrograd.¹⁰ By the end of April, the number of unions in this city grew to seventy-four.¹¹ In Moscow, where only a handful of unions survived the wartime repression by the government, there were forty-two unions in mid-April.¹² The increase of trade unions in other industrial centers was equally impressive.¹³ By the end of April, the total number of unions in Russia was in excess of two thousand; in Petrograd and Moscow alone there were over 130 unions.¹⁴

The number of trade union members also increased dramatically after the outbreak of the revolution. For example, the trade union membership in Russia grew from a prewar high of forty to forty-five thousand workers in 1912, to nearly one and a half million, or about forty percent of the entire Russian industrial proletariat, at the end of June. Moscow and Petrograd held the lead with nearly one third of the total trade union membership.¹⁵ By October 1917, the total union membership in Russia was close to two million. This number constituted about sixty percent of the Russian industrial workers, or 10 percent of all wage earners in the country.¹⁶

The expansion of the trade union movement required a more sophisticated organizational framework. Two principal developments occurred in this area: (1) the formation of central trade union organizations; and (2) the evolution of unions from organizations based on craft or trade into organizations which represented workers by industrial branches, or, as they were called, "industrial unions."

Central trade union organizations (called "central bureaus" or "central councils") had first come into existence during the 1905 revolution. They emerged in major industrial centers in response to a need for coordinating activities of individual unions. The initiative to set up central city-wide organizations came from trade unions in Khar'kov, Moscow, and St. Petersburg, and was supported by unions throughout the country.¹⁷

By the beginning of 1907, thirty-eight central trade-union bureaus existed in Russia.¹⁸ In the period between the two revolutions, the number of central bureaus (which were *de facto* prohibited by the law on trade unions of March 4, 1906)¹⁹ drastically declined due to government persecutions. In some instances, as was the case with the Central Bureau in Moscow, they had to go underground and continue their operation under the constant threat of arrests and repression.²⁰

In the wake of the February Revolution, union organizers, drawing upon their pre-1917 experience, immediately set out to revive central bureaus. On March 2, a meeting of union representatives in Moscow reestablished the citywide central trade union bureau.²¹ Beginning in mid-March, union organizers in Petrograd took initial steps toward creating a central bureau, which began to function at the end of the month.²² The Petrograd Trade Union Bureau grew quickly in strength and by May included thirty unions with nearly 200,000 members, or nearly fifty percent of all Petrograd workers.²³ Central trade union bureaus were created in Kostroma, Samara, Minsk, and other cities.²⁴ By July, there were altogether over fifty central bureaus in the country.²⁵

The primary function of the bureaus was the coordination of activities of individual unions at the municipal/regional level. For example, according to paragraph 2 of the statute of the Petrograd Central Trade Union Bureau, one of the bureau's tasks was "to promote the economic struggle of the working class, as well as to coordinate activities of individual unions."²⁶ Describing the bureaus' functions, David Riazanov said in his speech at the Third All-Russian Trade Union Conference that trade union councils (as bureaus were renamed after the conference) "unify, coordinate, and direct activities of the trade union movement in localities, and [also] represent the interests of the entire movement."²⁷

As the trade union movement grew, central bureaus (which were renamed central trade union councils after the Third All-Russian Trade Union Conference)²⁸ played a very important role on the city and regional levels. Their functions expanded far beyond just coordinating efforts of individual unions. For example, they, rather than individual union organizations, usually initiated and negotiated changes in wage scales and sanctioned strikes.²⁹

In addition to central bureaus on the municipal/regional level, the leaders of the trade union movement revived the idea of a central national organization for the entire movement. This idea dated back to 1904 when a union (*obshchestvo*) of artisans in Khar'kov initiated the convocation of an all-Russian trade union congress.³⁰ This initiative was

later discussed at the two all-Russian trade union conferences in 1906 and 1907, and included the creation of an all-Russian center in the agenda of the future congress of Russian trade unions.³¹ However, police repression, which began after the 1905 revolution, was not conducive for the convocation of an all-Russian trade union congress, and the national center was not created.

Shortly after the overthrow of the tsar, the idea of a permanent central organization began to spread in trade union circles.³² For a while, the Central Trade Union Bureau in Petrograd functioned as the movement's all-Russian center. At the beginning of April, the All-Russian Conference of Soviets put forward the initiative for the convocation of an all-Russian trade union conference that would create the real national trade union center.³³ Following this initiative, representatives of the Workers' Section of the Petrograd Soviet and the Petrograd and Moscow Central Trade Union Bureaus held joint meetings on April 16 and 17 that proposed the format, rules for representation, and the agenda of the future conference. This agenda included the formation of an all-Russian center.³⁴

Finally, the Third All-Russian Trade Union Conference, held in Petrograd on June 20-28, elected the All-Russian Trade Union Central Council (VTsSPS), which had thirty-five members.³⁵ While the conference was still in progress, the newly created center held its first meetings (June 27 and 28) and elected the Presidium and the Executive Committee of VTsSPS. The Menshevik V. Grinevich and S. Lozovskii, a nonaffiliated Social Democrat who later joined the Bolsheviks, became respectively the first chairman and secretary of VTsSPS.³⁶

The Russian trade union movement had a variety of different organizational forms. There were the following types of trade unions: (1) industrial unions, or unions that organized workers by industrial branches, such as the metalworkers' union, the textile workers' union, the printers' union; (2) unions that included workers employed in the same shop or those who had the same trade (for example, unions of foundry workers, machinists, welders, various unions of technicians, draftsmen, shoemakers, woodworkers, et cetera); (3) unions of workers employed by a particular company or enterprise (e.g., the union of workers employed at the Singer and Co. enterprises, the union of employees of the Brothers Noble Co., the union of employees of the Mal'tsev stock company plants); and finally, (4) unions of workers employed in a particular area (the union of workers of Lensko-Vitimskii mining regions, the union of miners of the Donets basin). In addition, there were other, less common, categories.³⁷

This diversity of organizational forms created a great deal of confusion.

For example, at the beginning of May, workers employed in the Petrograd metal industry were organized into twenty-four different unions.³⁸ *Tsekhovshchina* (literally "craft unionism") frequently divided workers employed in the same industry or even at the same enterprise, and impeded efforts to improve their conditions. In many instances, union organizers who represented workers of different trades employed in the same industry or even enterprise could not come to an understanding concerning, for example, new wage scales. Disagreements among them undermined their position and hindered negotiations with employers. These problems became particularly acute during the campaign for the introduction of new wage scales in the summer and fall of 1917. In September, for example, when the Petrograd woodworkers' union issued a call for a strike in support of the new wage scale, the Petrograd Central Trade Union Council agreed to back the strike on the condition that it should involve only those enterprises where woodworkers constituted a majority of the labor force. On October 17, the day after the strike began, a meeting of Petrograd woodworkers stated its strong disagreement with this stipulation and called upon all Petrograd woodworkers to join the strike. Since this move threatened to disrupt the work of many enterprises unrelated to the wood-processing industry, the chairman of the metalworkers' union, Alexander Shliapnikov, denounced the strike as disrupting the workers' movement. Although the strikers won some support from workers of other trades, the strike revealed profound differences in the trade union ranks as a result of *tsekhovshchina*.³⁹ Similar conflicts over demands concerning wages also occurred between the stokers' union and the metalworkers' union, and between woodworkers at the Okhtenskii gunpowder plant and the chemical workers' union.⁴⁰

Even before the 1917 revolution, there was a strong opposition to *tsekhovshchina* in the trade union movement. In 1906, the Second All-Russian Trade Union Conference recommended that newly organized unions "should not be divided into specific trades."⁴¹ The period of relative freedom in the wake of 1905 was favorable for the integration of small unions into big industrial unions, but the ascension of Stolypin to power and the government's crackdown on the trade union movement ended this evolution.⁴²

In view of their pre-1917 experience, trade union activists opposed *tsekhovshchina* from the moment the labor movement reemerged onto the Russian industrial scene after the overthrow of the monarchy. They advocated organization of unions by industries as a way of preventing divisions within trade union ranks. For instance, the first meeting of the

Petrograd Central Trade Union Bureau on March 15 issued a strong statement of opposition to craft unionism. "Unions," it said, "should be organized by industries, [any] divisions by trades are harmful."⁴³ In April, the bureau adopted a normative trade union statute that contained the following recommendation: "all male and female workers employed in a given industry can be members of [an industrial] union."⁴⁴ In addition to such verbal support for creating industrial unions, the bureau gradually began to apply pressure on small unions to make them join bigger industrial unions; it initiated several mergers of two or more unions whose members were employed in the same industry into one big union.⁴⁵

Many major unions in Petrograd and other cities followed the lead of the Petrograd Bureau. On April 16, for example, members of the boards of the two major unions in Orekhovo-Zuevo (the metal and the textile workers' unions) held a joint meeting and expressed their support for the industrial principle.⁴⁶ The decision approved by the Petrograd metalworkers' union on May 7 was a landmark in reorganizing unions on an industrial basis. The regulations adopted by this very powerful union directed all organizations of Petrograd workers employed in metal industry to merge into one union.⁴⁷

The Third All-Russian Trade Union Conference played a singularly important role in establishing the industrial principle as the dominant one in the entire trade union movement. By a unanimous vote, the conference adopted the resolution on the organization of trade unions proposed by the Menshevik P. Kolokol'nikov, a deputy minister of labor in the Provisional Government. Emphasizing that the evolution of Russia's capitalism made the integration of the trade unions a necessity, the resolution said:

Workers should organize unions by industries, rather than by shops or trades, so that all workers [employed] at [a given] enterprise are members of [the same] union, irrespective of their trade or even a particular sector of production [in which they are involved].⁴⁸

The resolution further stipulated that a trade union could be subdivided into sections that would represent the interests of the union members of a particular trade. But these sections would be subordinated to all-union central organizations and could not play an independent role in the "economic struggle."⁴⁹

This decision provided a tremendous impetus to the reorganization of the trade unions. Although the number of union members in Russia continued to grow, the number of unions began to decline. In the fall of

1917, the number of unions in Petrograd was nearly half the number in the first half of the year.⁵⁰ During the same period, the number of unions in Moscow fell from seventy-five to thirty-eight.⁵¹ The process of integration led to the formation of such powerful national unions as the metalworkers' union, the textile workers' union, and the printers' union.⁵²

TRADE UNIONS AND THE COALITION POLICY

There were two major political factions in the trade union movement: "internationalists" (not to be confused with the Menshevik Internationalists led by Iulii Martov) and "neutralists." The "internationalist" faction was led by the moderate Bolsheviks (while supporting the transfer of power to the soviets, they did not favor the establishment of the Bolshevik political monopoly sought by Lenin) but also included representatives of other socialist groups, such as, for example, David Riazanov, who was a nonfactional Social Democrat at the beginning of the revolution and later became a Bolshevik, or S. A. Lozovskii, a Social Democrat Internationalist who later also joined the Bolshevik party. Members of this faction were opposed to the war, hence the faction's name. They also believed that trade unions should not be exclusively concerned with the improvement of workers' welfare, but should be actively involved in resolving major political issues, such as the war. Finally, they opposed the coalition with the liberals, advocated by the moderate socialists, as the policy that, in their opinion, only served to prolong the "imperialist war." The "neutralist" faction included primarily the Mensheviks and the SRs. Members of this faction insisted that the trade unions should be politically neutral (hence the name of the faction) and should primarily concentrate on protecting workers' rights and improving their welfare, rather than become involved in political matters.

The differences between the two factions surfaced very early in the revolution. For example, at the first meeting of the Provisional Central Bureau of the Petrograd Trade Unions, held on March 15, the Bolsheviks voiced their protest against the idea of "neutrality" of the trade union movement advocated by the Mensheviks. V. D. Shmidt, a prominent Bolshevik trade unionist, said: "The example of our West European comrades convinces us that there is no such thing as neutrality in the trade union movement; it is impossible to separate economics and politics in [policies of] such working class organizations as the trade unions."⁵³

Both factions enjoyed considerable support in the trade union movement. Despite the generally moderate stance of the trade union movement, victories of the "internationalists" were not at all uncommon on all levels. As

evidenced by numerous resolutions, the "internationalists" were very influential in the metalworkers' union,⁵⁴ the woodworkers' union,⁵⁵ the union of Moscow confectionery workers,⁵⁶ the Petrograd garment workers' union,⁵⁷ the textile and other unions.⁵⁸ A joint meeting of board members of all Petrograd unions, held on April 28, passed a resolution that stated that Petrograd unions had no objections to the formation of blocs among socialist parties "opposed to defensism."⁵⁹ The "internationalists" also held strong positions in the Central Trade Union Bureaus in Moscow and Petrograd.⁶⁰

In Petrograd, the leadership of the trade unions was more or less evenly divided between the "internationalists" and "neutralists."⁶¹ On April 12, for example, the Petrograd Central Trade Union Bureau debated whether workers should work on their regular day off instead of the day off they would have to celebrate the May 1 holiday. The Petrograd Soviet directed workers to work on their regular day off. The meeting produced two resolutions: one, by the "internationalists," and another, by their opponents. Although the "internationalist" resolution did not encourage resistance to the Soviet's decision ("to avoid," as the resolution stated, "disorganization . . . and the undermining of the Soviet's authority"), it condemned this decision as "a concession to the chauvinistic imperialist bourgeoisie." By contrast, the proponents of neutrality called upon union members to "carry out decisions of the Soviet . . . faithfully and to the fullest extent possible." Both resolutions collected eleven votes.⁶²

There were numerous skirmishes between the two factions during the spring of 1917, but the real test of strength came at the Third All-Russian Conference of Trade Unions, which took place in Petrograd from June 20 to June 28, and was attended by 211 delegates representing close to a million and a half workers.⁶³ It was without a doubt the most important trade union forum, which set policies of the movement on a number of vital issues. Its agenda included the discussion of the tasks of the trade union movement, its organizational problems, as well as problems related to the improvement of workers' conditions, labor legislation, and economic regulation.⁶⁴

As one might expect, the "internationalists" and "neutralists" clashed on most of these issues. The available data indicates that the strength of both groups was about equal. In order to gain a decisive advantage over its opponent, each faction had to appeal to those delegates who came to the conference without firm ideological or political commitments and concerned with practical needs of their constituency. The number of del-

legates who belonged to this category is difficult to establish, but it appears to be significant.⁶⁵ Moreover, the formal party affiliation was no guarantee that party loyalty would prevail over other concerns.⁶⁶

At the heart of all the disagreements between the “internationalists” and the “neutralists” was one fundamental issue—the attitude toward the coalition policy and the Provisional Government. The two factions staked out their positions even before the discussion of substantive issues. In his welcoming address the minister of labor and deputy chairman of the Petrograd Soviet, M. I. Skobelev, outlined the steps taken by the Provisional Government designed to improve the economic situation and workers’ conditions. He extolled the unions as “a combatant organization of the working class” and called for their support of the government’s efforts.⁶⁷ Insofar as the policy of coalition was concerned, Skobelev conceded that it might be a mistake. Nevertheless, he tried to defend it—rather ineffectively—by saying that “it is better to be mistaken with revolutionary democracy than to be right without it.”⁶⁸

Responding to Skobelev’s address, a member of the Bolshevik Central Committee, Vladimir Miliutin, stated that the country’s economic problems could be resolved only “through the conscious leadership and intervention of the working class,” and not through coalition with “the bourgeoisie.” While stressing an “enormous revolutionary role” that the trade unions should play in improving the economic situation, Miliutin pointed out that “. . . [t]hen, and only then we will be able to develop our activities on a broad scale, when the Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies have power.”⁶⁹

The first major substantive issue over which the two factions clashed was the tasks of the trade unions. In his keynote speech on this issue, a well-known Menshevik trade unionist, V. M. Grinevich, emphasized that the principal function of the trade unions was “to direct the economic struggle” of workers.⁷⁰ In performing this function, the trade unions should not “assume [the responsibility of] organizing production, or take upon themselves the management of individual enterprises.” Rather, they should protect workers’ interests by actively participating in the system for economic control and regulation organized by the state. Although Grinevich refrained from calls in support of the current political order, his position clearly implied that unions should back the government.⁷¹

The “internationalists” in principle agreed that the main objective of the trade unions was the protection of workers’ interests. However, their way of achieving this objective was quite different from the one proposed by the moderate socialists. Speakers from the “internationalist”

faction argued that the evolution of Russian capitalism, just like that of capitalism in the West, had entered its imperialist stage ("the period of imperialist policies and world war").⁷² In order to protect workers in these new "objective conditions," the unions should oppose the policies of the "imperialist bourgeoisie" (i.e., they should oppose the war and the government that prolonged Russia's participation in the war). The "internationalists" proposed that Russian trade unions should take an active part in organizing a worldwide campaign against the war and the "imperialist bourgeoisie."⁷³ They also insisted that the trade union movement should back "those socialist parties which have staunchly promoted and will continue to promote the class interests of the proletariat, and will support the speediest termination of the war through mass revolutionary struggle against ruling classes in all countries."⁷⁴

While indicating their general support for the soviets, the "internationalists" insisted that the unions should be very critical of the course pursued by the current soviet leadership. N. P. Glebov-Avilov, a prominent Bolshevik labor leader, stated most clearly the "internationalist" position in this regard:

We cannot agree to the formula [which says] that we should support [all policies of] the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. We cannot agree to this since it logically follows that we, then, should support the Provisional Government. There is, to be sure, a definite link between the Soviet . . . and the socialist ministers, thus [we] should support the entire coalition. We cannot support the coalition. We should assist the Soviets . . . in becoming a truly revolutionary organization. We, the trade union functionaries, should carry out this task when we return to our local [unions].⁷⁵

The "internationalists" insisted that the unions should support the soviet policies only "insofar as they [these policies] will be directed at the consolidation and further expansion of the proletariat's gains."⁷⁶ In terms of economic policies, the "internationalists" advocated the establishment of a system for regulating production, but in contrast to their opponents, they insisted that this system should be organized by the soviets in cooperation with labor organizations.⁷⁷

The debates on the tasks of the trade unions were heated as both blocs vied for support of the noncommitted delegates. Many of these noncommitted delegates indicated in their speeches that their choice would be determined by the practical needs of the local organizations that had sent them to the conference. A delegate from the city of Saratov, Belitskii, articulated best the attitude of this group. He criticized

both blocs for their one-sided approach and indicated no decisive preference for any faction. Belitskii called upon leaders of these blocs to address real problems that concerned “delegates from locals,” like himself. While emphasizing the need for the political involvement of unions, he cautioned against dissolving the unions in political parties. Belitskii argued as well that unions had their own distinct task, that of the “economic struggle” for improving workers’ conditions, and that all other policies, including involvement or noninvolvement in politics, should be subordinated to this principal function.⁷⁸

Although the noncommitted delegates were critical of both factions, they leaned more toward the position of the “neutralists,” precisely because it was more emphatic in stressing the need for the unions to protect workers’ rights and ameliorate their conditions, rather than fight for some political goals. With few changes, the conference approved the draft resolution drawn up by the Menshevik Grinevich.⁷⁹ The only amendment that the “internationalists” managed to insert into the final version of the resolution was one paragraph which defined the contemporary stage of capitalism in Russia as imperialist, and stressed that in this stage the Russian trade unions faced new and complex challenges. Although this vague formula seemed utterly inconsequential for the resolution, it was nevertheless very important since it implied that the perspective set by the resolution was provisional and may be revised in the future as new challenges would arise.⁸⁰

The “internationalists” also suffered a defeat on another key issue—the organization of production. One of the main speakers who presented the “internationalist” position was the Bolshevik Vladimir Miliutin. In his speech, Miliutin argued that as a result of the February Revolution, political power in Russia was divided between the Provisional Government, which represented the interests of the bourgeoisie, and the soviets, which represented workers and peasants. Fearing the influence of the soviets and other mass organizations, the bourgeoisie embarked on the path of sabotage and disorganization of industrial production with the aim of creating economic chaos in the country and using it as a pretext for getting rid of the soviets.⁸¹ From this assessment of the situation, Miliutin concluded that regulation and control over production should have two main purposes: to eliminate speculation and profiteering and to prevent lockouts. He advocated passing a law that would require punishing employers for curtailing production by taking over their enterprises. He proposed that the soviets in cooperation with the trade unions should create a system of economic regulation in which workers’ representatives

should constitute a majority. Miliutin concluded his speech by stressing that the main precondition for realizing this plan was the transfer of power to the soviets.⁸²

In many of its substantive aspects, the "neutralist" plan for organizing production, outlined by the Menshevik N. Cherevanin, was not significantly different from the one by their opponents. It also proposed the creation of a national system of economic regulation, with workers' representatives constituting a majority in it. At the enterprise level, production should be supervised by agencies consisting of "representatives from factory committees, the government, and revolutionary democracy" (i.e., soviets). The only major difference between the two plans was the attitude toward the Provisional Government. In contrast to the "internationalist" plan, Cherevanin's plan did not require the overthrow of the government; rather, the government was to play an important role in creating and running the system of economic regulation. It was to integrate major industrial enterprises into trusts and syndicates and set up regulatory agencies.⁸³ This difference between the two plans seems to have been a decisive factor in swaying the delegates' vote. Fearful of becoming embroiled in politics, the noncommitted delegates chose the plan that would allow them to concentrate more on what they perceived to be the principal goals of the movement. By a majority of sixty-five votes, the conference rejected the "internationalist" plan and adopted the resolution by Cherevanin.⁸⁴

One interesting episode that occurred at the conference also supports this conclusion. When preparing for the conference, the "internationalists" insisted that the agenda should include the discussion of the relationship between the unions and political parties, which had initially been excluded.⁸⁵ The Bolshevik Grigorii Zinov'ev was supposed to deliver the principal address on this subject. According to the available information, this speech would have included the demand that unions must participate in antiwar efforts by cooperating closely with "political organizations of the proletariat which uphold [the principle of] internationalism" and by supporting the idea of reestablishing "an international trade union organization incorporating those unions which have rejected and continue to reject the support for the imperialist war and [which] did not abandon the principle of class struggle."⁸⁶

Evidently, anticipating a negative response of the delegates, Zinov'ev canceled his speech on the very day it was supposed to be delivered. *Pravda* simply explained that he was "unable to appear before the conference."⁸⁷ However, despite the cancellation, the "internationalists" did

not abandon their intention to discuss the issues that Zinov'ev was to raise in his speech. On the last day of the conference, Riazanov made a motion that the draft resolution on Zinov'ev's speech (which was never delivered) be announced and discussed by the conference.⁸⁸ The delegates rejected the motion and only allowed the "internationalists" to make a statement that would explain their reasons for voting against the Menshevik resolution on the tasks of the trade unions. They used this statement for propaganda purposes, enunciating their opposition to the war, the policy of "civil peace" (i.e., coalition), and the participation of socialist ministers in the "bourgeois government." The statement also stressed the need for the trade unions to support only those socialist parties that "uphold the principle of revolutionary internationalism and unconditionally reject the policy of defensism."⁸⁹ But the conference did not heed this call.

The defeats sustained by the "internationalists" did not mean that their opponents—the moderate socialists—had complete control over the conference. The "internationalists," for example, were successful in promoting their views on the "economic struggle." They argued that since Russian capitalism was in its imperialist stage, and since in this stage the proletariat was involved in "the revolutionary struggle against the bourgeoisie," strikes, rather than negotiations, were the only method consistent "with the class struggle of the proletariat, with its class position." Therefore, they insisted, strikes should be "the only revolutionary method," "the cornerstone of trade union life and their economic struggle." They called trade unions "combatant class organizations" of the proletariat, thus emphasizing their militant posture vis-à-vis the bourgeoisie.⁹⁰

The moderate socialists generally advocated nonmilitant approaches. In their view, workers' conditions could be improved by combatting economic dislocation through state control and regulation of industry. Therefore, they argued, trade unions should help the state in organizing and running the system rather than disrupt the economy further by staging strikes.⁹¹ The "neutralists" also rejected the confrontational approach in dealing with employers. According to the Menshevik D. Kol'tsov, the principal spokesman of the moderate socialists on this issue, the contemporary conditions in Russia imposed "certain responsibilities" upon workers and their organizations that they "cannot neglect." He insisted that unions must take into account the overall situation when presenting their demands to employers and should try to avoid conflicts.⁹² If conflicts occurred, the unions should resort to negotiations rather than strikes. These negotiations should be conducted in reconciliation boards

and courts of arbitration.⁹³ The moderate socialists advocated the compulsory use of arbitration courts for resolving conflicts "in exceptional economic conditions."⁹⁴ Some of them (for example, the Menshevik Agulin, who represented the Arkhangel'sk maritime union) even proposed outlawing strikes altogether.⁹⁵

Guided by their practical concern for improving workers' conditions, a majority of the delegates sided with the "internationalists" on this issue. In the absence of an effective system for mediating industrial conflicts, they could not but see strikes as the principal means for performing successfully their main function. The final resolution emphasized strikes as "the main and most powerful weapon in the hands of the trade unions," rather than negotiations as in the draft by Kol'tsov. Reconciliation boards and courts of arbitration would serve as merely a supplementary means, which, the resolution underscored, could produce lasting results only "if workers are organized in powerful unions and are ready to defend their demands to the end through a well-prepared strike."⁹⁶ The resolution directed individual unions to create special wage-scale commissions [*tarifnye komissii*] that would "elaborate new regulations for employment and work." In contrast, Kol'tsov's draft had proposed that new wage scales should be based on decisions of reconciliation boards and courts of arbitration.⁹⁷

The moderate socialists made an attempt to reverse the decision of the conference as to the policy toward reconciliation boards later in the conference. The erstwhile Menshevik who later became a prominent Soviet diplomat under Stalin, I. M. Maiskii, the main speaker on this subject at the conference, proposed that reconciliation boards and courts of arbitration should be the primary means in the struggle of workers for improving their conditions, and defined the strike as the means of last resort.⁹⁸ Maiskii also proposed a compulsory use of arbitration at the enterprises under the control of the state.⁹⁹ The conference rejected Maiskii's position on this issue and merely recognized that "the strike is an extreme means of the organized proletarian struggle," and that its use should be preceded by an attempt to resolve a dispute through a reconciliation board or a court of arbitration. The final resolution also made no mention of compulsory arbitration.¹⁰⁰

The program formulated by the Third Trade Union Conference drew a very fine line between the two positions of the "neutralists" and "internationalists." On the one hand, it repudiated the "internationalist" notion that the workers' situation could be improved only if the Provisional Government were overthrown, and stated that the unions

should cooperate with the government in creating a system of economic regulations; on the other hand, however, the conference refused to accept the "neutralist" view that negotiations rather than strikes should be the primary means of the unions in performing their function.

It seems that in each case the outcome in the debates depended on the noncommitted delegates (such as the delegate from Saratov Belitskii who was quoted earlier and who so eloquently articulated their position), and practicality was the main criterion that determined their choices. The experience of the first months of the revolution showed that the overthrow of the post-February political order was not necessary for the improvement of the workers' situation. In fact, attempts to achieve this goal might even be counterproductive since they would distract the unions from performing their principal function. The experience also suggested that workers' conditions could not be improved if the economic situation continued to deteriorate. Therefore, the conference stressed the necessity of cooperating with the government in creating a system of economic regulation that would help to curb the economic dislocation. At the same time, practical considerations suggested that unions should not renounce strikes as the principal means for achieving their objectives. Indeed, in the absence of an effective system for mediating industrial conflicts, strikes remained the major, if not the only, means of trade unions in trying to improve workers' welfare.

The course formulated by the Third All-Russian Trade Union Conference was contradictory: while rejecting the antagonistic attitude toward the Provisional Government, it advocated a confrontational approach vis-à-vis employers. Implicit in this course was the notion that political issues and labor issues per se could be effectively dissociated. The fact of the matter was that they were intimately interrelated: strikes certainly destabilized the political and economic order and thus undermined the position of the government. Reliance on strikes as their chief weapon was certainly a confrontational approach that could bring the unions into conflict with the government. One should be cautious, however, in blaming the delegates alone for this inconsistency. It was not their fault that in the adverse conditions of political and economic instability their choices in performing this function were limited to confrontation rather than conciliation.

THE WAGE-SCALE CAMPAIGN AND THE FAILURE OF RECONCILIATION

Following the Third All-Russian Conference, Russian trade unions

launched a major campaign for new wage scales. The drive to increase wages was an integral part of the spontaneous upheaval in February. Even before major trade unions reemerged in the Russian industrial scene, labor activists at the enterprise level had already begun to formulate demands for improving workers' conditions and to present them to employers. On March 9, for example, a meeting of representatives of the Petrograd tobacco factories passed a resolution demanding wage increases for workers and the introduction of an eight-hour working day.¹⁰¹ Similar demands were presented by union activists at many other enterprises throughout Russia.¹⁰²

Initially, these efforts were disorganized. Demands formulated in different industries and even at different enterprises within the same industry greatly varied; they were often presented in a haphazard manner without any prior study of conditions. Even as late as the beginning of the summer, the metalworkers' union—one of the better organized unions in the country—issued the following statement in which it lamented the chaos and disorganization in submitting demands to employers. The statement said:

Instead of organization we, unfortunately, see chaos [*stikhiia*]; instead of discipline and solidarity, fragmented actions. Today one factory acts, tomorrow another; and the day after that, the first factory strikes again in order to catch up with the second. At various enterprises, alas, we see . . . irresponsible actions . . . when one group delivers ultimatums to another. Demands are often presented without any prior preparation, sometimes circumventing the elected factory committee. The metalworkers' union is [often] informed about conflicts only after demands have already been presented to the management when both sides are already in a state of war. The demands themselves lack consistency and uniformity.¹⁰³

Such chaotic attempts merely hurt the economy without any significant effect upon the workers' situation.

The emergence of unions helped to bring some order and a degree of predictability in the "economic struggle." Usually, unions would conduct a preliminary study of conditions in a given industry and then present their demands to employers in the form of collective contracts, which included new wage scales. Often a union would create a special commission for this purpose. On May 22, for example, the metalworkers' union set up such a commission.¹⁰⁴ In April, the union of woodworkers and the textile workers' union began to study the existing wage scales in their industries.¹⁰⁵

This policy was more successful in bringing about lasting improvements for workers than were random strikes. As early as March and April, some unions already prepared new contracts and even succeeded in having employers accept them.¹⁰⁶ The Third Conference of Russian Trade Unions gave a major impetus to the campaign for new wage scales. By midsummer, many unions had already prepared new contracts and began to present them to employers. Some unions had even managed to get employers' approval for new wage scales. According to the available information, new wage scales were introduced by nine out of twenty-two unions in Petrograd and nine out of fourteen unions in Moscow.¹⁰⁷ At the beginning of May the powerful union of construction workers had already prepared its contract, and some of its sections (for example, the sections for workers who worked with marble and granite) had even succeeded in concluding agreements with employers, abolishing overtime work, and establishing rules for hiring workers exclusively through the union.¹⁰⁸ By the end of June, such major unions as the textile and metalworkers' unions had submitted their contracts to the Society of Factory and Plant Owners for approval.¹⁰⁹

The principal features of new wage scales were the abolition of piece-rates, a considerable increase in wages, and a decrease in wage differentials between skilled and unskilled workers. For example, in the new scale proposed by the woodworkers' union, pay for skilled workers, which ranged from one to three rubles per day, was to rise to eight to sixteen rubles per day. At the same time, the wages for unskilled workers—which in some instances were as low as seventy-five kopeks a day for female workers—were to reach eight rubles per day and higher.¹¹⁰

The introduction of new wage scales required extensive negotiations with employers. Given the adverse conditions of the Russian economy, it was important that these negotiations should have proceeded in an orderly manner so that the fragile economy would not be disrupted further. For the purpose of handling controversial issues between workers and their employers, the government proposed to revive reconciliation boards and courts of arbitration—institutions that dated back to the revolution of 1905 and that had suffered a long period of decline and neglect under the oppressive rule of the tsar.¹¹¹ According to government plans, these institutions were to consist of an equal number of representatives from workers and employers, and their function was to ensure a peaceful resolution of industrial conflicts and to prevent strikes. Unfortunately, reconciliation institutions failed to perform this function.

The blame for the failure lay to a large extent with the government.

To begin with, in introducing the system for resolving industrial conflicts, the government relied primarily on voluntary agreements between organizations of workers and employers, rather than legislation and enforcement. Without strong leadership from the government, the network of reconciliation institutions expanded very slowly. In the absence of these institutions and established procedures, workers and employers frequently resorted to familiar tactics of pressuring each other by way of strikes and lockouts, which led to grave conflicts.

When the government finally issued the decree on reconciliation boards and courts of arbitration in August, many industrial conflicts were already raging out of control and significant damage to the economy had already been done.¹¹² The decree had several fundamental flaws that rendered it virtually ineffective. It did not require, for example, a mandatory recourse to reconciliation. It simply said that "entrepreneurs and workers have the right to address their oral and written demands to a local commissar of labor, expressing their wish to submit their dispute, which can result or have already resulted in a full-fledged conflict, for consideration by a reconciliation board."¹¹³ The decree did not provide any punishment for bypassing reconciliation institutions or failing to comply with their decisions. It merely stipulated that a local commissar of labor should report all such incidents in the local press.

The decree also did not specify the rules for electing members of reconciliation boards and their chairpersons, leaving this issue to the discretion of the disputing parties.¹¹⁴ As a result, reconciliation boards had no guidelines for resolving procedural matters and often functioned, or rather did not function, without any statutes or rules. Naturally, that created additional confusion and severely impeded their effectiveness. According to the data provided by the Petrograd Society of Factory and Plant Owners, as late as the beginning of October sixty-nine out of ninety reconciliation boards in Petrograd had no statutes; only ten reconciliation boards in the capital had statutes that they had created themselves.¹¹⁵

The system for mediating industrial conflicts, as it was set up by the decree of August 5, required a certain degree of trust between workers and employers. However, given the history of labor-management relations in tsarist Russia and the contemporary conditions in the country (political instability, economic dislocation, the war, intense political propaganda, et cetera) such a degree of trust was very difficult to achieve. Having to compete for diminishing resources in the declining economy, workers and employers harbored deep suspicions toward each other, which made their cooperation practically impossible.

Political factors additionally compounded the ineffectiveness of reconciliation institutions. In order to mediate labor disputes successfully, these institutions needed the support of a strong, authoritative government. Unfortunately, the Provisional Government was very weak and mistrusted by both business and labor. As a result, reconciliation boards and courts of arbitration, as the government's creatures, carried the stigma of weakness and mistrust. As early as March, for example, a meeting of factory and plant owners of the Vyborgskii district in Petrograd stated that "... reconciliation boards cannot realize hopes which they [originally] inspired since they do not enjoy the trust of workers and, in essence, have no solid foundation."¹¹⁶ N. Dmitriev, a prominent Menshevik trade unionist and a deputy minister of labor in the Provisional Government, confirmed that in many instances workers were unwilling to submit their disputes to reconciliation boards as a result of their distrust of the government.¹¹⁷ From the very beginning of their conflict with the management over wages, the workers of Nevskaiia and Rossiiskaia textile factories in Petrograd refused to accept any decision of the reconciliation board.¹¹⁸ A similar situation developed at the Petrogradskii machine-building and metal plant, the Putilov plant, and the military-uniform factory of the Alafuzovskii textile enterprises.¹¹⁹

Similarly, entrepreneurs and their organizations often refused to participate in reconciliation institutions or to accept their decisions. In April the Petrograd Committee of Medium and Small Enterprises refused to accept a minimum wage for unskilled workers established by the Central Reconciliation Board.¹²⁰ The directorate of the Guzhon metal plant in Moscow rejected the decision of the reconciliation board to increase wages of the plant's workers.¹²¹ The directorates of the Likinskaia textile factory in Moscow, the Singer factory (the Moscow Industrial Region), the Sormovo steel and machine-building plant (Nizhnii Novgorod), and the P. Beliaev lumber mill (the Arkhangel'sk province) boycotted reconciliation boards.¹²²

Central organizations of employers often supported this intransigence on the part of the management in opposing reconciliation institutions. The Council of Congresses of the Urals Mining Industry stated that the management at mining enterprises of that region "are the masters [*khoziaeva*] at [their respective] enterprises" and "will never recognize any [factory] committees and [reconciliation] boards."¹²³

Throughout the summer and fall of 1917, the popularity of reconciliation institutions steadily declined. Their rate of success was generally low, particularly in dealing with conflicts at the enterprise level. At the

Baltiiskii naval and machine-building plant, only 12 out of 160 cases submitted to the plant's reconciliation board were successfully resolved. At the Izhorskii naval plant, the rate was seven out of fifty, and at the Novyi Admiralteiskii naval plant, three out of twenty-nine.¹²⁴ Toward the end of October, the system for mediating industrial disputes, as it was conceived by the decree of August 5, practically ceased to exist. The few reconciliation institutions created by trade unions were the only remaining means for resolving industrial conflicts.¹²⁵

In the absence of an orderly and efficient way of resolving differences with employers, unions relied increasingly on strikes as a principal means for achieving their objectives. In addition, the decisions of the Third All-Russian Trade Union Conference directed them to do so. As a result, during the period from July to the end of October, unions organized numerous strikes throughout the country in support of their demands to increase workers' wages and to improve workers' conditions.¹²⁶ On July 6 after persistent refusals by the Moscow Society of Factory and Plant Owners to accept a new wage scale or to discuss this issue in a court of arbitration, the Moscow metalworkers' union announced a strike. Close to eighty-five thousand workers took part and the society was finally forced to accept the union's demands.¹²⁷ Strikes over wages were staged by oil industry workers in Baku (July),¹²⁸ printers in Petrograd (August),¹²⁹ workers of leather-industry enterprises in the Moscow Industrial Region (August),¹³⁰ workers of rubber-industry enterprises and construction workers in Moscow (August),¹³¹ the all-Russian union of railroad workers (September),¹³² and the all-Russian union of textile workers (October).¹³³

Many of these strikes lasted a long time and involved many workers. For example, the strike by workers of leather-industry enterprises of the Moscow Industrial Region lasted from August to October and ended only a few days before the October insurrection. It involved close to 110,000 workers.¹³⁴ The August strikes of workers of rubber-industry enterprises and construction workers in Moscow lasted about a month and involved fifteen and twenty-seven thousand workers respectively.¹³⁵ The general strike of textile workers in October involved nearly three hundred thousand workers.

Employers, in turn, resorted to their own devices—lockouts and reductions of the work force—as a way of putting pressure on workers. On June 28 the Union of Coal Mining Enterprises of the Donets Basin sent a telegram to the Provisional Government warning about the impending closure of many enterprises in the area due to the escalating

demands of workers and declining productivity.¹³⁶ Similar warnings were issued by the management of numerous enterprises throughout Russia.¹³⁷

One should not get the impression that the wave of strikes that occurred during the summer and fall was due exclusively to the failure of the system for mediating industrial conflicts. Certainly, class antagonisms had a great impact on the deterioration of industrial relations during that period. However, one should also recognize that the weakness of the government made mediation between employers and workers' organizations extremely difficult. The failure of the system for mediating industrial conflicts had a disastrous effect upon the country's economy. It increased the incidence of strikes and contributed to the disruption of the already declining economy. It also helped to antagonize the trade unions and turn them against the coalition policy and the Provisional Government.

THE POLITICAL REORIENTATION OF THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT

The first major test of the course set by the Third Trade Union Conference, which directed trade unions to operate within the framework of the current political system, occurred only a few days after the end of the conference, during the July days. The breakdown of order in the capital revealed a profound inherent instability of the post-February political system that presented a potential threat to the very existence of the trade unions. This crisis shattered the precarious unity achieved at the Third Conference and threw the trade union leadership into a state of confusion that was reflected in a resolution drawn up by a joint meeting of representatives from the Petrograd Central Trade Union Council, boards of major Petrograd unions, and the CCFC, held on July 7.

This resolution urged "revolutionary democracy" to refrain from "uncoordinated actions," since such actions "create conditions which greatly help counterrevolution to prepare its assault." It also called upon the masses "to rally around the plenipotentiary organs of revolutionary democracy" (i.e., the soviets) and to consolidate "class, political, and trade organizations."

However, at the same time the resolution contained salutations to "revolutionary internationalism" that only a few days before had been rejected by the Third Conference. The resolution emphasized that since "the Russian bourgeoisie has already organized for the conquest of power," it was up to "worker and peasant democracy" to bring singlehandedly "the revolution to its victorious conclusion." Curiously, the resolution

refrained from calls for the overthrow of the Provisional Government and the transfer of power to the soviets, but rather emphasized the need for the speediest convocation of the Constituent Assembly.¹³⁸ Although the resolution stopped short of siding with the proponents of soviet power, it certainly signified a shift in sentiment to the left. In his article published in October of 1918, the Bolshevik trade unionist N. Glebov noted this change. He wrote:

If in June, at the All-Russian Conference of Trade Unions, there was no unanimity in the trade union movement on the question of the future destiny of our revolution, and if a majority of the delegates took the path of reconciliation and support of the bourgeois order, after July of 1917 a drastic turn occurred [among the trade unions] in the direction of recognizing the necessity to struggle for soviet power.¹³⁹

The prevalence of anti-Bolshevik attitudes in the wake of the July Days had temporarily weakened the "internationalist" appeal, but their influence began to grow again as soon as the unions stepped up their wage-scale campaign. With the growing economic dislocation, it was indeed very difficult to substantially improve the workers' situation. Employers could not make significant concessions, and when they did make them, the gains were soon eliminated by the galloping inflation. The inherent political instability of the dual-power system was a principal source of the economic difficulties. It prevented the government from introducing effective economic policies that could help to curb the decline.

As the Third Conference showed, trade unions understood that the constraints of the economic situation would not allow a significant improvement in workers' conditions. That was why the conference directed the unions to cooperate with the government in creating a system of economic regulation. Unfortunately, political weakness prevented the government from providing leadership in this area. Its chief economic agencies, such as the Economic Council and the Main Economic Committee, were mostly preoccupied with procedural matters and factional disputes and failed to chart and implement a coherent economic policy.¹⁴⁰ This impotence further antagonized the unions toward the government.

The realization that the government could not stabilize the political situation and improve the economy stimulated their interest in political alternatives to the Provisional Government. As a result, the predominant attitudes in the trade union movement began to shift ever so slightly in

favor of the Bolshevik-led "internationalists." For example, the leadership of the metalworkers' union in its address to the Sixth Congress of the Bolshevik party promulgated at the end of July summarized the union's position in the following way: "Our hopes and demands can be realized only when the organization uniting representatives of workers and peasants has power. . . . Your [Bolshevik] victory, the victory of the workers' class party, will enable us to realize our demands."¹⁴¹ Many other unions voiced very similar attitudes and demanded a stop to persecution of the Bolsheviks.¹⁴² This was clear evidence of the mounting opposition to the coalition policy among the unions.

The Moscow State Conference, which was an attempt by the government to give a new life to the coalition policy,¹⁴³ drew a particularly sharp response from the unions. The government announced its decision to convene the conference at the end of July, when conflicts over wages and other benefits for workers were in full swing. The intensity of the conflicts largely determined the attitude of the trade unions to the conference.

On August 7, a week after the government made its announcement, a joint meeting of the Moscow Central Trade Union Bureau and representatives from twenty-eight major trade union bureaus adopted a resolution that expressed their intention "to conduct broad agitation among the unions in favor of a vigorous action against the entire counter-revolutionary policy of the ruling bourgeoisie which [the policy] culminated in the convocation of the Moscow State Conference."¹⁴⁴ Two days later, in fulfillment of that promise, the Moscow Central Trade Union Bureau organized another meeting, which was attended by representatives from forty-one trade union boards, as well as representatives from socialist parties and the Moscow Soviet.¹⁴⁵ I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov, a representative of the Moscow Committee of the Bolshevik party, delivered the keynote speech. In this speech he charged that the conference would represent the Russian *tsenzovye elementy* (census groups)—a widely used euphemism for propertied classes—and was an attempt by the counterrevolution to organize itself. Trade unions could not maintain neutrality, Skvortsov-Stepanov argued, in view of the growing wave of counterrevolution. He urged the participants of the meeting to organize demonstrations and meetings protesting against the conference.¹⁴⁶

By evoking the specter of counterrevolution, Skvortsov-Stepanov clearly appealed to fears that a prolonged political instability could threaten the survival of the unions.

Although some participants disagreed with the Bolshevik delegate,¹⁴⁷ a majority expressed their approval and adopted a resolution that was

essentially "internationalist" in spirit.¹⁴⁸ Although the resolution refrained from direct attacks against the government, it clearly implied that the policy of the Provisional Government abetted the counterrevolution and would lead to the destruction of democracy and unions. The resolution said:

While the Moscow Conference is being convened, [the convocation of] the Constituent Assembly is delayed further and further. The bourgeoisie cautiously but steadily moves toward its objective: to disrupt [the convocation of] the Constituent Assembly and to replace it with such an organ which would ensure its [the bourgeoisie's] domination.¹⁴⁹

The resolution recommended that the unions should participate in the work of the conference with one purpose only—to help in organizing "its revolutionary elements around the demands of the consistent revolutionary democracy." After this task was completed, the unions were to make "a declaration exposing the counterrevolutionary essence of the conference" and then "to depart ostentatiously from the conference." The resolution also urged the unions to stage mass meetings and a one-day strike in protest against the conference.¹⁵⁰

The initiative of trade unions in Moscow gained the support of unions throughout the country. On August 10, the Petrograd Council of Trade Unions approved a proposal, advanced by the Bolshevik V. D. Shmidt, which directed the trade union delegation at the State Conference "to make a declaration expressing its negative attitude toward the character of the conference."¹⁵¹ Strong statements against the Moscow State Conference were made by other major trade union organizations.¹⁵²

With several major industrial conflicts in Moscow and other parts of Russia under way,¹⁵³ the call for a protest against the government's policies fell on very fertile ground. The general strike in Moscow, which took place on August 12—the opening day of the conference—was a major success for the "internationalist" wing of the trade union movement. The next day, the newspaper *Izvestiia* carried the following account of events in Moscow:

The Moscow State Conference has opened under somewhat unusual circumstances: there is no street-car transportation, cafes and restaurants are closed. . . . From early morning, huge crowds of people—probably ten thousand—have gathered around the Bolshoi theater [where the conference met]. . . . The crowd greets the delegates in a rude manner. Only a small part of the crowd expresses an approval. Most of the crowd shows hostility; even hisses are heard.¹⁵⁴

In Moscow alone, over 400,000 workers took part in the strike.¹⁵⁵ Numerous workers' organizations throughout the country supported it.¹⁵⁶ Strikes protesting against the Moscow State Conference took place in many cities.¹⁵⁷

The campaign against the State Conference gave a powerful boost to the cause of the Bolshevik-led "internationalists." It provided them with an opportunity to publicize widely their objectives and to win more supporters in the trade union movement. For the first time since the beginning of the revolution, the "internationalists" were able to seize the initiative and to lead the trade union movement in a national campaign, and not just in individual unions and cities.

Even though their momentum somewhat slackened in the wake of the campaign, they continued to capitalize on the growing political and economic instability, and the discontent with the government that it generated among the trade union rank and file; they seized every opportunity to attack the coalition policy. The developing confrontation between workers and employers over wages and benefits, in which the trade unions took a very active part, greatly aided their efforts. As a result, toward the end of the summer a new political course began to take shape within the trade union movement. In contrast to the policy outlined by the Third Trade Union Conference, it envisaged a more active role for the trade unions in ending the war, establishing supervision over the management, and, above all, transferring power to the soviets.

These objectives figured prominently in the decisions of the First Regional Conference of the Urals Trade Unions, which took place in Ekaterinburg in August 10-15.¹⁵⁸ The resolution on the tasks of the trade unions, passed by the conference, noted that the conditions that had developed in Russia "threaten the very gains" achieved by the working class in the course of the revolution. The resolution called for the unity of trade unions and their close ("organic") cooperation with "the political class movement of the proletariat"—a clear instigation toward political involvement.¹⁵⁹ It stressed that the unions would be able to fulfill their tasks only if

*... they reject any idea of class cooperation, any possibility for class reconciliation with the domestic bourgeoisie; if during the elections to the Constituent Assembly they struggle for the victory of those socialist parties which persistently uphold the class interests of the proletariat and advocate the speediest termination of the war by way of mass revolutionary struggle against the ruling classes in all [belligerent] countries.*¹⁶⁰

In the resolution on the struggle against lockouts, the conference outlined its plan for combatting the industrial dislocation and lockouts in the Urals industrial region. According to the resolution, "revolutionary democracy" should organize comprehensive control over the entire "industrial and financial life of the country." The implementation of this control involved the creation of a broad network of special agencies—from "supervisory nuclei" at the enterprise level, to central organizations dominated by representatives of "revolutionary democracy." The resolution emphasized that this policy could be successful only when

... revolutionary democracy takes all power in its hands, since in [pursuing] its policy of lockouts the bourgeoisie relies on the central power which it has completely seized in its hands; thus, the struggle against the [economic] dislocation and lockouts becomes the struggle for power, the struggle for the victorious conclusion of the Russian revolution, for the fulfillment of its tasks.¹⁶¹

Similar demands and statements in support of the Bolshevik program also appeared in resolutions by other prominent trade union organizations.¹⁶² Demonstrating the growing influence of the "internationalists," the Executive Committee of the VTsSPS made a drastic departure from its earlier policy of noninvolvement in political matters by deciding in August to send its delegation to the Third Zimmerwald Peace Conference.¹⁶³ This move antagonized many moderate socialists who had always urged unions to remain neutral on the issue of the war.¹⁶⁴

As the "internationalists" continued gradually to expand their influence in the trade union movement, a new political crisis—the Kornilov affair—shook the country. It began to take shape toward the end of August when German troops broke through the Russian defenses and captured Riga. This offensive greatly alarmed the Russian population, especially in the capital, and prompted immediate action. For the trade unions, the Kornilov affair proved to be a powerful catalyst in their further radicalization. First of all, it dramatically demonstrated the fragility of the current political order and a potential threat to the survival of the unions that could emerge as a result of a right-wing coup. Secondly, it presented the "internationalists" with an excellent opportunity to step up their propaganda against the coalition policy and increase their influence in the movement.

Beginning on August 21—the day Riga was captured—representatives of the Petrograd Trade Union Council took part in several joint sessions together with representatives of the VTsIK, the CCFC, and other mass organizations. The sessions were convened on the initiative of the

VTsIK for the purpose of finding a solution to the critical situation developing in and around Petrograd. During the session of August 22, representatives of the Petrograd trade unions declared that they would support the VTsIK only when the latter would radically change its policy. They demanded the release of the radicals (mostly Bolsheviks) who were imprisoned in connection with the July crisis, and a guarantee that paramilitary workers' units—the Red Guards—would not be disarmed (as was the case after the July Days).¹⁶⁵ The joint meeting of the Petrograd Trade Union Council and the CCFC, held on August 24, passed a resolution that set up the Committee for the Defense of Petrograd. The resolution charged that the government allied itself with the “bourgeoisie” and became an instrument of the counterrevolution. According to the resolution, this policy was the source of the current crisis. As a way of resolving it, the resolution proposed the establishment of workers' control, the transfer of land to the peasant committees, the arming of workers, and a resolute struggle against all counterrevolutionary forces.¹⁶⁶

Despite the militant tone and radical demands (e.g., to arm workers and establish workers' control), the demand for the transfer of power to the soviets was conspicuously absent from the “internationalist” resolutions. This reticence indicated the unwillingness to oppose the soviets on the issue of power. Such an attitude sharply contrasted with the one prevalent in the factory committees. For example, the “internationalists” succeeded in effecting a compromise at the above-mentioned August 22 meeting of representatives from mass organizations. According to the Bolshevik newspaper *Proletarii*, in the course of the meeting “a complete rapture between the VTsIK and the representatives of the Petrograd proletariat became obvious.”¹⁶⁷ Extremists tried to widen the gap and get the meeting to adopt a resolution against the Provisional Government. Yet when this issue was called into question, the chairman of the Petrograd Trade Union Council, David Riazanov, (an “internationalist” who had only a short while ago joined the Bolshevik ranks) introduced a compromise proposal, promptly approved by the participants, which advised against the adoption of any resolution.¹⁶⁸ In his keynote address to the August 24 joint meeting of the Petrograd Trade Union Council and the CCFC, another prominent “internationalist,” S. A. Lozovskii, (a member of the Bolshevik party from June 1917)¹⁶⁹ carefully avoided any mention of the transfer of power to the soviets.¹⁷⁰ Although the final resolution of that meeting, which was based on Lozovskii's speech, contained some strongly worded condemnations of the government policies, it shunned the calls for the overthrow.¹⁷¹ Even when the news of the

Kornilov march on the capital reached Petrograd, the unions tried to maintain a relatively moderate posture and avoided any open rupture with the soviets. It was symptomatic that none of the trade union organizations in Petrograd were among the signatories of the Bolshevik appeal "To All the Working People, Workers, and Soldiers of Petrograd" calling for the establishment of soviet power, which was cosigned incidentally by the CCFC.¹⁷² The resolution of August 27 adopted by a joint meeting of the Petrograd Trade Union Council and the CCFC went only so far as to demand the introduction of a democratic republic by a government decree and carefully skirted around the issue of the transfer of power to the soviets.¹⁷³ Many other trade union organizations exercised similar restraint.¹⁷⁴ In its resolution, published on August 31, the Central Bureau of the metalworkers' union called for the unity of "revolutionary democracy," discipline, and restraint.¹⁷⁵ The most radical demands advanced by the Moscow Central Trade Union Council were the demands to organize workers' militia—the Red Guards—and to terminate the publication of the so-called bourgeois press, but the council stopped short of calling for the transfer of power to the soviets.¹⁷⁶ There were, however, trade union organizations that adopted more radical resolutions even at that early date. On August 29, for example, a meeting of factory committees and trade union boards in Voronezh adopted a resolution that demanded that the soviets should take the entire power in the country in their hands, arm the workers, and disarm the bourgeoisie.¹⁷⁷

Only when the major soviet organizations, particularly in Petrograd and Moscow, changed their position on the question of power¹⁷⁸ did the "internationalists" begin to include in their resolutions the demand for ending the coalition policy and replacing the Provisional Government. On September 5 the meeting of the Petrograd Trade Union Council, in which representatives from twenty-eight major unions took part, approved the motion by the moderate Bolshevik Glebov-Avilov to issue a political declaration based on the resolution "On Power," adopted by the Petrograd Soviet on August 31, which called for the transfer of power to the soviets.¹⁷⁹ The declaration in no uncertain words condemned the coalition policy. It said:

In the face of the counterrevolutionary mutiny by General Kornilov . . . the Petrograd Trade Union Council considers its duty to proclaim that from now on, all vacillations concerning the organization of power must be stopped. Not only must the representatives of the Constitutional Democratic party [Kadets], who were openly involved in the mutiny, and representatives of the census elements be removed [from power], but also rejected must be the overall policy

of conciliation and irresponsibility, as a result of which the supreme command [of the army] and the state apparatus turned into a breeding ground and a weapon of conspiracy against the revolution.¹⁸⁰

In a very short time after the major soviets changed their position on the issue of power, numerous trade union organizations passed resolutions advocating the termination of the coalition policy and the transfer of power to the soviets.¹⁸¹

The proponents of trade union neutrality stood little chance of holding their own against this rising tide of the opposition to the coalition policy in the unions. Under various guises, they made repeated attempts to revert the unions to the course outlined at the Third Conference; but these attempts invariably failed. For example, the chairman of the VTsSPS, Grinevich, met with a rebuff when he tried to get the participants in the September 4 session of the Moscow Trade Union Council to condemn the council's earlier decision to oppose the State Conference.¹⁸² In response to his insistence on depoliticizing the unions, the Bolshevik A. M. Bakhutov said:

The Central Bureau's action against the Moscow Conference in defiance of the will of the [Moscow] Soviet . . . in no way contradicts the decisions of the Third Trade Union Conference, which clearly speaks about a complete contact and support of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies and political parties [by the unions] in all [their] activities *directed at the broadening and deepening of the revolution*.¹⁸³

A large majority of the delegates spoke very favorably about the council's decision back in August. The meeting did not accede to Grinevich's demand and its refusal to pass any resolution on this issue signified a major victory for the "internationalists."

The growing opposition to the coalition policy in the trade union movement revealed itself most strikingly in connection with the convocation of the Democratic Conference, which was the last, desperate attempt by the moderate socialists to preserve the post-February political order.¹⁸⁴ The Conference was convened on the initiative of the VTsIK on September 14-22 with the aim of finding a solution for Russia's continued political crisis.¹⁸⁵ According to the resolution of the plenary meeting of the VTsIK, held on September 3, the objective of the Democratic Conference was to create "a strong revolutionary power capable of realizing the program of revolutionary democracy and conducting an active struggle against counterrevolution and external enemies."¹⁸⁶

Even when unions began to elect delegates to the conference,¹⁸⁷ it became clear that the "internationalists" would dominate the trade union delegation. Five out of six delegates elected by the Moscow Trade Union Council on September 9 could be identified as "internationalists."¹⁸⁸ On September 12, members of the Petrograd Trade Union Council decided that they would send delegates who stood on the platform of the council's resolution of September 5, which advocated the transfer of power to the soviets. As a result, all three delegates elected by the meeting were moderate Bolsheviks.¹⁸⁹ Opponents of the coalition policy constituted well over a half of the 120-member trade union delegation to the Democratic Conference.¹⁹⁰

Given this strong representation, it was not surprising that at the conference the trade union delegation supported the Bolshevik position on the question of power.¹⁹¹ The caucus of the trade union delegates (convened shortly before the opening of the conference to discuss the delegation's platform and selected its spokespersons) voted overwhelmingly against the coalition with the "bourgeoisie." The resolution opposing the coalition collected a total of seventy-three votes. As many as twenty Menshevik Internationalists voted for it. Two out of three official speakers from the delegation supported the termination of the coalition policy.¹⁹² It is interesting that even delegations from such moderate unions as, for example, the union of white-collar employees (where Bolsheviks were usually in minority) adopted this position. According to Grigorii Aronson, eight out of twelve delegates from that union voted against the coalition; and only one of them was a Bolshevik.¹⁹³

The decision of the delegation to support the "internationalist" platform represented a very serious setback for the moderate socialists. In protest against this decision, the chairman of the VTsSPS, Grinevich, resigned his post.¹⁹⁴ His resignation visibly dramatized the rapid decline of the moderate socialist influence. When the vote on the coalition policy was taken at the Democratic Conference, 139 trade union delegates voted against the coalition and only thirty-two voted in its favor.¹⁹⁵ Of the twenty-one representatives elected by the trade union group to the All-Russian Democratic Council—more commonly known as the Preparliament—thirteen were Bolsheviks.¹⁹⁶ The message of the trade union delegation was clear: no more vacillations on the question of power; the Provisional Government should step down and the power should be transferred to the soviets.

This powerful message further spurred antigovernment attitudes in the trade union movement. Following the Democratic Conference, num-

erous trade union organizations passed resolutions that linked the improvement of the economic situation and the attainment of their objectives with the removal of the Provisional Government. They also stated their determination to fight for the transfer of power to the soviets. A typical resolution was adopted by the First All-Russian Conference of the Textile Workers' Union (held shortly after the Democratic Conference, on September 23-28).¹⁹⁷ This resolution, which formally concerned the wage-scale campaign, said:

Noting the fact that an agreement with the bourgeoisie moves us further away from [achieving] the main economic objective of the present moment—the stabilization of [Russian] industry, that the coalition power will lead the Russian revolution into deadlock by subordinating foreign and domestic policies of the Russian republic to the interests of Russian and allied imperialists, that the economic policy of the Russian working class is directly connected with the problem of power, the All-Russian Conference of Textile Workers resolves: to conduct an energetic struggle against any reconciliation with the bourgeoisie and for the transfer of power into the hands of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, since only such power is capable of saving the country from the economic and political collapse and of improving the working class' [economic] status.¹⁹⁸

The resolution by the meeting of representatives from the Moscow metalworkers' union, held on October 15, set before the members of that union the task of "conquering power together with the village poor by way of organizing action through the Soviets."¹⁹⁹ Resolutions in support of the transfer of power to the soviets were passed by many other trade union organizations, congresses, and meetings.²⁰⁰

It should be emphasized that the change in the political orientation of the trade union movement did not mean that a one-party dictatorship advocated by Lenin was supported. The "internationalist" faction was dominated by the moderate Bolsheviks, and not by Lenin's followers. The former shared Lenin's conviction that Russian capitalism had already evolved into imperialism and Russia had "entered the period of liquidation of the capitalist order."²⁰¹ However, while Lenin insisted on establishing the dictatorship of the Bolshevik party and severing all contacts between the Bolsheviks and the moderate socialists,²⁰² the moderate Bolshevik leaders in the trade union movement were generally opposed to such steps and considered that contacts between all socialist parties within mass organizations—soviets, trade unions, et cetera—should be maintained. In September when Lenin raged in fury over the

decision of the Bolshevik leadership to take part in the Democratic Conference and demanded that the Bolsheviks should take power and chase the moderate socialists out of "all revolutionary organizations,"²⁰³ a prominent moderate Bolshevik and a trade union leader, Lozovskii, in what seemed to be an answer to Lenin, called in his article "The Ideological Differences in the Trade Union Movement" for the unity of all socialists within the labor movement.²⁰⁴ At the time, these differences in the Bolshevik camp were overshadowed by the common objective of transferring power to the soviets. They began to play an increasingly important role after the overthrow of the government when the two factions within the Bolshevik camp clashed over the future organization of soviet power. Labor politics would play a major role in the final outcome of this struggle.

As this chapter has shown, during the summer of 1917, the political course of the trade union movement changed from a tacit support of the Provisional Government to a vocal opposition against it. Toward the end of the summer, the trade union movement increasingly came under the sway of the "internationalist" faction led by the moderate Bolsheviks. This change was reflected in the policy statements made by various trade union organizations and in the composition of central trade union organizations. At the beginning of the summer the leadership of the trade union movement had, by and large, a moderate socialist majority; nothing made this fact more evident than the election of the Menshevik Grinevich as the chairman of VTsSPS. In the fall the situation changed dramatically. The leadership in many unions and in central organizations was in the hands of the "internationalists";²⁰⁵ facing a nonconfidence vote, Grinevich had to resign his position. In a demonstration of their support for the Bolshevik platform, many prominent "internationalists" (such as Riazanov and Lozovskii) went so far as to join formally the Bolshevik party.

Undoubtedly, workers' antagonisms toward employers did have an effect on the political evolution of the trade union movement. However, one should be cautioned against overemphasizing this factor. While workers' antagonisms were very strong, the trade unions could and did try to play a constructive role. They tried to ameliorate workers' antagonisms by improving their conditions and to help the government in curbing the economic decline. However, the inability of the government to provide leadership in creating a system of industrial regulation and its failure to create an effective system for mediating industrial disputes

antagonized the unions and left them no choice but to take a confrontational approach in dealings with the government.

The unions viewed the growing economic and political chaos in the country with apprehension: a right-wing coup (of the Kornilov type) might have led to the suppression of trade unions. Since the Provisional Government proved to be incapable of coping with the deteriorating conditions, the trade unions eventually began to look for political alternatives to the post-February political order. The only other alternative acceptable to the unions was the transfer of power to the soviets advocated by the Bolshevik party. It appealed to the unions by its promise to end the political and economic instability and to enhance the role of the unions in economic matters. Thus, a concern for the survival of their organizations and the desire to enhance their role was a major factor in turning the unions against the Provisional Government.



4

The Struggle for Control of Industry

The Kornilov affair sounded the death knell of the coalition policy. Following this episode, the Liberals no longer wanted to be associated with the Provisional Government. Upon the resignation of the four remaining members of the Kadet party from the government, F. F. Kokoshkin, the state comptroller, stated that all four departing officials considered that “a coalition government . . . cannot exist now.”¹ The support for the coalition policy also precipitously declined in the soviets, with the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets—the two most important soviet organizations in the country—taking the lead in adopting pro-Bolshevik resolutions on power.² Yet the leadership of the moderate socialist bloc was unwilling to heed the call for ending the coalition. At the same time, the Bolsheviks and their supporters intensified the pressure for the transfer of power to the soviets.

In an attempt to reconcile the two camps and resolve the ongoing political crisis, the Provisional Government in September convened the Democratic Conference, which represented a broad spectrum of the left-wing forces and excluded the Liberals. As the conference got under way, there were some favorable signs that the crisis in fact could be resolved by creating a purely socialist government, including the Bolsheviks.³ Against Lenin’s opposition, the Bolsheviks even joined the Council of the Republic (also called Preparliament), which was formed by the conference.⁴ Yet these constructive steps ended in a total failure when on October 7 the Bolsheviks left the Council, in protests against the continued refusal of the moderate socialists to resolve the issue of power and transfer power to the soviets.⁵

On October 10, following the departure from the Council of the Republic, a secret meeting of the Bolshevik Central Committee adopted the decision to begin preparations for an uprising. This decision was

upheld by the subsequent expanded meeting of the Central Committee with representatives of mass organizations on October 16.⁶ In implementing these decisions, the Bolsheviks staged the uprising on October 25 and overthrew the Provisional Government. In the afternoon of that day, Lenin made his historic announcement about the transfer of power to the soviets at the Second Soviet Congress (then in progress in Petrograd), which created the first Soviet government dominated by the Bolsheviks and headed by Lenin.⁷

As soon as they took power, Lenin and his supporters proceeded to consolidate their position. Lenin's government did so in two ways: first, it adopted decrees addressing the issues that had wide popular appeal, such as peace and land; and second, it took steps designed to silence the opposition (suppressing the opposition press and organizing the political police, or Cheka).⁸ Yet despite these efforts, the prospects for Lenin's plans remained rather precarious. As shown by the elections to the Constituent Assembly, held in mid-November, in which the Bolsheviks won only about a quarter of the total vote, Lenin's opponents outside the party enjoyed wide popular support.⁹ There was also significant opposition inside the party to the establishment of the Bolshevik dictatorship.

Besieged by opponents both inside and outside the Bolshevik party, Lenin and his supporters began a protracted struggle for establishing a Bolshevik monopoly on power. Rather than seek to stabilize the situation and come to terms with the opposition, Lenin's government engaged in radical experimentation, adventurist foreign policy, and broad repression. These policies contributed to a greater political polarization and the civil war. Yet, surprisingly as it may appear, they also helped to solidify the Bolshevik dictatorship. They deepened the cleavage between the Bolshevik party and the rest of the Russian left, making a reconciliation between the Bolsheviks and the moderate socialists virtually impossible. Labor, and first of all the factory committees, played a very important role in the politics of this period.

LABOR AND THE OCTOBER TAKEOVER

The political reorientation of the trade unions at the beginning of the fall of 1917 marked a complete break between the labor movement and the Provisional Government. Indeed, there were still some vacillations; however, they were no longer over the question of whether the post-February political system should be replaced or not, but rather, how to

bring about this change. Labor organizations, which were now dominated by the Bolsheviks (whether radical or moderate), were busy discussing tactical issues and organizational problems related to the transfer of power to the soviets. These organizations helped to create the Red Guards—workers' paramilitary detachments that were an important part of the insurgent armed force in the uprising of October 25-26. They also provided money and logistical support for the insurrection; many labor activists were involved in planning and directing it.¹⁰

The support of labor for the government's overthrow did not necessarily mean an endorsement of a dictatorial system under the Bolshevik tutelage. In fact, there is a great deal of evidence showing that many labor organizations and workers favored the idea of a democratic government on the soviet model, which would involve all socialist parties. Of the thirty-nine resolutions from labor organizations published in *Izvestiia* on October 1, only one favored a solution that may appear as dictatorial (it called for the transfer of power to the "revolutionary proletariat," rather than "revolutionary democracy"—a euphemism for an all-socialist government). The rest favored some type of a democratic solution.¹¹

Many Bolshevik labor leaders who participated in the expanded meeting of the Bolshevik CC on October 16, which discussed the uprising, indicated that a "temporizing" attitude was quite widespread among workers.¹² Ivan Gaza noted that at the time of the October takeover, several shops at the Putilov plant "had a coalition fever" and demanded the creation of "uniform socialist power."¹³ The issue of the newspaper *Novaia zhizn'* that appeared on November 1 reported that a general meeting of the workers employed at the Putilov plant and shipyards protested against the Bolshevik coup and demanded the formation of a "united revolutionary authority." The newspaper also reported a second meeting of the Putilov shipyard attended by four thousand workers that issued a similar demand.¹⁴ Workers at the giant Obukhovskii works put forward demands for creating a "uniform socialist government" on October 30 and 31.¹⁵ According to *Novaia zhizn'*, a meeting at the Patronnyi plant in Petrograd, attended by two thousand workers, adopted a similar resolution proposed jointly by Bolsheviks, Menshevik Internationalists, and Left SRs. Workers at the Orudiinyi plant demanded the creation of a government consisting of all socialist parties represented in the soviets.¹⁶ It is worth mentioning that many resolutions did not see the transfer of power to the soviets as a permanent solution, but only as a temporary stage that would ensure a peaceful transition to a Constituent Assembly.

A resolution adopted by workers at the Nobel factory in Saratov shortly after the October insurrection was an example of this attitude.¹⁷

The demand for an all-socialist democratic government was especially popular in the trade unions. Dominated by the moderate Bolsheviks, a majority of the trade union organizations insisted on reaching an agreement among all socialist parties. In his memoirs, V. Perazich thus characterized the erstwhile trade union leadership:

In this situation [i.e., at the end of October] the only salvation was a strong dictatorship of the proletariat. . . . One cannot say, however, that the "top echelon" of our trade union movement quickly understood the current situation, despite the fact that the Bolsheviks already had a majority in the leadership of most of the trade unions and in the [Petrograd] Council of Unions. At the time, many of these leaders, brought up on the examples of the Western European workers' movement, were still largely captivated by old social-democratic ideas.¹⁸

There is considerable evidence that supports this assessment and shows that indeed many Bolshevik labor leaders, particularly those in the trade unions, favored a democratic solution of the problem of power, and they tried to do something to bring it about. The position of the Bolshevik trade unionists at the October 16 expanded meeting of the Bolshevik CC, mentioned earlier, was very indicative in this respect. By insisting that the predominant attitude among workers did not favor an uprising, they covertly advised the party to take a more moderate course and refrain from staging an insurrection.

Following the October takeover, Bolshevik trade unionists continued to promote a democratic solution. Early in November, the Petrograd Trade Union Council adopted the following resolution:

Recognizing that power should belong only to the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies, the Petrograd Trade Union Council insists upon an immediate agreement of all socialist parties, based on the following conditions:

1. The organization of a uniform socialist power accountable to the Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, supplemented by representatives of the parties which left [the Second Congress of Soviets] and representatives of the Executive Committee of [the Soviets of] Peasants' Deputies. The government should be formed from representatives of all socialist parties, from the Bolsheviks to the Popular Socialists inclusively.¹⁹

Similar resolutions were adopted by the Moscow Trade Union Council, the Petrograd metalworkers' union, and the textile workers' union.²⁰ The

board of the textile union temporarily froze funds collected for the VTsIK (3,000 rubles) and the Military Revolutionary Committee (1,000 rubles); its objective was to put pressure on these organizations so that they would agree to create an all-socialist government. It was only after the failure of the Vikzhel' negotiations at the end of October that the board changed its position.²¹ The powerful railroad workers' union (Vikzhel') threatened a national strike if the Bolshevik CC refused to negotiate with other socialist parties.²²

Even the CCFC, where the influence of the radical Bolsheviks was very strong, initially adopted, in late October, a resolution that demanded that all socialist parties should come to an agreement. The resolution specified that the new democratic government should include representatives from all socialist parties in proportion to their representation at the Second Congress of Soviets, and that it should be responsible before the VTsIK. The resolution also stated that all socialist parties (presumably that would also include the Bolsheviks) that refused to accept these guidelines should be considered traitors to the revolution.²³

Yet despite labor's initial opposition to a dictatorial solution, labor organizations eventually became involved in the creation and consolidation of the Bolshevik dictatorship. Two fundamental questions arise in this connection: what were the reasons why labor organizations changed their position in favor of the dictatorship, and what was their role in its establishment and consolidation? Western studies of revolutionary labor explain labor policies after the October takeover as due to Russia's dire circumstances, the deceptive tactics of the Bolshevik leadership, divisions within the working class, and the lack of experience and systematic strategy on the part of working-class organizations.²⁴ Few would deny the validity of these factors. However, it is hard to understand labor policies in the post-October period without taking into account the specific institutional interests and concerns of factory committees and trade unions.

WORKERS' CONTROL AND LABOR POLITICS

Few issues concerned the factory committees as much as did workers' control. This study has shown how important this issue was in defining the factory committees' attitude toward the Provisional Government. They fiercely opposed the government in order to secure their role in economic regulation and, as a result, their own survival and independence. Yet the Provisional Government was not the only menace to the

factory committees' independent role in regulating production. Another, and probably more serious threat came from the trade unions, which did not regard the factory committees as an autonomous part of the labor movement and tried to turn them into their own subordinate organizations.

Trade union leaders started their attacks on factory committee independence long before the October insurrection. They charged that by insisting on autonomy the factory committees created a dangerous division within the labor movement, that factory committees did not have the necessary experience and expertise to supervise production, and that they lacked the organizational structure and personnel to perform this function.

Despite many differences, the views of the moderate socialist and the moderate Bolshevik trade unionists on this issue were virtually identical. The desire to dominate the factory committees transcended bloc divisions among trade unionists and vividly exemplified their common interest. For example, in his unpublished manuscript Solomon Schwarz indicated that two Bolshevik trade unionists, Vladimir Shmidt and Nikolai Glebov-Avilov, had participated in drafting the decree of April 23 on the factory committees and had not raised the issue of factory committees' participation in management.²⁵ Speaking at the Third All-Russian Trade Union Conference, Glebov-Avilov emphasized that "the task of supervising production is a task of the trade unions," not factory committees. He insisted that factory committees should be subordinated to the trade unions and provide personnel for agencies of economic regulation set up by the unions. Glebov-Avilov particularly objected to the efforts of the CCFC (of which he was a member) to be financially independent from the unions. "This is an impossible situation," he stated, "and we must fight against it." In his view, a factory committee should receive funds for its operation from the appropriate trade union, and should have no right to launch strikes and present demands to employers without the consent of that union.²⁶

Demonstrating their remarkable unanimity with moderate Bolsheviks on this issue, Mensheviks P. Garvi and A. S. Astrov drew up a resolution after Glebov-Avilov's report, which was adopted by the Third Conference. This resolution directed trade unions to establish their control over factory committees, and stated unambiguously that the latter should be turned into the unions' primary cells. For example, according to the resolution, trade unions were to prepare slates of candidates to be elected to the factory committees and supervise elections.²⁷

Since the trade unions had no means of enforcing such decisions, they tried to use persuasion. The first serious attempt to convince the factory committees to give up their independence took place at the First Conference of the Petrograd Factory Committees. Moderate Bolsheviks led this initiative. One of their principal spokespersons on this issue, Riazanov, argued in his speech that factory committees achieved their prominent position only because of the initial weakness of trade unions, thus implying that as the trade unions became stronger, the factory committees should accept their tutelage. He insisted that "the economic functions of the factory committees are ephemeral," that they could not successfully protect workers' rights and welfare, and that their role could only be that of unions' primary cells and, therefore, they needed no central organization of their own.²⁸

Following Lenin's lead, radical Bolsheviks opposed this move. To them and their leader, the idea of subordinating the radical factory committees to the more moderate trade unions (which, at the time, still tacitly supported the Provisional Government) was, for political reasons, totally unacceptable. They saw the factory committees' radicalism as a sword to be used against the government; they did not want this sword to be blunted. As was stated in the draft resolution on the tasks of the factory committees by V. M. Levin, a radical Bolshevik labor leader, the special role of the factory committees was "to further the goals of the revolution," not just to improve workers' conditions or to save the economy.²⁹ The radical Bolsheviks bitterly criticized the position advocated by the moderates within their own party. Responding to Riazanov, Matvei Zhivotov, a prominent figure in the factory committee movement, said:

It is not surprising . . . that the bourgeoisie struggles against factory committees—this is quite understandable. But I am surprised when Minister [of Labor M. I.] Skobelev has shrugged them off [otmakhnulsia] and said: 'factory committees have accomplished their task and now they should serve as mere tentacles of trade union.' It is not an accident that the opinion of the minister coincides with the wishes of the bourgeoisie. But it is absolutely beyond [my] understanding when comrade Riazanov and comrade [V. D.] Rubtsov [a member of the board of the Petrograd metal workers' union and a member of the CCFC] say almost the same thing. According to them, factory committees should be merely nuclei of trade union organizations. This is exactly what Minister Skobelev has said.³⁰

Led by radical Bolsheviks, the opponents of subordination emphasized the independent and combative nature of the factory committee movement.

Although they indicated that they would not forgo a close relationship and cooperation with the trade unions, they insisted that the factory committees had their own distinct functions and should preserve their independence and organizational autonomy.

As has already been pointed out earlier, the conference approved that position and created an independent central organization of the Petrograd factory committees, the CCFC, which became the *de facto* national center for the factory committee movement. According to the conference's resolution, the CCFC and the Petrograd Central Trade Union Bureau should work out "specific organizational forms of cooperation between the trade unions and factory committees," but the CCFC was in no way to be dependent on the bureau.³¹

In August, the proponents of subordination tried once again to raise the issue of the relationship between factory committees and trade unions at the Second Conference of the Petrograd Factory Committees. This time they acted with greater circumspection so as not to antagonize the delegates. In his keynote speech on this issue, the moderate Bolshevik S. Lozovskii, secretary of the VTsSPS, devoted considerable attention to the theme of separate roles and functions of the two types of workers' organizations. However, the central thesis of his speech was that the trade unions should play the leading role in the labor movement. "Trade unions," he said, "include the most conscious representatives of the working class," and, therefore, were more suited for leading workers. While trade unions should be concerned with general policies of the labor movement, factory committees should confine themselves to local matters. While paying lip service to the role of factory committees in industrial regulation, Lozovskii also pointed out that even in this sphere they should be subordinated to the trade unions: "Insofar as trade unions organize [all workers of] a given trade, factory committees are a part of the trade union movement; they [should] implement locally decisions of an [appropriate] union and should [help to] involve broad masses into the trade union movement."³² He denied any independent role to the factory committees, which, according to Lozovskii, should have no right to initiate strikes or take any other action on their own.³³

Lozovskii's maneuvering did not deceive the delegates. They rejected the moderate Bolshevik proposal to change the status of the factory committees in the labor movement. As the radical Bolshevik N. A. Skrypnik, a leading figure in the factory committee movement, put it, "we do not want to look for new plans, let us develop and strengthen those forms [of labor organizations] which we already have."³⁴ On the

proposal of the CCFC's chairman, N. I. Derbyshev, the conference, by an overwhelming majority, confirmed the resolution on the relationship between the factory committees and the trade unions that had been adopted by the First Conference of the Petrograd Factory Committees, and which stressed that both organizations should enjoy independent status within the labor movement.³⁵

Despite these setbacks in the capital, the proponents of subordination made some headway in other parts of Russia. During the summer and fall, a number of influential labor organizations (including some factory committee organizations) accepted the idea of subordination. The position taken on this issue by the metalworkers' union—one of the most powerful labor organizations in the country—played a very important role in this respect. As early as June 11, the board of this union had adopted a resolution that emphasized that factory committees in the metal industry were to be subordinated to the union. The resolution read:

The union is the highest and sole organization which is responsible for the conduct of workers in this industry. In the general framework of organization of [workers] in this industry, factory committees occupy a position subordinate to that of the trade unions.³⁶

Although the union later modified this position somewhat,³⁷ the main principles of relationship between the union and committees in the metal industry remained essentially unchanged. For example, the Moscow Regional Conference of the Metalworkers' Union, held in October, adopted a resolution that confirmed that the union was the highest workers' organization in the metal industry and factory committees should implement its decisions. "One of the main tasks of the union," the resolution stated, "is to make sure that factory committees confine themselves to that role."³⁸

In response to this and similar pressures from trade unions, some factory committee organizations accepted the tutelage of the trade unions. The increased strength of the trade unions and their radicalization at the end of the summer most likely aided in this development. In its resolution on the relationship between the factory committees and the trade unions, a joint conference of unions and factory committees in the city of Iaroslavl' stressed that "the leadership in the economic struggle of workers should be exercised by the trade unions, which also direct all general policies on a national scale." Factory committees should carry out policies outlined by unions, "providing for that purpose their entire apparatus." The conference also stipulated that factory committees

should be composed of as many trade union leaders as was possible.³⁹ Similar resolutions were adopted by the First Conference of Factory Committees in the city of Saratov (October 11-13), the First Conference of Factory Committees in the city of Arkhangel'sk (October 11), and a conference of factory committees of the Tavricheskaia province (October 13-14).⁴⁰

Overall, however, the opposition to subordination remained quite strong. Many factory committee organizations, including the powerful CCFC, continued to insist on special prerogatives and the organizational independence of the factory committee movement. On October 11, for example, the factory committee conference in the city of Nikolaev, in the Kherson province, adopted a resolution stressing that factory committees "are completely independent organizations which should maintain close contacts with the trade unions in [those] spheres which have general significance." However, the resolution stipulated that factory committees merely had to inform trade unions about their activities, not to seek their approval.⁴¹

Similarly, a factory committee conference in Ekaterinburg also refused to endorse the subordination of the factory committees and emphasized their leading role, both "in the center and locally," in matters related to supervision and regulation of industrial production.⁴² Directives for the delegates from Odessa to the First All-Russian Factory Committee Conference emphasized that they should support the strengthening of factory committee organizations and their close cooperation with trade union organizations rather than subordination.⁴³ The regulations of factory committees in Ivanovo-Voznesensk also included a clause regarding the independent role of factory committees in regulating industry.⁴⁴

A major showdown between the proponents and opponents of factory committee independence took place at the First All-Russian Factory Committee Conference. This first national forum of factory committees took place in Petrograd on October 17-22 and was attended by 239 delegates and guests.⁴⁵ The moderate Bolsheviks completely dominated the conference, and most of the conference's decisions reflected this influence. The general trend of the discussion on the current situation was indicative in this respect. Trotsky, the main speaker on this issue, did not even once mention in his speech the proletarian dictatorship. The final resolution based on that speech called for the transfer of power to the soviets as a way of preserving democracy and ensuring the convocation and proper functioning of the Constituent Assembly.⁴⁶ Very few delegates spoke unfavorably about the convocation of the Constituent

Assembly—one was an SR-Maximalist from Khar'kov, Vas'ko, and another an anarcho-syndicalist member of the CCFC, V. S. Shatov.⁴⁷

The moderate Bolsheviks also prevailed in the discussion on workers' control. Two of them, Vladimir Miliutin and Iurii Larin, were keynote speakers on this issue.⁴⁸ They both argued in favor of "state workers' control"—that is, a system for supervising and regulating production organized by the state and dominated by workers' representatives (two thirds, according to Miliutin). They indicated that this system was to be used for advancing the cause of democracy, rather than creating a dictatorship. In their view, it was a way of transferring "democratic ideas in the economic sphere" (Larin's expression). As such, this system was compatible with capitalism and did not require socialization of industrial enterprises or the establishment of the proletarian dictatorship. Larin even spoke about the introduction of workers' control through the Constituent Assembly. He argued that there was every reason for capitalists to welcome workers' control as a way of making their enterprises work and getting "at least some return on their capital."⁴⁹

There were two major groups opposed to the moderate Bolsheviks. One of them, the anarcho-syndicalists, considered workers' control as the first step in transferring the ownership of the means of production to workers.⁵⁰ They rejected the view of workers' control as merely a supervision over essentially the capitalist economy. Piotrovskii, an anarcho-syndicalist from Odessa, said:

... control over production and control commissions should not be merely supervisory bodies, but rather they should become the nuclei of the future now and begin preparing for the transfer of the [entire] production into the hands of workers.⁵¹

Iustin Zhuk, a very famous anarchist from the Shlisselburg gunpowder plant, proposed that control commissions consisting of representatives of various trades were to be united into one federation that would serve as the supreme organization for managing the country's economy. Once this organization was created, Zhuk argued, "capitalists will become superfluous" and "factories, plants, and land will be transferred into the hands of toilers."⁵²

The radical Bolsheviks was another faction that challenged the moderate Bolshevik view of workers' control. They essentially agreed with the latter that the state should organize the system for economic regulation.⁵³ However, in contrast to the moderates, who insisted that "all classes [which are] interested in developing production and increasing

consumption can really regulate the economic life,"⁵⁴ the radicals argued in favor of a much narrower approach toward organizing the system of industrial regulation. From their point of view, workers' control should advance the cause of the proletarian dictatorship, which in fact implied that regulatory agencies should exclude factions opposed to the dictatorship. Skrypnik stated, for example, in his speech: "In reality, only toilers are interested in [establishing] control over production, one must not deny the class character of the demand for workers' control."⁵⁵

By an overwhelming majority of eighty-three votes, with four opposing votes and one abstention, the conference adopted the moderate Bolshevik position on workers' control. The final resolution was based on the drafts submitted by Larin and Miliutin. It stressed a democratic, rather than class, orientation of workers' control. "Having overthrown the autocracy in the political sphere," the resolution said, "the working class also strived toward ensuring the triumph of the democratic order in the sphere of its productive activity." The resolution specifically indicated that workers' control did not involve a socialist transformation of the existing economic order, but rather should be implemented in the essentially capitalist environment.⁵⁶ Contrary to the emphasis of radical Bolsheviks on the class character of workers' control, the resolution underlined that economic regulation should serve the interests of "the entire contemporary [Russian] society, the entire nation," rather than the interests of "toilers" alone.⁵⁷

While the moderate Bolsheviks achieved a relatively easy victory on the issue of workers' control, the discussion of the relationship between the factory committees and the trade unions generated the most controversy at the conference. The moderate Bolsheviks insisted on subordination. Larin proposed that central factory committee organizations should be reorganized into departments of workers' control at trade union councils. While they were to implement economic policies, the formulation of these policies would be a prerogative of trade union organizations.⁵⁸ Vladimir Shmidt, another moderate Bolshevik, insisted that "the policies of the factory committees should be unconditionally subordinated to the trade unions." He was only willing to concede some autonomy to the committees in executing policies ("the technical sphere") at the plant level.⁵⁹ V. Lin'kov, a delegate from Saratov, supported Shmidt and insisted that factory committees should become "trade union locals." Therefore, he argued, they did not need their own central organizations.⁶⁰ David Riazanov put it even more bluntly by proposing that factory committees should merge with trade unions.⁶¹

These proposals produced a furor among the opponents of moderate Bolsheviks. Anarcho-syndicalists viewed them as an attempt to “gobble up” (*sozhrat'*) the factory committees.⁶² They went to the opposite extreme and insisted that factory committees rather than trade unions should manage the country's economy. In their view, unions were to become mere “federations of factory committees.”⁶³

Although radical Bolsheviks did not in principle object to the merging in the future, they did not consider that it was appropriate at that time. Instead, they advocated an autonomous and cooperative coexistence of both organizations. Skrypnik said in his speech:

All forms of the labor movement should be consolidated [eventually]. But at the present time, we cannot make factory committees into agencies totally [subordinate to] trade unions.⁶⁴

He proposed that for the time being factory committees should follow the trade union policies only in matters related to the improvement of workers' conditions. However, policies related to economic regulation should be formulated at joint meetings of representatives from factory committees and trade unions.⁶⁵

The relationship between the factory committees and the trade unions was such an explosive and divisive issue that the presidium of the conference (dominated by the moderate Bolsheviks) decided to remove it from the floor. It created a special nine-member commission that wrote and voted the final version of the resolution on this issue. This move did not seem to have abated the controversy. The results of the voting in the commission showed that disagreements continued to be very strong. Each paragraph of the final resolution was voted separately and passed only by a very narrow majority. For example, crucial paragraph 5, which dealt with the status of the newly created all-Russian central organization of the factory committees, passed only barely, with five votes in favor, three votes against, and one abstention.⁶⁶

The final resolution was a hard blow against factory committee independence. Factory committee organizations were to be fractionalized and subordinated to trade unions both on the national and local levels. Paragraph 5 ruled that the All-Russian Council of Factory Committees would become the Department of Industrial Regulation and Workers' Control at the VTsSPS. The resolution stipulated that this department should include representatives of the VTsSPS and national union organizations. The relations between local factory committees and trade

union councils were to be modeled on the same pattern. Factory committee councils were to be divided into industrial sections, which would supervise working conditions and the hiring of workers in different industries under the direction of an appropriate industrial union. If the factory committee and union leadership would agree, individual sections of a factory committee central organization could become departments of workers' control in unions.⁶⁷

Despite the passage of the resolution, the opposition to the subordination remained very strong and evidently only a skillful maneuver—the moving of the vote to a special narrow commission—allowed the moderate Bolsheviks to defeat their opponents. The adoption of the resolution posed for many factory committee activists a difficult choice. If they followed the moderate Bolsheviks, they would have to accept the destruction of centrally organized autonomous network of factory committees (as envisaged in the resolution) and the subordination of the factory committees to the trade unions. If, on the other hand, they wanted to preserve the autonomy of the factory committee movement, they would have to support their radical opponents who promised to give factory committees an independent role in economic regulation. One cannot overlook the profound political implications of that choice. In order to preserve their independence, factory committee activists had to turn against the moderate Bolsheviks, who advocated the creation of a democratic system on the soviet model, and side with radicals, who were committed to the establishment of the “proletarian dictatorship.” And conversely, support for a democratic cause would spell the end of the movement's autonomy.

THE DECREE ON WORKERS' CONTROL

On the eve of the October insurrection, the Bolshevik party was deeply divided between the moderate Bolsheviks, who tried to reach an agreement among all socialist parties and establish a democratic government responsible to the soviets, and the radicals, who followed Lenin in his single-minded drive for dictatorship. The available evidence indicates that at the time of the October insurrection the moderates held the upper hand in the party's leadership. Their influence began to increase after the events in July. They succeeded in countering Lenin's demands for an immediate uprising and for the Bolshevik withdrawal from the Democratic Conference, convened by the Provisional Government in mid-September for the purpose of reconciling the left. As Lenin himself

admitted at the time: "Not all is well at the 'parliamentary' top of our party. . . . There is not the slightest doubt that at the 'top' of our party we see vacillations which can become ruinous."⁶⁸ The Bolshevik CC resisted Lenin's efforts and even suppressed his writings. For example, his article "O geroiakh podloga i ob oshibkakh bol'shevikov" (On the Heroes of Forgery and the Mistakes of the Bolsheviks), in which he criticized the Bolshevik leadership for trying to reach an agreement with the moderate socialists, was published several weeks after Lenin had submitted it. Moreover, it was censored and its crucial passages were deleted.⁶⁹ Lenin bitterly complained about this and even threatened to resign from the CC and split the party.⁷⁰

Although Lenin managed to get his way in October on the issue of an uprising after a bitter struggle with the moderates at the October 10 and October 16 meetings of the Bolshevik CC, the predominant mood in the party's leadership favored an all-socialist government. As Robert Daniels summarized:

The party . . . was tacitly violating his [Lenin's] instructions and waiting for a multi-party and semi-constitutional revolution by the Congress of Soviets. Lenin had failed to seize the moment, failed to avert the trend to a compromise coalition regime of the soviets, failed to nail down the base for his personal dictatorship.⁷¹

Following the insurrection on October 25, the Bolshevik moderates convinced the CC to take part in the negotiations organized by the All-Russian Railroad Workers' Union (Vikzhel') with the aim of reaching an agreement among the socialists.⁷²

The CC delegated Kamenev and G. Sokol'nikov for the Vikzhel' negotiations. Even when it became clear that the negotiations had reached an impasse, the CC in its resolution of November 1 decided to make the final attempt to reach an agreement with the moderate socialists.⁷³ As the minutes of the CC meeting of October 29 show, the Bolshevik leadership on the whole agreed to form a government with the moderate socialists. A secretary's notation in the minutes of the October 29 meeting indicated that the Bolshevik CC was even willing to consider the removal of Lenin and Trotsky from the government as the price for an agreement. There was also a note in the minutes that a proposal to this effect was adopted by the meeting.⁷⁴ Although the text of this proposal was not included in the official version of the minutes (the secretary's notations were crossed out), A. Avtorkhanov, an expert on the Soviet Communist Party history, asserts that this proposal was incorporated into paragraph

6 of the Bolshevik conditions for an agreement. This paragraph stated that the Bolshevik CC accepted the right of both sides in the negotiations to "reject [any] party candidates" for the government.⁷⁵

Even when the negotiations failed, the CC did not abandon attempts to seek reconciliation with the moderate socialists. In pursuing this course, it clearly went against Lenin who insisted on breaking the negotiations or using them as "a diplomatic cover-up for militant actions." Only four members of the CC voted for withdrawing from the Vikzhel' negotiations, as opposed to ten members who voted in favor of continuing the negotiations. The participants in the meeting also decided to present an ultimatum to moderate socialists that would spell out the Bolshevik conditions for an agreement. They rejected, however, the proposal by the radicals to demand an immediate answer to the ultimatum and decided to wait for two hours during which the moderate socialists could still give their answer.⁷⁶ It was not until after the Vikzhel' negotiations failed completely (largely due to the unwillingness of the moderate socialists to accept the transfer of power to the soviets)⁷⁷ that Lenin was able to have his way within the party leadership.

It is beyond the scope of this study to discuss the reasons for Lenin's opposition to an agreement with the moderate socialists. Suffice it to say that it had deep roots in his political philosophy and could be traced back to the beginning of his career. As early as 1901, in his article "Goniteli zemstva i annibaly liberalizma" (Oppressors of Zemstvo and Hannibals of Liberalism), Lenin attacked the idea of a coalition with the liberals in a future revolution that was advocated by the Mensheviks.⁷⁸ Lenin's political course from February to October of 1917 was largely determined by his drive for exclusive power. On more than one occasion, Lenin stated that the Bolshevik party should strive toward political domination for itself.⁷⁹ Merle Fainsod, a perceptive interpreter of Soviet politics, concluded in his *How Russia Is Ruled* that in order to understand "the turnings and twistings of Soviet policy, the advances and retreats, the continuities and the reversals, it is essential to comprehend the preoccupation with power which has motivated the responsible Bolshevik leadership at every crucial stage in the development and consolidation of the Soviet political system."⁸⁰ Many other Western scholars have agreed with Fainsod.⁸¹

Throughout 1917, Lenin's course regarding an agreement with the moderate socialists varied from covert opposition to open hostility. Lenin's telegram to the Bolsheviks who were leaving for Russia in March 1917 stressed that there should be no rapprochement between

the Bolsheviks and other socialist parties.⁸² In his letter to V. A. Karpinskii, written on March 25, Lenin repeated the same demand and even threatened to split with anyone in the Bolshevik party who advocated such a rapprochement.⁸³ Lenin's slogan "Power to the Soviets," advanced in the "April Theses," did not mean that Lenin finally agreed to a compromise. On the contrary, Lenin insisted that the Bolsheviks should take active steps toward transferring power to the soviets only when they had a majority there.⁸⁴ At the April Conference, for example, Lenin emphasized that the soviets were not important to him as a form of political organization. "It is important for us," he stated, "which classes these Soviets represent," that is, which party controlled the soviets.⁸⁵

In his speech at the First All-Russian Congress of Soviets Lenin confirmed that his objective was, indeed, the assumption of "political power in its entirety" by the Bolshevik party.⁸⁶ Lenin repeated this call, as well as the demand for no rapprochement with the moderate socialists, on numerous occasions throughout the spring, summer, and fall of 1917. On September 22, he made the following entry in his "Diary of a Publicist": "Down with the Mensheviks and the SRs! Merciless struggle against them! Chase them without compassion from all revolutionary organizations, no negotiations with these *friends of the Kishkins* [a prominent Kadet and a member of the Provisional Government], friends of Kornilovite landowners and capitalists."⁸⁷

During the period immediately preceding the October uprising, Lenin demanded that the Bolsheviks sever all relations with the moderate socialists, that a merciless struggle be conducted against them, and that they be expelled from "all revolutionary organizations."⁸⁸ Finally, in the wake of the October insurrection, Lenin vehemently opposed any agreement with the moderate socialists. He insisted that the Bolsheviks terminate contacts with the Mensheviks and SRs and withdraw from the Vikzhel' negotiations.⁸⁹

As soon as these negotiations broke down, Lenin seized the initiative and purged the Bolshevik CC of "conciliators." He was the author and the main force behind the CC's resolution of November 2, which condemned the Bolshevik moderates.⁹⁰ He used all his personal influence to pressure the members of the CC into signing the well-known "Ultimatum of the Majority of the CC of the RSDRP(b) to the Minority," which threatened moderate Bolsheviks with expulsion from the party should they continue their efforts to bring about an agreement with the moderate socialists.⁹¹ According to A. Bubnov, after Lenin had written the "Ultimatum" on November 3, he invited individual members of the CC

into his study, where in a tête-a-tête conversation he pressured them into signing it. After the "Ultimatum" had been signed in such manner, it was simply announced at the CC meeting of November 4.⁹² The fact that Lenin was willing to go to such an extreme and violate the normal procedure for discussing and adopting party documents indicated that this issue was very important for him and that he was not at all sure of success.

However, the adoption of the "Ultimatum" did not remove the dangers to the realization of Lenin's idea of the "proletarian dictatorship." The opponents of dictatorship, both inside and outside the Bolshevik party, did not lay down their arms and still posed a serious threat to Lenin's plans. On November 4, in protest against Lenin's actions, five members from the CC and ten from the Council of Peoples' Commissars resigned. Among them were such prominent Bolsheviks as Lev Kamenev, Grigorii Zinov'ev, Alexei Rykov, Viktor Nogin, Vladimir Miliutin, and others.⁹³ In their statements the dissenters stressed the necessity of reaching an agreement with all socialist parties, and they threatened to appeal to the party's lower echelons if the Council of Peoples' Commissars failed to respond to their demand.⁹⁴

An open letter by the Bolshevik S. Lozovskii, which he published in the newspaper *Novaia zhizn* in November, showed the defiant mood among the moderate Bolsheviks:

I feel it is impossible to keep silent for the sake of Party discipline when I realize, when I sense from the depth of my soul, that the tactics of the Central Committee are leading to the isolation of the proletarian avant-garde, to a civil war within the working class. . . . I cannot . . . be silent about the administrative fury of the VRK [the Military Revolutionary Council] representatives, such as Lt. Colonel Muraviev, who issued the order for mob law and for the confiscation of enterprises—an order worthy of the Tsarist generals that Shchedrin [M. E. Saltykov-Shchedrin] used to depict. I cannot keep silent . . . in the face of the stamping out of all press media which hold differing opinions, in the face of searches in private homes, arbitrary arrests, persecution and baiting which arouse a muffled protest among the populace as a whole and give the working masses the impression that this regime of the bayonet and the saber is in fact that same dictatorship of the proletariat which the socialists have been preaching about for decades. . . . I cannot . . . ignore the smoldering discontent of the working masses who fought for a Soviet government only to find that it has become, as a result of a combination that is completely beyond their comprehension, a purely Bolshevik government. I cannot . . . acquiesce in a personality cult or make the holding of a ministerial office by this or that person a condition for political agreement, thus prolonging the bloodshed even for a minute.⁹⁵

Despite their defeat at the CC level, the moderate Bolsheviks still retained powerful positions in the soviets and labor organizations. Many prominent Bolshevik trade unionists (such as, for example, Vladimir Miliutin, David Riazanov, Nikolai Derbyshev, a leader of the Petrograd printers and a member of the CCFC, Iurii Larin) could be included into this category. Even Alexander Shliapnikov, commissar of labor and chairman of the Metalworkers' Union, joined the protest against Lenin's actions, although he stopped short of resigning his post as a member of the government.⁹⁶

Despite a decline in popularity, the moderate socialists still commanded a significant following and retained some important positions in the left-wing organizations. Their influence was strong, for example, in the trade unions. After the overthrow the moderate socialists continued to have as many members in the VTSPS and its Executive Committee as did the Bolsheviks.⁹⁷ They also dominated some major trade unions, among them the Petrograd Printers' Union. Although there was much ideological resistance among the moderate socialists to the transfer of power to the soviets, some groups among them (for example, the left SRs and the Menshevik Internationalists) were not averse to this alternative and to an agreement with the Bolsheviks.⁹⁸

In retrospect, it may seem unlikely that the moderate socialists and Bolsheviks would have reached an agreement. But from the perspective of 1917, such an outcome certainly could not be ruled out completely. Given prior experience, Lenin certainly had much to fear: in his view, the moderate socialists and the Bolsheviks could still thrash out their differences and come to a reconciliation. Whether the possibility of the rapprochement was realistic is irrelevant. As many of his writings indicate, Lenin feared that such an outcome was possible and wanted to prevent it. In order to achieve this goal, Lenin realized that he had to consolidate the emerging dictatorial system, neutralize its opponents, and gain control over the most important spheres and institutions. One such vital sphere was certainly industry.

The jockeying for control over industry between the radical and moderate Bolsheviks erupted immediately after the new regime began to create its system of economic regulation. It was clear that Lenin's government had no levers through which it could exercise its control over industry, and would have to rely on labor organizations. Trade unions did not suit Lenin's purpose. They were dominated by the moderate Bolsheviks who were in favor of reconciliation with the Mensheviks and SRs; they had a substantial moderate socialist following. Factory committees,

on the other hand, were a much better candidate. Their leadership had few, if any, moderate socialists and more radical Bolsheviks than in the top echelon of the trade union movement.

But there was also another, and more important reason that made the factory committees better suited for Lenin's purpose than the trade unions. The Bolshevik proponents of reconciliation among socialist parties did not favor an independent role for the factory committees in economic regulation. Their victory would spell the end of factory committee independence. Therefore, there was nothing that the factory committees would wish less than the ascendancy of the moderate Bolsheviks, which made them Lenin's natural allies. By extending his support to the proponents of factory committee independence, Lenin could secure their cooperation in his struggle for the dictatorship.

Therefore, it should hardly come as a surprise that immediately following the overthrow of the Provisional Government, Lenin had several meetings with radicals from the factory committee movement. At the same time, he made absolutely no visible effort to meet with representatives of the trade unions. The Bolshevik Vlas Chubar', a prominent figure in the factory committee movement, recalled that on October 26, while the uprising was still in progress, Lenin met with members of the CCFC. The discussion focused on seizing control of organizations involved in economic regulation. Lenin asked leaders of the CCFC, "What [human] resources do we [the CCFC] have and which [economic] institutions do we have to capture first?"⁹⁹

Several days later, two members of the CCFC, Matvei Zhivotov, the erstwhile chairman of the CCFC, and Pavel Amosov, a member of the CCFC, brought Lenin their draft decree on workers' control and industrial regulation. The draft envisaged the creation of a Supreme Economic Council (VSNKh) that would be the highest regulatory agency in the country.¹⁰⁰ This new agency was to consist of representatives of mass organizations, and would have broad powers in regulating the economy, including the right to sequester and confiscate private enterprises. Lenin approved the draft and advised its publication.¹⁰¹

During the same period (October 26-31), Lenin drew up his own draft decree on workers' control. According to this draft, workers' control was to be implemented by "all workers and employees at enterprises either directly . . . or through their elected representatives [factory committees]." Local soviets and factory committee conferences were to provide regulations for exercising workers' control.¹⁰² This draft was discussed and approved by the CCFC on October 26 or 27.¹⁰³

The fact that the two drafts dealt essentially with the same issue, that they complemented rather than competed with each other, that they were discussed and approved by Lenin and members of the CCFC, suggests that they were integral parts of a cooperative effort. They outlined a comprehensive system for economic regulation that included local (factory committees and their conferences) and central (VSNKh) agencies, and that strongly favored the factory committees over the trade unions by assigning them an independent and prominent role in regulating the economy.

It was suggested earlier that by promoting the cause of factory committee independence Lenin expected to reap a political benefit—factory committees' support for his efforts to establish the Bolshevik dictatorship. Indeed, Lenin's expectations were justified. Shortly after the meetings between Lenin and the leaders of the CCFC took place, the CCFC reversed its position on the question of power. It passed a resolution abandoning its support for the idea of an all-socialist government, which it had favored only a few days earlier, and endorsed Lenin's idea of a Bolshevik dictatorship.¹⁰⁴ The failure of the *Vikzhel'* negotiations may have also facilitated this reversal in that it further weakened the influence of the moderates in the factory committee movement. The Fifth Conference of Petrograd Factory Committees, held on November 15-16, condemned moderate members of the CCFC who, following the October takeover, voiced support for an all-socialist government on behalf of the entire factory committee movement.¹⁰⁵

While Lenin and the radicals from the factory committee movement collaborated in designing the future system of economic regulation, moderate Bolshevik trade unionists—mostly those employed in the commissariat of labor—also prepared a draft decree on workers' control that dealt with industrial regulation. Among the authors of the draft were Alexander Shliapnikov, G. V. Fedorov, Vladimir Shmidt, and A. T. Arskii, most of whom opposed Lenin's idea of a dictatorship.¹⁰⁶

Soviet scholars who have studied this period assert that this draft was based on Lenin's,¹⁰⁷ and many Western historians agree with this assessment. Steven Smith, for example, concluded that "it was Lenin's draft which was taken as the basis for the decree on workers' control."¹⁰⁸ However, even a superficial comparison reveals significant differences between the two. According to the commissariat's draft, regulatory agencies should include representatives of the soviets, trade unions, and factory committees, not just the soviets (nominally) and factory committees, as in Lenin's draft. The latter mentioned the trade unions only as

agencies with which employers could file their appeals against actions by the factory committees, not as agencies that would exercise daily supervision over the management of enterprises. Further, according to the commissariat's draft, councils of workers' control (which by all indications would include representatives from various organizations), rather than just factory committee conferences, should provide regulations for implementing workers' control; local factory committees would be required to act strictly within the limits outlined in these regulations.¹⁰⁹

According to Lenin's wife, Krupskaja, after the publication of all three drafts, Lenin met with representatives of the commissariat of labor in order, as she put it, "to thrash out differences concerning workers' control."¹¹⁰ During that meeting, Lenin criticized the draft of the commissariat for instituting restrictions on what the factory committees could do. He argued: "One cannot narrow down this matter [workers' control], one cannot curtail workers' initiative."¹¹¹ According to eyewitness accounts, the two sides did not come to any understanding on this matter.¹¹²

Public statements made by Lenin during that period also repeated the same theme of "enhancing workers' initiative," which in Lenin's parlance meant giving free rein to the factory committees. In his speech at the VTsIK meeting on November 4, Lenin said:

Let workers create workers' control at their factories and plants. . . . Socialism cannot be decreed from above. Formal bureaucratic automatism is alien to its spirit, live and original socialism is the creation of the popular masses.¹¹³

In another speech, one month later, Lenin reiterated:

We should struggle against the prejudice that only the bourgeoisie can govern the state. The proletariat should take upon itself the government of the state. . . . Let every factory committee feel that it is involved not only in the affairs of its own plant, but that it serves as a nucleus for organizing the life of the entire state.¹¹⁴

Some Western historians have taken Lenin's pronouncements, which called for enhancing "creativity of the masses" and "workers' initiative," at face value. Steven Smith, for example, concluded that Lenin had "a profound faith at this time in the creativity of the masses," and that he

recognized the right of workers in all industrial enterprises, regardless of size, to control all aspects of production, to have complete access to all spheres of administration, including the financial, and, finally, the right of lower organs of workers' control to bind employers by the decision.¹¹⁵

This conclusion is totally inconsistent with Lenin's attitude toward workers' spontaneity, which he had expressed on numerous occasions. As early as 1902, Lenin wrote, in his famous pamphlet *What Is to Be Done*, that "the *spontaneous* development of the labor movement leads to the subordination to the bourgeois ideology" and to "the abandonment of socialism." In his narrow conceptions of "vanguardism" and "the leading role of the party," which were central to his political outlook, there was little room for independent actions by workers.¹¹⁶ The very suddenness of change in Lenin's rhetoric regarding workers' spontaneity (and the later reversion to the old position) suggests that it did not involve a profound rethinking of his ideological views on this matter, but rather that it was motivated by political expediency. Indeed, as this study has suggested earlier, the unleashing of the factory committees, then controlled by radicals, could prevent the trade unions, led by the proponents of a democratic system, from establishing their control over industry.

Despite intense campaigning and lobbying, Lenin and his supporters were defeated. "The Decree on Workers' Control," which was adopted by the VTsIK on November 14, bore a striking resemblance to the draft of the commissariat of labor.¹¹⁷ Like the commissariat's draft, the decree provided for the creation of local workers' control councils, which were to include representatives of various workers' organizations: trade unions, factory committees and other workers' committees, and workers' cooperatives. An all-Russian congress of these councils would create a central organization of workers' control. Until the convocation of this congress, the All-Russian Council of Workers' Control (ARCWC), consisting of representatives from various mass organizations, would direct local councils.

As the decree indicated, its authors envisioned a much more balanced representation in the system of economic regulation than did Lenin's draft or that by the CCFC. In contrast to the plan by Lenin and his allies in the factory committees, the supreme agency of workers' control—ARCWC—would include representatives from the soviets (including the peasants' soviets, which were still dominated by the SRs and which were not even mentioned in the drafts by Lenin and the CCFC), trade unions, and factory committees, and not just the factory committees and soviets. Moreover, in addition to these organizations, the ARCWC would include a significant number of representatives from cooperatives, the All-Russian Union of Engineers, and the All-Russian Union of Agronomists—all three decidedly moderate in their political orientation. An analysis of the "Decree on Workers' Control" shows that if introduced,

the proposed system of economic regulation would have been dominated by prodemocratic groups; and it would have given preference to the trade unions over the factory committees (the latter would have only five representatives out of a total forty members, while the former, sixteen).¹¹⁸

The adoption of the decree on workers' control was certainly a serious setback for Lenin, since it would give control over the economy to the opponents of his political objectives. It was also a blow to the factory committees, since it assigned to the trade unions a more important role in regulating production than it did to the factory committees. This relegation of the factory committees to the secondary and clearly subordinate place was definitely a step toward their subordination to the trade unions. In order to counter these setbacks, Lenin and the leadership of the factory committees decided to act immediately, before the newly created regulatory agencies would come into control of the economy.

The day after the adoption of the decree, the CCFC convened the Fifth Conference of the Petrograd Factory Committees. A report in the newspaper *Novaia zhizn'* described the general mood of the conference as overwhelmingly in favor of takeover of enterprises. The report further noted that the advocates of the decree had little support among the delegates.¹¹⁹ On November 16, the conference discussed the organization of industrial control and regulation. By an overwhelming majority the conference rejected the draft resolution proposed by the advocates of the decree (Larin and Kotlov) and adopted the draft proposed by Zhivotov, which reflected the views on workers' control prevalent in the CCFC.¹²⁰

Despite general statements calling for "friendly joint work . . . of all workers' organizations including the trade unions and factory committees," the resolution in fact advocated giving control over enterprises to the factory committees. It directed the CCFC and the All-Russian Center of Factory Committees to provide regulations for exercising workers' control.¹²¹ This decision contradicted the decree on workers' control passed only a few days earlier. According to this decree (to which Lenin as chairman of the Council of Peoples' Commissars affixed his signature), neither the CCFC nor the All-Russian Council of Factory Committees had the right to issue any regulations concerning workers' control. This provision suggests that the factory committee leadership did not concede defeat and was preparing to oppose the implementation of the decree. The leaders of the CCFC indicated their willingness to oppose the decision, which was democratically adopted by the soviets, thus in fact undermining still relatively pluralist soviet rule.

At the first meeting of the ARCWC on November 28, representatives of the CCFC (Zhivotov and Antipov) tried to convince the members of the council that they should adopt regulations on workers' control drafted by the CCFC. They insisted that the implementation of workers' control should be under "the authority of factory committees organized by industrial branches into district and regional centers of workers' control." Zhivotov charged that the draft regulations on workers' control proposed by the commissariat of labor were "fragmentary" and in fact killed the very idea of workers' control. He emphasized that initiative in matters of industrial regulation should belong to the factory committees and no other organization. He said:

In our factory committees, from below, regulations emerged for all branches [of industry]; they come from the shop-floor, from life [itself]. These are the only valid regulations, and only the factory committee is capable of producing them; this determines its leading role in matters of [workers'] control.¹²²

In their response to the CCFC delegates, the representatives of the commissariat of labor (Lozovskii, who presented the commissariat's draft regulations on workers' control, and Iu. Larin)¹²³ argued that the CCFC's approach to workers' control was unsatisfactory and did not provide for centralized control of industry. One can easily see, however, that this was not the case. As has been mentioned earlier, the CCFC also envisaged the creation of a central agency (VSNKh) for economic regulation. Essentially, the two sides disagreed over one fundamental issue: which organization would control industry, factory committees or trade unions.

Participants in the meeting supported the commissariat's position. They upheld the view that the continued existence of "factory committee patriotism" was unacceptable, and that all workers' organizations should cooperate in carrying out common tasks. The meeting decided to elect a special seven-member commission, which included only one member of the CCFC (Amosov), to write the final draft regulations in three days. The commission also included Miliutin, Lozovskii, Larin, Bronskii, and Trakhtenberg, and one unnamed representative from the metal workers' union—all undoubtedly trade union sympathizers and moderate Bolsheviks.

Considering the commission's composition, radical leaders of the CCFC had little doubt what the final regulations would be like. As a matter of last resort, they decided to go to Lenin. Shortly after the ARCWC meeting of November 28, a group of three members of the CCFC—Amosov, A. M. Kaktyn', V. A. Ivanov—visited him. According

to Kaktyn's memoirs, Lenin fully supported their approach to workers' control. After the visitors told Lenin that the CCFC's regulations were rejected, Lenin gave them "fatherly advice." Kaktyn' recapitulates Lenin's words:

"If you want to achieve a true realization of workers' control, do not rely on authorities [avtoritety] and formal rights, but act, agitate, by all means carry your thought to the masses. If it is revolutionary and vital, it will blast its way and refute all dead, although 'legal,' regulations and interpretation of workers' control." This was the sense, if not the exact wording, of Lenin's reply.¹²⁴

In effect, what Lenin said was that factory committees should disregard the decree, adopted by the VTsIK and signed by Lenin, and implement their own regulations on workers' control. The visitors, according to Kaktyn', were astounded. They anticipated "some kind of legality (signature, decree, et cetera)." Instead, as he put it, they received "fatherly advice accompanied by a good-natured, comradely gibe—a mockery of sorts: how naïve and young you are, if you do not understand that decrees and regulations do not determine social life and class struggle."

The visitors left the meeting assured of Lenin's continued support; now they were determined to resist legal soviet agencies of economic regulation. In Kaktyn's own words,

the lesson by Vladimir Il'ich was not lost on us. . . . The [draft] regulations [by the CCFC] were sent to all places; they were not adopted, or signed, [and] had no recommendation from anyone, but they were decisively supported by the entire process of revolutionary development in the sphere of industrial relations.¹²⁵

Kaktyn's account is invaluable in that it shows how Lenin and his radical supporters undermined the fragile soviet democracy, how they tried to disrupt rather than help to consolidate the new order. It is impossible to find any other motivation for this act of subversion than the political one. Having lost the legal battle, Lenin and his radical supporters resorted to illegal methods as a way of achieving their objectives. Only this time, their actions were directed against the soviets, not against the bourgeoisie and the Provisional Government, and not even against the socialist parties opposed to the transfer of power to the soviets.

While the CCFC was sending its regulations and orders to local factory committees, thus in fact neutralizing the influence of the moderates at the enterprise level, Lenin pushed for the creation of a central government agency that would neutralize the moderates and the agency that

they dominated—the ARCWC. It is worth remembering that the creation of this agency was part of the original plan advanced by Lenin and the CCFC. As indicated earlier, their proposed system of economic regulation included the Supreme Council of National Economy (VSNKh) — the agency conceived by the CCFC right after the overthrow of the Provisional Government.

The creation of the VSNKh was discussed at the December 1 session of the VTsIK. In his speech at this session Lenin lashed out against the treacherous “bourgeoisie” and demanded that urgent actions should be taken to foil its disruptive activities. He strongly objected to parliamentary practices in industrial regulation—an all too obvious allusion to the ARCWC with its balanced representation and moderate orientation. Instead, he proposed the creation of “a militant organ for struggle against capitalists.”¹²⁶

This time Lenin and his supporters were successful. The participants of the December 1 session adopted Lenin’s proposal. The new agency, as the resolution of the VTsIK meeting described, was to be the highest authority in managing the country’s economy; all other organizations, including organizations for workers’ control, were to be subordinated to it. The decree provided the VSNKh with extensive powers for regulating the country’s economic life. It could sequester and confiscate private enterprises, and could merge enterprises into trusts and syndicates.¹²⁷

The decree also provided for the creation of a fifteen-member bureau (or presidium, as it was sometimes called) of the VSNKh which was “to resolve the tasks which demand an immediate resolution.” This body was to play a singularly important role in making and executing economic policies. The composition of the new supreme economic agency, which was elected on December 6 at the first meeting of the VSNKh, was very different from the composition of the ARCWC in that the VSNKh included more of Lenin’s radical supporters and had a higher proportion of factory committee representatives. Five of its fifteen members were members of the CCFC (by comparison, only five out of forty members of the ARCWC were from the factory committees); among them were such leaders of the factory committee movement as Antipov, Chubar’, Amosov, and Skrypnik—all strong supporters of Lenin.¹²⁸

The creation of the VSNKh provided enormous advantages to Lenin and his followers. It strengthened the position of the radical Bolsheviks in the economy. It averted the inevitable drift toward the subordination of the factory committees to the trade unions and improved the factory committees’ chances for preserving their independence. Finally, it created

an opportunity for the factory committees to implement their own version of workers' control, since the new agency provided the backing and the necessary facade of legality for their activities.

The adoption of the decree on the VSNKh emboldened the factory committees. The day after its adoption, the newspaper *Izvestiia* carried an announcement in which the CCFC informed readers that it would be sending out its own regulations on the implementation of workers' control to local factory committees. The announcement also added that "all regulations which were not issued by us [the CCFC] should be ignored."¹²⁹ On December 7, the day after the publication of the decree on the VSNKh, and in defiance of the existing legislation on workers' control, the CCFC promulgated its draft regulations. In the introduction the draft said:

[Workers'] control will achieve its objectives, and will fulfill the hopes which it inspires, only when it is conducted most energetically by workers' organizations, both central and local, which do not stop at [taking] active steps against entrepreneurs. . . . This very urgent and logically inevitable policy must be carried out unswervingly, without a day's delay, through creative revolutionary work by the masses—namely, the factory committees—and in accordance with resolutions adopted at [their] general conferences, and with regulations and directives issued by the CCFC.¹³⁰

Understandably, the authors were reticent as to who entrusted them with writing these regulations, and which "general conferences" adopted resolutions to this effect.

The draft provided for the following organization of the workers' control hierarchy. At the enterprise level, factory committees would supervise production and ensure that their enterprises had sufficient amounts of raw materials and fuel. Trade unions would have no part in running enterprises; their role would be restricted to mediating disputes between workers and employers. In order to avoid "unwanted separatism," individual factory committees would be subordinated to "central and supreme [regional and all-Russian] organizations of workers' control." But these central organizations would not be councils of workers' control, as envisaged in the "Decree on Workers' Control," but factory committee conferences. Individual factory committees would be grouped by production branches or industrial regions and would hold regular regional or industrial factory committee conferences that would direct activities of factory committees at the enterprise level. Between conferences, central factory committee councils, to be created in every city or industrial region, would provide guidance.¹³¹

This draft was the first of three installments on workers' control published by the CCFC during December and January. The other two appeared in *Izvestiia* on December 31 and January 3 under the title "Draft Regulations to the Decree of the Council of People's Economy on Workers' Control Issued by the Central Council of the Petrograd Factory Committees."¹³² These installments described other aspects of the proposed system of industrial regulation: one dealt with the organization and functions of individual factory committees; and another, with those of the VSNKh. Accordingly, individual factory committees would control hiring and dismissal of blue- and white-collar workers, and would supervise production, supply of raw materials and fuel, and distribution of finished products. In cases of "a deliberate sabotage and malicious disruption of production" by employers, factory committees had the right to request "the supreme organizations of the national economy" (i.e., the VSNKh) to employ drastic measures (such as seizure of the enterprise) against owners and management.¹³³

According to the third installment (published in *Izvestiia* on January 3, 1918), individual factory committees would be subordinated to local councils of the national economy (SNKh)—that is, local branches of the VSNKh—where representatives from "workers' organizations" would constitute a two-thirds majority, the rest being representatives of employers and technical specialists (or, as the document called them, "*tsenzovye elementy*"). The regulations did not even mention the ARCWC or its local branches as agencies of workers' control. The document stressed that in distributing functions among the sections of the SNKh, "it is desirable" that "questions pertaining to production organization and supply be assigned to factory committees' central organizations." Trade unions were to deal exclusively with labor disputes and problems arising from the conversion of industry to peacetime production. An all-Russian congress of local councils of the national economy would elect the VSNKh,¹³⁴ which would be the highest authority in matters related to the economy. It had the right to regulate production, combine individual enterprises into syndicates and trusts, and, if necessary, nationalize them. Its decisions would be superseded only by those of "the highest political body in the country and by resolutions of all-Russian congresses of the councils of the national economy"; again there was no mention of the ARCWC. The VSNKh could regulate production organization, enforce the combination of enterprises into syndicates and trusts, and nationalize entire industrial branches.¹³⁵

While the CCFC was publishing its draft regulations, the seven-member

commission elected at the meeting of the All-Russian Council of Workers' Control on November 28 created its own draft regulations on workers' control, which appeared in *Izvestiia* on December 13.¹³⁶ The system for regulating production described in this draft was significantly different from the one in the regulations by the CCFC in that it ascribed a dominant role to the trade unions in running industry. According to the commission's draft, special workers' control committees—not just factory committees—would supervise production at the enterprise level.¹³⁷ They would be grouped by industrial branches and directed by central control committees set up essentially by industrial unions (*proizvodstvennyi soiuz*). These unions and their boards would have all but complete control over the composition of central control committees. They were responsible for convening congresses of representatives from workers' control committees at individual enterprises. These congresses would elect no less than fifty percent of the central-committee membership; the rest would be appointed either by the union board or by a union conference. Although the draft recognized the VSNKh as the supreme authority in economic matters, it emphasized the role of the ARCWC in setting general policies and issuing regulations and directives for implementing workers' control. Committees of workers' control at individual enterprises would have broad functions in supervising management. However, the decree underlined that they should not attempt to take over enterprises without proper authorization. As the draft indicated, owners and managers should continue to run enterprises on the same basis as before the takeover. Workers' control committees had no right to intervene in financial operations, which should be handled by state regulatory agencies. In cases of a deliberate sabotage by employers, committees of workers' control could request that state regulatory agencies nationalize the enterprise. Although the draft gave enterprise committees the right to issue their own regulations, these regulations could not violate the draft's provisions.¹³⁸

Thus there were two sets of regulations on workers' control: the one created by the moderate Bolsheviks centered in the trade unions, and the other by the Bolshevik radicals who dominated the factory committees. Although the two had the same general approach to economic regulation (that is, a broad system of economic regulation involving the state and labor organizations), they reflected two very different political viewpoints. The moderate Bolsheviks designed their system of economic regulation with the intention that it would have a broad political base. They included in their economic agencies representatives from various

organizations, some of which were not even controlled by the Bolsheviks. Most notably, they gave a prominent role in overseeing production to trade unions which, at the time, had essentially a prodemocratic orientation and a bipartisan representation. The system designed by the Bolshevik radicals was geared to promote the dominance of one party, indeed one faction within that party. It was narrowly based and included only those institutions and organizations that supported the idea of the Bolshevik dictatorship. State agencies controlled by Lenin's supporters (such as the VSNKh) and factory committees would have complete control over this system.

This study does not intend to discuss which political course was more correct from the vantage point of Marxist ideology, which served the interests of the proletariat better or was more expedient. However, one observation ought to be made. The system designed by the moderates was discussed and approved by the soviets. If the transfer of power to the soviets had any meaning at all, the "Decree on Workers' Control" and bylaws based on it, rather than some self-serving regulations by the factory committees, constituted the legislation that the government ought to have enforced. Instead, Lenin's government engaged in undermining the existing legislation on regulating the economy and encouraged the factory committees to do the same. Contrary to the commonly accepted notion that the subsequent Soviet economic policies were in complete agreement with the "Decree on Workers' Control," the decree never went into effect and its provisions were never implemented. Solomon Schwarz wrote in his unpublished manuscript:

In practice, local councils of workers' control were not created anywhere; and the All-Russian Council of Workers' Control (which consisted practically of the members of the Petrograd Trade Union Council) was languishing from the very first days of its existence and soon—during the first months of 1918—quietly, without any official action, departed from the scene, having been replaced by the VSNKh and its local agencies.¹³⁹

Thus Lenin and the factory committees contributed to the further disruption of the precarious situation that developed after the October takeover and threw the country—already ravaged by war, political instability, and economic dislocation—into the abyss of chaos and anarchy.



5

“Red Guard Attack Against Capital”

By the beginning of the winter the situation in the country was rapidly deteriorating. Repressive policies by the government were alienating an increasingly large segment of the Russian political spectrum and driving the country ever closer to civil war. The government's irrational economic policies contributed to the developing crisis in the economy. The demobilization of the army compounded this crisis by sharply reducing the demand for war materiel. Despite this sharp decline in demand, as late as the end of December the conversion of military enterprises to peacetime production had hardly begun. Many plants and factories continued to produce guns and bullets when the population suffered increasingly from shortages of even the most basic goods.¹

Despite these adverse conditions, the factory committees refused to follow the course outlined in the decree on workers' control and help in a peaceful restructuring of Russian industry. With the help and connivance of the government, they proceeded to take over control of industrial enterprises. This policy became known as the “Red Guard attack against capital”—a phrase that was coined by Lenin.²

FACTORY COMMITTEES AND SEIZURE OF ENTERPRISES

The government and its agents justified the launching of the “Red Guard attack” by the alleged need to break the resistance of capitalists in the industrial sector. However, the available information does not suggest that the scope and intensity of resistance by capitalists during the post-October period was strong enough to require such a policy. Many capitalists fled the country and those who remained were quite docile. Major organizations of Russian industrialists refrained from intervening in politics altogether, confining themselves primarily to issues related to

industry. And even on these issues their stance was quite moderate. For example, the congress of the All-Russian Union of Societies of Factory and Plant Owners, held at the beginning of December 1917, recognized the need for state control and regulation of industry and only objected to interventions in the management that were not authorized by the current legislation.³ This attitude can hardly be described as vehement opposition.

Even for many Bolsheviks the "Red Guard attack" was a complete surprise. David Riazanov, for example, speaking at the First All-Russian Trade Union Congress in January 1918, said that he could not understand why the factory committees, which only a few days before the October insurrection had agreed to "a death sentence"—the subordination to the trade unions—had reneged on this agreement a few weeks after the takeover and proceeded to implement their own policies.⁴

The "Red Guard attack" began in December 1917 when the CCFC sent its self-styled regulations on workers' control to local factory committees, directing them to take the management of enterprises into their own hands. The episode related in the December 21 issue of the newspaper *Novaia zhizn'* was typical of the situation in many enterprises. The factory committee of the Kersten factory in Petrograd hired a worker, Tseitlin, bypassing the factory administration. The hiring seemed to have been politically motivated since soon after hiring Tseitlin became a member of the factory committee. Then the committee demanded that the management recognize the hiring of Tseitlin as legal and obey all other decisions of the factory committee. To legitimate their demand, the members of the committee referred to point 14 of "the decree on workers' control" (obviously, they meant the regulations by the CCFC), which ruled that all decisions by the administration curtailing activities of the factory committees were to be abolished. Thus, the newspaper noted, the committee seized the enterprise and terminated the effective control by the management over the factory.

When the committee established its *de facto* control over the factory, white-collar employees went on strike and a special meeting of representatives from the commissariat of labor, the trade unions, and the CCFC was convened to settle the conflict. A member of the CCFC who came to the meeting refused to discuss the matter and proposed that the meeting should adopt a resolution that approved the action by the factory committee and condemned all decisions directed against it as counterrevolutionary sabotage. A representative of the trade unions—the report referred to him as "a prominent figure in the labor movement

and a Bolshevik"—opposed the adoption of such a resolution, stating that the purpose of the meeting was not to adopt resolutions but to settle the conflict. His speech was not well received by the audience. The meeting adopted a compromise whereby the management agreed to recognize control by the factory committee but only in matters related to raw materials and inventories at the factory. Despite this compromise, however, the factory committee prevailed in the dispute and Tseitlin stayed on the job.⁵

By adopting a resolution on December 11, 1917, the committee of the Baltiiskii plant assumed control over the plant operations. The resolution ruled that the regulations on workers' control by the CCFC should be accepted and "all outsiders should be prevented from entering the plant."⁶ The resolution of November 27, 1917, by the committee of the Peter the Great Arsenal plant also suggests that the committee was in charge of the plant's operation, with the management only providing advice. The resolution specifically proposed that the committee should request the CCFC to send its regulations on workers' control, and that the management should be familiarized with these regulations.⁷

David Dallin, a prominent Menshevik, provided the following figures for the known cases of takeovers of enterprises by factory committees: thirty-three in December, thirty-seven in January, twenty-two in February, and thirty-seven in March, one takeover in April, and seven in May. Dallin counted a total of 513 takeovers by June 1918, when the government launched its policy of the nationalization of Russian industry.⁸ L. Kritsman, a prominent Bolshevik economist, gave a slightly smaller figure of 487 seizures.⁹ Finally, the First Congress of the Councils of National Economy, held in 1918, set the number of seizures at 304.¹⁰ Whatever the number of seizures, they do not give a complete picture of the extent to which factory committees actually controlled Russian industry. The Bolshevik Semen Lozovskii, an eyewitness to these events, described factory committees during that period as virtual "masters and owners" of enterprises, "to a significant extent independent of central regulatory agencies."¹¹

Having assumed control over enterprises, factory committees, instead of implementing a coherent national plan, pursued their own improvised policies whose only rational goal was to keep enterprises open and production going at any cost. According to Dallin, central authorities learned about takeovers only when they received requests for money to pay workers' wages.¹² The Bolshevik government acknowledged the chaotic nature of the "Red Guard attack" when in May 1918 the First All-Russian Congress of the Councils of National Economy ruled that the disorganized takeovers of enterprises should be stopped.¹³

The disorderly situation in industry during the first months of the Soviet regime had disastrous effects on the country's economic life. With little experience and knowledge of the market, without proper centralized direction and financing, factory committees could not effectively manage plants. They soon discovered that their enthusiasm was a poor substitute for expertise, and that compulsion did not increase productivity.¹⁴ When the situation became critical, factory committees and the government had no other choice but to start reducing workers' wages, paring the labor force, closing enterprises, and relocating them to the provinces. These were the same policies that had earlier been proposed by the Provisional Government and that had been resisted by the factory committees. In this connection, the Bolshevik leader of the metal workers' union, G. D. Vainberg, made an acerbic remark at the Constituent Congress of the Metalworkers' Union in January 1918. "It was Pal'chinskii," Vainberg quipped, "who said that it was necessary to evacuate [industry from] Petrograd. Maybe it was necessary. But now it is forbidden to talk about it."¹⁵

When the government and its supporters finally began to curtail production and relocate enterprises, these steps were long overdue and serious damage to the economy had already been done. The situation was desperate and the government had to act fast, but the implementation of new policies was poorly coordinated, they were carried out rashly, and with little prior planning. Confusion followed and, as a result, production declined even further and unemployment rose sharply. According to Grigorii Aronson, a Menshevik trade unionist, the number of workers employed in Petrograd enterprises dropped drastically. In January 1917, 365,800 had been employed in Petrograd. By April 1918, only 144,500 kept their jobs—a decline of sixty percent. In the Moscow region, during March and April of 1918, thirty-six textile enterprises with 130,000 workers and twenty-four machine-building plants with 120,000 workers closed down.¹⁶ A worker from the Putilov plant, Rozenshtein, reported to the Shop Steward Assembly in March 1918 that there were only thirteen thousand workers left at the plant where thirty-six thousand had been employed in 1917.¹⁷ In January 1918, nine thousand workers were laid off at the Putilov plant and fourteen thousand at the Obukhovskii plant.¹⁸ The total number of unemployed registered in 1918 was 1,512,275 people, over 90 percent of whom were workers. That means that about 40 percent of the entire Russian working class had lost their jobs.¹⁹

Those who continued to work did not fare significantly better. Their wages declined precipitously even by comparison with 1917, which had

not been a year of great prosperity for Russian workers. In the first half of 1918 the real wages of Russian workers were about one third of the 1917 level.²⁰ Workers also suffered from malnutrition. According to Stanislav Strumilin, a prominent Soviet statistician and economic historian, from September 1917 to March 1918 the amount of rationed food, primarily bread, distributed to workers declined 300 percent. In 1918 only 1.1 percent of Russian workers consumed 3,600 calories a day, over 50 percent got less than half of that amount, and 11 percent lived on 1,680 calories a day.²¹ In March 1918, the caloric intake in a daily food ration of the Russian worker was only six hundred calories.²² In order to survive, even those workers who retained their jobs had to supplement their rations with whatever food they could get on the market. However, with declining wages, dwindling supplies of food, and growing prices, procuring food from the market was extremely difficult.

Life was particularly hard for unskilled workers. When the reduction of the labor force started, they were its first victims. The situation at the Oruzheinyi plant in Petrograd was typical. On January 16 the factory committee adopted a resolution that stated that the reduction of the plant's labor force was inevitable. The committee proposed that "well-to-do" individuals who could "exist without work and who are not hereditary proletarians" be dismissed. The resolution named the following categories as "well-to-do" people: peasants who had been employed after 1915, adolescents under sixteen years of age who were not the sole breadwinners in their families, peasants with land, and individuals who had previously held nonindustrial occupations.²³ Many women were among the laid-off workers. These were certainly not the most prosperous among workers; many of them had sought industrial employment as a way of alleviating difficulties faced by their families as a result of the war and economic dislocation. On the whole, in 1918 unemployment among unskilled workers was twice as high as that among skilled workers.²⁴ Their wages and nutrition were equally poor. In 1918, the wages of unskilled workers could cover only one third of their basic expenses for food, shelter, and clothing.²⁵

Dallin provided the following description of the plight of workers in 1918:

Every day, the demilitarization of industry, on one hand, and the lack of basic means of production on the other, brought new sufferings to the working class. The mass closure of enterprises, which began in the summer of 1917, continued after October at an increasing rate. It was not an ordinary [economic] crisis, but a complete halt of industrial production; that is why this crisis was not

accompanied by the usual increase in the industrial reserve army, but [as a result of it] nearly three quarters of the [Russian] working class became part of the unemployed reserve. This was a catastrophe for millions of proletarians who were deprived of any means of existence.²⁶

This study does not intend to suggest that the "Red Guard attack" was the sole source of Russia's economic plight; there were certainly other factors involved. One must recognize, though, that this policy severely aggravated the crisis to the point that it became a national catastrophe. One must also recognize that factory committees bear at least part of the responsibility for this disaster; after all, they were in control of Russia's industrial enterprises.

It also would be a mistake to blame the factory committees alone for the "Red Guard attack" (as did, for example, Semen Lozovskii in his speech at the trade union congress in January 1918).²⁷ The "Red Guard attack" received support at the very top of the Bolshevik regime. Not only were the factory committees given permission to take over enterprises, they were overtly and covertly encouraged to do so by leaders of the factory committee movement, leaders of the new regime, and first and foremost by Lenin himself. As has been shown,²⁸ it was Lenin who encouraged the "enhancement of workers' initiative" and urged factory committees to take industrial enterprises into their own hands. It was the Bolshevik CC, controlled by Lenin's faction, that advised the CCFC to send its illegal regulations on workers' control to local factory committee organizations. Z. V. Drobizhev, a Soviet economic historian, cites an incident when the factory committee of the Kuvshinov factory in the Tver' province sent a letter to the Bolshevik CC, requesting assistance in organizing workers' control. The CC directed the CCFC to send its regulations to local factory committees. It also requested additional copies for itself "to be mailed upon request."²⁹

The factory committees also acted with the connivance and often explicit permission of those central government and economic agencies that were controlled by Lenin's supporters, especially the Council of People's Commissars (CPC) and the VSNKh. N. Podvoiskii, a member of the CPC, revealed the close relationship between the factory committees and Lenin's government at the time when, at the Fifth Conference of the Petrograd Factory Committees, he said that the government had considered making the factory committees the state agencies of economic regulation in the near future.³⁰ In his speech at the Constituent Congress of the Metalworkers' Union in January 1918—barely a month

after the institution of the VSNKh—another leading Bolshevik, Riazanov, also pointed out that the VSNKh and the factory committees closely coordinated their policies.³¹ The VSNKh's policy was formulated by its bureau. Alec Nove writes that

the full council [the VSNKh] seldom met, and a bureau, initially of fifteen members, was responsible for day-to-day work. It had the power to issue orders on economic affairs, which were (in theory) binding on everyone, including the people's commissariats whose functions it partially duplicated.³²

Lenin played a very active role in the work of the bureau. Many former members of the bureau remembered that Lenin closely supervised the work of the agency during that period. A. V. Shotman, secretary of the first bureau of the VSNKh, wrote in his memoirs that until the government moved to Moscow (March 10-11, 1918), "there was not a single meeting of the VSNKh in which Lenin did not participate." Lenin's close association with the bureau was also corroborated by another member of the VSNKh, G. I. Lomov.³³ In directing the work of this agency, Lenin did his best to help factory committees assert their authority. On one occasion he insisted that the bureau should remove from its circular the provision that, if adopted, would have prohibited factory committees from taking over enterprises without the prior knowledge and consent of the VSNKh. The provision was removed.³⁴

The disastrous effects of the "Red Guard attack" on the economy were not entirely unanticipated. In fact, the chief architects of this policy never meant it to be an economic success. Lenin and other proponents of this policy indicated on numerous occasions that the principal goals of the "Red Guard attack" were political, not economic. On December 4, speaking in the Workers' Section of the Petrograd Soviet, Lenin told his audience that they should not think of improving workers' conditions; rather, they should think of becoming "the dominant class."³⁵ One can find the same theme in speeches of factory committee members. A. E. Vasil'ev, the chairman of the committee at the Putilov plant, said at the meeting on December 11, 1917:

The committee is being accused of conducting a political struggle and completely abandoning an economic one. [The accusers] forget . . . one truth . . . that economic struggle without political struggle is a nonsense, an absurdity, foolishness. Of course, such accusations are merely a guise which conceals wolves in sheep's clothing.³⁶

Indeed, as the architects of this policy intended, the "Red Guard

attack" produced its most important results in the political sphere. Lenin himself recognized this fact. In April of 1918 he wrote: "The 'Red Guard' attack against capital was successful, it was victorious, because we suppressed the military resistance of capital and countered its sabotage."³⁷ What Lenin did not mention was that the alleged "saboteurs," who, in his words, put up "military resistance" against the new regime, were not "conniving, armed-to-the-teeth capitalists," but unarmed workers and their families who desperately were trying to survive in the increasingly difficult conditions.

The disruption of industry and the suppression of workers made the moderate socialists even less willing to accept the transfer of power to the soviets. The "Red Guard attack" drove them further from the Bolsheviks, making an agreement between them and the moderate Bolsheviks even less likely. Also, the "Red Guard attack" eliminated any chance that those who were in favor of political democracy might establish their control over industry, which might improve their chances for achieving their political goals. After the "Red Guard attack," the moderate Bolsheviks were never able to regain the momentum and influence that they had enjoyed since the July events. Their influence in the Bolshevik party gradually waned. They either had to subordinate themselves to the increasingly rigid party discipline, relentlessly enforced by Lenin, or be expelled from the party, as was the case with the moderate Bolshevik Lozovskii, expelled from the party at Lenin's insistence in December 1917.³⁸

THE SUPPRESSION OF WORKERS

The establishment of control over industry strengthened the position of Lenin's government and its agents, but the advantages of this situation were dubious. Now the leaders of the new regime were responsible for resolving problems that had plagued Russian industry. Takeovers of enterprises, attempts to maintain their operation at any cost, and some short-term concessions to workers were no solution to problems of Russian industry. These policies were good as propaganda devices when Lenin and his supporters were in the position of critics struggling for power, but not when they were in power. Russian industry needed restructuring and conversion to peacetime production, which required closing enterprises, laying off workers, and sometimes lowering their wages. The longer the restructuring was delayed, the greater the damage was to Russian industry and the more severe were its effects for workers. Eventually, the government and the factory committees had to initiate

policies that had earlier been advocated by the Provisional Government—paring the labor force, cutting workers' wages, relocating enterprises, et cetera. As one could expect, these steps were extremely unpopular among workers and fanned their discontent. This discontent fueled conflicts between workers and the regime and created the situation that played into the hands of the parties opposed to Bolshevik rule. One can sense the growing influence of these parties in numerous resolutions adopted by workers' meetings that frequently included political demands advocated by the moderate socialists: the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, the abrogation of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, and freedoms of the press and assembly. In order to preserve the dictatorship, Lenin's government decided to suppress workers, rather than seek a reconciliation with the opposition.

Tensions and conflicts between workers and the regime began to appear in late November 1917, soon after the factory committees came into control of industrial enterprises. On November 29, following the discussion of supplementary payments demanded by workers, the factory committee of the Peter the Great Arsenal plant stated its opposition to the workers' demand. Rather than side with the workers, the committee decided to wait for directives from higher organizations.³⁹ Relations between workers and the factory committee at the Admiralteiskii plant were so acrimonious that during the December 5 general assembly meeting, one worker, Zakharenko, called the factory committee a "pack of thieves and drunkards."⁴⁰ At the December 22 meeting of the general assembly, the factory committee of the Novyi Arsenal plant also opposed workers' demands, charging that they were illegal and that they "disorganized" the working class.⁴¹ At the Putilov plant, tensions between the factory committee and workers was one of the main themes in the report delivered by the chairman of the committee, A. E. Vasil'ev, to the December 22 joint session with representatives of shop committees, rates commissions, trade unions, and the Petrograd soviet. He said:

Under the guise of political struggle and economic demands, some groups conduct the struggle directed against working class organizations and even individual members [of these organizations]. . . . There are frequent attacks against the factory committee as a whole and its individual members [who are accused of] conducting political struggle, instead of an economic one.⁴²

Members of the factory committees frequently explained these conflicts by the prevalence of "petit bourgeois, philistine interests" and also by the lack of "proletarian consciousness" among workers.⁴³ Rather than look into the real causes behind workers' discontent, members of the

factory committees charged that workers were lazy and that they could not understand the significance of the momentous changes that occurred in Russian with the Bolshevik takeover; they complained that workers' "proletarian consciousness" declined and their "pocketbooks win over their consciousness."⁴⁴

There were several specific issues that precipitated conflicts between workers and the Soviet authorities. Most of them, just like during the pre-October period, were directly related to workers' living and working conditions. One major issue was pay increases and various supplementary payments demanded by workers to offset the galloping inflation. When the Bolsheviks and factory committees were fighting for control of industrial enterprises, they advocated wage increases and various supplementary payments for workers. When, however, they took charge of industry and were confronted with economic realities, they completely reversed their position and opposed workers' demands, which led the latter to protest.⁴⁵

At the Putilov plant, the debates over supplementary payments started shortly after the factory committee took control of the plant. On November 18, 1917, the general assembly of the plant workers demanded that no later than November 23 they should receive the difference between the old and the new wage scales for the period beginning on March 7, 1917. They also decided to send a special delegation to the commissariat of labor to present their demand.⁴⁶ A representative of the commissariat who attended the meeting of the general assembly on November 23 told the workers that the treasury was empty and they should drop their demand. However, his speech did not change the workers' position on this issue.⁴⁷ They continued to advance the demand for wage increases and supplementary payments well into 1918, albeit without much success.⁴⁸ Demands for wage increases and supplementary payments were frequently raised at the Peter the Great Arsenal, the Novyi Arsenal, and other Petrograd plants.⁴⁹

Another major issue which caused much dissatisfaction among workers was assignments to low-skill jobs. When the government began to curtail production and reduce the labor force, the factory committees, which tried to retain the skilled, laid off primarily unskilled workers. However, there were many unskilled jobs that needed to be performed—such as unloading fuel and raw materials and cleaning factory premises. Since there was not enough work for skilled workers, factory committees usually assigned them to do unskilled jobs. Skilled workers were generally unwilling to perform these assignments. Their professional pride

certainly had something to do with this resistance, but mostly they were concerned with the financial aspect. During periods of forced idleness, skilled workers received two thirds of their average pay. When they were assigned to perform unskilled tasks, their fear was that the temporary assignment would become a permanent one and that they would lose, as a result, their status and income. For this reason, they demanded to be paid regular rates for performing unskilled jobs, in addition to the two-thirds pay for forced idleness.

At the expanded meeting of the Putilov factory committee on November 27, 1917, several members of the factory committee complained that skilled workers refused to take unskilled job assignments. Numerous appeals to workers produced no results. Workers insisted on being paid regular rates in addition to their payment for forced idleness.⁵⁰ The meeting adopted a resolution that contained threats against workers who refused to perform unskilled jobs.⁵¹ However, as evidenced by discussions at the subsequent meetings of the factory committee, the dispute was not settled and conflicts over this issue continued.⁵² Similar conflicts occurred at many other Petrograd plants.⁵³ The problem was so serious that on March 6, 1918, E. Sklianskii, commissar for military affairs, issued a circular letter that directed factory committees to fire workers who refused unskilled jobs and to bring their cases before the revolutionary tribunal.⁵⁴

The most serious conflicts between the authorities and workers—certainly the most violent ones—occurred over food. Shortly after the Bolsheviks came to power, they established a monopoly on food supply, partly in order to gain control over the available food, and partly in order to use food as a political weapon. Armed detachments organized by the government guarded approaches to the city, intercepting private individuals who tried to bring in food. Due to these policies, the food-supply system, which was gradually deteriorating throughout 1917, now completely collapsed. While prohibiting private individuals to bring in food from the countryside, the government proved to be incapable of providing sufficient amounts of food to feed the cities.

Hungry workers began to demand that the government should either become more efficient in providing food, or allow workers to bring food on their own. Letters from workers to the Petrograd soviet reveal their anger and frustration with the government. In his letter written in December 1918, one Petrograd worker complained about food shortages and his inability to feed a family of seven. He particularly resented the fact that he was not permitted to bring potatoes from the countryside.⁵⁵ Another worker, in a letter to Zinov'ev, blamed the government's

food policies for the loss of his two children who had starved to death.⁵⁶ In their letters, workers also complained about the arbitrariness of local officials and the Red Guards who took away even the food for which they obtained an official authorization.⁵⁷

On December 31, 1918, the general assembly of workers at the Putilov plant presented an ultimatum demanding that food prices be lowered and that the ban on bringing food from the countryside be lifted.⁵⁸ Many speakers who addressed the general assembly of workers at the Putilov plant on June 25, 1918, criticized the government's failure to provide food. One speaker, Kaufman, connected food shortages with the government's dictatorial policies. Another speaker, Vikhrov, blamed food requisition detachments for alienating peasants and disrupting the procurement of food for the city. What particularly infuriated the workers was the fact that while neglecting their needs, the government made every effort to provide food for the army and the Red Guards that helped it to stay in power.⁵⁹ The resolution adopted by a group of Putilov workers on August 1, 1918, demanded that the government "immediately disband all armed detachments which control railroads and, under the guise of the Red Army, shoot and rob workers and peasants."⁶⁰ The minutes of general assemblies at the Novyi Arsenal, Sestroretskii, and other Petrograd plants provide ample evidence of workers' unrest over the food situation; they contain numerous resolutions demanding that the government should abolish its prohibitions on private food trade.⁶¹

The issue of food was so acrimonious that it led to several major riots, which led to arrests and even shootings of workers. On May 8, 1918, a major riot broke out at the Sestroretskii plant where several workers were arrested.⁶² Bread riots on a large scale occurred on May 9, 1918, in the town of Kolpino—the location of the Izhorskii plant—where two workers were killed by the Red Guards.⁶³ In some instances, workers resorted to violence against individuals in charge of food distribution.⁶⁴

Conflicts over specific issues often led to more general protests against Bolshevik rule. Workers began to make a connection (as did, for example, one speaker, Rozenshtein, at the general assembly meeting of Putilov workers on December 16, 1917)⁶⁵ between these policies and their economic plight. The demand for supplementary payments led the workers of the gun shop at the Putilov plant to issue a general statement of nonconfidence against the commissar of labor, Alexander Shliapnikov.⁶⁶

Minutes of workers' general assemblies abound in vitriolic attacks against the government. Several speakers at the general assembly of the Putilov plant workers held on March 6, 1918, criticized the government

for the situation that had developed in the country. One of them charged that the Bolsheviks "drowned the country in blood" and allowed the Germans to exploit it mercilessly. When one speaker tried to defend the government, he was heckled and interrupted.⁶⁷ Following a very bitter discussion of supplementary payments on March 11, 1918, the general assembly of the Novyi Arsenal adopted a resolution demanding the publication of the complete text of the Brest-Litovsk treaty, freedom of the press, and the immediate abolition of the death penalty and arbitrary executions.⁶⁸ A very strong denunciation of the Bolshevik policies came from a meeting of the Putilov workers held on August 1, 1918.⁶⁹

A discussion of the food situation, which took place at the general assembly meeting of the Novyi Arsenal on May 9, 1918, turned into a condemnation of the Bolshevik policies. Very few participants spoke in support of the Bolsheviks; those who did were constantly interrupted and heckled.⁷⁰ One participant, Vasil'ev, charged that the policies of the Soviet government led to food shortages and would result in the collapse of the entire country. Vasil'ev argued that the Bolsheviks were "far more conciliationist" in their policies than the so-called conciliators, since it was the Soviet government that dealt with the "German imperialists." He concluded his speech by demanding the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. Many other speakers supported Vasil'ev's views. By an overwhelming majority (with two opposing votes and eleven abstentions), the meeting passed a resolution that stated that the "autocracy of the commissars" (*komissaroderzhavie*) would bring about the complete destruction of the country; it demanded the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, the abrogation of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, and the abolition of the monopoly on the food supply. The resolution specifically supported the Putilov workers in their protest against the government.⁷¹

Labor unrest posed a difficult dilemma before the factory committees: if they sided with workers, they would have to turn against the government; if, on the other hand, they backed the government policies, they would have to participate in suppressing workers. In his speech at the general assembly meeting of the Novyi Arsenal, held on January 25, 1918, a member of the factory committee, Kukushkin, eloquently described the situation faced by the committee:

The factory committee . . . finds itself between the hammer and the anvil: on one hand, the general assembly, and on the other, the Council of People's Commissars. The question is, whom should it obey?⁷²

Many factory committees followed the government. The support of the Bolshevik dictatorship by their central organizations, and particularly the CCFC, was an important factor in this decision.

Indeed, there were instances when factory committees sided with workers and against the government. Such instances occurred, for example, at the Obukhovskii, the Sestroretskii, the Peter the Great Arsenal, and particularly the Izhorskii plant where shootings of workers occurred on May 9, 1918. The government tried to take steps to discipline recalcitrant committees or to replace them with docile ones. The factory committee of the Tenteleevskii chemical plant was disbanded by the Peterhof district soviet. In its letter of July 27, 1918, the soviet ordered the old factory committee to step down in favor of the group of people appointed by the soviet, which included two individuals, Kronberg and Belov, and one representative from the soviet's labor section. The letter threatened that if members of the old committee disobeyed this decision, the soviet would put them on trial.⁷³ In another incident, which took place in August 1918, the committee of the Peter the Great Arsenal tried to obtain the release of one of its arrested members, Kuznetsov. The government threatened to arrest the entire committee.⁷⁴

When the food riot occurred in the town of Sestroretsk on May 8, 1918, the factory committee of the Sestroretskii weapons plant took the side of workers against the local soviet. It protested the arrests made by the Soviet authorities during the riot. The Bolshevik members of the committee responded to this decision by leaving the committee and all attempts to bring them back were unsuccessful.⁷⁵ However, this effort to put pressure on the committee did not yield any results. When the committee persisted in its opposition to the Soviet authorities and their policies, the government simply stopped allocating money so that the committee could not pay wages to workers, thus effectively closing the plant and shutting off the committee.⁷⁶

Instances when factory committees sided with workers in their disputes with authorities were rather rare. Such dissident actions were not in line with the official policy as enunciated by the factory committees' central organizations, and produced conflicts between recalcitrant committees and those adhering to the official line. An interesting episode was reported at the factory committee meeting of the Novyi Arsenal on May 13, 1918. Following the incident of May 9 at the Izhorskii plant, when workers were shot by the Red Guards, a delegation of the Novyi Arsenal committee, which took the side of the workers in this incident, visited the Putilov plant to consult with the local committee about the

incident. According to one reporter, Ionov, members of this all-Bolshevik committee had been very hostile and called the visitors "defensists," thus associating them with the parties opposed to Bolshevik rule. When the visitors tried to explain their proworkers position by pointing out that they followed the decision of the general assembly, the response of the Putilov committee was that it did not "matter what resolutions workers will pass at their meetings, but if they would attempt any action, we [the members of the Putilov factory committee] would know how to cope with them."⁷⁷

Although instances when a factory committee would support workers against the government did occur, for the most part, the committees followed the lead of the government and its own central organizations. For example, while workers resisted the government policies designed to cut their wages, it was the factory committees that implemented these policies. In doing so, committee members would frequently evoke "state interests" or the "general interests of the proletariat" as a way of justifying their actions. In its resolution adopted on December 1, 1917, the factory committee of the Peter the Great Arsenal stated that "in observing the interests of workers," the committee should pursue an independent course, and not follow decisions by the workers' general assembly. The resolution further emphasized that the committee considered essential "to be guided by general state interests, presently pursued by centers of state life which enjoy [our] complete confidence." Needless to say, the resolution condemned workers' demands for higher wages as illegal.⁷⁸

Members of the factory committee of the Novyi Arsenal also emphasized their essential ties with the government. A member of the committee, Kukushkin, said in his speech at the factory committee meeting on January 25, 1918, that the factory committee could not go against the decision of the highest state agencies with which "it is closely tied" (*sviazan po rukam i nogam*). He also insisted that the decision against supplementary payments to workers should remain in force, at which point he was heckled by the workers and had to leave the podium.⁷⁹ Another member of the factory committee, Vasil'ev, reiterated the same argument at the meeting of the general assembly on January 29:

The factory committee cannot fail to implement the decisions of the higher organizations . . . and the general assembly should keep this in mind. If this decision of the factory committee is regarded [by workers] with suspicion, the general assembly can elect another committee, but whatever [will be] its composition, the withholdings [of supplementary payments] should take place.⁸⁰

The government and its supporters employed several methods in quelling workers' unrest. Propaganda was one of them. In their public statements and resolutions, factory committee members tried to defend the government's policies and give a negative image to the protesting workers by portraying them either as lazy and unaware of their proletarian tasks, or as "malicious hirelings" of the counterrevolutionary bourgeoisie seeking to destroy Soviet power. In the view of factory committee members, conflicts with workers were due to the fact that the latter were not sufficiently conscious (*nesoznatelnye*) of their role and tasks as proletarians, and that they were still influenced by bourgeois mentality.

One proposed solution was that workers should be "educated" and provided with the "correct" view of the contemporary situation and their proper role in it. The speech by a member of the Putilov committee, Vankhanen, at the meeting on November 27, 1917, succinctly summarized the predominant attitude among the participants. He said:

The masses do not want to take into account either the current political situation or the economic dislocation. . . . At shop-floor meetings, it is necessary to provide the broadest and most comprehensive view of the general economic and political situation in order to open the eyes of the masses.⁸¹

Another speaker, Korchagin, insisted that workers should understand that the "resistance of comrade workers to their own organizations is their resistance to themselves. . . ." ⁸² It is obvious, however, that Korchagin and other speakers did not expect workers to be much impressed by this logic, since many of them proposed to back propaganda with repression.

A popular propaganda device used by factory committees was to portray workers' spontaneous resistance to government policies as efforts of malicious individuals with a petit bourgeois mentality. The philippic against workers by the chairman of the Putilov factory committee, Vasil'ev, in his speech on December 11, 1917, was very characteristic in this respect:

Recently, due to the agitation of some individuals who pursue purely personal, egotistic aspirations, instead of general proletarian class interests, the movement developed [at our plant] which disorganizes [workers]. . . . Numerous quarrels and discords occur on the basis of purely philistine, petit bourgeois aspirations. We witness a complete lack of collectivism and the appearance of private interests dictated by stagnant, philistine psychology. . . . Of course, accusations [against the factory committee] are merely a guise which hides wolves in sheep's clothing and masks individualistic, egotistic demands.⁸³

Another propaganda device was to connect workers' efforts for improving their conditions with the alleged "efforts by the imperialists" to overthrow the Soviet state. The resolution adopted on December 31, 1917, by a joint meeting of the factory and shop committees held at the Putilov plant was very typical in this respect. It is worth quoting this resolution at length since its language already contained the idioms which became the staple of Bolshevik propaganda:

In view of the difficult situation of the soviets in Russia crushed by the Anglo-American imperialism, which tries to drown in the blood of the Russian proletariat the blooming of the world socialist revolution, the meeting states that the demands of workers [to increase their wages] are opposed to the general proletarian interests, [these demands] disrupt the supply of food, as well as the procurement, transportation, and distribution of all materials necessary for the life of the state devastated by the imperialist war.⁸⁴

The resolution called the striking workers "self-seeking egotists [shkur-niki] and traitors" who "have no place among honest workers"; it condemned their strike as illegal.⁸⁵

Still another propaganda device was to portray the contemporary situation—despite its hardships—as infinitely better than that which Western workers faced in their countries, or than the one which Russian workers should expect in the case of the victory of the Bolsheviks' opponents. At one general assembly meeting of the Novoe Admiralteistvo plant, the principal speaker, Ivanov, claimed that the situation in Russia was improving. He argued that the conditions of Russian workers were infinitely better than those of German workers because "capitalism is much stronger there than in Russia." He further explained that the civil war continued because "the French and English bankers" were able to incite the "dark" [*nesoznatelnye*] individuals. The resolution adopted at the meeting, based on the report, was full of clichés typical of Bolshevik propaganda. It stressed the determination of workers to fight against "the White Guard scum" as well as "capitalists and their lackeys." The victory in this fight, the resolution promised, would lead to the "resurgence of the working class" and would allow workers to fulfill their "international mission."⁸⁶

At a meeting on June 19, 1918, which gathered workers from several Petrograd plants (the Perun plant, the Ekateringofskii factory, the Grigor'ev lumber mill, and the Tam factory), the principal speaker, Itkina, alleged that the SRs were trying to reestablish monarchy. She painted frightful pictures of the plight of workers that would inevitably

follow if the SR plans were realized. She favorably compared the conditions of Russian workers with those in capitalist countries (her example was Finland) and called upon workers to make Soviet Russia a shining example to "our West European comrades."⁸⁷

Although propaganda played an important role in the efforts to quell the unrest among workers, the authorities realized that words alone would hardly be sufficient. They frequently resorted to more direct methods. One of them was electoral manipulations. Prior to the "Red Guard attack," elections held at factories usually took place at general assemblies. As workers' discontent against Bolshevik rule grew, the government recognized the need to control these elections. Electoral manipulations served to ensure the election of candidates who supported the Bolshevik dictatorship. In many instances, the nomination of candidates for elected positions was moved from the general assembly to factory committee meetings. A factory committee would nominate candidates and then the general assembly would only approve the nominations. The absence of any discussion of candidacies at the general assembly facilitated control over elections.

The election of the factory committee at the Novoe Admiralteistvo plant, which took place at the end of 1918, was a typical example of such a practice. In its meeting on November 30, the factory committee of the plant nominated its own replacement, including all the positions on the committee. The meeting of the general assembly, held later the same year, simply approved the nominations. The bureaucratic language of the minutes shows the extent to which the control over the elections was already formalized. The assembly thanked the old committee for its good work during the year that had passed and expressed its confidence that the new committee would continue to work just as well in the future. Then the entire committee was reelected for the next year. There was no discussion of the candidates or the committee's work. Moreover, the voting was by a show of hands rather than by a secret ballot, which certainly helped to intimidate workers.⁸⁸

Similarly, in its meeting on December 12, 1917, the factory committee of the Baltiiskii plant ruled that it would select representatives to the auditing commission created at the plant.⁸⁹ In anticipation of unfavorable results, the committee at the Putilov plant refused to organize elections to the Petrograd soviet, which were requested by the general assembly of workers at the end of May 1918.⁹⁰

The available evidence shows that the government encouraged the practice of bypassing general assemblies in elections. On July 21, 1918,

acting on instructions from the Petrograd soviet, the committee of the Langezippen plant elected delegates to the soviet without convening the general assembly. Only six people, all members of the factory committee, participated in the election of one delegate.⁹¹

Bans on workers' meetings was another method used by the authorities for suppressing labor unrest. General assemblies of workers were one of the most important and influential forums at the shop-floor level. At their general meetings, workers could air their grievances and formulate their demands; most important plant-wide elections were usually held at such meetings; finally and most importantly, these meetings could initiate workers' protests and demonstrations. As the antagonism toward the Bolshevik dictatorship among workers grew, general assemblies became a hotbed of workers' resistance to the Bolshevik government and a major threat to its control over industrial enterprises.

In order to forestall workers' protests, factory committees used numerous pretexts to prevent the so-called unauthorized meetings. They refused, for example, to pay for the time spent at such meetings, when they were held during work hours.⁹² On May 11, 1918, the committee of the Putilov plant issued a regulation that prohibited paying workers for "the time spent at meetings organized during work hours and unauthorized by the committee." The resolution adopted at the meeting specifically ruled that workers who had taken part in the meeting held the day before (in the description of the committee, "organized by individuals and unauthorized by the committee") would not get paid for the time spent at that meeting.⁹³ This rule was confirmed by a resolution of May 28, 1918.⁹⁴ When in August 1918 workers of one shop at the plant requested permission to hold a meeting for electing their representatives, the committee reminded the workers that meetings during work hours were prohibited.⁹⁵ There is much evidence that suggests that such actions were not improvisations by factory committees, but were inspired and directed from the very top of the Bolshevik regime.⁹⁶

Even if "unauthorized" meetings were planned for off-work hours, factory committees still tried to prevent them by simply prohibiting to hold them on the plant's premises. In contravention of the existing rules, they claimed that they, not the plant administration, were in charge of the premises and only they could authorize their use for meetings. At the end of November 1917, the union of engineers at the Baltiiskii plant tried to organize a conference of employees from four Petrograd plants (including the Admiralteiskii, Obukhovskii, and Izhorskii plants). The union representatives requested and received the permission of the

plant's manager. However, on the order of a member of the factory committee, Zaikin, the Red Guards disbanded the meeting. All protests against the unlawful actions were rejected. In its resolution of December 4, 1917, the committee stated that it, and not the management, was in charge of the premises. Since the committee had not been consulted regarding the conference, the resolution explained, it had the right to deny access to the delegates. The resolution confirmed the correctness of Zaikin's order and ruled that in the future only meetings authorized by the committee would be permitted.⁹⁷ Eventually, the committee had to admit that the plant administration was in charge of the premises, but it nevertheless insisted that its actions were "correct."⁹⁸

The files of the Putilov plant factory committee provide ample evidence as to how this committee dealt with "unauthorized" meetings. At the end of December 1917, when workers of the Putilov plant struck over food prices and the government monopoly on the food supply, the factory committee condemned them and issued a threat to close the plant. In his report at the factory committee meeting on December 31, A. E. Vasil'ev, the committee's chairman, connected the unauthorized meetings that were taking place at the plant with "imperialist plots" and the "desire to overthrow soviet power." The resolution adopted by this meeting stated that in "case they [workers] do not end the regretful experience of December 30 [a reference to the meeting of the general assembly] and continue [to hold] meetings, [the factory committee] will be forced to close the plant."⁹⁹ In another instance, on July 9, 1918, the committee refused to affix its official stamp to the minutes of the general assembly that took place a few days earlier, thus denying its legitimacy.¹⁰⁰ Although in theory the factory committee was subordinate to the general assembly, it frequently refused to implement the assembly's decisions when they ran counter to the intentions of the committee. On November 28, 1917, the committee simply rejected the decision of the plant security guards to elect a new shop committee.¹⁰¹ If for some reason the committee did not like a resolution passed by the general assembly, it could simply replace it by a progovernment one. Such was the case with the anti-Bolshevik resolution approved by the general assembly on May 11, 1918, which was first rejected by the committee and then replaced with another, written by a member of the Bolshevik government, V. Volodarskii.¹⁰²

The authorities also clamped down on any open expression of dissatisfaction with the regime. They usually described such spontaneous expressions as "spreading hostile rumors." Punishments for "spreading rumors" were severe. The decision adopted by the committee of the

Sestroretskii plant on March 9, 1918, threatened that those "who will spread rumors among workers will be brought to the factory committee and will be dealt with as enemies of workers."¹⁰³ When a worker of the Novoe Admiralteistvo plant, Luk'ianov, complained to the factory committee about the actions of a foreman, Nikitin, the committee reprimanded Luk'ianov and stated that if he did not stop his "depressing conversations" (*pechal'nye razgovory*), the committee would "treat him as a counterrevolutionary;" he would be arrested and sent to the Cheka.¹⁰⁴

The authorities often used prohibitions on strikes and other forms of workers' protest as a method of controlling workers' unrest. The resolution passed on December 31, 1917, by the factory committee of the Putilov plant specifically stated that workers had no right to strike and stop the operation of their plant. The threats made in the resolution proved to be effective: a notation made on the margins by one member of the factory committee, Takhtaev, indicated that this resolution ended the strike at the plant.¹⁰⁵ When the electricians of the Putilov plant started a strike at the beginning of June 1918, demanding wage increases, the factory committee issued the resolution that classified strikes as "crime" and demanded that workers resume work. The resolution also advised workers to present their demands through "their" organization, i.e., the factory committee. This advice was absolutely useless since the committee was clearly opposed to the workers' demand for a wage increase.¹⁰⁶

In support of the prohibitions, factory committees, just like the management and owners before them, intimidated workers by issuing threats to close plants and lay off workers. Delegates to the shop steward assembly in the spring of 1918 told stories of temporary closure of their plants in retribution for demands to put an end to Bolshevik dictatorial practices. Such incidents were reported by Zil'nitskii and Zhuchkov, representatives of the Rechkin plant. Zhuchkov told the assembly meeting that when plant representatives went to pick up wages for workers, they were told that their wages would not be paid since workers expressed sympathy for the Constituent Assembly. Their polite request was rudely rebuffed: "Ask the Constituent Assembly [*Uchedilovka*] for it [money], [since] you voted for it."¹⁰⁷ When propaganda and appeals to workers proved ineffective in stopping the strike of the Putilov workers at the beginning of June 1918, the committee threatened that it would close the plant and lay off workers.¹⁰⁸

Generally, when confronted with protests by workers, factory committees frequently showed as much, and probably even more intolerance than had managers and owners. The conflict at the Sestroretskii plant was

a good case in point. When in the spring of 1918 the employees of the Sestroretskii plant accused the factory committee of "capitalist exploitation," the committee issued a statement on March 20 in which it declared that

at this time [the committee] is worse than capitalists, since its members consider themselves true socialists, and as regards the people's property, the revolution, and freedom, it will take the most decisive steps against all those who are unhappy with [the committee's] orders.¹⁰⁹

If threats and bans were insufficient to break workers' resistance, the authorities were not averse to using repressions and even force against workers. Minutes of factory committee meetings provide ample evidence of such attitudes. Speakers at the factory committee meeting that took place at the Putilov plant on November 27, 1917, advocated "harsh actions" (*krutye mery*) against workers. One member of the committee, Comrade Grisha, characterized the attitude of workers as "criminal" and demanded to "raise the issue of revolutionary discipline." He justified the use of force against workers by arguing that workers were too distant from their elected representatives to understand the full significance of the change brought about by the October takeover. In his view, this change imposed certain obligations. "We live," he said, "in the period of the civil war. All [our] opponents should be suppressed without mercy. . . ." ¹¹⁰ Other speakers, including the committee's chairman, A. E. Vasil'ev, articulated a similar attitude.¹¹¹

The final resolution adopted by the meeting stated that individuals who disobeyed the authorities, who "intentionally disorganize [the fulfillment of] our common task, will be dismissed from the plant without any deferment of military service, and without severance payment."¹¹² In another resolution, adopted on December 11, 1917, the committee ruled that workers who refused to perform unskilled jobs would be deprived of their payment for forced idleness; the resolution also envisaged severe penalties for those workers who did not show up for work (workers frequently missed work when they had to travel to the countryside for food).¹¹³

Workers and employees who refused to cooperate with the authorities were often subjected to harassment. When employees of the Robert Krug machine plant refused to follow orders of the factory committee, not only were they dismissed from their jobs, but the committee also decided that, as traitors, they should be prosecuted in the revolutionary tribunal and their names should be made public.¹¹⁴ This decision was subsequently approved by the general assembly of the plant workers on

November 27, 1917. The language of the resolution leaves no doubt that it was written by Bolshevik leaders of the factory committee and that it did not reflect the attitude of workers; it also suggests that the factory committee had already established complete control over the general assembly. The resolution condemned the employees as "traitors who covered with shame the people's cause." It stated that "these traitors and cowards had no place in [workers'] ranks," and demanded that their names be subjected to public shaming, that they should be fired from their jobs and prosecuted in the military revolutionary tribunal.¹¹⁵

It was not uncommon for the authorities to use force against workers. For example, when employees of several Naval Administration plants, including the Baltiiskii, convened a meeting at the end of November to write a salutation address to the Constituent Assembly, it was dispersed by the Red Guards. The committee of the Baltiiskii plant approved the action by the Red Guards.¹¹⁶ When members of the local soviet in the town of Kolpino were asked why the Red Guards were present at general assembly meetings at the Izhorskii plant, they answered that they simply "cannot permit pogrom-like [*pogromnye*] actions [by workers]."¹¹⁷ The meeting of the general assembly of the Novyi Arsenal on February 12 (25), 1918, was rudely interrupted by the arrival of the Red Guards. They tried to arrest the person presiding at the meeting, Voronkov, who was supportive of the assembly's demand for supplementary payments. The meeting nearly ended in a bloody fight, and only the disarming of the Red Guards helped to avoid a tragic outcome.¹¹⁸

Workers from Petrograd enterprises delegated to the shop steward assembly in the spring of 1918 complained that factory committees used harassment and outright violence to suppress democracy at the shop-floor level. At the March 13 meeting of the assembly, a representative of the Trubochnyi plant stated that workers had been unable to reelect the factory committee, despite the fact that four times their general meetings had adopted decisions to that effect. Supported by the Red Guards, the committee disregarded these decisions and refused to accept the newly elected members.¹¹⁹ Similar incidents were reported by Litovin and Zotov (also representatives of the Trubochnyi plant), Korokhov, a delegate from the Obukhovskii plant, and a representative from the Staryi Lessner plant.¹²⁰

An incident that took place at the Trubochnyi plant and was reported by the plant's representative to the shop steward assembly, Zotov, at the meeting on March 15, 1918, vividly illustrated the repressive policies by the authorities. When a delegate to the Extraordinary Shop Steward

Assembly read a declaration at a meeting of the general assembly of workers, the commander of the Red Guard detachment came up on the stage and snatched the declaration from his hands. He accused the delegate of counterrevolutionary activities and started to interrogate him in front of the audience. Workers were outraged. They assaulted the commander and only the intervention of the person whom he had earlier accused of counterrevolution saved him from an imminent beating. Once he was in relative safety, the Red Guard chief sent for his men. They disbanded the meeting and tried to arrest the presidium and the delegate, threatening him with execution (eventually he managed to escape).¹²¹

Workers' clashes with the authorities often had much more serious outcomes than did the above incident. According to the evidence cited in Vladimir Brovkin's study of the post-October period, the Bolsheviks used repression against workers in the cities of Tula, Nizhnii Novgorod, Kostroma, Tver, Voronezh, Kaluga, Zlatoust, and Vitebsk.¹²² Force was used against workers of the Berezovskii plant in the Ekaterinburg province in the Urals (May 9).¹²³ A meeting held on January 14, 1918, by workers of the Tula railroad depot ended in a tragedy. It was convened for discussing the recent killing of two railroad workers (Soshnikov and Illarionov) by the Bolshevik Kazharinov. The Red Guards ordered the meeting to disperse. When the participants refused, the Red Guards opened fire.¹²⁴ Shootings of defenseless workers occurred during the peaceful demonstrations in support of the Constituent Assembly that took place in Petrograd on January 5.¹²⁵

One can get an idea of the ruthlessness of the authorities from a letter to Zinov'ev by the military commissar from the town of Viatka, Naumov. Written in a businesslike manner, the letter described the campaign of terror conducted by the local authorities against innocent people. Naumov wrote: "The events in Petrograd are very serious. We respond to them as best we can. . . . We have shot twenty-four hostages after the attempted assassination of Vladimir Illich [Lenin], the assassination of Mikhail Solomonovich [Uritskii], and the attempt against your own [Zinov'ev's] life, and have announced that this is only a beginning." "In a word," the author concluded cynically, "we are catching up in all areas."¹²⁶

A reconstruction of the tragic episode that occurred in the town of Kolpino in May 1918 provides an insight into the relationship between workers and the Bolshevik authorities. According to the minutes of the factory committee of the Novyi Arsenal (which sent a special team to investigate the events in Kolpino), the trouble started over the distribution of

bread. On May 9, 1918, the local authorities announced that the bread rations, which were supposed to be distributed on that day, would not be distributed. The women who waited in line approached the local commissar, Panov, and demanded bread. They were particularly infuriated by the fact that the members of the local soviet had had a wild drinking party [*perepilis*'] just a few days earlier, during the Easter celebration, and also by the fact that the local Red Guards received their bread rations on that very same day.

The commissar refused to give in to their demands. In the skirmish and confusion that followed, the commissar shot and killed a boy. Then he called the Red Guards to disperse the crowd, using guns and an armored vehicle. On the demand of the workers from the Izhorskii plant, located in the town, the factory committee (which sided in this case with the workers) convened a meeting of the general assembly attended by approximately three thousand workers. The meeting passed a resolution demanding that the Red Guards be disarmed. After the meeting, as the workers were leaving, the Red Guard detachment met them at the plant gates with a volley of gunshots. Two workers were killed and many wounded. The investigation undertaken by the factory committee of the Novyi Arsenal determined that contrary to the claim of Commissar Naumov, there was no threat to his life and the shootings were totally unprovoked.¹²⁷

The events in Kolpino evoked sympathy from workers at many Petrograd plants. Numerous speakers at the meeting that took place at the Novyi Arsenal on May 13, 1918, denounced the Bolshevik regime and expressed their solidarity with workers. The participants decided to lay wreaths at the graves of the victims with an inscription that was clearly anti-Bolshevik in its tenor. In an impassioned speech, a delegate from the Obukhovskii plant, Korotkov, blamed the government policies for food shortages and the deteriorating conditions of workers. He also called upon the participants to support the resolution of workers from the Obukhovskii plant to unite all Petrograd plants in a powerful protest against the regime and to present their demands to the authorities. The final resolution of the meeting denounced the Bolsheviks and their repressive policies.¹²⁸

It was a terrible time for workers. They were exhausted, undernourished, disillusioned, and disoriented. Instead of helping them to cope with the difficult situation, the authorities exploited them; and when workers protested, they used force to suppress these protests. An appeal by workers of the Tula railroad depot conveyed workers' despair:

It is not the bourgeoisie that is being shot at now, but we, workers and peasants. We kill each other, comrades and citizens. This is not a class war. This is a total extermination.¹²⁹

Resolutions against the Bolshevik dictatorship were adopted by meetings of Petrograd workers at the Obukhovskii, the Semianikovskii, the Vargunin, the Aleksandrovskii steam engine, and the Patronnyi plants. These resolutions condemned the atrocities committed by Lenin's government and its agents and demanded that they stop them and disband the Red Guards.¹³⁰

A private letter from a worker written in the fall of 1918 and addressed to Zinov'ev, the erstwhile chairman of the Petrograd soviet, showed very vividly the true attitude of ordinary workers to the Bolshevik regime. Although the author praised the Bolsheviks for some of their policies (the reform of the alphabet, the abolition of estates, the land reform, et cetera), his general assessment of Bolshevik rule was extremely negative. He wrote that even workers who had been initially sympathetic to the Bolsheviks now opposed their policies and the methods by which they implemented them. Focusing on the food situation, the author (who had lost two children to famine) emphasized the insensitivity of the government to the plight of the workers: "... as to the number of children and mothers that workers lose, you do not care. . . ." He further accused the government of suppressing and intimidating workers: "Instead of [giving] freedom, you organize ceremonial meetings where you do not allow workers to even open their mouth. . . . You condemn even resolutions passed by the Putilov workers and call them hooligan-like [*khuliganskie*]. . . . At your orchestrated meetings you do not allow speeches by representatives of other [political] parties; you know in advance that they can also sway people to their side." According to the author, the authorities relied primarily on the military, particularly sailors, in dealing with workers' unrest. He charged that the government provided them with food, while workers were starving. "At your meetings," he wrote, "you assert that the lower classes [*nizy*] support you. You are lying shamelessly; your support, just like Nicholas's [II], is bayonets. . . ." At the end of his letter the author explained why he did not sign his name or give his address. One can sense in this explanation the extent to which workers were intimidated by the Bolshevik regime: "I am afraid to give my address, since of course [in this case] you will send me to Gorokhovaia Street [the location of the Cheka headquarters] or may even shoot me as a counterrevolutionary. . . . I am afraid to sign this letter, since in this case [I will be sent] straight to Gorokhovaia Street."¹³¹

In discussing the suppression of workers during the post-October period, two points should be made absolutely clear. First, repression of workers was not, as some authors have suggested, a few fortuitous and isolated incidents caused by the exigencies of the civil war; it was part of the broad campaign designed to pacify the population. The repression started in some instances as early as November 1917, long before the beginning of the civil war, in response to the growing discontent among workers. Similarly to the pre-October period, economic demands were at the heart of workers' discontent. Ironically, the demands formulated prior to the October takeover (for example, the payment of the difference between the old and the new wage scale), which were supported by the Bolsheviks as part of their campaign against the Provisional Government, became one source of conflicts between workers and the new authorities. As the situation in the country deteriorated, due in part to Bolshevik policies, the discontent among workers grew. The fact that the new government allegedly represented their class interests and had to operate under severe economic constraints did not seem to impress workers a great deal. They demanded higher wages and better conditions, just as they did under the Provisional Government. As one factory committee member from the Putilov plant stated, workers did not "want to take into account either the current political situation or the economic dislocation."¹³² Since workers' discontent created a fertile ground for the opponents of dictatorship, the authorities decided to suppress it.

Second, repression against workers was not merely excesses by local authorities. Instigation came from the very top of the Bolshevik regime. As early as November 1917, Lenin urged the Bolsheviks to "arrest and bring to revolutionary justice" all who opposed "the people's cause."¹³³ Lenin considered that the "dictatorship of the proletariat" involved the use of "military actions . . . against opponents of proletarian power" and the suppression not only of the "bourgeoisie," but also "its accomplices."¹³⁴ In his essay "How to Organize the Competition?" Lenin called for the "purging of Russian land from various harmful insects." Among these "harmful insects," Lenin named "workers malingering at their work," such as "type-setters in Petrograd" (among whom, one might add, the prodemocratic sentiments were particularly strong). As a way of "purging the Russian land," Lenin insisted on executing "harmful people" or punishing them by "forced labor of the hardest kind."¹³⁵ Such were the directives communicated by the head of government that took power on behalf of workers.

◆ ◆ ◆

6

The End of Pluralism in the Labor Movement

At the beginning of 1918 the factory committees were in a difficult situation. The “Red Guard attack against capital” inflicted irreparable damage on their popularity and support. Its adverse effect on the economy discredited the policy of takeovers. Repressive policies seriously damaged the credibility of factory committees among workers and undermined the morale of factory committee members.¹ Several other factors also contributed to the weakening of the factory committees’ position. Massive layoffs (particularly of unskilled workers) brought about the erosion of their popular base. The incorporation of the Red Guards into the Red Army sapped their capacity for enforcing decisions.²

An incident which was reported by a worker from the Okhtenskii gunpowder plant, Blokhin, provides a good illustration of the factory committees’ weakening position at the beginning of 1918. According to Blokhin, on one occasion the workers employed at the plant refused to unload sixteen tons of gunpowder despite the factory committee’s order to do so. The workers did the job, only after the plant’s trade union organization intervened. Blokhin thus summarized the situation at the plant: “At present the factory committee and [the plant’s] union [organization] fight over all problems related to the plant’s operation.”³ And it appears from the above account that the union was winning the fight.

As a result of their weakening, the factory committees, instead of being an asset to Lenin’s government, were rapidly becoming its liability. Yet Lenin continued to support his tottering ally. In his public statements of early 1918, he extolled “the experience and instinct of the masses,” stressing the need for “a transformation from below” whereby “workers themselves create the new foundation for economic conditions.”⁴ He called for more sacrifices on the part of the workers, and chastised those

who demanded higher pay. In his speech to the Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets on January 11, Lenin said:

No doubt, war corrupts people, both at the front and in the rear, by paying above any norm to those who work for the war, by attracting those [people] hiding from the war . . . who are imbued with only one desire—to “grab” and disappear. These elements are the worst that remained from the old capitalist order . . . [and] we should throw [them] out, remove, we should attract to industrial enterprises only the best proletarian elements and create from them nuclei of a future socialist Russia. . . . Capitalism intentionally stratifies the working class in order to unite a miserable handful of the top layers of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie. Clashes with them are inevitable.⁵

This attack against workers demanding higher pay could also be interpreted as an indirect attack against trade unions whose main function was gaining material benefits for workers and which were usually associated with efforts to improve workers' conditions. There may have also been additional reasons for Lenin's distrust of and oblique charges against unions. In contrast to factory committees, the trade unions were still largely a multiparty organization representing a vestige of the once flourishing and now beleaguered soviet democracy. The unions were one of the few remaining forums where moderate Bolsheviks and moderate socialists could potentially thrash out their differences and come to an agreement. In hindsight this agreement may have been unlikely, but for Lenin a rapprochement did not seem impossible and he wanted to prevent that at all costs. These considerations may explain the reasons why Lenin, against all odds and at an enormous cost for the country, persisted in his support of factory committees: this policy helped him to prop up the still fledgling Bolshevik dictatorship.

Yet two months later, in March 1918, Lenin drastically changed his course: he abandoned his former ally, the factory committees, and agreed to their subordination to the trade unions. A close look at one significant development in the labor movement—namely, the exodus of the Mensheviks from the trade union movement—will help to understand this sudden shift.

THE MENSHEVIKS' DEPARTURE FROM THE TRADE UNIONS

The failure of the coalition policy left the Menshevik party in a total disarray. As early as September 1917, the party was divided over its political course. A growing number of the party members favored the

termination of the coalition policy, an agreement with the Bolsheviks, and the formation of an all-socialist regime. At the Democratic Conference (September 14-22), a majority of Menshevik delegates voted against a coalition with the liberals and elected Menshevik Internationalist Martov as their official spokesman, while Iraklii Tsereteli, a staunch Defensist, became the spokesman for the minority that still favored the coalition.⁶ Even those party leaders who had formerly advocated cooperation with the liberals began to shift their position. In his biography of Pavel Axelrod, Abraham Ascher tells that in October, Axelrod "seems not to have been averse to the exercising of power by a combination of socialist parties"⁷ Many well-known Menshevik Defensists—such as B. O. Bogdanov, I. A. Isuv, L. M. Khinchuk, and N. Cherevanin—supported the creation of an all-socialist government at the Democratic Conference.⁸

The events of October 25-26 deepened the rift within the Menshevik party. The Menshevik Defensists, led by N. Potresov and M. Liber, insisted that the Bolshevik adventure should be stopped immediately, if necessary even by military means. According to Boris Nikolaevsky, a prominent Menshevik, the Menshevik CC, which was still dominated at the time by the Defensists, viewed the organization of a new government in the context of "the struggle against the Bolsheviks." "It saw this [new] authority," Nikolaevsky wrote, "in the Committee for the Salvation of the Country and Revolution."⁹ This committee was organized during the night of October 25-26, after the Menshevik and SR factions had left the Second Congress of Soviets.¹⁰ It was in the name of this committee that A. Gots, a prominent SR, organized the uprising of military cadets on October 29, 1917, in Petrograd.¹¹

The Defensists were opposed by a new party majority. This majority emerged during the fall of 1917 in response to the defeats sustained by the party in the course of the revolution. At the beginning of October, Pavel Axelrod bitterly criticized the Menshevik leadership for continuing its current course. In his letter to the German Social Democrat Karl Kautsky, Axelrod wrote: "Now I must acknowledge that after closer observation . . . I also became critical of them [the Menshevik leadership]." He further emphasized that Menshevik policies "have helped the Bolsheviks to achieve domination over the masses."¹² Axelrod charged that the party played into the hands of the Bolsheviks "by neglecting to pursue more vigorously the goal of internationalizing the campaign for a democratic peace and by failing to convoke a democratically elected constituent assembly."¹³

The new majority constituted itself officially on October 31 and included a splinter group of the Menshevik Defensists led by Fedor Dan and the

Menshevik Internationalists led by Iulii Martov. Its program demanded an end to the ill-fated coalition policy and the formation of a united socialist government that would include the Bolsheviks.¹⁴ Following the mid-November elections to the Constituent Assembly, representatives of the new majority led the Menshevik CC in adopting a resolution that condemned the policy pursued since the February Revolution and advocated the creation of an all-socialist government including the Bolsheviks. The resolution bemoaned the defeats that the Mensheviks had recently sustained, particularly in the elections to the Constituent Assembly. The defeat in the elections was in its estimation "nothing short of catastrophic"; the resolution particularly regretted the fact that the party suffered major losses in big industrial centers where previously it had enjoyed a significant lead over the Bolsheviks. The authors urged the party to take immediate steps to improve its position and restore its influence among workers.

Despite sweeping condemnations of the party's former course, the resolution offered very little by way of practical policies. In very general terms, it directed the party to form an all-socialist government and then proceed to win over the pro-Bolshevik workers and the "petite bourgeoisie" that continued to follow the SRs. Yet it contained no specific guidelines as to a political platform for such a government, nor did it indicate what the party should offer to workers and the "petite bourgeoisie" to win them over. According to the resolution, the party was to achieve these objectives by "overcoming the attraction of the *tsenzovye* [propertied] strata for the right-wing elements of the petit-bourgeois democracy" and by "curing the proletarian masses of the social utopianism and anarchist tendencies cultivated among them by the Bolsheviks."¹⁵

In an article published shortly after the promulgation of the resolution, Fedor Dan, a member of the new majority, tried to elaborate on the resolution. The article belied the confusion that reigned in the new majority. On one hand, Dan defended the course that the party had followed after the February Revolution and blamed the masses, and not the Menshevik leadership, for the party's failure. On the other hand, he believed that the party's post-February course had to be changed. Dan advocated the formation of an "all-democratic" government—a formula slightly broader than that of an "all-socialist" government favored by the new majority. Dan did not object in principle to an agreement with the Bolsheviks, but strongly insisted that a new government must be created by the Constituent Assembly, not the soviets.¹⁶

Controversies among Menshevik leaders, which surfaced in November, foreshadowed bitter debates over the policy of the party at the

Extraordinary Congress of the Menshevik party at the end of November.¹⁷ The new majority predominated at the congress and the delegates adopted its political perspective, which stated that the Menshevik party should recognize the Constituent Assembly as the only legitimate authority in Russia. Once the assembly was convened, the party should call for an agreement "among all socialist parties (from the Bolsheviks to NSs [the Popular Socialists]) on the formation of a revolutionary government." The consensus for this agreement should include the recognition of the sovereignty of the Constituent Assembly, the restoration of political freedoms, the conclusion of a democratic peace, the implementation of democratic agrarian reforms, and the establishment of state control over industry in which workers' organizations would participate.¹⁸

The program adopted at the Extraordinary Congress of the Menshevik party was too little, too late. The new majority was at odds with the political reality. The soviets actually were the source of power and the refusal of the new majority to recognize this fact was a sign of serious political myopia. A reversal of Lenin's drive for dictatorship required more than a quixotic insistence on ideological orthodoxy and appeals for democracy; it required realism. If leaders of the new majority wanted to prevent the consolidation of the dictatorship by political, not military, means, an agreement with the moderate Bolsheviks was the only way to reach this goal. But, as the Vikzhel' negotiations showed, the acceptance of the transfer of power to the soviets was a *sine qua non* for such an agreement. The persistent refusal of the Mensheviks to recognize this fact rendered futile all their hopes for reestablishing democracy. It also weakened the Menshevik party itself by widening the rift between the Menshevik leaders and the party's rank and file, who increasingly demanded that the authority of the soviets should be recognized. For example, the meeting of the Menshevik Internationalists, held on November 30, voted down Martov's proposal to boycott the VTsIK until the supreme rights of the Constituent Assembly were recognized and the political terror halted. In its resolution, the meeting stated that a boycott would be a mistake and that the Mensheviks should return to the VTsIK and enter the government if they were offered an opportunity.¹⁹

The new course had a serious impact on the trade unions. As has been indicated earlier, in the wake of the October insurrection, the trade unions were one of the few remaining multiparty organizations where Mensheviks and Bolsheviks still worked together. Many of them still held identical views on a host of political and economic issues. The Bolshevik trade unionists opposed Lenin's plans for the establishment of

the Bolshevik dictatorship, and important trade union organizations (for example, the Petrograd and Moscow Trade Union Councils, the metal workers' union, and Vikzhel', which were dominated by the moderate Bolsheviks) favored an agreement among all socialist parties and the formation of an all-socialist government.²⁰

Many prominent Bolshevik trade unionists opposed repressions and political terror instituted by Lenin. For example, in December of 1917 Semen Lozovskii published two articles in the trade union journal *Professional'nyi vestnik* (nos. 7 and 8) in which he denounced Lenin's repressive policies.²¹ He emphasized that unity of the proletariat should not be achieved "by merely mechanical means, arrests, shipping to the front, or deprivation of bread cards. . . . Preliminary censorship, the destruction of newspapers, the abolition of freedom of agitation for the socialist and democratic parties is, for us, absolutely unacceptable." Lozovskii drew a very unflattering comparison between the way Lenin's government ran the country and the former tsarist regime, which brought Lenin's wrath down on him and caused his temporary expulsion from the party.²² Summarizing the activities of the VTsSPS in the post-October period, the Menshevik V. G. Chirkin, a representative of the council, emphasized that on many important issues, disagreements between Menshevik and Bolshevik factions in the council had been so minimal that they could speak with one voice on behalf of the VTsSPS.²³

The political course adopted at the Extraordinary Congress of the Menshevik party seriously undermined this unity. In charting the policy that would be consistent with their party line, the Menshevik trade unionists demanded that unions should take essentially a confrontational approach in dealing with the government, rather than participate in efforts designed to stabilize the economic situation. The Bolshevik trade unionists, however, while opposing Lenin's attempts to turn soviets into an instrument of the Bolshevik dictatorship, insisted that the trade unions should recognize the soviets as the source of power and assist the soviet government's efforts insofar as they helped to improve the economy. This fundamental disagreement led to a clash between the two factions at the First All-Russian Trade Union Congress.

The congress opened on January 7, 1918, in the wake of the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly (January 5-6). The dissolution was a terrible blow to the Mensheviks since they linked their hopes for the reestablishment of democracy with this institution, not the soviets. This new crisis contributed to an extremely hostile and tense atmosphere at the congress and precipitated the split between the Menshevik and Bolshevik trade unionists.

As one could expect, Menshevik delegates to the All-Russian Trade Union Congress opposed any participation by the trade unions in cooperating with the government. Taking a partisan position, they argued that soviet rule was incompatible with the development of Russia's productive forces, and that the Bolshevik adventure would soon end. It was their view that the Bolshevik government would either have to perish or become the spokesman for those classes that controlled the means of production.²⁴ In either case, the trade unions should remain independent from the state apparatus so that they would be able to protect workers' interests.²⁵ Referring to the absence of any immediate plans by the Bolsheviks to eliminate capitalism, Ivan Maiskii, a member of the Menshevik CC, remarked: "If capitalism remains intact, the tasks which trade unions face under capitalism remain unchanged." Elsewhere he stated that the trade unions should remain "independent organizations of the proletarian class struggle."²⁶

Martov, a spokesman for the Menshevik faction at the congress, tried to strike a delicate balance between the independence of the trade unions and their participation in the government's efforts at economic recovery. On one hand, Martov said, the trade unions should participate in rehabilitating the national economy (a concession to the left wing of the congress and perhaps to his own common sense). On the other hand, he insisted, the trade unions "should preserve their independent character in relation to that power which in the given historical moment . . . cannot be the power of the working class alone, but can be in fact only the power of proletarian and non-proletarian elements, and therefore [it] cannot conduct an economic policy against the consistently and clearly expressed interests of the working class"—an obvious concession to the Menshevik ideological line and party discipline.²⁷

Martov's contradictory perspective was an attempt to avoid the inescapable issues faced by the trade unions: to recognize or not to recognize the legitimacy of soviets as the source of power, and to help or not to help the government in saving the economy. But avoiding these issues was no solution, and the Menshevik faction rejected Martov's ambiguous course. Its draft resolution emphasized the demand for independence of the trade unions and made no mention of cooperation with the soviet government; moreover, the draft implied that the unions should oppose it. According to the draft, the Bolsheviks were "incapable of changing the foundation of capitalist society." Therefore, the draft demanded the continuation of the struggle against "all forms of capital"—an allusion to the Bolshevik regime as a type of state capitalism. In

conducting this struggle, workers should rely on "free, class-oriented, and independent trade unions acting . . . in increasingly close contact with the political party of the proletariat" (a rather awkward attempt at self-advertisement). The closing policy statement of the draft said:

The First All-Russian Congress of Trade Unions, confirming the resolution of the Third All-Russian Conference [of Trade Unions] on the tasks of the trade unions, decisively rejects the attempt of the Council of People's Commissars to turn the trade unions into an auxiliary organization of the so-called "Workers' and Peasants' Government," and openly declares that the trade unions should remain independent and free associations for the proletarian class struggle.²⁸

Such blatant opposition to soviet power alienated many delegates, including the Bolshevik supporters of reconciliation. They were frustrated by the Menshevik intransigence. Grigory Zinov'ev, the principal spokesman for the Bolshevik faction at the congress, gave vent to this frustration in his speech when he said:

There have been attempts at reconciliation; it is futile to try to present things as if the party, on behalf of which I have the honor of speaking before you, did not want an agreement, as if throughout the revolution this party made no attempts to reach such an agreement.²⁹

He proceeded to remind his audience of the past attempts at reconciliation. "I should confess," Zinov'ev said, "that I personally belonged to the group in our party which after September once again . . . made an attempt to reach an agreement."³⁰ He accused the Mensheviks of making such an agreement "objectively impossible" since "the main disagreement was and remains in that our opponents have not understood the role of the Soviets."³¹

Turning to the tasks of the trade unions, Zinov'ev reminded the delegates that at the Moscow State Conference in August 1917 the Menshevik party urged the trade unions to support the Provisional Government. Now, Zinov'ev charged, the economic situation was incomparably more ominous, and yet the Mensheviks denied the trade union support to the soviet state. He found this double standard unconscionable and urged the delegates to reject it.³²

The draft resolution proposed by the Bolshevik faction defined the tasks of trade unions as "the organization of production and the restoration of the undermined productive forces of the country." The authors of the draft envisaged that in the future the trade unions would become

part of the state system for managing the economy ("organs of state power"). With this in mind, the trade unions should establish close ties and work in cooperation with other political organizations of the proletariat, and, first of all, with the soviets.³³

Many delegates who were uncommitted prior to the congress found the Menshevik position on the task of the trade unions inconsistent and insupportable. At the same time, the participation in directing the economy, which was discussed by the unions since the beginning of the summer 1917, was attractive enough to sway them to the Bolshevik side. As a result, the Bolshevik draft won an overwhelming approval, with 182 votes in its favor and 84 votes cast in support of the Mensheviks.³⁴

In contrast to the confrontational atmosphere that prevailed during the debates on major policy issues (such as the tasks of the trade unions and their relationship with the soviet regime), the discussion of the relationship between the trade unions and the factory committees presented an uncommon unanimity. Petr Garvi, a participant in the conference, observed that an overwhelming majority of the congress—"from the Bolsheviks to the Mensheviks"—opposed the independence of the factory committee organizations. Only a small group of anarcho-syndicalists led by Grigorii Maksimov supported factory committee independence and demanded the division of functions between the committees and the unions. They insisted that factory committees, rather than trade unions, should deal with production. They were to organize production "on new principles."³⁵ The anarchists, however, were completely isolated and had little impact on the conference. Following a discussion on this issue, the congress approved a resolution that unequivocally demanded the subordination of the factory committees to the trade unions. Even the Bolshevik hardliners joined the moderate Bolsheviks on this issue. The final resolution was drafted by Semen Lozovskii, who had been recently expelled from the party on Lenin's insistence, and Mikhail Tomskii, a rapidly rising Bolshevik star and Lenin's supporter. The resolution emphasized that from the beginning of the revolution factory committees had assumed the tasks of the trade unions. However, "with the development and strengthening of industrial trade unions [*proizvodstvennyi soiuz*]," the resolution went on to say, "these factory committees should become local agencies of the appropriate trade union."³⁶ A crucial paragraph of the resolution, written by Tomskii, read as follows:

Taking into account [the fact] that a number of complex economic and organizational tasks pertaining to such questions as demilitarization, supervision of

the economy, and regulation of industry demand from the proletariat an exertion and consolidation of all its forces, that the simultaneous existence of the two forms of economic organizations of the working class with overlapping functions can only hinder the process of the concentration of proletarian forces, the Congress considers that the working class can best fulfill the above tasks under the leadership of its economic class organizations built according to the production principle.³⁷

Such instances of unanimity were rare at the congress. The fundamental division between the right (Menshevik) and the left (Bolshevik) factions loomed large over its proceedings. As Garvi points out in his study of the revolutionary trade unions, for the moment, the formal unity of the movement was saved, but the split within it was becoming apparent and "the rupture was maturing."³⁸ Before the delegates voted in the members of the presidium of the VTsSPS, the Menshevik faction issued the following statement:

Having deep disagreements of principle with the majority of the congress regarding the current situation and the tasks of the trade unions, by this [statement] we declare that we enter the VTsSPS with the aim of conducting the most resolute struggle for the complete freedom and independence of the trade unions.³⁹

The statement sent a clear message that the Mensheviks did not intend to follow the congress's decisions. Such a course inevitably led to the further isolation of the Mensheviks within the trade union movement and precipitated their final departure.

Following the trade union congress, many powerful trade unions approved its decisions. On January 15, 1918, the day after the closure of the First All-Russian Trade Union Congress, the Constituent Congress of the Metalworkers' Union opened in Petrograd. The congress was dominated by the Bolsheviks and confirmed all important resolutions of the First Trade Union Congress, including the resolution on the tasks of the trade unions.⁴⁰ There was little that the Mensheviks could do. By adopting an uncompromising position they put themselves in a situation where they either had to forgo their statements or leave the trade unions. They chose the latter course. In January 1918, they concentrated their attention on shop steward assemblies in order to use them for achieving their objectives. This move marked a complete exodus of the moderate socialists from the trade unions and had an indirect but profound effect on the fate of the factory committees.

THE END OF FACTORY COMMITTEE INDEPENDENCE

In dealing with the subordination of the factory committees to the trade unions, Soviet historians without exception describe it as a voluntary act on the part of the factory committees. In their interpretation, the factory committees accomplished their tasks and then of their own free will submitted themselves to the trade unions, disbanding their own central organizations, such as the CCFC.⁴¹ The facts, however, show that this subordination was anything but peaceful and voluntary.

After the First All-Russian Trade Union Congress the trade unions launched a large-scale campaign to stop factory committees' interventions in management and to suppress their independence. In keeping with the congress's resolutions, major trade union organizations moved more aggressively in subordinating committees. On January 19, the day after the First Congress closed, the Constituent Congress of the Metalworkers' Union adopted a resolution confirming the decision of the First All-Russian Trade Union Congress regarding the relationship between the trade unions and factory committees.⁴²

As the pressure began to mount, the factory committees had to consolidate their own ranks. For this purpose, they convened in Petrograd their Sixth Conference, which opened on January 22. Their position at the time was very precarious: their popular support had eroded, their policies were discredited, and their armed hand—the Red Guards—amputated. On a more positive note, they still had the backing of Lenin. His statements at the Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets, which had ended only a few days earlier (January 18), indicated that there was every reason to believe that he did not intend to abandon his tested ally.⁴³ As past experiences of the factory committees had shown, Lenin's support could help enormously in countering encroachments on factory committee independence.

The conference opened with a report by Matvei Zhivotov, erstwhile chairman of the CCFC,⁴⁴ on the accomplishments of the factory committees since the Fifth Conference (November 1917). In assessing the situation in industry, Zhivotov stated that the policy of workers' control had successfully fulfilled its goals. Now the major task was to establish a comprehensive system of regulating production on the national level. As he put it: "Now that political power is in the hands of the workers, they should not limit themselves only to supervising production; they must also seize economic power and resolve this question in a revolutionary manner."⁴⁵ With this objective in mind, Zhivotov went on to say that the

CCFC had written and enforced its own regulations on the implementation of workers' control and refused to comply with the regulations by the All-Russian Council of Workers' Control. The reason for this insubordination, as stated by Zhivotov himself, was very simple: the regulations by the ARCWC "do not satisfy the factory committees." Zhivotov also stated that in order to strengthen its role in the economic sphere, the "proletarian dictatorship" created the VSNKh which, in Zhivotov's own words, consisted of "people who stood most closely to industry, *that is, [people] from the factory committees.*"⁴⁶ At the end of his speech, Zhivotov commented on the disagreements with the trade unions, saying that the latter refused to cooperate with the factory committees.

Judging by newspaper accounts, the first day of the conference proceeded quite smoothly and without surprises. Then, on the second day, during the debate on the relationship between the factory committees and the trade unions, the proponents of factory committee independence suddenly found themselves under fire. The beginning of the debate did not foreshadow what was to come. The advocates of subordination produced their old argument—which had been so unsuccessful in the past—that the parallel existence of two workers' organizations was unnecessary and not conducive to the interests of the proletariat. This time, however, the mood at the conference was definitely different and the argument evoked a great deal more sympathy than it had on previous occasions. As a report in *Novaia zhizn'* noted, it was not only "conciliators" [*soglashateli*] but even representatives of labor organizations "with a uniform [all Bolshevik] composition" who opposed the CCFC.⁴⁷ From the speeches of those opposed to the factory committees' independence it was clear that shortly before the conference a special meeting of representatives of the CCFC, the Petrograd Trade Union Council, and the Metalworkers' Union, had discussed the relationship between the factory committees and the trade unions. This joint meeting had passed a resolution demanding the subordination of the factory committees. And now this resolution was offered to the Sixth Conference for approval.⁴⁸

In the name of the Sixth Conference, this draft resolution proposed a merger of the two organizations into "one industrial workers' organization"—i.e., industrial trade unions. The resolution also directed factory committees and trade union councils at individual enterprises to merge and create organizations that would serve as locals of industrial unions. The most crucial paragraph of the draft read as follows: "With the reorganization of unions according to the above principles, all functions per-

formed by the CCFC are to be transferred to appropriate industrial unions.”⁴⁹ The message was clear: factory committees must surrender completely and unconditionally. By taking over the functions of the CCFC, the trade unions would effectively deprive the factory committees of their independence. Without this central organization, which coordinated activities of individual factory committees, the movement could not continue to play an independent role in regulating the economy. The draft naturally generated a heated debate at the end of which the conference adopted a rather ambiguous resolution: it accepted the merger of factory committees and the trade unions but, as *Novaia zhizn'* noted, under the dominance of the factory committees rather than the trade unions. For example, in accordance with the resolution, union boards (*pravleniia*) were to be elected at city conferences of factory committees. As Zhivotov aptly summarized, “If they want to change us, we will not allow it; by merging with the unions we will change them.”⁵⁰

The debate on workers' control continued in the subsequent sessions of the conference, which demonstrated that the proponents of factory committee independence did not lay down their arms. During the January 24 session, numerous delegates insisted that the factory committees should have their special sphere and function—the regulation of production. Zhivotov, for example, urged the conference “to sanction the will of the masses and thus to exert a certain moral influence on higher organizations with the aim of the speediest introduction of the [CCFC's] regulations [on workers' control].”⁵¹ On the fifth day of the conference, the delegates unanimously (with only nine abstentions) adopted the resolution, which demanded that “all means of production” should be nationalized and that factory committees should be placed in charge of nationalized enterprises.⁵²

This show of strength, however, was very deceptive. The factory committee movement was greatly weakened by internal dissension and its apparatus was depleted by numerous desertions. During the session on January 26, Chairman of the CCFC Zhivotov appealed to local committees and even individual members to help provide personnel. He charged that many functionaries who had been elected to the CCFC had not shown up to perform their responsibilities, despite the fact that they had been contacted on numerous occasions both at their homes and workplaces.⁵³ A report about the conference in *Novaia zhizn'* dispassionately recorded that throughout the conference the number of delegates attending its sessions had significantly and steadily declined. Only one third of all delegates attended the last session. When one speaker

appealed to the delegates to elect several representatives from their midst to assist the CCFC in performing its "colossal work," they did not heed his plea.⁵⁴ It was the beginning of the end.

On January 27, while the Sixth Conference was still in progress, the opponents of factory committee independence made a decisive move. On their initiative, the Petrograd Metalworkers' Union adopted the decision to reorganize the union along the lines proposed by the Sixth Factory Committee Conference, that is, factory committees in the metal industry—one of the country's major industries—would merge with the union.⁵⁵ Obviously, the union leadership interpreted the ambiguous resolution of the Sixth Conference in accordance with its own best interests.

For the factory committees, the move was potentially fraught with dire consequences. If implemented, the decision threatened to weaken the factory committee movement by removing from it a very important segment—factory committees of the metal industry. Furthermore, this decision by one of the most powerful trade unions in the country sent a signal to other trade union organizations and they might take the same course. There was only one last hope for the proponents of independence: appeal directly to Lenin, as the CCFC's leaders had done on earlier occasions. As this study has shown, such direct contacts helped factory committees immensely, particularly after the adoption of the "Decree on Workers' Control" in November of 1917.

At the end of January several members of the CCFC went to Lenin. The visitors put before him a plan for the salvation of industry by organizing a system for centralized distribution of industrial orders through the VSNKh. In contrast to earlier meetings, Lenin's response to the CCFC's proposal was different. Chairman of the CCFC Zhivotov, who was present at that meeting, remembered that Lenin bluntly refused to support the plan and advised his visitors to turn their attention from economic matters to the struggle against the White Guards, internal counter-revolution, and sabotage.⁵⁶ The message was clear: get out of industrial regulation and stop intervening in management.

The tenor of Lenin's rhetoric changed about the same time as well. Praises for the "initiative of the masses" disappeared from his public statements. He began to denounce "proletarian spontaneity" and to insist on disciplining workers. "The lack of discipline," he argued in his speech to the Moscow Soviet of March 12, "[and] our inertia and flabbiness, which [did not prevent us] from defeating tsarism and the Russian bourgeoisie," could become a serious obstacle in the struggle against "the European international bourgeoisie."⁵⁷

Indicative of this change was Lenin's reversal in his attitude toward anarchists, who had wholeheartedly supported the policy of takeovers. At the Third Congress of Soviets in mid-January he had praised the anarchists for their support of soviet power. He had indicated that a "new current" in the anarchist movement "definitely took the side of the Soviets in which it sees the vitality and the ability to stir sympathy and creative force in the masses."⁵⁸ In March, however, in his pamphlet "The Immediate Tasks of Soviet Power" Lenin unequivocally condemned anarchism as a "bourgeois current" that was opposed to "socialism, proletarian dictatorship, and communism."⁵⁹ In his letter to the Petrograd workers entitled "On Hunger," he wrote: "It is enough to give [even] a little thought to these steps [required] for the victory over famine to understand the infinite stupidity of despicable windbags of anarchism who deny the necessity of state power."⁶⁰

The rhetoric denouncing the "top strata of the proletariat" completely disappeared from Lenin's public statements. On the contrary, he began to praise "the most organized, the most conscious and disciplined" vanguard of the working class. In the same letter "On Hunger," Lenin referred to a worker from the Putilov plant who had told him that most of the forty thousand workers, who had previously been employed at the plant, "were 'temporary,' unreliable, flabby people." After layoffs only fifteen thousand remained. "But these," Lenin wrote sympathetically, "are proletarians, tried and tempered in struggle." Lenin called on this small "vanguard of the revolution" to assume a leading role in the organization of production, and in raising productivity and labor discipline.⁶¹

As has been argued earlier in this study, Lenin's rhetoric should not be taken at face value. His earlier exaltations concerning "workers' spontaneity" and condemnations of "workers' aristocracy" was his way of stating publicly his support for factory committees and his denunciation of trade unions. By the same token, his adulation of the "hereditary proletarians" and the "most conscious vanguard of the working class" in February-March of 1918 meant the endorsement of the trade unions. In his well-known article "The Immediate Tasks of Soviet Power," written in March-April of 1918, Lenin wrote:

The most conscious vanguard of the Russian proletariat has already set before itself the task of improving labor discipline. For example, the Central Committee of the Metal Workers' Union and the Central Trade Union Council have begun to elaborate the necessary measures and decrees. This work should be supported and promoted with all [our] strength.⁶²

In the draft of this article Lenin was even more direct. Lauding the new role of the trade unions, the Bolshevik leader signaled that since the establishment of soviet power, the tasks and role of the trade unions had greatly changed and, therefore, that cooperation with them was now possible:

Yesterday the main task of the trade unions was the struggle against capital and the protection of the class independence of the proletariat. Yesterday the slogan of the day was the distrust toward the state, because this was a bourgeois state. Today the state is becoming and has become proletarian. The working class is becoming and has become the dominant class in this state. The trade unions are becoming and have become state organizations which assume responsibility for the re-organization of the entire economic life on the basis of socialism.⁶³

Not only Lenin's statements, but his actions also demonstrated the change in his attitude toward the trade unions. During the March 27 meeting of the presidium of the VSNKh, Lenin insisted that the VTsSPS should be entrusted with the drafting of the decree on labor discipline,⁶⁴ which was promulgated on April 3 over the signature of the VTsSPS.⁶⁵ At the same meeting, Lenin demanded that trade unions should supervise the enforcement of labor discipline.⁶⁶

The change in Lenin's position was a dramatic one. As late as the beginning of January, from the platform of the Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets, Lenin had condemned "the top layer of the working class" and glorified "the instincts of the masses";⁶⁷ and now he abandoned his staunchest ally and approved the death sentence for the factory committee movement. The question arises: what could have happened in those few weeks to cause this change? It could not have been some substantive changes in the economic policies of the factory committees and the trade unions. The new plan for distribution of orders proposed by the CCFC was perfectly consistent with its previous position. The economic policy of the trade unions had hardly changed since the October takeover. In fact, the two programs were quite similar: both envisaged the transition from supervision of the management to economic regulation on a national scale;⁶⁸ both provided for the establishment of a comprehensive and centralized state system for regulating the economy; both were in favor of nationalizing major industries. The only difference between the two plans was which organization would perform economic regulation—factory committees or trade unions.

One should also discard legal considerations as a possible motive for the change in Lenin's position; that is, Lenin suddenly decided to

observe the existing legislation on economic regulation, such as the "Decree on Workers' Control." As Lenin's support for the "Red Guard attack" showed, he had little regard for law when fundamental political issues were at stake. Economic conditions also could not have prompted Lenin's sudden reversal. True, these conditions rapidly deteriorated, but they were not significantly different from those of two weeks earlier. At the beginning of 1918, trade unions were in many respects more attractive and viable candidates for organizing and managing industrial production than were the factory committees. The former had more experience and better trained personnel. They were not connected with the unpopular "Red Guard attack" and repressions and had better relations with skilled workers (who, as a result of massive layoffs during the winter, constituted most of the active labor force) than did the factory committees. But all these considerations had been just as valid a few weeks earlier and yet the change occurred only at the end of January.

A logical conclusion is that since none of the above considerations could have influenced Lenin, there can be only one possible reason: a political one. Many will agree that political considerations generally dominated Lenin's actions and, as a rule, prevailed in his decisions over all others. Therefore, the dramatic reversal in Lenin's attitude could have been caused by an equally dramatic change in the labor movement.

The only change of that kind that occurred in the labor movement during January was the exodus of the moderate socialists from the trade unions. The particular timing and suddenness of Lenin's repudiation of the factory committees and the change of his attitude toward the trade unions suggests that his decision to support the subordination of the factory committees was tied to one event, namely, the First All-Russian Trade Union Congress. After this congress, the trade unions became *de facto* a one-party institution. They ceased to be a forum where the moderate socialists and moderate Bolsheviks could potentially come to an agreement. Thus, in Lenin's eyes, they no longer presented a threat to his plans for the establishment of a Bolshevik political monopoly. At the same time, the alliance with the factory committees, which had already become a political liability, was no longer expedient from a political point of view and, therefore, Lenin decided to end it.

Without Lenin's support, the factory committees were absolutely defenseless against encroachments on their independence. Slowly but surely the proponents of subordination were preparing their final blow. On January 15, the VSNKh decided that no confiscation of enterprises without the permission of the VSNKh would be tolerated, thus taking this

very important prerogative away from the factory committees.⁶⁹ It is worth recalling that only a few weeks earlier, during the "Red Guard attack," it was Lenin who had personally crossed out a provision of paragraph 2 in the circular on the relationship between the VSNKh and people's commissariats that stipulated that a factory, plant, or building could not be expropriated without the prior knowledge or consent of the VSNKh.⁷⁰

In a last desperate attempt to preserve factory committee independence, members of the CCFC decided to appeal to the Bolshevik party. The approaching Seventh Party Congress (scheduled for March 6-8, 1918) was an appropriate forum to present their case. According to the minutes of the Bolshevik CC meeting of January 24, the discussion of the relationship between the factory committees and the trade unions had been included in the agenda of the congress.⁷¹ Even before the congress opened, the CCFC tried to sway the delegates to its position. In a letter to the Bolshevik CC, written shortly before the congress, the CCFC recalled the invaluable services that the factory committees had rendered to the Bolshevik party in promoting the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and requested the admittance of four representatives from the CCFC to the congress as nonvoting delegates.⁷² Permission was granted only for two,⁷³ but the two delegates never had a chance to present their case. During the preliminary session on March 5, it was decided that the relationships between the factory committees and the trade unions would not be discussed due to a "lack of time."⁷⁴ No information on Lenin's role in this decision is available. However, one can say with a high degree of certainty that he was not opposed to removing the issue from the agenda. At the time, Lenin's authority in the party was at its peak and he knew how to use that authority to get what he wanted, or at least to show his disapproval.

Without the backing of the party leadership, without a popular base, the factory committees were an easy prey. On April 1, a joint conference of the metalworkers' union and factory committees of the Petrograd metal industry struck the final blow to the dying movement. A resolution on reorganizing the union on an industrial basis demanded that the merging of factory committees at metal-industry enterprises with the metal workers' union should be completed. As Pankratova aptly summarized, this resolution ended the independent existence of the factory committees.⁷⁵ The crucial paragraph of the resolution stipulated that:

With the departure from the CCFC of the representatives of the metal-working industry, who constitute about two-thirds of this organization, the CCFC ceases to be the center of the factory committees and [financial] allocations to this organization will be terminated.⁷⁶

This was the “death sentence” and there was nothing that the factory committees could now do to prevent it from taking effect.

The last meeting of the CCFC took place on March 27, 1918.⁷⁷ By then, this organization did not have a trace of its former luster. Having undermined its own base by its adventuristic economic policies and suppression of workers, the once powerful center of the factory committees was now only a shadow of its former self. The only purpose of the meeting was to sanction the incorporation of the CCFC into the rapidly growing Bolshevik bureaucratic machinery. The final resolution of the CCFC stated this fact in dispassionate bureaucratic lingo:

The CCFC, with its entire apparatus and Bureau, incorporates [itself] into the SNKh of the Northern Region as a department for supervising enterprises, and will have equal rights with other departments [of this SNKh].⁷⁸

THE SHOP STEWARDS' MOVEMENT

A history of labor in the 1917 revolution would not be complete without an account of events connected with the shop steward assemblies (*sobranie upolnomochennykh*). Like the other two types of workers' organizations—the factory committees and the trade unions—the shop steward assemblies emerged long before the 1917 revolution. Their beginning dates to the revolution of 1905.⁷⁹ According to available information, these assemblies (or, as they were also called, delegate assemblies and assemblies of elected representatives [*vybornykh*])⁸⁰ first appeared after the strikes in January and February of 1905. One of the first known shop steward assemblies convened in Ivanovo-Voznesensk on May 14 during the strike of textile workers.⁸¹ Interestingly enough, the initiative in creating this assembly came from tsarist officials—the senior factory inspector, Svirskii, and the governor of the province—who suggested that workers should elect their representatives for negotiating their demands with employers.⁸² Also during that spring, the union of Petrograd printers created a “council of elected representatives” for the purpose of spreading the union's influence among Petrograd printers.⁸³

During the period 1905-1907, numerous shop steward assemblies appeared throughout Russia. When the union of metal workers was organized in the spring of 1905, it created shop steward assemblies at the district and city levels. St. Petersburg sales clerks had elected their own delegate assembly at the city level shortly before the metal workers did.⁸⁴ In August 1906 the First All-Russian Conference of Tailors recommended

that "delegate councils" be elected in workshops.⁸⁵ Shop steward assemblies were particularly widespread at printing enterprises. According to a report by the Organizational Bureau of the First All-Russian Conference of Printers (April 1907), permanent shop steward assemblies were created by printers in Petersburg, Moscow, Nizhnii Novgorod, Samara, Odessa, and Kiev. These assemblies represented close to seventeen thousand union members, or roughly 80 percent of all unionized printers.⁸⁶ Only twelve out of a total of sixty-one locals represented at this conference did not have shop steward assemblies; in seven union organizations assemblies existed at some but not all printing enterprises in their areas.⁸⁷

Shop steward assemblies were particularly active in St. Petersburg, Moscow, the Donets basin, and Odessa. According to a survey of thirty-five unions in St. Petersburg, conducted in 1906 by the Organizational Commission for convening an all-Russian trade union congress, sixteen of these unions had shop steward assemblies. Although this number may not seem very high, these sixteen unions included such influential organizations as the metalworkers' union, the textile workers' union, the printers' union, and the leather workers' union. These sixteen unions organized roughly 80 to 90 percent of all union members in Petersburg and had a higher percentage of dues-paying members than other unions.⁸⁸ In Moscow, shop steward assemblies existed in the plumbers' union, the woodworkers' union, the textile workers' union, and the union of commerce employees.⁸⁹ Even before the unions appeared in the Donets basin, shop steward assemblies already existed and played a very important role in organizing workers of that area. A delegate from this region to the First Conference of Metalworkers' Unions of the Moscow Industrial Region reported that assemblies were responsible for most gains achieved by workers of the Donets basin during the summer of 1906.⁹⁰

Within the labor movement, shop steward assemblies occupied a very special place, combining features of both factory committees and trade unions. Like factory committee members, delegates to assemblies were elected by all workers of a given enterprise (rather than just those of a given trade, as was the case with the trade unions).⁹¹ However, in contrast to factory committees, shop steward assemblies were not enterprise based; they represented workers employed at enterprises of a given industry, which made them similar to trade unions, particularly industry-based unions (*proizvodstvennye soiuzy*) with which they were closely connected. In many instances, assemblies provided a basis for organizing trade unions. In Moscow the creation of shop steward assemblies preceded and led to the creation of the printers' union, the tobacco workers'

union, the carpenters' union, the tea packers' union, the union of confectioners, the textile workers' union, and the toy makers' union.⁹²

The functions of shop steward assemblies also resembled those of factory committees and trade unions. Like factory committees, assemblies also represented workers of a given enterprise in their dealings with employers.⁹³ At the same time, just like trade unions, assemblies often addressed issues pertaining to entire industries. In the fall of 1905, for example, shop steward assemblies organized a number of strikes over wages in Moscow (printers, carpenters, tobacco workers, and others), Khar'kov (machinists, tobacco workers, and workers of flour mills), and St. Petersburg (printers).⁹⁴

Shop steward assemblies, which uniquely combined various features and functions pertaining to different types of workers' organizations, managed to provide a vital link between workers at individual enterprises and trade unions that were usually nonenterprise based. In Petersburg shop stewards in metal-industry enterprises recruited new members for the metalworkers' union, collected membership dues, distributed union publications among workers, circulated union questionnaires, organized meetings of workers at the shop/enterprise level, and in general promoted the unions.⁹⁵ Many trade unions realized the importance of shop steward assemblies and directed their own members to set up assemblies as soon as a union was organized (such was the case with St. Petersburg unions of printers, metalworkers, and sales clerks). The First All-Russian Conference of Tailors (August 25-27, 1906) recommended that for the purpose of maintaining "links between the governing board [of the union] and the [working] masses . . . delegate councils should be elected in workshops to conduct agitation on behalf of the union and to collect dues."⁹⁶

In many instances, shop steward assemblies even had considerable power in directing unions in their respective industries. Assemblies elected by printers in Moscow, Odessa, and Kiev had a decisive voice in formulating union policies.⁹⁷ The First All-Russian Conference of Printers (April 1907) stated that in all major printers' unions shop steward assemblies must be recognized as a "*sovereign body within the union*."⁹⁸ In metalworkers' unions, the city shop steward assembly was usually "*the highest legislative body of the union*."⁹⁹ Sometimes assemblies were incorporated into union boards (e.g., the printers' union in Arkhangel'sk) or functioned as union boards (e.g., the printers' unions in Tiflis and Taganrog).¹⁰⁰ Summarizing the role of the shop steward assembly in the Moscow printers' union, V. V. Sher, a Menshevik trade union leader, wrote:

From the moment of their election, deputies, or shop stewards, as they were later called, acquired tremendous importance for the entire organization [of Moscow printers]. At their meetings, they discussed and resolved the most important issues of union life. Having been elected by all workers (they were elected by both unionized and nonunionized workers), [these shop stewards] subordinated the [union] board itself to their influence.¹⁰¹

Shop steward assemblies played a particularly important role in the labor movement during the period of reaction when the tsarist government banned and closed many unions in an attempt to curtail the labor movement. When the government would close a union, the assembly, which was often overlooked by tsarist officials, continued to carry on union functions. Thus shop steward assemblies saved many unions from complete disintegration when all unions in Petersburg and many unions in Moscow and other cities were closed after the dissolution of the First State Duma.¹⁰² However, as the labor movement declined due to repressive policies of the government, so did shop steward assemblies. They led only a sporadic existence until the new revolutionary upheaval shook the country.

Throughout most of 1917 shop steward assemblies were overshadowed by the trade unions, with which they were closely associated, and the factory committees. They attracted little attention from politicians. It was not until after the October takeover that the Mensheviks suddenly "rediscovered" shop steward assemblies and decided to use them in their struggle against the soviet regime.

At the end of December 1917, the Mensheviks (primarily the right wing of the party) convened the first conferences of workers' delegates under the aegis of the Petrograd Union for the Defense of the Constituent Assembly.¹⁰³ The first official meeting of the Extraordinary Shop Steward Assembly took place on January 18, 1918, in Petrograd. An announcement in the newspapers called it "a workers' conference of the Union for the Defense of the Constituent Assembly."¹⁰⁴

The creators of the movement intended it as a political organization that they would oppose to the soviets. S. Volin, a well-known Menshevik trade unionist, indicated that according to organizers of the assemblies, they were "to become a kind of spontaneous workers' parliament instead of the Soviets, which were losing power, authority, and trust."¹⁰⁵ Grigorii Aronson wrote in his memoirs that at the end of 1917 debates were going on in Menshevik circles in Petrograd and Moscow as to whether the party should pursue a reelection of the existing soviets or create a different workers' organization in opposition to the soviets.

Until about March-April 1918, the leadership of the party did not commit itself one way or the other. (Martov and Dan, for example, remained lukewarm to the shop steward movement until its very end in 1918.) It was not until April that the Menshevik CC finally took serious interest in the assemblies.¹⁰⁶

The movement initially was quite successful. In Petrograd, for example, during the period from March 13 to April 10 seven meetings of shop stewards took place.¹⁰⁷ From Petrograd the movement quickly spread to the provinces. Meetings of shop stewards were held in Samara, where stewards of the Trubochnyi plant led the plant's workers in adopting a decision to recall seventy-two delegates from the plant to the local soviet. In the Nizhnii Novgorod province, regular meetings of about 180 representatives elected by forty thousand workers were held until the Red Guards dispersed them. At the beginning of March, 116 delegates from local weapon plants and ten representatives from trade unions began to convene regular meetings of shop stewards in Tula.¹⁰⁸ Beginning in April, conferences of shop stewards regularly convened in Moscow,¹⁰⁹ and individual shop stewards' meetings were reportedly held in Rybinsk, Iaroslavl', and Sormovo.¹¹⁰

At first, shop steward conferences were primarily concerned with economic rather than political issues. S. Volin noted in his memoirs that the first meetings of the Extraordinary Shop Steward Assembly in Petrograd were "preoccupied with practical questions pertaining to the evacuation of Petrograd [industry], unemployment, food supply, et cetera."¹¹¹ This orientation to a significant extent accounted for the initial success; the movement attracted many workers who were not affiliated with any political party and who were mostly concerned with workers' economic plight, rather than high politics. For example, out of 101 delegates who attended a meeting of shop stewards in Petrograd on March 13, there were thirty-five Mensheviks, thirty-three SRs, one Popular Socialist, and forty-two nonaffiliated delegates.¹¹²

The Mensheviks hoped that in the course of resolving practical issues, sooner or later the workers would confront the need to address general political questions. The Menshevik B. Bogdanov, at the March 15 meeting of shop stewards in Petrograd, argued:

All questions are concerned with general political questions. In every issue we shall face general questions. Every step will mean the struggle against the government.¹¹³

Solomon Schwarz also revealed the Menshevik intentions at one of the

shop steward meetings in Petrograd: "In the process of struggle for the fulfillment of practical tasks [we] can promote the real cause. The front line can be penetrated in several places."¹¹⁴

However, the hopes of politicizing workers, cherished by the Mensheviks, were doomed to failure. Physical and mental exhaustion, the political and economic instability of the previous months, fear of repression, and especially the disillusionment in and distrust of all socialist parties had drastically changed workers. Apathy and indifference seized once active and militant workers. As a worker from the Obukhovskii plant succinctly put it at the March 15 shop stewards' meeting in Petrograd: "Those who will give [us] bread, will rule."¹¹⁵ Abramov, a delegate from the Nevskii ship-building plant, voiced workers' attitudes at the March 13 meeting: "Workers have lost their trust in [socialist] political parties. We gained freedom and could not preserve it."¹¹⁶ Summarizing the moods among workers at the time, the Menshevik V. O. Levitskii wrote in a letter to Pavel Axelrod in June 1918:

This is a period of general apathy and disillusionment: "May you all, the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks, go to hell with all your politics." The irritation spreads against socialists in general, against all parties which "betrayed" hopes.¹¹⁷

Several delegates at the March 13 and 15 meetings of shop stewards in Petrograd resented the Mensheviks' attempts to politicize the shop steward movement. For example, criticizing those who advanced "old, narrow, factional slogans" (meaning those who advocated party goals), Shishkov, a delegate from the State Printing Shop, insisted on building "a non-party workers' organization."¹¹⁸ Other delegates refused to vote for a political declaration proposed at the March 13 meeting. Nikiforov, a delegate from the Trubochnyi plant, explained his refusal in the following way: "I was elected to the shop steward conference to discuss the question[s] of unemployment, evacuation, and others. I have no right to vote for a declaration because these [political] questions were not discussed at the plant's meeting."¹¹⁹ The March 13 meeting of Petrograd shop stewards even voted down a proposal to give a consultative voice to representatives from political parties.¹²⁰

The organizers of the shop steward movement faced a critical dilemma: if they tried to politicize the movement, they ran a risk of losing support from the workers; if they did not politicize it, they would not attain their objective of changing the existing political system. In this no-win situation the Menshevik activists chose to challenge the Bolshevik regime

under their old slogan, which demanded the reestablishment of the Constituent Assembly. Since they failed to politicize the workers, their undertaking was doomed to failure; all it did was just to increase the Mensheviks' isolation. Only those who remained personally loyal to the party followed them in this ill-fated enterprise.

By the summer of 1918, the movement intensified its activities, which had assumed a definite political character. At the end of May, rumors spread that the Bolshevik government intended to disband the extraordinary assemblies of shop stewards. Delegates to the Petrograd Extraordinary Assembly responded to these rumors with a resolution, passed on May 23, which stated their determination to fight "with all available means including the organization of a general political strike."¹²¹ A shop steward meeting of June 1 in Petrograd confirmed this resolution and reiterated the delegates' determination to stage a political strike. According to this resolution, the strikers were to put forward political slogans: "the transfer of power to the Constituent Assembly, the re-establishment of local self-government organizations [dumas], and the struggle for the integrity and independence of the Russian republic [i.e., the abrogation of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty]."¹²²

The Extraordinary Shop Stewards' Assembly discussed the idea of a general strike throughout June. Finally, on June 26, a meeting of shop stewards in Petrograd adopted a decision to stage a one-day political strike on July 2. This decision was supported by conferences of shop stewards in other cities. On June 29, the Moscow shop stewards resolved to take part in this strike and join the shop stewards of Petrograd in advancing their political demands. The idea of a strike was upheld by shop steward assemblies in Tula, Perm', Nizhnii Novgorod, Syzran', Iaroslavl', and Sormovo.¹²³

Workers did not respond to the political slogans put forward by the strike organizers, and the strike proved to be a failure.¹²⁴ Even in Petrograd, where the movement was probably most active, disillusioned and apathetic workers, terrorized by threats from the Bolshevik authorities, remained at their working places. An independent Petrograd newspaper, *Novaia zhizn'*, stated that "strikes occurred only at individual plants, and not major ones."¹²⁵ Suffice it to say that even Petrograd printers, among whom the influence of the moderate socialists was traditionally very strong, did not come out into the streets of Petrograd in full strength.¹²⁶ As a result of this unenthusiastic response by workers, the authorities easily dispersed random demonstrations and meetings.

While organizing the strike, the leaders of the movement were also

preparing for an all-Russian conference of shop stewards that was to lay the ground work for an all-Russian shop steward congress or, as the Mensheviks also called it, the Workers' Congress.¹²⁷ In May 1918 they set up an Organizational Bureau in Moscow, where the congress was to take place.¹²⁸ Although the organizers of the congress claimed that it would be a strictly nonparty forum, the congress certainly was to have a political orientation along Menshevik lines. The dominance of the Mensheviks in the Organizational Bureau was a clear indication that the future congress would focus on political issues, and first of all the reorganization of state power. According to the July 7 issue of the newspaper *Vecher*, the congress was to raise first and foremost "general questions of working class policy."¹²⁹

As one could expect, the government's response to the Menshevik idea of convening a congress of shop stewards was unmitigated hostility. During the period preceding the congress the authorities intensified persecutions of activists in the shop steward movement. They disbanded meetings of shop stewards and arrested the participants. In his letter to Pavel Axelrod, dated June 14, 1918, Genrikh Erlikh wrote about the arrest of fifty-six participants of the meeting that took place a day earlier. Among the arrested were two prominent Mensheviks, G. D. Kuchin (Oranskii) and A. A. Troianovskii.¹³⁰ On June 23, 1918, the authorities arrested forty participants of another meeting of shop steward delegates from over a dozen localities who gathered in Moscow to discuss the future congress.¹³¹

When the congress opened in Moscow at the end of July, the Bolshevik authorities decided to launch a decisive attack. On July 23, agents of the Cheka disbanded the congress and arrested about forty delegates, including some workers.¹³² Among those arrested were such prominent Menshevik trade unionists as Ruvim Abramovich, Iurii Denike, Grigorii Aronson, and V. Chirkin. They, along with others, were detained without charges in the Taganka prison for several months.¹³³

As could be expected, the conference, like the entire shop steward movement, had a negative coverage in the press (by this time the opposition press had already been suppressed). The delegates to the congress were accused of "falsifying the will of the working class," conducting a struggle against soviet power (which was true), and instigating "the overthrow of Soviet power through an armed uprising" (a deliberate lie).¹³⁴ The dictatorial government never gave the arrested delegates a chance to defend themselves and to present their position.

The shop steward movement had convincingly showed once again

that the moderate socialists did not have a practical course that would give even a remote hope of successfully bringing democracy to Russia. This entire campaign was not a result of a deliberate and well-calculated policy, but rather was the last, desperate attempt on the part of the Mensheviks to regain their position after their devastating defeats, including the one in the trade union movement. It is worth noting that the first official meeting of the Extraordinary Shop Stewards' Assembly (January 18, 1918) coincided with the end of the First All-Russian Trade Union Congress, at which the Mensheviks failed so miserably to convince the unions to oppose the soviet regime. After the defeat, the Mensheviks either had to comply with the decisions of the congress, or to break entirely with the trade union movement. They chose the latter course. A disproportionately large number of former Menshevik trade unionists in the leadership of the shop steward movement, as compared with the number of political veterans of the Menshevik party, supports the suggestion that the revival of the shop steward movement was connected with the Menshevik exodus from the trade unions.

The brutal suppression of the shop steward movement by the government was a severe blow to the Menshevik party and its plans. S. Volin noted that the shop steward movement was the last broad campaign of the Mensheviks under the soviet regime. Summarizing the reasons for the failure of the movement, he wrote: "With the apathy which by this time had seized many workers . . . it was impossible to create such positions [as to challenge the government]. That is why the Soviet government could break the movement—which had been developing so successfully—by several police raids which eliminated its leadership."¹³⁵

After the suppression of the shop steward movement, the Menshevik party was never again a factor in Russia's political life. On the whole, its subsequent course with regard to the Bolshevik regime until the early 1920s could best be described as that of a "loyal opposition." Israel Getzler, a biographer of Martov, concludes, for example, that while Martov continued "to agitate for a democratic parliamentary system and against the substitution for it of the Soviet system of democracy," he rejected, however, the path of active struggle against soviet rule.¹³⁶ In 1920, Martov described his position in the following way:

Our tactic may be defined as a struggle against Bolshevism insofar as it is a distortion of socialism and is a terrorist system based on a schism within the proletariat and between the proletariat and peasantry, but we link this struggle with unconditional support of Bolshevism in its resistance to international imperialism and its internal counterrevolutionary allies.¹³⁷

According to Ascher, "other Mensheviks, most notably Dan, extended this line of reasoning by offering what amounted to a Marxist rendition of an old theme: 'My revolution, right or wrong.'"¹³⁸ He goes on to say that in the end, "not only did the Mensheviks in Russia become somewhat less hostile to Lenin's rule, they even came close to absorbing some of his ideological positions."¹³⁹ The Menshevik party to a significant extent lost its identity and broke down into several factions.

The defeat of the Mensheviks in the labor movement and the suppression of factory committees marked the triumph of the principle of monopoly on power in the labor movement. The movement, which had once been a pillar of democracy, became one of the principal supporters of the Bolshevik dictatorship. This transformation played a very important role in the destruction of democracy in Russia and the labor movement paid dearly for choosing this course. The demise of political democracy eventually led to the suppression of labor's independence.

EPILOGUE

Following the suppression of the factory committees, the role of the trade unions in economic and political matters grew spectacularly, reaching its peak at the beginning of 1919. In March of that year, the new program of the Bolshevik party, adopted at the Eighth Party Congress, confirmed the exclusive role of the trade unions in organizing and regulating production. This political document—the most important one adopted by the party since the October Revolution—emphasized that "the organizational apparatus of socialized industry should first of all rely on the trade unions." It pointed out that the unions were to concentrate in their hands "the entire management of the national economy," and were to be the main safeguard against "the bureaucratization of the economic apparatus of the Soviet power."¹⁴⁰

The decisions of the Second All-Russian Congress of Councils of National Economy, held the same year, also emphasized the exclusive role of the trade unions in regulating production. The resolution "Workers' and State Control" stressed that "the only correct way to resolve the issue of workers' control will be to transfer it [control] to the trade unions." The resolution further stated that "control functions of *glavks*, *tsentrs*, and the departments of the Supreme Council of the National Economy" should be transferred to the departments of workers' control of appropriate industrial unions, while the all-Russian center of workers' control would be set up at the VTsSPS.¹⁴¹ According to the new

statute of the VSNKh adopted by the congress, trade union representatives should constitute about one third of the total number of delegates at the VSNKh's plenary meetings. Since the eleven-member presidium of the VSNKh was to be elected at these plenary meetings, it is safe to assume that the trade unions were also to have a proportionate representation in this agency. Local councils of the VSNKh should have a very similar composition.¹⁴²

However, the newly empowered trade unions were not the former democratic unions that relied on the support of the workers. The unions' close association with the dictatorial regime and their monopolistic position within the labor movement poisoned them; the virus of corruption and bureaucratization was rapidly devouring their flesh. In his memoir, Grigorii Aronson provided a vivid description of corruption that permeated the union of white-collar employees by the end of the civil war. According to Aronson, the union's leadership widely used food rations and various privileges to bring the rank and file into submission.¹⁴³

For the trade unions, the subordination of the factory committees was a Pyrrhic victory; along with the government favors, they inherited from the deceased factory committee movement the subdued, disillusioned, and apathetic workers who had already tasted the "proletarian" dictatorship and were distrustful of the new regime and its agencies.

Rather than protect workers' rights and improve their conditions, the trade union leadership, which was increasingly falling under the influence of Lenin's supporters,¹⁴⁴ concentrated its efforts on keeping workers in harness and making them serve the interests of the new regime.¹⁴⁵ The unions in fact became part of the dictatorial system. The resolution on the tasks of the trade unions adopted by the Second All-Russian Congress of Trade Unions promised unflinching support for the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and agreed to a "complete merger of the trade unions with the organs of state power."¹⁴⁶ Even the moderate union of white-collar employees, which had always followed the Mensheviks, supported the cooperation with the Bolshevik government. As Aronson indicated in his memoirs, of all the delegations that attended the union's extraordinary conference in November of 1918, those who advocated independence of the unions from the government dominated only one—the delegation from Ukraine.¹⁴⁷

The subordination of the factory committees to the trade unions hardly changed anything for workers. They continued to suffer from hunger, adverse working conditions, and political repression. The more sophisticated methods of exploitation and police rule enforced by the trade unions substituted for the rough methods of direct coercion employed

by the factory committees and Red Guards. The Bolshevik dictatorship, of which the trade unions became an integral part, continued to deny workers their basic rights.

For the new masters, any means were suitable to discipline the starving Russian workers. The Bolshevik regime routinely used repressive policies against workers. Lenin's suggestions for the draft decree on labor discipline proposed, among other things, to treat any violation of labor discipline as a criminal offense and insisted that such violations should be punished by imprisonment.¹⁴⁸ The meeting of the presidium of the VSNKh, held on April 1, 1918, decided to rewrite the draft in the spirit of Lenin's suggestions.¹⁴⁹

The leaders of the new regime conveniently forgot their earlier condemnations of exploitative practices by capitalists. Now Lenin no longer criticized the "sophisticated methods" that had been employed earlier by capitalists to make workers work harder. In fact, he began to advocate the employment of former owners and managers and use their advice on how to discipline workers. In his speech on March 27, 1918, at the meeting of the Presidium of the VSNKh, Lenin said: "Entrepreneurs should be entrusted with creating the norms of labor discipline. . . . As far as dismissals [of workers] without warning are concerned, it is necessary to consult [on this matter] with entrepreneurs, engineers, and foremen."¹⁵⁰ Lenin also demanded the introduction of practices that would help to squeeze more work from the starving Russian worker. In his well-known article "The Immediate Tasks of Soviet Power," Lenin wrote: "[We] should put on the agenda and try the piece-rate system, and much of that which is scientific and progressive in the Taylor system."¹⁵¹

Trade unions joined the Bolshevik government in forcing Russian workers into submission. They were entrusted, on Lenin's insistence, with the drafting of the decree on labor discipline. The decree, which was promulgated on April 3 over the signature of the VTsSPS,¹⁵² provided for strict internal regulations at enterprises and envisaged severe punishments for violations of labor discipline. It made no mention of the workers' right to strike which, prior to the overthrow of the autocracy, had been one of the most important demands of the trade unions. When Lenin proposed the reintroduction of a piece-rate system, which had been abolished as excessively exploitative after the October uprising, trade unions undertook the implementation of this scheme. By July, close to one quarter of Petrograd workers were paid by piece-rate. The new labor code adopted in December of 1918 made legal the use of the piece-rate system.¹⁵³

In his assessment of current changes in Bolshevik economic policies, a prominent Menshevik, A. S. Martynov, wrote in his letter to Pavel Axelrod in May 1918:

... Lenin has recently declared that it is necessary to "slow down the attack against capital," that now the central task is the struggle against the economic dislocation and, first of all, for an increase of labor productivity by way of introducing the "iron labor discipline"; in practice, it means employment of prominent capitalists, for high pay, the replacement of the archaic state economy by a centralized bureaucratic one, an increase in work hours, and [the use of] a piece-rate and the Taylor system. There have already been meetings between the government and industrialists who have begun to flirt with the Bolsheviks in hope of taming them.¹⁵⁴

However, Martynov noted, despite their flirtations with capitalists, the authorities continued to be "hard as a rock" (*tverdokamennye*) in their political policies, unwilling to seek compromises with other political parties.¹⁵⁵

The wooing of the trade unions by Russia's new rulers did not last very long. The end of the trade unions' independence came in 1921 when, at the Tenth Party Congress, the trade union leaders—the so-called Workers' Opposition—like the leaders of the CCFC in 1918, were taught a hard lesson in politics. By that time, the Bolshevik government had acquired its own apparatus for economic management and did not need to depend on the trade unions. The alliance with the trade unions had become a burden on the party leadership since it hindered the increasing concentration of power in the hands of the gradually diminishing circle of party leaders.

Association with the dictatorial regime distanced trade union leadership from rank-and-file workers. Fearful of workers' unrest, they did not even dare to appeal to discontented workers and seek their support against the party leadership, when the latter made its move to eliminate the last vestiges of trade union independence. On the contrary, members of the opposition did their best to conceal from workers the dispute that rent the party. Their association with the dictatorial system poisoned them; like Lenin himself, they now knew very well the difference "between that which is being discussed at the congress and that which is thrown [sic!] to workers" (Lenin's words).¹⁵⁶ Together with Lenin, Trotsky, and other prominent Bolsheviks, two leaders of the opposition, Alexander Shliapnikov and I. N. Perepechko, signed a letter addressed to the striking Petrograd workers, calling upon them to show their "self-restraint"

and "discipline."¹⁵⁷ They assured workers of unity and order within the party when in fact there was none.

Without democratic freedoms and the support of workers, the trade unions, like the factory committees before them, were easy prey. Trade union bosses could offer little resistance to party leaders. Like the factory committees, they themselves created conditions for their own demise by accepting Lenin's political line and supporting his efforts in imposing the dictatorship upon the workers and the rest of the country. When in 1921 the interests of this dictatorship required the suppression of the trade unions, Lenin did not hesitate to sacrifice his former allies, just as he had sacrificed the factory committees in 1918, on the altar of his jealous god—the only god he ever really knew—the monopoly of political power.

Conclusion

The politics of Russian labor during the 1917 revolution defies even the most comprehensive explanations. A close examination reveals a whole gamut of underlying interactions that defined the role of labor organizations in the events of 1917. The complexity of these interactions will continue to challenge future researchers and will undoubtedly require new theoretical and methodological breakthroughs. Efforts to explain labor politics "from below" have certainly contributed toward expanding our knowledge about the social universe of the revolution, and particularly revolutionary radicalism at the factory level. They have focused our attention on the importance of workers' elemental discontent.¹ However, this approach does not adequately explain the complexity of labor politics in 1917. One reason for this inadequacy is the failure to recognize labor functionaries as a distinct group within the labor movement.

Even when some researchers have recognized that labor functionaries had a distinct identity of their own, they have still failed to grasp the full significance of this fact for labor politics.² They have continued to view the policies of Russian labor as being primarily an expression of workers' spontaneous attitudes that were merely articulated and to a certain extent amplified by labor leaders. Although Tim McDaniel, for example, recognizes that "the beginnings of oligarchy" among labor functionaries "were already visible in 1917,"³ he still maintains that labor policies in 1917 were primarily a product of workers' pressure from below. McDaniel writes: "As had been true over the past decades, grass-roots worker militancy put constant pressure on the weak organizations and so helped to turn them in a more radical direction"; elsewhere he remarks that "worker leaders had little autonomy of action."⁴

As McDaniel has aptly noted, the approach that emphasizes workers' attitudes in explaining labor politics reveals a strong influence of Marxism since the focus is on social factors as determinants of political behavior.⁵ Undoubtedly a valuable analytical tool in studying society, Marxism has advanced our understanding of social reality. However, its theory and methodology have limitations, particularly when applied to political

processes; the category of class may be very useful in social analysis, but it often proves to be misleading in explaining politics.⁶

This study has argued that in order to better understand labor politics during the Russian revolution, labor functionaries should be viewed as a distinct group with its own specific agenda. Although many Russian labor organizers came from the working class, they were generally better educated and more politically sophisticated than the average worker.⁷ But more than education and political sophistication, it was their function that set them apart from the workers. This function bound them together into one cohesive group and had a profound effect on their identity. They viewed reality through the prism of this identity and what they saw certainly influenced their actions.

As this study tried to show, factory committees' policy toward the Provisional Government was to a significant degree affected by the latter's unwillingness to accept factory committees' participation in management. Participation in management was the main function of the factory committees, their *raison d'être*. Factory committee activists understood very well that there would be no reason for their organization to exist as an autonomous entity within the broader labor movement if it had no role in management. If they gave up that function, they would have to accept a subordinate position to the trade unions and lose their independence. The refusal of the Provisional Government to accept the factory committees's demand played a crucial role in turning them against the government and the entire post-February political system which legitimized it. Instead of helping to preserve stability, they disrupted the operation of enterprises and helped to undermine the political order. Rather than play a constructive role, they amplified the spontaneous discontent among workers and helped to rally them to the Bolshevik cause. As part of their activities against the government, factory committees organized strikes and demonstrations, helped to create the Red Guards, provided logistical support for the uprising in October, and rendered other forms of assistance to the opponents of the Provisional Government.

The relationship with political parties also suggests a strong influence of the factory committees' concern about their participation in management. The failure of the moderate socialists to appreciate the significance of this demand for the factory committee movement was the principal reason why they had to leave it. The Bolshevik support for workers' control, as conceived by the factory committees, strengthened the influence of the party in this organization. In the wake of the Octo-

ber insurrection, Lenin's backing of factory committee independence tipped an uneasy political balance that existed in the factory committees in favor of the Bolshevik dictatorship. The prospect of playing a prominent role in regulating the economy was a major motivation in this decision. Having initially endorsed the idea of a democratic solution on the soviet model, the leaders of the factory committee movement quickly reversed this decision in favor of the course advocated by Lenin.

Another, and probably most vivid, evidence of the impact of the factory committees' institutional concerns on the policies they pursued was their participation in the suppression of workers during the early months of the Bolshevik regime. When the economic policies implemented by the factory committees brought them into conflict with workers, they sided with the government and helped to quell workers' unrest. Indeed, there were committees that sided with workers in their disputes with the authorities. However, one should note that these were individual actions by dissident committees. They were not in line with the official policy of the movement as enunciated by its central organizations, and often brought them into conflict with these organizations and other factory committees that adhered to the official line.

The specific agenda of the trade unions also helped to shape their opposition against the Provisional Government. Initially, the unions tried to play a constructive role in helping the government to stabilize the situation. Rather than incite workers' discontent, they tried to moderate it by improving workers' conditions through orderly negotiations with employers. Also realizing that improvements for workers would be hard to achieve without solving economic problems, the unions offered their cooperation in helping the government to create a system of economic regulation. The failure of the government to provide leadership in introducing an effective system for mediating industrial disputes and in creating a system of economic regulation undermined these efforts. These failures combined with the continued economic and political instability, which was perceived by the unions as posing a serious threat to their existence, led to the unions' disillusionment with the government and the coalition policy, and solidified their support for the transfer of power to the soviets.

Lenin's concessions to the unions, which promised to enhance their role in running the economy, helped to win the unions' endorsement of the Bolshevik dictatorship. Despite their earlier support for a democratic solution, the unions embraced the goals of the Bolshevik dictatorship and became part of the emerging system that oppressed and exploited

Russian workers. They cooperated with the government in inventing new ways for a more effective and sophisticated exploitation of the labor force.

The influence of institutional interests is revealed most vividly in the relationship between the trade unions and the factory committees. There was no reason for conflicts between them other than competition for the dominance in the industrial sphere.⁸ Incidentally, despite numerous political differences, the Bolshevik and Menshevik trade unionists were in complete agreement on the question of subordination, thus showing that group interests could even transcend factional disputes. It is difficult to accept arguments advanced by the proponents of subordination that factory committees were anarchistic, parochial, and opposed centralization. Such accusations were completely baseless; they were mere rationalizations of the desire on the part of the trade union leadership to get rid of a potential opponent and establish their dominance in the labor movement. Factory committees, just like the trade unions, were in favor of a centralized system for regulating the country's economy. Their plan for the establishment of the VSNKh was merely one of many facts that support this contention.

Lenin, with his acute sense of a consummate politician, was keenly aware of the institutional disputes between factory committees and trade unions and their political potential. He successfully sought to exploit these disputes for realizing his political goals. Political considerations, rather than visions of an immediate socialist transformation of the economy, were behind Lenin's support of the factory committees: the latter were less predisposed toward conciliation with the moderate socialists than were the trade unions. Increased personal contacts between Lenin and leaders of the factory committee movement right after the October insurrection visibly dramatized Lenin's preference for the factory committees. In supporting the policies of factory committees Lenin wanted to make sure that the moderates would not establish their control over industry and thus acquire a leverage against his hard-line approach. One should appreciate Lenin's keen political acumen in sensing the change that occurred in the trade unions after their First All-Russian Congress. By that time, factory committees ceased to be a political asset and became a liability: their economic policies had miserably failed and their support among workers had eroded. At the same time, with the departure of the moderate socialists from the unions, they were no longer perceived by Lenin as posing a threat to his plans. Without any apparent hesitation, Lenin abandoned his discredited allies and shifted his support

to the trade unions. From Lenin's point of view, there was nothing unprincipled in abandoning his former ally. His reversal was motivated by his ultimate commitment to the idea of the Bolshevik dictatorship, rather than by a particular vision of economic organization.

The approach that views labor functionaries as a distinct group with its specific interests and agendas suggests that their relationship with workers was based on mediation, on coordination of their respective goals and aspirations. In other words, this relationship was essentially political in nature. In view of this consideration, conflicts between them were not fortuitous excesses caused by the war and economic dislocation but were rooted in the very nature of their relationship. They cooperated when their respective agendas coincided, but they could enter into a conflict when these agendas differed.

Prior to the October takeover, workers' unrest was due primarily to their deteriorating conditions. Labor organizations, which had their specific reasons for being dissatisfied with the government, helped to translate this elemental discontent into coherent political action. In their propaganda, they explained to workers that their conditions could improve only if the Provisional Government were overthrown. Due to the steady decline in their conditions, workers responded to this propaganda and rallied against the government.

The situation was quite different after October. When the workers' desire to improve their economic conditions clashed with the agenda of the factory committees, the latter turned against workers and used force against them. Instead of protecting workers' interests, the trade unions also joined the Bolshevik government in demanding sacrifices from starving workers; they participated in creating a sophisticated system of economic management that exploited workers and kept them in check.

The fact that both the factory committees and the trade unions eventually sided with the Bolshevik government and became incorporated into its system of economic management suggests that workers did not ultimately control their policies. The support of the government by labor organizations may indeed, as some historians have argued, have been justified from a political or economic point of view. But labor organizations would never have become part of the Bolshevik government if workers controlled their policies. One can argue about the degree to which workers sympathized with the Bolshevik regime, but they certainly did not identify with it to such an extent as to surrender voluntarily the organizations that could help them improve their situation. Obviously, workers had little influence in such decisions.

The experience of the shop steward movement, which, more than the factory committees or trade unions, had to rely on the support of workers since it opposed the government, proves the essentially political nature of the relationship between workers and their organizations. Despite workers' explicit demands to make their economic needs the highest priority of the shop steward movement, the movement's leaders pursued their own agenda. Ultimately, they were successful: political, rather than economic, goals (for example, the demand to transfer power to the Constituent Assembly) became the movement's highest priority. However, the success of the leaders proved to be their own undoing. The politicization drove many workers away from the shop steward assemblies; the ease with which the Bolshevik government finally suppressed the movement was a convincing evidence of the lack of mass support.

The above is not to suggest that the actual relations between workers and labor functionaries were based exclusively on cold political calculations. Nothing could be further from truth. The actual relations were infinitely more complex and richer than this analysis may suggest. Labor functionaries, many of whom came from the workers' midst, often had deep sympathies for their constituency; conversely, labor leaders frequently enjoyed the workers' trust, which was based on deep emotional identification. This identification of workers with their leaders and vice versa undoubtedly colored their relations and affected their behavior. However, these emotional ties should not obscure the real political essence of their relationship. One can observe how these ties were ruptured, causing a great deal of personal pain and frustration to the individuals involved, under the impact of hard political realities. In the end, the two sides—workers and labor functionaries—had to follow the imperatives dictated by their specific interests; and when these interests diverged, no emotional or ideological substitutes could bridge the gaping abyss. The very nature of political process requires a coalescence of interests. But such coalescence presupposes, rather than negates, essential differences, even though labor organizers tirelessly cultivated the view that the policies they charted were in the interests of workers.

In characterizing the relationship between workers and labor functionaries as political, one should also beware of describing it as one of manipulation of the former by the latter. Labor functionaries certainly did not cause workers' discontent against the Provisional Government. This discontent was a product of complex cultural and socioeconomic factors and its exploration is well beyond the scope of this study. What labor activists did was to help to shape this discontent into a coherent political action.

Any interpretation is an approximation: it is difficult to grasp the complexity of real-life situations. The approach advanced in this study is no exception. However, while recognizing that the actual events were colored by numerous and diverse factors, this author believes that the approach that views labor functionaries as a distinct group is very helpful in understanding labor politics. This approach helps to avoid the difficulties in explaining the shift in the relationship between workers and labor organizations. It suggests that the nature of the relationship between labor functionaries and rank-and-file workers remained unchanged throughout the revolution. The shift in their relations occurred as a result of the divergence of their interests. When prior to October the agenda of labor organizations coincided with the aspirations of workers, both sides worked in unison, with the latter providing support and the former, direction for the entire movement. When, however, during the post-October period workers' aspirations diverged from the objectives pursued by labor organizations, the conflict between the two sides became inevitable.

The approach that views labor functionaries as a distinct group paints a very different picture of the revolutionary process in Russian industry than the one that has so far been common. Most studies see the development of this process as a product of the interaction between workers' spontaneous attitudes and Bolshevik propaganda. Labor activists play no independent role in it. In helping the Bolsheviks to carry their propaganda into the workers' midst and organizing workers in support of the Bolshevik cause, they merely articulated and expressed that which was implicit in workers' aspirations.

The view of labor functionaries as a distinct group significantly changes this picture. The process of radicalization appears to be a product of interaction among three largely autonomous groups—workers, labor activists, and the Bolshevik party—whose agendas overlapped but were by no means identical.⁹ The unique position of labor functionaries, their connections to both the workers and the Bolshevik party allowed them to play an exceptionally important role in the “revolution in the factories.” They were the force that bound together the party and the workers. They translated political programs into the language of workers' economic demands and mobilized workers in support of political causes. In playing this role, labor organizations did not act as mere agents of either the workers or of the political parties, but rather pursued vigorously their own agenda. This picture helps to demystify the revolutionary process. It conceives this process as a chain of interactions that linked,

through intermediate stages, social processes with political events. By focusing attention on mass organizations, as intermediaries that helped to translate spontaneous mass discontent into political action, this study seeks to stimulate further research into this underinvestigated, but vital, aspect of the revolution.

The interpretation of labor politics provided in this study does not intend to suggest that pressures from below or connections with political parties played no part in labor politics. Labor activists operated in a complex environment of social unrest that inevitably affected their policies. In charting their policies they had to take into account workers' attitudes. Workers often provided support for these policies. Also, many labor functionaries were members of political parties and party politics had an impact on their decisions. Yet these pressures should not obscure the fact that labor organizers were not just executors of the will of either workers or political parties; they had their own agendas, motivations, and goals that affected their actions. As the post-October developments showed, when workers' aspirations ran counter to objectives of labor organizations, the latter could turn against workers. Similarly, a divergence between party strategy and tactics and the agenda of labor organizations could lead to the waning of the party influence. Such was the case with the moderate socialists who lost their influence, first, in the factory committees, and later in the trade unions.

In addition to labor policies, this volume has dealt with several other related issues. One of them is the early economic policy of the Bolshevik regime: who formulated this policy and what were its objectives? The current literature that deals with the initial period of Soviet economic development provides confusing answers.¹⁰ The evidence discussed in this study shows that the principal motivations behind the early economic policy of the Bolshevik dictatorship had little to do with economics at all but were primarily political. The main objectives of this policy were not the stabilization of the economy, but rather the political consolidation of the Bolshevik dictatorship.

The "Red Guard attack against capital" is a good case in point. When it was launched, "capital" was hardly in a position to threaten the new regime. As Lenin perceived, the real danger to his plans could come from his socialist opponents, and first and foremost from the moderate socialists and the moderate Bolsheviks. The latter seemed particularly dangerous to Lenin since they, in his view, posed a threat to the integrity of the Bolshevik party—the centerpiece of his dictatorial system. Lenin encouraged and actively promoted the "Red Guard attack" because it

prevented the moderates from establishing their control over industry and then using this control as a leverage against Lenin. The devastating economic effects of this policy were its logical result: it was never intended to be an economic success. Only after the political goal was achieved and the danger of an agreement between the moderate socialists and moderate Bolsheviks disappeared, economic, rather than exclusively political, considerations became a factor in the government's economic policies.

The evidence in this study also helps to clarify the nature of Bolshevik rule. Some recent works have suggested that the dictatorial outcome of the Russian revolution was a product of adverse conditions, and not of the conscious designs of Lenin and his supporters.¹¹ Episodes such as the "Red Guard attack" disprove this view. They demonstrate that, indeed, the proper goal of Lenin's policy was dictatorship, not democracy: to prevent at all costs the proponents of a democratic solution, including the moderate Bolsheviks, from establishing their control over industry. Strictly speaking, the "Red Guard attack" was an antisoviet policy since it was directed at subverting the implementation of the "Decree on Workers' Control" adopted by the VTsIK. The decree was drafted by the moderate Bolsheviks from the trade unions and the Commissariat of Labor. It provided for a balanced representation from all major organizations (labor, government, professional) that were concerned with the economy. Contrary to what some studies have argued, the decree bore no resemblance to Lenin's plan to give control over industry exclusively to the government and the factory committees.¹² In pursuing their own plan, Lenin and the factory committees in fact acted against the soviets' decision. Actions such as these undermined the authority of the soviets. They contributed to their eventual demise as the main institution of state power and helped to subordinate them to the dictates of the Bolshevik leadership.

This study shows that Lenin's dictatorial policies were not prompted by the current conditions, but rooted in his ideological commitment to dictatorship. Although this is hardly a new argument, it needs to be reinforced in light of the recent revisions. It does not suggest that Lenin was an unprincipled politician hungry for power. He was a socialist and there is no reason to doubt his commitment to transforming society along socialist lines. But he saw monopoly on power as the only possible route to socialism and was determined to establish such a monopoly. Lenin believed that revolutions should lead to dictatorships. He interpreted revolutionary events in the light of this belief. That is why he saw dictatorship as the only possible outcome of the Russian revolution. In a way, he saw what he wanted to see and acted in accordance with what he saw.

Finally, and quite unintentionally, this study has touched upon one general issue related to the events of 1917—that of historical inevitability. Many Western scholars of the Russian revolution have tried to answer one fundamental question: was the course of the revolution and the triumph of the Bolshevik dictatorship inevitable or could human action have averted this outcome? Some scholars believe that social and political polarizations that developed under the old regime had the decisive impact on the final outcome of the revolution.¹³ Others disagree and argue that the war, economic dislocation, and a determined (even if unscrupulous) leadership of the Bolsheviks undermined Russia's fragile democracy and resulted in the establishment of the dictatorship.¹⁴ Despite decades of intense debate, the issue has not been resolved conclusively,¹⁵ although currently, as at least one author observed, the trend among social historians is clearly on the side of inevitability.¹⁶

Tim McDaniel attempted to modify this trend in his recent volume. According to McDaniel, the course of the Russian revolution should be viewed in the context of "the combined effects of capitalism and autocracy," and not just in terms of contradictions of capitalist society.¹⁷ He concluded that "historical patterns of political and class relations illuminate the process and outcome of the 1917 revolution, not rigidly determining it but nonetheless providing the matrix of likely possibilities." "From this perspective," he maintains, "the Bolshevik victory was by no means inevitable, but it was not simply a putsch without deep social roots."¹⁸ Although McDaniel's interpretation does not conclusively settle the issue, his approach is indicative of an implicit dissatisfaction with the deterministic trend in Western scholarship of the Russian revolution.

This study has not intended to address the controversy between the determinist and interventionist approaches. However, it does lead to some questions regarding the course of the revolution. In examining events involving labor organizations, one can observe that ideology and party doctrine, rather than factors beyond human control such as "objective conditions" or "class relations," prevented the moderate socialists from taking a different course in the revolution: for instance, abandoning the coalition policy, establishing a strong government, implementing a coherent economic policy, creating an effective system for mediating industrial disputes, accepting the factory committees' participation in the management, and solving other practical problems that threatened their plans for a democratic Russia.¹⁹

While this study does not resolve the problem of historical inevitability in relation to the Russian revolution, it shows that the outcome of the

revolution depended to a significant degree on human choices, rather than primarily on "objective conditions" or "class antagonisms." This conclusion suggests that the principal actors in the revolutionary events had a much greater freedom of political maneuvering than that which seems to be possible within the narrow scope of class analysis. In examining the revolutionary events, one begins to see some truth in Jean-Paul Sartre's observation that revolutions provide a convincing proof that the human will and choices, not "objective conditions," ultimately determine the course of history.²⁰

Notes

INTRODUCTION

1. See Paul Avrich, "The Bolshevik Revolution and Workers' Control in Russian Industry," *Slavic Review*, vol. 22 (March 1963), pp. 47-63; and "Russian Factory Committees in 1917," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, no. 2 (June 1963), pp. 161-82.
2. See, for example, S. A. Smith, *Red Petrograd: Revolution in the Factories, 1917-1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); David Mandel, *The Petrograd Workers and the Fall of the Old Regime: From the February Revolution to the July Days, 1917* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983) and *The Petrograd Workers and the Soviet Seizure of Power* (London and Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1984); Diane Koenker, *Moscow Workers and the 1917 Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981).
3. This rivalry was eventually resolved by the subordination of the factory committees to the trade unions. As many Soviet studies have alleged, this subordination was voluntary (see, for example, Pankratova's *Fabzavkomy Rossii v bor'be za sotsialisticheskuiu fabriku* [Moscow: "Krasnaia nov'," 1923]).
4. Vladimir Brovkin, "The Mensheviks' Political Comeback: The Elections to the Provincial Soviets in Spring of 1918," *The Russian Review*, vol. 42 (January 1983), p. 47. See also his *The Mensheviks After October. Socialist Opposition and the Rise of the Bolshevik Dictatorship* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1987), particularly Chapter 5, "The Elections to the City Soviets."
5. See Maurice Brinton's syndicalist portrayal of the period in his *The Bolsheviks and Workers' Control* (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1975) and Smith's *Red Petrograd*.
6. See William Rosenberg's "Reply" in a polemical exchange published in *Slavic Review*, vol. 44, no. 2 (Summer 1985), pp. 253-54.
7. Robert Michels, *Political Parties. A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*, translated by Eden and Cedar Paul (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1949), p. 154.
8. Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, translated by A. R. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, edited by Talcott Parsons (London: William Hodge & Co., Ltd., 1947), p. 377.
9. John L. H. Keep, *The Russian Revolution: A Study in Mass Mobilization* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1976), p. 268.

10. Marc Ferro, *October 1917: A Social History of the Russian Revolution*, translated by Norman Stone (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), p. 194.
11. Ibid., p. 196.
12. Ibid., p. 190.
13. Smith, *Red Petrograd*, p. 208.
14. Reginald Zelnik, translator and editor, *A Radical Worker in Tsarist Russia. The Autobiography of Semen Ivanovich Kanatchikov* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1983), p. xv.
15. William Rosenberg has pointed out that the literal translation of the Russian word *kontrol'* is "supervision," "checking," or "oversight" rather than "control." See William Rosenberg, "Workers and Workers' Control in the Russian Revolution," *History Workshop*, issue 5 (1978), pp. 89-97.
16. Smith, *Red Petrograd*, pp. 225-26. One finds such assessment of Lenin's position on this issue difficult to accept given his statist and generally authoritarian attitudes toward workers' spontaneity. For more on Lenin's attitudes in this respect, see T. T. Hammond, *Lenin and the Trade Unions* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954).
17. Cf. Carmen Sirianni *Workers' Control and Socialist Democracy* (London: Verso, 1982); Thomas F. Remington, *Building Socialism in Bolshevik Russia: Ideology and Industrial Organization, 1917-1921* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1984); and Silvana Malle, *The Economic Organization of War Communism, 1918-1921* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

NOTES 1

1. In his well-known article "The Problem of Social Stability in Urban Russia, 1905-1917," Leopold Haimson provided an analysis of the two most significant aspects of this breach—the unrest among workers and peasants and the alienation from the tsarist regime of the educated public (*Slavic Review*, vol. 23, no. 4 [December 1964], pp. 619-42; and vol. 24, no. 1 [March 1965], pp. 1-22). On the origins of the split between the autocracy and the intelligentsia, see Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, *A Parting of Ways: Government and the Educated Public in Russia, 1801-1855* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976).
2. S. O. Zagorsky, *State Control of Industry in Russia during the War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1928), p. 236.
3. William Henry Chamberlin, *The Russian Revolution, 1917-1918* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 103.
4. Ibid., pp. 143-47. One of the Soviet leaders, Nikolai Sukhanov (Himmer), pro-

vides an insider's view of this crisis in his memoirs *The Russian Revolution 1917*, translated by Joel Carmichael (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 313-21.

5. Chamberlin, *The Russian Revolution*, pp. 148-49.
6. Several studies discuss the early history of the factory committees: S. P. Turin, *From Peter the Great to Lenin: A History of the Russian Labor Movement with Special References to Trade Unionism* (London: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1968); A. M. Pankratova, *Fabzavkomy Rossii v bor'be za sotsialisticheskuiu fabriku* (Moscow: "Krasnaia nov'," 1923); M. Tugan-Baranovskii, *Russkaia fabrika v proshlom i nastoiashchem: istoricheskoe razvitiie russkoi fabriki* (Moscow: "Moskovskii rabochii," 1922); Victoria E. Bonnell, *Roots of Rebellion: Workers' Politics and Organizations in St. Petersburg and Moscow, 1900-1914* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983). Also, see my dissertation "The Russian Revolution and Organized Labor," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia, 1985.
7. Pankratova, *Fabzavkomy Rossii*, p. 134.
8. A. G. Shliapnikov, *Semnadsatyi god*, 4 vols. (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1923-1927), vol. 1, p. 280. For more information on the activities of the Workers' Group see Lewis H. Siegelbaum, "The Workers' Group at the War-Industries Committee: Who Used Whom?" *The Russian Review*, vol. 39, no. 2 (April 1980), pp. 150-80.
9. V. Perazich, *Tekstili Leningrada v 1917 godu* (Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo gubotdela tekstil'shchikov, 1927), p. 18.
10. *Velikaia Oktiabr'skaia sotsialisticheskaiia revoliutsiia: dokumenty i materialy. Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v Rossii posle sverzheniia samoderzhavii*, edited by L. S. Gaponenko (Moscow: Nauka, 1957), p. 455.
11. V. I. Selitskii, *Massy v bor'be za rabochii kontrol': mart-iiul' 1917* (Moscow: Mysl', 1971), p. 41.
12. *VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii posle sverzh. samoderzh.*, p. 459.
13. Selitskii, *Massy v bor'be*, p. 85.
14. Selitskii provides a very extensive list of cities where factory committees were influential (*Massy v bor'be*, p. 192).
15. Z. V. Stepanov, *Rabochie Petrograda v period podgotovki i provedeniia oktiabr'skogo vooruzhennogo vosstaniia* (Moscow-Leningrad: Nauka, 1965), p. 26.
16. Perazich, *Tekstili Leningrada*, p. 79.
17. I. I. Gaza, ed., *Putilovets na putiakh k Oktiabriu. Iz istorii "Krasnogo putilovt-sa"* (Moscow-Leningrad: OGIZ, 1933), p. 83.

18. A. S. Blinov, *Tsentral'nyi sovet fabzavkomov Petrograda 1917-1918 g.g.* (Moscow: Profizdat, 1982), p. 16.
19. Pankratova, *Fabzavkomy Rossii*, pp. 35-36.
20. On early attempts to introduce factory elders see Pankratova, *Fabzavkomy Rossii*, pp. 35-36; M. Tugan-Baranovskii, *Russkaia fabrika v proshlom i nastoiashchem*, pp. 98-130, passim. Pankratova's book contains the text of the law of June 10 and a brief discussion. Other assessments of the law are in: Bonnell, *Roots of Rebellion*, pp. 94-95; S. N. Prokopovich, *K rabochemu voprosu v Rossii* (St. Petersburg: Izdanie E. D. Kuskovoi, 1905), pp. 120-22; V. Ia. Laverychev, *Tsarizm i rabochii vopros v Rossii, 1861-1917 gg.* (Moscow: Mysl', 1972), pp. 163-65; Turin, *From Peter the Great to Lenin*, pp. 57-58.
21. Jeremiah Schneiderman, *Sergei Zubatov and Revolutionary Marxism: The Struggle for the Working Class in Tsarist Russia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976), p. 171.
22. Walter Sablinsky, *The Road to Bloody Sunday: The Role of Father Gapon and the Assembly in the Petersburg Massacre of 1905* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 161; Pankratova, *Fabzavkomy Rossii*, p. 98.
23. See the text of the petition in Sablinsky, *The Road to Bloody Sunday*, p. 348.
24. Pankratova, *Fabzavkomy Rossii*, p. 112.
25. *Izvestiia*, March 11, 1917.
26. D. A. Kovalenko, "Bor'ba fabrichno-zavodskikh komitetov Petrograda za rabochii kontrol' nad proizvodstvom," *Istoricheskie zapiski*, vol. 61 (1957), pp. 72-73.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 79.
28. L. S. Gaponenko, *Rabochii klass Rossii v 1917 godu* (Moscow: Nauka, 1970), p. 367.
29. Kovalenko, "Bor'ba fabrichno-zavodskikh komitetov," p. 79.
30. *Izvestiia*, March 11, 1917.
31. *VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii posle sverzh. samodерж.*, p. 508.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 470.
33. *Oktiabr'skaia revoliutsiia i fabzavkomy*, edited by P. N. Amosov et al., 2 parts (Moscow: VTsSPS, 1927) (hereinafter *Okt. rev. i fabzavkomy*), part 1, pp. 109-10.

34. *VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii posle sverzh. samoderzh*, p. 468.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 469.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 473.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 483.
38. *Ibid.*, pp. 491-551, documents no. 419, 420, 423, 441, 503.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 480.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 475.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 490.
42. Stepanov, *Rabochie Petrograda*, p. 109.
43. *VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii posle sverzh. samoderzh.*, pp. 495-96.
44. Selitskii, *Massy v bor'be*, pp. 191-93.
45. See, for example, Abraham Ascher, *Pavel Axelrod and the Development of Menshevism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972); Samuel H. Baron, *Plekhanov: The Father of Russian Marxism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963); Vladimir Brovkin, *The Mensheviks After October. Socialist Opposition and the Rise of the Bolshevik Dictatorship* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1987); Ziva Galili y Garcia, *The Menshevik Leaders in the Russian Revolution: Social Realities and Political Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); Israel Getzler, *Martov: A Political Biography of a Russian Social Democrat* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1967); Leopold H. Haimson, ed., *The Mensheviks: From the Revolution of 1917 to the Second World War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974); W. H. Roobol, *Tsereteli—A Democrat in the Russian Revolution: A Political Biography* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976); Solomon Schwarz, *The Russian Revolution of 1905: The Workers' Movement and the Formation of Bolsheviks and Menshevism* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967).
46. For a complete text of the agreement see *Izvestiia*, March 11, 1917.
47. Kovalenko, "Bor'ba fabrichno-zavodskikh komitetov," p. 79.
48. *Ibid.*
49. *Okt. rev. i fabzavkomy*, part 1, p. 21. The author of the draft was Professor V. V. Leont'ev.
50. *Ibid.*, pp. 22-24.

51. Ibid., p. 218.
52. It is worth noting in this respect that when factory committees first emerged during the revolution of 1905, they were sometimes called "plant dumas" (e.g., the Patronnyi plant in Petrograd) by analogy with the national representative body, the Duma (Pankratova, *Fabzavkomy Rossii*, p. 134).
53. *Okt. rev. i fabzavkomy*, part 2, p. 171.
54. *Pervyi Vserossiiskii s'ezd professional'nykh soiuzov, 7-14 ianvaria 1918 goda* (Moscow: VTsSPS, 1918) (hereinafter *Pervyi Vserossiiskii s'ezd profsoiuzov*), p. 191.
55. Ronald Grigor Suny, "Revising the old story: the 1917 revolution in light of new sources," in Daniel H. Kaiser, ed., *The Workers' Revolution in Russia, 1917: The View from Below* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 12 (emphasis added).
56. Selitskii, *Massy v bor'be*, p. 132.
57. Ibid, pp. 9-10.
58. Selitskii, *Massy v bor'be*, p. 191-93. Both these plants were owned by the state.
59. *VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii posle sverzh. samoderzh.*, p. 487.
60. Selitskii, *Massy v bor'be*, p. 142. These thirty-five instances exclude, of course, cases of temporary takeovers which took place after the tsar's abdication when management left enterprises fearful of possible retaliation and violence.
61. In its resolution, a conference of factory committees at the Main Artillery Administration enterprises stated, for example, that workers should not assume the responsibility for organizing production until a complete socialization of the entire national economy (*Okt. rev. i fabzavkomy*, part 1, p. 30).
62. Ibid., p. 171.
63. I. Ia. Ivanov, "Tri zadaniia Lenina," *Pravda*, April 15, 1960.
64. *Okt. rev. i fabzavkomy*, part 1, p. 192.
65. See, for example, an assessment by A. K. Gastev who pointed out that the incompetence of the Russian "bourgeoisie" was due to the fact that in the past it had existed only "on the sops of the government, it had huge subsidies, protective tariffs which helped it to fulfill state orders" (*Pervyi Vserossiiskii s'ezd profsoiuzov*, p. 164). While Gastev's assessment may be an overstatement, it certainly reflected one aspect of Russian reality.

66. *VOSR: Rev. dvizh v Rossii posle sverzh. samoderzh.*, pp. 549-51.
67. *Okt. rev. i fabzavkomy*, part 1, pp. 146-47.
68. Gaza, *Putilovets*, p. 99.
69. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *The February Revolution: Petrograd, 1917* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1981), p. 380.
70. Gaza, *Putilovets*, p. 75.
71. *Ibid.*, p. 340.
72. *Sed'maia [Aprel'skaia] Vserossiiskaia konferentsiia RSDRP [bol'shevikov]. Petrogradskaia Obshchegorodskaia konferentsiia RSDRP [bol'shevikov]. Aprel' 1917 goda. Protokoly* (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1958) (hereinafter *Aprel'skaia konferentsiia*), p. 17.
73. Perazich, *Tekstili Leningrada*, p. 79.
74. Blinov, *Tsentral'nyi sovet fabzavkomov Petrograda*, p. 16.
75. See p. 12 of this study.
76. *Okt. rev. i fabzavkomy*, part 1, pp. 25-27.
77. *VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii posle sverzh. samoderzh.*, p. 517.
78. *Okt. rev. i fabzavkomy*, part 1, pp. 27-28.
79. Gaza, *Putilovets*, p. 83. The rest of the factory committee members were not affiliated with any political party, which was a very common phenomenon. The Soviet historian D. A. Kovalenko gives a very generous estimate of the pro-Bolshevik members of the first factory committee at the Putilov plant—six Bolsheviks and seven sympathizers (Kovalenko, "Bor'ba fabrichno-zavodskikh komitetov," p. 75). Taking into account the general mood among workers at the time, Gaza, who was a labor organizer in 1917, seems to be more realistic in his estimate.
80. Some materials on this conference are in *Okt. rev. i fabzavkomy*, part 1, pp. 37-41.
81. *Ibid.*, p. 30.
82. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
83. *Ibid.*, pp. 31-35.

84. Ibid., pp. 37-41.
85. V. I. Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, 5th edition, 55 vols. (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1958-1965) (hereinafter *PSS*), vol. 31, pp. 115-16.
86. See Lenin's "Rezoliutsiia o sovetakh rabochikh i soldatskikh deputatov" and "Rezoliutsiia ob otnoshenii k Vremennomu pravitel'stvu" in *PSS*, vol. 31, pp. 407-9, 430-31.
87. Ibid., pp. 445-46, *passim*.
88. *Aprel'skaia konferentsiia*, p. 91.
89. Ibid., pp. 94-95.
90. See the conference's resolution "On the Attitude toward the Provisional Government" (ibid., p. 245).
91. See Lenin's article "Idut napererez" (written on May 6 and published in *Pravda* on May 7) and "Grozit razrukha" (published in *Pravda* on May 14) in *PSS*, vol. 32, pp. 37-39, 74-76.
92. Ibid., p. 107.
93. Ibid., pp. 195-6. The resolution was published in the May 25 issue of the Moscow Bolshevik newspaper *Sotsial-demokrat* over the signature of the Bolshevik CC. On June 2, it was reprinted in *Pravda* as a draft resolution presented to the First Conference of the Petrograd Factory Committees by the Organizational Bureau (*PSS*, vol. 32, p. 495).
94. Ibid., p. 196.
95. *Okt. rev. i fabzavkomy*, part 1, p. 66.
96. Selitskii, *Massy v bor'be*, p. 135. It is worthwhile to point out that the article actually suggested workers' control instead of, rather than in addition to, strikes. The former was definitely a more constructive solution than disruptions of production.
97. *Velikaia Oktiabr'skaia sotsialisticheskaia revoliutsiia: dokumenty i materialy. Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v Rossii v mae-iiune 1917 goda: iiun'skaia demonstratsiia*, edited by D. A. Chugaev et al. (Moscow: Nauka, 1959), p. 157.
98. V. L. Meller and A. M. Pankratova, eds., *Rabochee dvizhenie v 1917 godu* (Moscow-Leningrad: Gosizdat, 1926), p. 140.
99. *Okt. rev. i fabzavkomy*, part 1, p. 86.

100. Ibid., p. 85. It is worth reminding that the total number of workers employed in the area was 417,000 or 11.8 percent of the entire industrial proletariat in Russia (Stepanov, *Rabochie Petrograda*, p. 26).
101. *Okt. rev. i fabzavkomy*, part 1, p. 96.
102. Ibid., p. 92.
103. Ibid., p. 87.
104. Ibid., p. 134.
105. Ibid., p. 86.
106. Ibid., p. 132.
107. Ibid., p. 136.
108. Ibid., p. 70.
109. Ibid., p. 121.
110. Ibid., p. 130.
111. Ibid., p. 136.
112. Selitskii, *Massy v bor'be*, p. 176.
113. *Okt. rev. i fabzavkomy*, part 1, p. 136.

NOTES 2

1. One can find a detailed account of the events related to this episode in Alexander Rabinowitch's important study *Prelude to Revolution: The Petrograd Bolsheviks and the July 1917 Uprising* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968), Chapter III.
2. Ibid., pp. 97-106.
3. The following ministers resigned from the government: A. Shingarev, minister of finance, A. A. Manuilov, minister of education, V. A. Stepanov, acting minister of trade and industry, and D. I. Shakhovskoi, minister of welfare. The Kadet N. N. Nekrasov decided to stay in the government and therefore had to leave the party (ibid., p. 143).
4. Chamberlin, *The Russian Revolution*, p. 167.

5. The four members were F. I. Kokoshkin, S. F. Oldenburg, P. P. Iurenev, and A. V. Kartashev (Rabinowitch, *Prelude to Revolution*, p. 218; also *Izvestiia*, August 29, 1917).
6. Chamberlin, *The Russian Revolution*, pp. 192-221.
7. Kovalenko, "Bor'ba fabrichno-zavodskikh komitetov," p. 84.
8. *VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii v mae-iiune*, p. 310.
9. The meeting of the Bolshevik Central Committee, which adopted the decision to cancel the demonstrations, was attended by 150 delegates from the Bolshevik district committees, military units, and factory committees. It is indicative of special relations between the party and the factory committees that the latter were the only labor organization that sent their representatives to this meeting (see *VOSR: Iiun'skaia demonstratsiia*, p. 611).
10. Rabinowitch, *Prelude to Revolution*, pp. 97-106.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 99.
12. N. Sukhanov, *The Russian Revolution*, edited and translated by Joel Carmichael, 2 vols. (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), vol. 2, pp. 416-17.
13. *VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii v mae-iiune*, pp. 306-07.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 309-10.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 322.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 220.
17. P. N. Miliukov, *Istoriia vtoroi russkoi revoliutsii*, 2 vols. (Sofia: Rossiisko-Bolgarskoe Knigoizdatel'stvo, 1921), vol. 1, pp. 216-17. Such moods were reported among workers of the Vyborgskaia Storona district, the power station on Vas-il'evskii Island, the Promet plant, the Moskovskii district, and the Narvskaiia Zastava district (*ibid.*).
18. Gaza, *Putilovets*, p. 95.
19. *VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii v mae-iiune*, p. 205.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 216.
21. Gaza, *Putilovets*, p. 103.
22. *VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii v mae-iiune*, p. 593.

23. *Aprel'skaia konferentsiia*, pp. 244-45, and 312-13.
24. Ia. Sverdlov, "Sobytiia 3-6 iulia v Petrograde" in *Velikaia Oktiabr'skaia sotsialisticheskaia revoliutsiia. Sbornik vospominanii uchastnikov revoliutsii v Petrograde i Moskve* (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1957) (hereinafter *VOSR: Sbornik vospominanii*), p. 108.
25. *Izvestiia*, June 24, 1917.
26. *VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii v mae-iiune*, p. 322; Gaza, *Putilovets*, p. 102.
27. Rabinowitch, *Prelude to Revolution*, p. 234.
28. Probably the best account of these events was and still is Rabinowitch's *Prelude to Revolution*, particularly pp. 135-228.
29. Miliukov, *Istoriia vtoroi russkoi revoliutsii*, vol. 1, pp. 237-38.
30. Ia. Sverdlov, "Sobytiia 3-6 iulia v Petrograde," p. 109.
31. Cf. Rabinowitch, *Prelude to Revolution*, pp. 161-66, 202-5.
32. See Rabinowitch, *Prelude to Revolution*, p. 184, also Leon D. Trotsky, *The History of the Russian Revolution*, 3 vols. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1936), vol. 2, p. 35. Lenin recapitulated the content of his speech to the participants of the demonstrations in his article "Otvét" ("A Reply"), published in the Bolshevik newspaper *Rabochii i soldat* on July 26 and 27, to prove that he had called for moderation and vigilance, not militancy (Lenin, *PSS*, vol. 34, p. 23).
33. Kovalenko, "Bor'ba fabrichno-zavodskikh komitetov," pp. 89-90.
34. *VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii v mae-iiune*, p. 593.
35. Meller and Pankratova, eds., *Rabochee dvizhenie*, p. 144. Rabinowitch identified some of the four representatives of workers who spoke at that meeting. They were Martin Latsis and Gavril Veinberg—two Bolshevik organizers from the Vyborg district (Rabinowitch, *Prelude to Revolution*, p. 194). It is worth mentioning that Veinberg was a leader in the factory committee movement. At the Second Conference of the Petrograd Factory Committees he was elected to the CCFC (*Okt. rev. i fabzavkomy*, part 1, p. 254).
36. Kovalenko, "Bor'ba fabrichno-zavodskikh komitetov," p. 90, and Meller and Pankratova, eds., *Rabochee dvizhenie*, p. 150.
37. Referring to the incident in April, when the participants of the demonstration organized by the Bolsheviks, unexpectedly for the party leadership, brought up the slogan "Down with the Provisional Government," Kamenev warned that the masses "will always make a straightforward conclusion ('Down with the

- Provisional Government') from the general characterization of the contemporary situation" (*Aprel'skaia konferentsiia*, p. 86).
38. Stepanov, *Rabochie Petrograda*, p. 161.
 39. Chamberlin, *The Russian Revolution*, pp. 176-83.
 40. Miliukov, *Istoriia vtoroi russkoi revoliutsii*, vol. 2, p. 15.
 41. Trotsky, *The History of the Russian Revolution*, vol. 2, p. 93.
 42. Roobol, *Tsereteli—A Democrat in the Russian Revolution*, p. 163.
 43. *Velikaia Oktiabr'skaia sotsialisticheskaiia revoliutsiia: dokumenty i materialy. Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v Rossii v avguste 1917 goda: razgrom Kornilovskogo miatezha*, edited by D. A. Chugaev et al. (Moscow: Nauka, 1959), p. 197.
 44. Meller and Pankratova, eds., *Rabochee dvizhenie*, pp. 153-55.
 45. Resolutions on the introduction of workers' control were adopted, for example, at the Dinamo plant (July 13), the Ivanovo-Voznesensk textile factory (July 14), the A. V. Bari plant in Moscow (July 15), by a group of four Petrograd plants including the Shtein and Co. and the Novyi Baranovskii plants (July 15), by a conference of factory committees in Ekaterinoslav (July 16), by a conference of factory committees in Saratov (July 19), at the Okhtenskii plant in Petrograd (July 21), at the Putilov plant (July 22), the Siemens-Gal'sk plant in Petrograd (July 21), the Petrograd Kabel'nyi plant (July 24), and by a meeting of Petrograd factory committees (July 31) (*Velikaia Oktiabr'skaia sotsialisticheskaiia revoliutsiia: dokumenty i materialy. Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v Rossii v iuule 1917 goda: liul'skii krizis*, edited by D. A. Chugaev et al. [Moscow: Nauka, 1959], pp. 348-70).
 46. *Ibid.*, pp. 342-43.
 47. *Ibid.*, p. 566.
 48. Meller and Pankratova, eds., *Rabochee dvizhenie*, p. 104.
 49. *Ibid.*, pp. 105-9.
 50. *VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii v avguste*, p. 220.
 51. Meller and Pankratova, eds., *Rabochee dvizhenie*, p. 103.
 52. The second coalition government, which was formed after the July demonstrations, had eight socialists to seven liberals (Alexander Rabinowitch, *The Bolsheviks Come to Power: The Revolution of 1917 in Petrograd* [New York: W. W. Norton, 1978], p. 26).

53. *Okt. rev. i fabzavkomy*, part 1, p. 259.
54. See the "Resolution on Control over Production and Distribution" in *Okt. rev. i fabzavkomy*, part 1, p. 108). It is interesting that representatives of the factory committees who participated in the work of government agencies refused to receive any money for their work in these agencies because, as Vlas Chubar' stated at the First Conference, by accepting payments they "separate [themselves] from the working masses and tie up their own hands in defending their [workers'] interests" (*ibid.*, pp. 177, 259).
55. Stepanov, *Rabochie Petrograda*, p. 112.
56. *Ibid.*
57. *VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii v iiule*, pp. 345-64.
58. *Okt. rev. i fabzavkomy*, part 1, p. 274.
59. *VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii v iiule*, pp. 363-64.
60. *Ibid.*, pp. 372-75; and Meller and Pankratova, eds., *Rabochee dvizhenie*, p. 146. Similar resolutions were passed at nine other enterprises in Petrograd and Moscow (see *VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii v iiule*, p. 363).
61. Stepanov, *Rabochie Petrograda*, p. 161.
62. *Ibid.*, p. 168-69.
63. Gaza, *Putilovets*, p. 114.
64. Stepanov, *Rabochie Petrograda*, pp. 168-69.
65. *VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii v iiule*, p. 287.
66. *Ibid.*, p. 214.
67. Stepanov, *Rabochie Petrograda*, pp. 164-65. It should be noted, however, that in absolute terms the Bolsheviks did not increase their votes significantly. They collected in August 183,694 votes as compared to 159,690 in the May-June elections. Such a relatively slight increase in absolute terms meant a big increase in relative terms because of the total slump in the number of voters participating in August elections. The Bolsheviks were the only party which increased their votes in absolute terms (*ibid.*).
68. See, for example, Lenin's theses "Politicheskoe polozhenie" ("Political Situation"), written on July 10, and his article "K lozungam" ("On Slogans"), written in mid-July (Lenin, *PSS*, vol. 34, pp. 1-5 and 10-17).

69. Lenin expressed this view in a conversation with Georgii Ordzhonikidze, who visited Lenin in hiding in Razliv. See Ordzhonikidze's memoirs in *Lenin v 1917 godu: vospominaniia* (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1967), p. 128.
70. See, for example, the resolution "On the Political Situation" adopted by the congress in *Shestoi s"ezd RSDRP (bolshevikov). Avgust 1917 goda: protokoly* (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1958), p. 257.
71. *Okt. rev. i fabzavkomy*, part 1, p. 164.
72. In part, the letter underlined that the Bolshevik party had formulated and set the tasks for the working class in supervising production and distribution. The letter also encouraged the party to proceed with its struggle against the temporarily victorious counterrevolution and the capitalist order (*ibid.*, pp. 292-3).
73. *Protokoly Tsentral'nogo komiteta RSDRP (b), avgust 1917-fevral' 1918* (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1958) (hereinafter *Protokoly TsK*), p. 12.
74. *Okt. rev. i fabzavkomy*, part 1, p. 174.
75. *Ibid.*, p. 199.
76. See the speech by Miliutin, who delivered the keynote address on the tasks of the factory committees (*ibid.*, p. 202).
77. *Ibid.*, pp. 229-30.
78. See speeches by Lozovskii and David Riazanov (*ibid.*, pp. 227-30).
79. *Ibid.*, p. 230.
80. It is worth mentioning that this resolution was identical with "The Resolution on the Economic Situation," also drafted by Miliutin, which was approved by the Sixth Party Congress only a few days earlier.
81. *Ibid.*, pp. 217-20.
82. *Ibid.*, pp. 238-45.
83. *Ibid.*, p. 239.
84. *Ibid.*, p. 233.
85. *Okt. rev. i fabzavkomy*, part 2, p. 5.
86. Resolutions to this effect were adopted by the Vol'ta plant in Revel' (August 8), the Benckendorf and Co. plant in Baku (August 9), the Kolpino Regional Council of Metalworkers' Union (August 10), the Putilov workers (August 11), and others (*VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii v avguste*, pp. 206-12).

87. Ibid., pp. 177, 186.
88. Ibid., pp. 177 and 614, note 101.
89. Ibid., p. 207.
90. Stepanov, *Rabochie Petrograda*, p. 150.
91. Meller and Pankratova, eds., *Rabochee dvizhenie*, p. 103.
92. *VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii v avguste*, pp. 180-81.
93. Ibid., pp. 189-90.
94. Ibid., pp. 233-34.
95. Ibid., p. 105. The conference also opposed economic demands of workers and insisted on a further limitation of the factory committees' activities.
96. Kovalenko, "Bor'ba fabrichno-zavodskikh komitetov," p. 100.
97. One can find an excellent account of the origin and events of the Kornilov coup in Rabinowitch's *The Bolsheviks Come to Power*, pp. 94-150.
98. See the full text of the appeal in *VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii v avguste*, pp. 474-75.
99. Ibid., pp. 500-1.
100. Ibid., p. 537.
101. Resolutions to this effect were adopted by a joint meeting of the Petergofskii District Soviet and representatives of the district's factory committees (August 28), the Nevskii District Council of Factory Committees representing twenty-three plants with forty thousand workers (August 28), the Baltiiskii ship-building plant, the enterprises of the joint-stock company United Cable Plants (August 28), the Petrograd Metallicheskie plant (August 28), the Obukhovskii metal plant, and the Saryi Lessner plant (ibid., pp. 485-89).
102. *VOSR: Sbornik vosponinanii*, p. 256.
103. A. G. Egorova, *Partiia i profsoiuzy v Oktiabr'skoi revoliutsii* (Moscow: Mysl', 1970), p. 166.
104. Kovalenko, "Bor'ba fabrichno-zavodskikh komitetov," p. 101. N. Dmitriev, an eyewitness of these events, puts the total number of workers mobilized for the defense of the capital at forty thousands ("Petrogradskie fabzavkomy v 1917 godu," *Krasnaia letopis'*, no. 2 [1927], p. 94).

105. *VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii v avguste*, p. 236. This notorious metaphor—"the bony hand of hunger"—was used to illustrate the true intentions of the capitalists in the revolution. It became well known after it had been first used by P. P. Riabushinskii, chairman of the All-Russian Union of Trade and Industry, who said at the Second Congress of the union's representatives (August 3-5): "Perhaps in order to find a way out of the current situation it will be necessary that the bony hand of hunger, the privation of the people, should grab the throat of the false friends of the people—democratic soviets and committees" (Pankratova, *Fabzavkomy Rossii*, p. 200).
106. *Velikaia Oktiabr'skaia sotsialisticheskaia revoliutsiia: dokumenty i materialy. Oktiabr'skoe vooruzhennoe vosstanie v Petrograde*, edited by G. N. Golikova et al. (Moscow: Nauka, 1957), p. 91.
107. *Ibid.*, pp. 35-36.
108. *Okt. rev. i fabzavkomy*, part 2, pp. 27-28. The resolution incorrectly cites the dates for the promulgation of "Skobelev's circulars" as August 28 and 29.
109. See the resolution "On the Attack Against Factory Committees and on the Policy of the Labor Ministry" (*ibid.*, pp. 27-28).
110. See the resolutions "On the Democratic Conference" and "On the Evacuation of Petrograd Industry" (*ibid.*, pp. 35-36, 43-44).
111. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
112. *VOSR: Oktiabr'skoe vooruzh. vosstanie*, pp. 67-68.
113. Perazich, *Tekstili Leningrada*, p. 90.
114. *VOSR: Oktiabr'skoe vooruzh. vosstanie*, pp. 96, 100, 102.
115. Gaza, *Putilovets*, p. 28.
116. *VOSR: Iiun'skaia demonstratsiia*, p. 598.
117. Meller and Pankratova, eds., *Rabochee dvizhenie*, pp. 214-15, 224-25.
118. *Velikaia Oktiabr'skaia sotsialisticheskaia revoliutsiia: dokumenty i materialy. Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v Rossii nakanune Oktiabr'skogo vooruzhennogo vosstaniia (1-24 oktiabria 1917 goda)*, edited by D. A. Chugaev et al. (Moscow: Nauka, 1962), p. 247.
119. *Ibid.*, p. 225.
120. *Ibid.*, p. 227.

121. Ibid., p. 217.
122. In Khar'kov, for example, a reconciliation board tried to resolve the issue of wage increases for unskilled workers. The negotiations collapsed after employers offered to increase wages for unskilled workers at the expense of skilled workers (Meller and Pankratova, eds., *Rabochee dvizhenie*, p. 216).
123. *Ekonomicheskoe polozhenie Rossii nakanune Oktiabr'skoi sotsialisticheskoi revoliutsii: dokumenty i materialy*, 4 vols. (Leningrad: Nauka, 1967), vol. 1, pp. 408-09, 600; Meller and Pankratova, eds., *Rabochee dvizhenie*, pp. 217, 224-25.
124. Meller and Pankratova, eds., *Rabochee dvizhenie*, p. 217.
125. Ibid., p. 228.
126. *Ekonomicheskoe polozhenie Rossii*, vol. 1, p. 416.
127. Ibid., p. 490.
128. Meller and Pankratova, eds., *Rabochee dvizhenie*, pp. 229-30.
129. Ibid., p. 235. "Wheelings in barrows" (*vyvoz na tachke*) was widely used at the time by rebellious workers. Workers would put a manager whom they disliked in a barrow and would take him out of the factory. During these "wheelings" workers would usually put a sack over the manager's head, beat him up, and subject him to various verbal and physical abuses.
130. Ibid., p. 231.
131. Ibid.
132. Ibid., p. 233.
133. *Izvestiia*, October 17, 1917.
134. Ibid.
135. Meller and Pankratova, eds., *Rabochee dvizhenie*, pp. 238-39.

NOTES 3

1. For more information on the emergence of trade unions see Bonnell, *Roots of Rebellion*; Turin, *From Peter the Great to Lenin*; Iulii Gessen and E. Gershenzon, eds., *Khrestomatiia po istorii rabocheho klassa i professional'nogo dvizheniia v Rossii*, 2 vols. (Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Lengubprofsoiuza, 1925); V. Grinevich, *Professional'noe dvizhenie rabochikh v Rossii* (Moscow: Krasnaia nov', 1923); Schneiderman, *Sergei Zubatov and Revolutionary Marxism*; Reginald E. Zelnik, *Labor and Society in Tsarist Russia: The Factory Workers*

in *St. Petersburg, 1855-1870* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971); Walter Sablinsky, *The Road to Bloody Sunday*.

2. See, for example, numerous announcements published in the Menshevik newspaper *Rabochaia gazeta* on March 1, 1917, which called upon workers of various trades (textile workers, shoemakers, construction workers, and others) to organize their unions (Meller and Pankratova, eds., *Rabochee dvizhenie*, p. 82).
3. A. Anskii, ed., *Professional'noe dvizhenie v Petrograde v 1917 godu* (Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo oblastnogo soveta professional'nykh soiuзов, 1928), p. 319.
4. The Bolshevik *Pravda* of March 7, 1917, contained the following announcement: "The Petersburg Committee [of the RSDRP] invites comrades to organize unions immediately by direct action [*iavochnym poriadkom*]" (*Pravda*, March 7, 1917).
5. For example, just on March 5, in Petrograd, organizational meetings that created unions were held by chauffeurs and auto mechanics, tailors, seamstresses, hat-makers, employees of commercial enterprises, draymen, electricians, gold- and silversmiths, bronze smelters, bakers, confectioners, office clerks, leather workers, paper and cardboard paper workers, employees of credit banks (Anskii, ed., *Professional'noe dvizhenie v Petrograde*, pp. 319-20).
6. *VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii posle sverzh. samoderzh.*, p. 509; P. A. Garvi, *Professional'nye soiuzy Rossii v pervye gody revoliutsii (1917-1921)*, edited by G. Ia. Aronson (New York: Fond po izdaniiu literaturnogo naslediiia P. A. Garvi, 1958), p. 125.
7. T. V. Bataeva et al., eds., *Profsoiuzy SSSR: dokumenty i materialy*, 4 vols. (Moscow: Profizdat, 1963), vol. 1, p. 352.
8. See, for example, the statute of the Petrograd metal workers' union adopted at the constituent meeting of the union on April 23, 1917, in Anskii, ed., *Professional'noe dvizhenie v Petrograde*, p. 118; see also the resolution of the meeting of Kiev metal workers, held on March 22 (*VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii posle sverzh. samoderzh.*, p. 533), the April 16 appeal of the board of the Rostov-on-the-Don metal workers' union (Bataeva et al., eds., *Profsoiuzy SSSR*, vol. 1, pp. 356-57), the address of the commission for organizing trade unions at the steam-engine plant in Kolomna (*VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii posle sverzh. samoderzh.*, pp. 584-85).
9. See, for example, Riazanov's speech at the May 20 meeting of the Petrograd metal workers' union (Anskii, ed., *Professional'noe dvizhenie v Petrograde*, pp. 123-24) and a resolution that was adopted by the Petrograd Central Trade Union Bureau at the end of May (*Izvestiia*, June 2, 1917). A meeting of the Moscow Trade Union Council, held on August 17, noted that many trade unions began to formulate a new set of demands that concerned the organiza-

- tion of production, something that many unions had not previously done (S. Nivel'son, ed., *Moskovskii sovet profsoiuzov (protokoly)* [Moscow: Trud i Kniga, 1927], p. 70).
10. Smith, *Red Petrograd*, p. 104.
 11. Egorova, *Partiia i profsoiuzy*, p. 46.
 12. Meller and Pankratova, eds., *Rabochee dvizhenie*, p. 88.
 13. By June, there were forty unions in Khar'kov, seven in Ekaterinoslav, twenty-seven in Baku, five in Rostov, nine in Ekaterinburg, twenty in Minsk (*ibid.*, p. 84; Egorova, *Partiia i profsoiuzy*, p. 44; A. M. Malashko, *K voprosu ob oformlenii odnopartiinnoi sistemy v SSSR* [Minsk: Izdatel'stvo BGU im. V. I. Lenina, 1969], p. 39).
 - 14 *Professional'nyi vestnik: oktiabr' 1917-oktiabr' 1918*, the issue in commemoration of the October Revolution (October 1918), p. 10.
 15. See Turin, *From Peter the Great to Lenin*, p. 130; *Professional'nyi vestnik*, no. 3-4 (October 15, 1917), p. 21; and *Tret'ya konferentsiya*, p. vii; Egorova, *Partiia i profsoiuzy*, p. 4. P. A. Garvi, a Menshevik trade unionist, provides a slightly more conservative estimate for the number of trade union members before the beginning of the war—113 unions with the combined membership of 34,266 people for 1913 (Garvi, *Professional'nye soiuzy Rossii*, p. 12).
 16. Smith, *Red Petrograd*, p. 108; N. P. Antropov et al., *Istoriia professional'nogo dvizheniia v SSSR* (Moscow: Profizdat, 1961), p. 139.
 17. In the summer of that year, Khar'kov trade unions initiated the convocation of an all-Russian trade union congress. Unions in St. Petersburg and Moscow supported this initiative. Preparations for the congress led to the emergence of central bureaus (Gessen and Gershenzon, eds., *Khrestomatiia po istorii rabochego klassa*, vol. 2, pp. 163-64; Bonnell, *Roots of Rebellion*, p. 181).
 18. Antropov et al., *Istoriia professional'nogo dvizheniia*, p. 38. For more on central trade union bureaus prior to the 1917 revolution, see Bonnell, *Roots of Rebellion*, especially pp. 180-83 and 266-68; and Grinevich, *Professional'noe dvizhenie*, pp. 38-57. Turin provides a detailed account of activities of the Moscow Trade Union Bureau as well as the texts of the bureau's statute and regulations (Turin, *From Peter the Great to Lenin*, pp. 84-110, *passim*).
 19. Grinevich, *Professional'noe dvizhenie*, p. 61. The explanatory note to the law of March 4 said that "the integration of several workers' societies into unions may present a serious threat to public order and tranquility" (Antropov et al., *Istoriia professional'nogo dvizheniia*, p. 41).
 20. Nivel'son, ed., *Moskovskii sovet professional'nykh soiuzov*, p. 5.

21. E. P. Tret'iakova, "Fevral'skie sobytiia 1917 goda v Moskve," *Voprosy istorii*, no. 3 (March 1957), p. 83; Nivel'son, *Moskovskii sovetskaia professional'nykh soiuзов*, p. 8.
22. The first meeting of representatives of Petrograd unions was convened on March 9 on the initiative of the Petrograd Committee of the Bolshevik party. Representatives of Petrograd unions met again on March 15. Finally, on March 20, a meeting of thirteen representatives of Petrograd unions elected the executive commission of the provisional central trade union bureau (Anskii, ed., *Professional'noe dvizhenie v Petrograde*, pp. 45-46).
23. *Professional'nyi vestnik*, no. 3-4 (October 15, 1917), p. 22.
24. *VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii v aprele*, p. 207; *VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii posle sverzh. samoderzh.*, p. 311; Malashko, *K voprosu ob oformlenii odnopartiinnoi sistemy*, p. 39.
25. Antropov et al., *Istoriia professional'nogo dvizheniia*, p. 112.
26. Anskii, ed., *Professional'noe dvizhenie v Petrograde*, p. 284. The statute was adopted on May 1, 1917.
27. *Tret'ia Vserossiiskaia konferentsiia professional'nykh soiuзов 3-11 iyulya (20-28 iyunya st. st.) 1917 goda: Stenograficheskii otchet* (Third All-Russian Conference of Trade Unions, 3-11 July [20-28 June Old Style], 1917, hereinafter *Tret'ia konferentsiia*), edited with introduction, notes, and index by Diane Koenker (Millwood, New York: Kraus International Publications, 1982), p. 225.
28. Anskii, ed., *Professional'noe dvizhenie v Petrograde*, p. 52.
29. *Ibid.*, pp. 66-67.
30. Grinevich, *Professional'noe dvizhenie*, p. 197.
31. Iu. Milonov, ed., *Putevoditel' po rezoliutsiiam vserossiiskikh s'ezdov i konferentsii professional'nykh soiuзов* (Moscow: VTsSPS, 1924), pp. 31, 43.
32. Anskii, ed., *Professional'noe dvizhenie v Petrograde*, pp. 64-65.
33. See the resolution of the Soviet Conference on this issue in *Izvestiia*, April 6, 1917.
34. See the transcripts of that meeting in *Tret'ia konferentsiia*, pp. 5-15.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 261.
36. *Professional'nyi vestnik*, no. 1-2 (September 1, 1917), p. 10.

37. There were, for example, unions organized on the basis of skill (such as unions of unskilled workers) or on the basis of a particular narrow branch of production (e.g., union of workers employed at sugar refineries in Kiev).
38. Anskii, ed., *Professional'noe dvizhenie v Petrograde*, pp. 68, 124.
39. Smith, *Red Petrograd*, p. 108.
40. Anskii, ed., *Professional'noe dvizhenie v Petrograde*, p. 125; and Smith, *Red Petrograd*, p. 108. For more on *tsekhovshchina* and its disruptive effects see K. Bruk's contribution in Anskii, ed., *Professional'noe dvizhenie v Petrograde*; and Smith, *Red Petrograd*, particularly pp. 103-9, *passim*.
41. Milonov, ed., *Putevoditel' po rezoliutsiiam*, p. 26.
42. Grinevich, for example, cites numerous congresses and conferences held by industrial unions before the June 3 coup d'état (*Professional'noe dvizhenie*, p. 186).
43. Anskii, ed., *Professional'noe dvizhenie v Petrograde*, p. 62.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 286. As Anskii explains, the statute could not categorically prohibit the formation of nonindustrial unions because such a prohibition would "render the statute irrelevant" due to the "flourishing of *tsekhovshchina* in the first half of 1917" (*ibid.*, p. 63).
45. *Ibid.*
46. Egorova, *Partiia i profsoiuzy*, p. 59.
47. Anskii, ed., *Professional'noe dvizhenie v Petrograde*, p. 122.
48. Milonov, ed., *Putevoditel' po rezoliutsiiam*, p. 54.
49. *Ibid.*
50. *Professional'nyi vestnik: oktiabr' 1917-oktiabr' 1918* (October 1918), pp. 10-11. Only thirty unions out of the sixty listed in the magazine remained after the wave of mergers.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
52. In some instances, however, small unions that organized workers on the basis of trade survived for a long time. For example, the final merger of the stokers' union with the metalworkers' union occurred only after the First All-Russian Congress of Trade Unions in January of 1918.
53. Anskii, ed., *Professional'noe dvizhenie v Petrograde*, p. 46.

54. The organizational meeting of Kiev metalworkers, held at the end of March, emphasized that the economic struggle of the proletariat was inseparable from politics and recommended that workers who joined unions should also join political parties that protected their interests (*VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii posle sverzh. samoderzh.*, p. 533). In May, the "internationalists" gained a majority in the Organizational Commission of the union in Petrograd. The May 20 meeting of the Petrograd metalworkers' union opposed government plans for the relocation of industrial enterprises from Petrograd. The two principal speakers at the meeting were the Bolshevik V. D. Shmidt and the "internationalist" Riazanov. "Internationalists" dominated the union's local branches in such key working-class districts of Petrograd as Vyborgskii, Narvskii, Petrogradskii, First and Second Gorodskoi districts, and others (Anskii, ed., *Professional'noe dvizhenie v Petrograde*, p. 119-124, passim).
55. See, for example, the April 15 resolution of the union in Petrograd rejecting the Liberty Loan, which was floated by the government to support its policies (*VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii v aprele*, p. 386), the resolutions of the upholsters' section of this union on April 21 and 30 demanding the overthrow of the Provisional Government and the establishment of soviet power and condemning the decision of the moderate socialists to enter the Provisional Government (*ibid.*, pp. 756 and 835), and the April 15 resolution of the Moscow woodworkers' union in support of the Bolshevik press (*ibid.*, p. 382). A resolution of the board of the Petrograd woodworkers' union adopted for the upcoming Third All-Russian Trade Union Conference (scheduled for the end of June) directed the board's delegate to protest against the continuation of the "capitalist war," and particularly against "the current [Brusilov] offensive." It also demanded the establishment of "a full supervision by workers over industry" and the transfer of political power to the soviets. (*VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii v mae-iune*, p. 311).
56. See its resolution of April 20 condemning the Liberty Loan (*ibid.*, pp. 405-6).
57. See the union's resolution of April 16 stating that peace could be achieved only if power were transferred to the soviets (*ibid.*, p. 425).
58. Milonov, ed., *Putevoditel' po rezoliutsiiam*, p. 48; on April 30, the meeting of representatives of the Khar'kov tailors' union passed a resolution protesting against Miliukov's note of April 18 and condemning the conciliatory policy of the Petrograd Soviet toward the Provisional Government (*VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii v aprele*, pp. 824-25).
59. *Izvestiia*, May 4, 1917.
60. The first meeting of the Central Trade Union Bureau in Moscow (March 2) passed a resolution advising union members to elect to the Moscow Soviet of Workers' Deputies "only those [representatives] who stand on the 'internationalist' position" (*VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii posle sverzh. samoderzh.*, p. 460.). The meeting of the bureau held the next day advocated a political involvement of the unions. In part, it stressed that unions should "maintain a complete orga-

nizational and ideological unity with the parties which stand on the position of the class struggle" (ibid., p. 471). The statute of the bureau also emphasized that the trade union movement should "stand on the ground of the international struggle of the proletariat" and urged political involvement for the unions. One can also identify the influence of the "internationalists" in documents adopted by the Petrograd Central Trade Union Bureau (see, for example, *VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii v aprele*, p. 403; Anskii, ed., *Professional'noe dvizhenie v Petrograde*, pp. 48, 284). The resolution of the bureau that dealt with the government's decision to relocate Petrograd enterprises emphasized that the relocation of Petrograd enterprises without "the supervision and regulation of production by workers" would only contribute to the general economic dislocation. The resolution demanded "the speediest termination of the imperialist war," the introduction of universal labor conscription, and the establishment of the "regulation and supervision of the entire production by the state authority resting in the hands of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies" (*Izvestiia*, June 2, 1917).

61. According to Anskii, for example, the Provisional Central Bureau of the Petrograd Trade Unions consisted of four Bolsheviks and four Mensheviks, and one syndicalist (Anskii, ed., *Professional'noe dvizhenie v Petrograde*, p. 47).
62. Ibid.
63. *Tret'ya konferentsiya*, p. vii; also *Professional'nyi vestnik*, no. 3-4 (October 15, 1917), p. 21.
64. The agenda of the conference was approved by a joint meeting of representatives from the Workers' Section of the Petrograd Soviet, the Petrograd Central Trade Union Bureau, and the Moscow Central Trade Union Bureau, held on April 16-17 in Petrograd. See the minutes of this meeting in *Tret'ya Konferentsiya*, pp. 5-15.
65. Smith gives the following breakdown of the delegates to the conference according to their party affiliation: 73 Bolsheviks, 36 Mensheviks, 6 Menshevik Internationalists, 11 Bundists, 31 nonfactional Social Democrats, 25 SRs, and 7 delegates not affiliated with any political party (Smith, *Red Petrograd*, p. 187). Unfortunately, I was unable to locate Smith's reference in the source which he cites in his book. The Soviet author A. G. Egorova gives a very similar breakdown of the delegates. However, there is one significant discrepancy. She puts the number of nonaffiliated delegates at 17 (Egorova, *Partiia i profsoiuzy*, p. 129). One can get an idea about an approximate number of delegates who supported each bloc by the count of votes: for example, 103 delegates voted in favor of the Menshevik draft resolution on the tasks of the trade unions written by the Menshevik V. M. Grinevich, and 79 delegates voted against this resolution (Milonov, ed., *Putevoditel' po rezoliutsiiam*, p. 52). Diane Koenker provides the following estimate of support for each bloc: approximately 100 for the moderate socialists and 85 for the "internationalists" ("Introduction," *Tret'ya konferentsiya*, pp. xv-xvi).

66. See speeches by I. I. Matrozov, a Bolshevik delegate from Podol'sk, and Rozov, a Menshevik delegate from Ekaterinodar, who indicated that they would vote on the merit of what was proposed, rather than who proposed it (ibid., pp. 96-98, 108-9).
67. Ibid., p. 52.
68. Ibid., p. 59.
69. Ibid., pp. 62-63, *passim*.
70. Ibid., p. 77.
71. Ibid., pp. 81-82.
72. See, for example, a speech by Bolshevik Miliutin (ibid., p. 91).
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid., p. 162.
75. Ibid., p. 107.
76. Ibid., p. 159.
77. Ibid., p. 95.
78. Ibid., p. 106. As has been mentioned earlier, Bolshevik I. I. Matrozov, a delegate from Podol'sk, and the Menshevik from Ekaterinodar Rozov expressed attitudes very similar to that of Belitskii (ibid., pp. 96-98, 108-9).
79. The original draft by Grinevich was adopted as the basis for the final resolution. One hundred three delegates voted in favor of the draft and 79 delegates abstained. The final resolution, which was drawn up by the editing commission consisting of 1 Bolshevik, 1 nonfactional Social Democrat, and 5 Mensheviks, differed from Grinevich's draft only in that it included the definition of the current stage of capitalism in Russia as imperialist. The final resolution on this issue was adopted by a majority of 68 votes in favor and 33 against (Milonov, ed., *Putevoditel' po rezoliutsiiam*, pp. 51-52).
80. This paragraph was adopted by a narrow majority: 89 delegates voted in favor and 75 against (*Tret'ya konferentsiya*, p. 156).
81. Ibid., pp. 296-97.
82. Ibid., pp. 302, 304.
83. Ibid., pp. 449-52.

84. Ibid., p. 387.
85. See the minutes of the April 17 joint meeting of representatives from the Workers' Section of the Petrograd Soviet and the Petrograd and Moscow Central Trade Union Bureaus. Despite the protests from the Bolshevik N. P. Glebov-Avilov, the participants of the meeting refused to include in the conference's agenda the question of the relationship between the trade unions and political parties (ibid., pp. 12-13).
86. Ibid., pp. 475-76.
87. *Pravda*, July 14, 1917.
88. Riazanov's proposal was rejected by a very narrow majority: 78 delegates voted against it and 58 in favor (*Tret'ya konferentsiya*, p. 396).
89. Ibid., pp. 396-97.
90. See, for example, a speech by A. M. Bakhutov, a prominent Bolshevik trade unionist from Moscow (ibid., pp. 252-53, *passim*).
91. See the theses by D. Kol'tsov (ibid., p. 481).
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid., pp. 243-44. Among those who advocated the use of reconciliation boards as a primary means for resolving conflicts between workers and management were V. M. Grinevich and Petr Garvi (ibid., pp. 283-85).
94. Ibid., p. 482. During the discussion of the resolution on the economic struggle, a Menshevik, Agulin, who represented the Arkhangel'sk union of maritime industry employees, proposed an amendment that would outlaw strikes for the members of their union. The amendment was unanimously rejected (ibid., pp. 283-85).
95. Ibid., pp. 283-85. The proposal was rejected by the conference.
96. Ibid., pp. 448-49.
97. Ibid., pp. 449, 481-82.
98. Ibid., pp. 437-38.
99. Ibid., p. 438.
100. Ibid., pp. 461-63.
101. *Izvestiia*, March 11, 1917.

102. Such demands were presented to employers by labor activists at the Skorokhod shoe factory in Petrograd (March 13) (*VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii posle sverzh. samoderzh.*, pp. 490-91), the Siemens and Gal'sk electrical engine plant in Nizhnii Novgorod (March 13) (*ibid.*, p. 494), the Merkurii shoe factory in Moscow (March 19) (*ibid.*, p. 519), the Trubochnyi plant in Petrograd and the Feniks machine-building plant in Moscow (*ibid.*, pp. 522-23). According to Perazich and Gaza, two Bolshevik trade union leaders, in April and May, workers at numerous textile factories and metal plants advanced demands for higher wages and a general improvement of their welfare (Perazich, *Tekstili Leningrada*, p. 56; Gaza, *Putilovets*, p. 98).
103. Smith, *Red Petrograd*, p. 120.
104. Anskii, ed., *Professional'noe dvizhenie v Petrograde*, p. 34.
105. Perazich, *Tekstili Leningrada*, p. 56.
106. Anskii, ed., *Professional'noe dvizhenie v Petrograde*, pp. 112, 260.
107. V. Shmidt, "Obzor professional'nogo dvizheniia za 1 1/2 goda," *Professional'nyi vestnik* (October 1918), pp. 12-13.
108. Anskii, ed., *Professional'noe dvizhenie v Petrograde*, pp. 179 and 182.
109. The textile workers' union submitted its wage scale to the Petrograd Society of Factory and Plant Owners on June 27 (Perazich, *Tekstili Leningrada*, p. 64), and the metalworkers' union sent its wage scale to the society on June 19 (Anskii, ed., *Professional'noe dvizhenie v Petrograde*, p. 127).
110. Anskii, ed., *Professional'noe dvizhenie v Petrograde*, p. 37.
111. For more information on the early history of reconciliation boards see Bonnell, *Roots of Rebellion*, pp. 186-87; Grinevich, *Professional'noe dvizhenie*, pp. 132-35; Anskii, ed., *Professional'noe dvizhenie v Petrograde*, p. 78. At the beginning of 1916, the Workers' Group at the Central War-Industries Committee revived the idea of reconciliation institutions (Siegelbaum, "The Workers' Group and the War-Industries Committee: Who Used Whom?" p. 170). After the overthrow of the tsar, on March 10 the Petrograd Soviet and the Petrograd Society of Factory and Plant Owners concluded an agreement which provided for the creation of reconciliation boards (*Izvestiia*, March 11, 1917).
112. The decree was issued on August 5, 1917.
113. *Ekonomicheskoe polozhenie Rossii*, vol. 1, p. 551.
114. *Ibid.*, pp. 551-52.
115. Anskii, ed., *Professional'noe dvizhenie v Petrograde*, pp. 86-87.

116. *Bol'sheviki Petrograda v 1917 godu: khronika sobytii* (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1957), p. 70.
117. Anskii, ed., *Professional'noe dvizhenie v Petrograde*, p. 84.
118. Ibid.
119. Ibid.; also Gaza, *Putilovets*, p. 57.
120. Anskii, ed., *Professional'noe dvizhenie v Petrograde*, p. 94.
121. *Ekonomicheskoe polozhenie v Rossii*, vol. 1, p. 446.
122. Ibid., pp. 450, 461, 480, 602; also *VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii v sentiabre*, p. 306.
123. Meller and Pankratova, eds., *Rabochee dvizhenie*, p. 103.
124. Smith, *Red Petrograd*, pp. 279-80.
125. N. Dmitriev noted that the Central Reconciliation Board in Petrograd practically ceased to function by the beginning of October and only reconciliation institutions organized by trade unions could still assist in resolving conflicts (Anskii, ed., *Professional'noe dvizhenie v Petrograde*, pp. 96-97).
126. For detailed information and a statistical analysis of these strikes see Diane Koenker and William Rosenberg, *Strikes and Revolution in Russia, 1917* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), especially the chapter "Labor Activism in Midsummer."
127. *VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii v iiule*, pp. 333, 565; also *Profsoiuzy SSSR*, vol. 1, pp. 447-48.
128. *VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii v avguste*, p. 617.
129. Meller and Pankratova, eds., *Rabochee dvizhenie*, pp. 188-89.
130. *VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii v avguste*, pp. 215-16, 616.
131. Ibid., pp. 215, 222-23, 617.
132. *VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii v sentiabre*, pp. 321-22, 377-78, 562.
133. *VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii nakanune Oktiabr'skogo vosst.*, p. 507.
134. *VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii v avguste*, pp. 214 and 616.
135. Ibid., pp. 215-16, 222-23, 617.

136. *Ekonomicheskoe polozhenie Rossii*, vol. 1, pp. 407-8.
137. Such warnings were, for example, issued by the directorates of the Taganrog metal plant (July 20), the Guzhon metal plant in Moscow (June 22), the Singer company (September), the Bogoslovskii mining company (May 10) (*Ibid.*, pp. 408-9, 444-45, 462-66, 495-96).
138. *VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii v iiule*, p. 337.
139. N. Glebov, "Deiatel'nost' profsoiuzov do i posle Oktiabria 1917 goda," *Professional'nyi vestnik* (October 1918), p. 7.
140. N. Sukhanov, who was a member of the Economic Council, left a colorful description of its activities: "Under the conditions of growing hunger and lack of goods, the Economic Council staged strange academic logomachies [*slovo-preniia*] twice a week; not only was there no practical approach to problems, but there were also no decisions of resolutions—[there were] only speeches and rebuttals as in any respectable scientific society" (N. N. Sukhanov, *Zapiski o revoliutsii*, 6 books [Berlin: izdatel'stvo Z. I. Grzhebina, 1922-1923], book 5, p. 129). Mensheviks M. I. Skobelev and V. G. Groman, who participated in the creation of the Main Economic Committee, indicated that the committee "was constantly changing its composition," and "practically never started to direct the implementation of economic policies of the state, it managed to resolve only a few individual problems" (P. V. Volobuev, *Ekonomicheskaiia politika Vremennogo pravitel'stva* [Moscow: Nauka, 1962], p. 402). According to Volobuev, over one third of all the meetings that the committee held from September 2 to October 16 were devoted to discussions of a new statute for the committee (*ibid.*).
141. *Shestoi s"ezd RSDRP (bol'shevikov). Avgust 1917 goda: protokoly* (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1958), p. 44.
142. See, for example, the resolutions adopted by a joint meeting of representatives from Minsk Central Trade Union Bureau, the city's trade union boards, and factory committees (July 25) (*VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii v iiule*, pp. 374-75), the Petrograd wood workers' union (July 11) (*VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii v iiule*, p. 73), the Krasnoarsk printers' union (July 16) (Bataeva et al., eds., *Profsoiuzy SSSR*, vol. 1, pp. 423-24), the union of lumber workers in Arkhangel'sk (July 27) (*ibid.*, p. 429), the Kiev Central Trade Union Bureau (August 2) (*ibid.*, pp. 430-32), and the union of garment industry workers (*Rabochii i soldat*, August 5, 1917).
143. In its decision to convene the State Conference, promulgated on July 31, the government stated that the conference was to effect "the unity between the state power and all other organized forces in the country" (*VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii v iiule*, p. 327).
144. Nivel'son, ed., *Moskovskii sovet professional'nykh soiuzov*, p. 54.

145. The minutes of that meeting are in Nivel'son, ed., *Moskovskii sovet profsoiuzov*, pp. 55-69. Meller and Pankratova erroneously date that meeting August 7-8 (see *Rabochee dvizhenie*, pp. 260-61).
146. Nivel'son, ed., *Moskovskii sovet professional'nykh soiuzov*, pp. 62-63.
147. See speeches by Kipen and V. I. Iakhontov (*ibid.*, pp. 63-69).
148. Meller and Pankratova, eds., *Rabochee dvizhenie*, p. 261. The resolution was proposed by a Bolshevik, A. A. Andreev (*ibid.*).
149. *VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii v avguste*, p. 386.
150. *Ibid.*, p. 387.
151. Anskii, ed., *Professional'noe dvizhenie v Petrograde*, p. 52. Garvi notes in his book that the Moscow Conference exacerbated the split in the trade union movement. The VTsSPS even sent two speakers to the conference—a Menshevik, M. G. Grinevich, and an "internationalist," David Riazanov (Garvi, *Professional'nye soiuzy v Rossii*, p. 22).
152. See, for example, resolutions by the First Regional Conference of the Urals Trade Unions and the Central Board of the Metal Workers' Union (Egorova, *Partiia i profsoiuzy*, p. 153; and *Professional'nyi vestnik*, no. 1-2 [September 1, 1917], p. 17).
153. For example, strikes involving the leather workers' union, the union of workers of rubber-industry enterprises, the construction workers' union in Moscow (*VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii v avguste*, pp. 214-16, 222-23, 616-17).
154. *Izvestiia*, August 13, 1917.
155. *Ibid.* Only the printers' union and the union of commerce employees did not take part in the strike. For a list of Moscow enterprises that took part in the strike, see Meller and Pankratova, eds., *Rabochee dvizhenie v 1917 godu*, pp. 254-58, and *VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii v avguste*, pp. 402-4.
156. See resolutions protesting against the Moscow State Conference passed by various workers' organizations in Meller and Pankratova, eds., *Rabochee dvizhenie*, pp. 258-60, *VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii v avguste*, pp. 387-88.
157. Strikes in protest against the Moscow State Conference took place in Kostroma, the Vladimir province, Kiev, Ufa, Tsaritsyn, Ekaterinburg, Petrograd, and Tver (*VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii v avguste*, pp. 399, 400, 405, 409, 414; Meller and Pankratova, eds., *Rabochee dvizhenie*, p. 260; Egorova, *Partiia i profsoiuzy*, p. 155).
158. The First Urals Regional Conference of Trade Unions took place in Ekaterinburg on August 10-15. Ninety-nine delegates, representing 134,304

union members, attended the conference. The breakdown of the delegates by political affiliation was as follows: 37 Bolsheviks and "internationalists," 26 SRs, 4 Mensheviks, and 20 delegates who were not affiliated with any political party but, according to the Soviet source, voted primarily for "internationalist" resolutions (*VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii v avguste*, p. 616). The texts of the conference's resolutions are in *Professional'nyi vestnik*, no. 1-2 (September 1, 1917), pp. 15-18.

159. *Professional'nyi vestnik*, no. 1-2 (September 1, 1917), p. 15.
160. *Ibid.*, p. 16 (italics in the original).
161. *VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii v avguste*, pp. 211-12. It is interesting that this resolution was not included in the selection of the conference's resolutions published in *Professional'nyi vestnik*. Although there is no conclusive evidence that can explain this oversight, one can surmise that it was due to the desire on the part of the VTsSPS, which published the journal, to avoid the extremely radical tone of this resolution, offensive to many moderate socialist members of the VTsSPS.
162. See the resolution by the congress of the Western Siberian miners' union, which appeared on August 15 in the newspaper *Znamia revoliutsii* (Bataeva et al., eds., *Profsoiuzy SSSR*, vol. 1, p. 393), the August 20 resolution of the textile workers' union in Moscow (*VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii v avguste*, pp. 224-25) and the August 19 resolution by the Petrograd Trade Union Council. The latter called upon Petrograd workers to vote in the upcoming municipal elections for the party "which advocates the speedy termination of the war, . . . a further development of the revolution, rather than a conciliation with the bourgeoisie, . . . and the introduction of state control over the production and distribution of products, exercised by workers' organizations" (*ibid.*, p. 221).
163. *Professional'nyi vestnik*, no. 1-2 (September 1, 1917), p. 12. The committee elected two delegates to the conference—the Menshevik D. Kol'tsov and the "internationalist" Riazanov (*ibid.*).
164. See, for example, a protest by A. Tatarchukov, an influential Menshevik trade unionist, in *Professional'nyi vestnik*, no. 1-2 (September 1, 1917), p. 24.
165. Anskii, ed., *Professional'noe dvizhenie v Petrograde*, pp. 52-53.
166. A. M. Pankratova, *Fabzavkomy i profsoiuzy v revoliutsii 1917 goda* (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1927), pp. 72-73.
167. *Bol'sheviki Petrograda v 1917 godu*, p. 454.
168. Anskii, ed., *Professional'noe dvizhenie v Petrograde*, p. 53. On August 30, the Bolshevik CC reprimanded Riazanov and called his behavior at the August 22 meeting unacceptable (*Protokoly TsK*, pp. 33, 257).

169. Nivel'son, ed., *Moskovskii sovet profsoiuzov*, p. 203.
170. Anskii, ed., *Professional'noe dvizhenie v Petrograde*, p. 53. The Bolshevik, N. A. Skrypnik, a member of the CCFC, noted this fact and proposed that more radical measures should be taken. Clearly hinting at the transfer of power to the soviets, he said: "Although all proposals by Lozovskii are necessary, they are not sufficient. We need the measure, not measures" (ibid.).
171. *VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii v avguste*, pp. 236-37.
172. Ibid., pp. 474-75.
173. *Professional'nyi vestnik*, no. 1-2 (September 1, 1917), p. 24. Except for that one clause, the resolution was a carbon copy of the August 24 resolution discussed earlier.
174. See resolutions which were adopted, for example, by the Kremenchug Central Trade Union Bureau (Bataeva et al., eds., *Profsoiuzy SSSR*, vol. 1, pp. 504-5), a meeting of representatives of trade union boards in Minsk (ibid., pp. 509-10), a joint meeting of representatives from trade union boards, factory committees, and the soviet in Kiev (*VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii v avguste*, pp. 581-82).
175. *VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii v avguste*, p. 527.
176. Nivel'son, ed., *Moskovskii sovet profsoiuzov*, pp. 76-77.
177. Bataeva et al., eds., *Profsoiuzy SSSR*, vol. 1, p. 510.
178. See, for example, the resolution "On Power" adopted by the Petrograd Soviet on August 31 (*VOSR: Oktiabr'skoe vooruzh. vosstanie*, pp. 67-68) and the resolution on power adopted on September 5 by the Moscow Soviet (*VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii v sentiabre*, pp. 144-45).
179. *Rabochii put'*, September 7, 1917. Glebov erroneously said that the resolution by the Petrograd Soviet was adopted on September 1.
180. T. Shatilova, "Profsoiuzy i Oktiabr'," *Krasnaia letopis'*, no. 2 (1927), pp. 184; also Pankratova, *Fabzavkomy i profsoiuzy*, p. 76. It is interesting to note that the resolution demanded the speedy convocation of the Constituent Assembly.
181. Resolutions to this effect were adopted by the Samara metalworkers' union (September 3) (*VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii v avguste*, p. 594); the Moscow textile workers' union (September 3) (Meller and Pankratova, eds., *Rabochee dvizhenie*, pp. 157-58 [for the transcript of that meeting, see *VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii v sentiabre*, pp. 268-70]); the Petrograd woodworkers' union (September 4) (ibid., p. 275); the delegates of the trade union boards in Ekaterinoslav (ibid.); the All-Russian Conference of Garment Industry Workers' Union (September 9) (ibid., pp. 292-93); the Western Siberian Regional Conference of

the Printers' Union (*ibid.*, pp. 313-14); the Khar'kov construction workers' union (September 17) (Bataeva et al., eds., *Profsoiuzy SSSR*, vol. 1, pp. 523-24), representatives of the Kiev Central Trade Union Bureau (*VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii v sentiabre*, p. 319); and the Petrograd transportation workers' union (September 22) (*Rabochii put'*, September 26, 1917).

182. Nivel'son, ed., *Moskovskii sovet profsoiuzov*, pp. 79-80.

183. *Ibid.*, p. 81 (*italics in the original*).

184. The Democratic Conference was convened on the initiative of the CEC on September 14-22 with the aim of finding a solution for Russia's continued political crisis (see *VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii v sentiabre*, p. 544).

185. *VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii v sentiabre*, p. 544.

186. *Ibid.*, p. 246.

187. Initially, the trade unions were to send 100 delegates, but after the total number of delegates who were to attend the conference was increased from 880 to 1600, the number of trade union delegates was increased to 120 (see Lozovskii's article "Profsoiuzy na obshche-demokraticheskom soveshchanii" in *Professional'nyi vestnik*, no. 3-4 [October 15, 1917], p. 1). Most of the trade union central bureaus sent 1 or 2 delegates, only Moscow, Petrograd, and Ekaterinoslav sent 6, 3, and 3 respectively. Several all-Russian trade union organizations—such as the All-Russian Metalworkers' Union and the All-Russian Printers' Union—were allowed to send additional delegates (*ibid.*, pp. 1-2).

188. The meeting of the council elected Maksimov, Ignatov, Poznanskii, Sergeev, Andreev, Krol' (Nivel'son, ed., *Moskovskii sovet profsoiuzov*, p. 84).

189. *Rabochii put'*, September 14, 1917. The meeting elected Antselovich, Belinskii, Bugrov.

190. The breakdown of the delegates by party affiliation was as follows: 69 Bolsheviks, 24 Menshevik Internationalists, 1 Bundist Defensist, 2 nonfactional Social Democrats, 2 SRs, 2 representatives of the Jewish Socialist Workers' Party, and 1 nonparty delegate (Lozovskii, "Profsoiuzy na obshche-demokraticheskom soveshchanii," *Professional'nyi vestnik*, no. 3-4 [October 15, 1917], p. 2).

191. As Lozovskii put it in his article, "The Trade Union Delegation at the Democratic Conference distinguished itself by its definite 'internationalist' position" (*ibid.*, p. 2).

192. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

193. Grigorii Aronson, "Sud'ba professional'nogo soiuza sluzhashchikh," typescript copy, Nikolaevsky Archive, box 174, file 10, p. 4.

194. Ibid.

195. *Izvestiia*, September 20, 1917. The discrepancy between the total number of trade union delegates mentioned earlier (120) and the total number of delegates who belonged to the so-called trade union group was primarily due to the fact that several unions—the All-Russian Railway Workers' Union (*Vikzhel'*), the All-Russian Union of Commerce Employees, and the All-Russian Union of Postal Employees—sent their separate delegations to the conference and were not formally a part of the trade union delegation. See the original list of organizations invited to the Democratic Conference in *Izvestiia*, September 3, 1917.

196. Lozovskii, "Profsoiuzy na obshche-demokraticheskom soveshchanii," p. 2.

197. See a report about the conference in *Rabochii put'*, October 3, 1917. The participants at the conference included 10 Bolsheviks, 7 Mensheviks, 4 SRs, and 2 non-party delegates.

198. *VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii v sentiabre*, p. 330.

199. Bataeva et al., eds., *Profsoiuzy SSSR*, vol. 1, pp. 529-30.

200. Such resolutions were passed, for example, by the congress of representatives of the union of workers employed at enterprises producing glass and china wares in the Moscow industrial region (October 1) (*VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii nakanune Okt. vooruzh. vosstan.*, pp. 239-40); by the Moscow regional conference of the metalworkers' union (October 5-9) (Meller and Pankratova, eds., *Rabochee dvizhenie*, pp. 303-6; *VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii nakanune Okt. vooruzh. vosstan.*, pp. 254-55); by a meeting of the Khar'kov railroad workers' union (October 13) (ibid., pp. 289-90); the Petrograd Trade Union Council (October 15) (ibid., p. 295); and at a meeting of the Moscow textile workers' union (October 15) (Meller and Pankratova, eds., *Rabochee dvizhenie*, pp. 299-300; also Bataeva et al., eds., *Profsoiuzy SSSR*, vol. 1, pp. 528-29).

201. See Lozovskii's article "Ideologicheskie raznoglasiiia v professional'nom dvizhenii," *Professional'nyi vestnik*, no. 1-2 (September 1, 1917), p. 5.

202. See pp. 114-115 of this work.

203. Lenin, *PSS*, vol. 34, p. 134.

204. *Professional'nyi vestnik*, no. 1-2 (September 1, 1917), p. 6.

205. For example, seventeen out of the total twenty-three members of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Trade Union Council were Bolsheviks and that situation was not unique (Shatilova, "Profsoiuzy i Oktiabr'," p. 180).

NOTES 4

1. *Izvestiia*, August 29, 1917.
2. Chamberlin, *The Russian Revolution*, pp. 277-78. See also Rabinowitch, *The Bolsheviks Come to Power*, pp. 159-62.
3. Rabinowitch, *The Bolsheviks Come to Power*, p. 177.
4. Chamberlin, *The Russian Revolution*, p. 283.
5. Rabinowitch, *The Bolsheviks Come to Power*, pp. 201-03.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 210-23.
7. N. N. Sukhanov provided a detailed description of these turbulent developments in his memoirs on the Russian revolution (*The Russian Revolution, 1917*, translated and edited by Joel Carmichael, [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984], chapters 29-32).
8. On the suppression of the press, see Leonard Schapiro, *The Origin of the Communist Autocracy: Political Opposition in the Soviet State: First Phase, 1917-1922* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1965), pp. 75-76; and on the creation of the Cheka, see Vladimir Brovkin, *The Mensheviks After October*, p. 95; and Rex A. Wade, *Red Guards and Workers' Militias in the Russian Revolution* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984), p. 317.
9. On the elections to the Russian Constituent Assembly and its eventual demise, see Oliver H. Radkey, *The Election to the Russian Constituent Assembly* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950).
10. For more detailed information on labor's involvement in the planning and executing of the takeover, see my doctoral dissertation "The Russian Revolution and Organized Labor," University of Virginia, 1985, pp. 329-43.
11. *Izvestiia*, October 1, 1917.
12. See, for example, remarks by the secretary of the metalworkers' union V. D. Shmidt and the union's chairman Alexander Shliapnikov (*Protokoly TsK*, p. 96).
13. Gaza, *Putilovets*, p. 145.
14. *Novaia zhizn'*, November 1, 1917.
15. Haimson, ed., *The Mensheviks*, pp. 67-68.
16. *Novaia zhizn'*, November 1, 1917.

17. V. A. Osipov and G. I. Sukhrev, eds., *1917 god v Saratovskoi gubernii. Sbornik dokumentov (fevral' 1917-dekabr' 1918 gg)* (Saratov: Saratovskoe knizhnoe izdatelstvo, 1957), p. 207.
18. Perazich, *Tekstili Leningrada*, pp. 97-99.
19. Garvi, *Professional'nye soiuzy Rossii*, p. 129.
20. Ibid., pp. 28, 129.
21. Perazich, *Tekstili Leningrada*, pp. 97-99.
22. Garvi, *Professional'nye soiuzy v Rossii*, pp. 129. For more information on the *Vikzhel'* negotiations, see the contribution by Leo Lande in Haimson's *The Mensheviks*, pp. 58-73.
23. *Novaia zhizn'*, November 1, 1917.
24. See Smith, *Red Petrograd*; Thomas F. Remington, *Building Socialism in Bolshevik Russia: Ideology and Industrial Organization, 1917-1921* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1984); Carmen Sirianni, *Workers' Control and Socialist Democracy* (London: Verso, 1982); Silvana Malle, *The Economic Organization of War Communism, 1918-1921* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); David Mandel, *The Petrograd Workers and the Soviet Seizure of Power*; Maurice Brinton, *The Bolsheviks and Workers' Control*.
25. Solomon Schwarz, "Fabrichno-zavodskie komitety i profsoiuzy v Rossii v pervye gody revoliutsii," unpublished manuscript in the Nikolaevsky Archive of the Hoover Institution Archives, box 137, file no. 4, p. 33.
26. *Tret'ya konferentsiya*, pp. 318-23, passim.
27. Milonov, ed., *Putevoditel' po rezoliutsiiam*, pp. 71-72; *Tret'ya konferentsiya*, pp. 452-53.
28. *Okt. rev. i fabzavkomy*, part 1, p. 97.
29. Ibid., p. 120.
30. Ibid., pp. 133-34.
31. Ibid., p. 136.
32. Ibid., p. 229. In his book on Petrograd workers, S. A. Smith seems to have missed the finer points of Lozovskii's position when he concludes that Lozovskii advocated "a division of labor between the unions and the factory committees" (*Red Petrograd*, p. 188). The conference in fact rejected Lozovskii's position.

33. *Okt. rev. i fabzavkomy*, part 1, pp. 229-30. Another moderate Bolshevik, David Riazanov, expressed the same view more bluntly when he said that factory committees "should not interfere [*putat'sia v nogakh*] with the activities of political parties and trade unions" (ibid.).
34. *Okt. rev. i fabzavkomy*, part 1, p. 233.
35. Ibid.
36. Meller and Pankratova, eds., *Rabochee dvizhenie*, p. 340; Pankratova, *Fabzavkomy Rossii*, p. 260.
37. The union instituted the so-called union assembly (*soiuznaia konferentsiia*)—a permanent body with representatives from factory committees and the union. However, this body had only advisory functions (I. Volkov, "Professional'noe stroitel'stvo i zavodskie komitety" ["The Organization of Unions and Factory Committees"], *Professional'nyi vestnik*, no. 1-2 [September 1, 1917], p. 9).
38. *VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii nakanune Okt. vooruzh. vosst.*, p. 263.
39. *Professional'nyi vestnik*, no. 1-2 (September 1, 1917), p. 20.
40. *VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii nakanune Okt. vooruzh. vosst.*, pp. 271-72; *Okt. rev. i fabzavkomy*, part 2, p. 137.
41. Bataeva et al., eds., *Profsoiuzy SSSR*, vol. 1, p. 401.
42. The full text of this resolution, which was adopted on October 15, is in *VOSR: Rev. dvizh. v Rossii nakanune Okt. vooruzh. vosst.*, p. 310.
43. Ibid., pp. 312-13.
44. *Okt. rev. i fabzavkomy*, part 2, p. 134.
45. For a complete list of delegates and guests, see *Okt. rev. i fabzavkomy*, part 2, pp. 250-63. Among the guests were two American journalists John Reed and Louise Bryant (ibid., p. 261).
46. *Okt. rev. i fabzavkomy*, part 2, pp. 164-67.
47. Ibid., pp. 164-66.
48. Iurii Larin (M. Z. Lur'e) was a Menshevik-Internationalist throughout most of the summer of 1917 and in August joined the Bolsheviks. He was a member of the CEC and the editor of the journal *Internatsionalist* ("Internationalist").
49. *Okt. rev. i fabzavkomy*, part 2, pp. 169-74.

50. See the speech by an anarchist from Moscow Bekrenev (*ibid.*, p. 176).
51. *Ibid.*, p. 180.
52. *Ibid.*, pp. 182-83.
53. See the speech by Nikolai Skrypnik (*ibid.*, p. 180).
54. See the speech by Miliutin (*ibid.*, p. 169).
55. *Ibid.*, p. 180.
56. Paragraph 5, for example, spoke about "workers' control over capitalist enterprise," and paragraph 7 said that "in order to bring fruitful results, workers' control should embrace all *capitalist* enterprises" (*ibid.*, p. 187, emphasis added).
57. *Ibid.*, pp. 186-87.
58. *Ibid.*, pp. 172-73.
59. *Ibid.*, p. 189.
60. *Ibid.*, pp. 190-91.
61. *Ibid.*, p. 192.
62. This expression was used by the anarchist Piotrovskii (*ibid.*, p. 191).
63. *Ibid.*
64. *Ibid.*, p. 193.
65. *Ibid.*, p. 189.
66. *Ibid.*, p. 193.
67. *Ibid.* The materials of the conference also contain another resolution which dealt with the relationship between the factory committees and the trade unions. This resolution was drafted by a special commission that discussed "organizational issues" (*ibid.*, pp. 212-14). Although, as Solomon Schwarz noted, this resolution did not go as far as did the resolution on the relationship between the factory committees and the trade unions in subordinating the former, if implemented, it would still ensure the control of the trade unions over the factory committee organizations (Schwarz, "Fabrichno-zavodskie komitety," p. 21).
68. "Iz dnevnika publitsista" ("From a Publicist's Diary"), *PSS*, vol. 34, p. 263.
69. *PSS*, vol. 34, pp. 248-56, and 488.

70. "Krizis nazrel" ("The Crisis Has Ripened"), *PSS*, vol. 34, p. 282.
71. Robert V. Daniels, *Red October: The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967), p. 216.
72. *Protokoly Tsentral'nogo komiteta RSDRP(b), avgust 1917-fevral' 1918* (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1958), hereinafter *Protokoly TsK*, p. 123.
73. *Ibid.*, p. 130
74. *Ibid.*, p. 122
75. A. Avtorkhanov, *Proiskhozhdenie partokratii* [Frankfurt: Possev-Verlag, 1973], vol. 1, p. 419; also *Protokoly TsK*, p. 123). One can find a good discussion of the *Vikzhel'* negotiations in Brovkin's *The Mensheviks After October*, pp. 21-24.
76. *Protokoly TsK*, pp. 127, 129-30.
77. In his "Letter to Comrades," written on November 7, 1917, G. Zinoviev, who can hardly be suspected of being Lenin's ally at that time, blamed the moderate socialists for the failure of the *Vikzhel'* negotiations. He also indicated in this letter that he had been and remained an ardent advocate of an agreement among all socialist parties that supported soviet power (*Protokoly TsK*, p. 144). In his book Vladimir Brovkin concludes: "There is no doubt that the Defensists would have split the party if such an agreement [with the Bolsheviks] had been signed. The SRs had no interest in coming to an understanding with the Bolsheviks, either. They took part in the negotiations only to win time and to let Kerensky assemble at the front as many troops as he could" (*The Mensheviks After October*, p. 33).
78. For more on this early attack by Lenin and the Menshevik response, see Richard Pipes, *Struve: Liberal on the Left, 1870-1905* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 276-77; and Abraham Ascher, *Pavel Axelrod*, pp. 174-75.
- 79 *PSS*, vol. 34, p. 134.
80. Merle Fainsod, *How Russia is Ruled* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 87.
81. Bertram Wolfe summarized Lenin's attitude in 1917 in the following passage: "Thus, what Lenin was aiming at in 1917 was a dictatorship, not only of his self-constituted and self-appointed 'vanguard of the proletariat' over the working class but a dictatorship over the entire population 'dictating positive programs to every class of society'" (Bertram D. Wolfe, *An Ideology in Power: Reflections on the Russian Revolution* [New York: Stein and Day, 1969], p. 172). Robert Daniels came to a similar conclusion that the only power that Lenin valued was an exclusive power (Daniels, *Red October*, p. 216).

82. *PSS*, vol. 31, p. 7.
83. *PSS*, vol. 49, p. 412.
84. In one of his statements made during that period, Lenin emphasized: "So long as we are in the minority [in the soviets], we conduct criticism [of the coalition policy] and [its] mistakes" (*PSS*, vol. 31, p. 115). On Lenin's motion, the April 22 meeting of the Bolshevik CC adopted a resolution which condemned as adventurist attempts by the radical Bolsheviks to advance the slogan "Down with the Provisional Government" during the April demonstrations against Miliukov's note (*Aprel'skaia konferentsiia*, pp. 312-13).
85. *Ibid.*, p. 68.
86. *PSS*, vol. 32, p. 267.
87. *PSS*, vol. 34, p. 262. On one occasion, at the beginning of September, Lenin proposed a compromise between the Bolsheviks and the moderate socialists. However, a close examination of his conditions shows that this compromise was merely a maneuver. In accordance with these conditions, power should have been transferred to the soviets and the moderate socialists should have formed a government responsible to the soviets. At the same time Lenin specifically prohibited the Bolsheviks (who at that time had already a majority in such major soviet organizations as the Petrograd and the Moscow Soviets) to form a joint government with the moderate socialists. Clearly, with the Bolshevik majority in the soviets, a government consisting of moderate socialists and responsible to the soviets would not last very long. Lenin himself indicated that this compromise was "an exception due to extraordinary circumstances and would, most likely, last only a very short period of time" (*ibid.*, vol. 34, p. 134). In that same article, "On Compromises," in which Lenin expounded his plan, he also stated that his party "strives for political power for itself," and that its goal had been and remained "the dictatorship of the proletariat"—which in Lenin's parlance always meant dictatorship by the Bolshevik party (*ibid.*). In other words, as Lenin himself indicated, his compromise was only another way for achieving his fundamental objective—exclusive power.
88. "Iz dnevnika publitsista" ("From the Publicist's Diary"), *ibid.*, vol. 34, p. 262.
89. See Lenin's remarks at the November 1 meeting of the CC (*Protokoly TsK*, pp. 126, 127, 129).
90. *Ibid.*, pp. 131-32.
91. *Ibid.*, pp. 131-34.
92. *Ibid.*, p. 275.
93. *Ibid.*, p. 137.

94. Ibid., pp. 135-37.
95. Quoted from M. Mihajlov, *Russian Themes*, translated and edited by Marija Mihajlov (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1968), pp. 247-48.
96. *Protokoly TsK*, p. 137.
97. Garvi, *Professional'nye soiuzy Rossii*, p. 28.
98. For example, at the Democratic Conference (September 14-22) the Menshevik faction voted 73 to 65 against the coalition policy and elected Martov as its official spokesperson; Tsereteli was demoted to be the spokesman for the minority still favoring coalition (Getzler, *Martov*, p. 158); see also Rabinowitch, *The Bolsheviks Come to Power*, p. 183, and Leopold Haimson, "The Mensheviks After the October Revolution: Part 1," *The Russian Review*, vol. 38, no. 4 (October 1979), pp. 458 and 463). According to Ascher, in October such a prominent figure in the Menshevik party as Pavel Axelrod "seems not to have been averse to the exercising of power by a combination of socialist parties" (*Pavel Axelrod*, p. 335).
99. *Lenin v 1917 godu: vospominaniia* (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1967), pp. 242-43.
100. Ibid., pp. 266-67.
101. *Dekrety Sovetskoi vlasti*, 9 vols. (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1957-1978), vol. 1, pp. 82-83.
102. *PSS*, vol. 35, p. 30. It is interesting to note that Lenin's draft did not even mention the trade unions as having any part in this work; they were only mentioned as organizations to which entrepreneurs could appeal decisions of factory committees.
103. Ibid., p. 447.
104. See *Izvestiia*, November 3, 1917.
105. Blinov, *Tsentral'nyi sovet fabzavkomov*, p. 172.
106. G. Tsyperovich, "Vospominaniia o Lenine," *Krasnaia letopis'*, no. 2 (1927), p. 230. In addition to the above-mentioned persons, Iurii Larin also participated in preparing the draft of the commissariat of labor (Blinov, *Tsentral'nyi sovet fabzavkomov*, p. 168).
107. See, for example, Blinov, *Tsentral'nyi sovet fabzavkomov Petrograda*, p. 166; and D. A. Baevskii, *Rabochii klass v pervye gody sovetskoi vlasti (1917-1921)* (Moscow: Nauka, 1974), p. 21.
108. Smith, *Red Petrograd*, p. 210.

109. *Dekrety Sovetskoi vlasti*, vol. 1, pp. 81-82.
110. N. K. Krupskaiia, *Vospominaniia o Lenine* (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1957), p. 399. Among the participants in the meeting were V. V. Shmidt, secretary of the Petrograd Trade Union Council and head of the Labor Market Department at the commissariat of labor, Nikolai Glebov (Avilov), Grigorii Tsyperovich, and Semen Lozovskii.
111. Ibid.
112. Tsyperovich, "Vospominaniia o Lenine," p. 230.
113. *PSS*, vol. 35, p. 57.
114. Ibid., p. 147.
115. Smith, *Red Petrograd*, pp. 209-10.
116. *PSS*, vol. 6, p. 40 (italics in the original). For more on Lenin's views regarding the workers' movement and organizations, see Thomas Hammond, *Lenin on Trade Unions and Revolution* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954).
117. For the full text of the decree, see *Dekrety Sovetskoi vlasti*, vol. 1, pp. 83-85.
118. The full composition of the All-Russian Council of Workers' Control was as follows: 5 representatives from VTsIK of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, 5 representatives from VTsIK of the Soviets of Peasants' Deputies, 5 from the All-Russian Council of Trade Unions, 2 from the All-Russian Center of Workers' Cooperatives, 5 from the All-Russian Bureau of Factory Committees, 5 from the All-Russian Union of Engineers and Technicians, 2 from the All-Russian Union of Agronomists, 1 representative from each all-Russian union with less than 100,000 members and 2 from a union with over 100,000 members, and 2 from the Petrograd Trade Union Council (*Dekrety Sovetskoi vlasti*, vol. 1, pp. 83-4).
119. *Novaia zhizn'*, November 18, 1917.
120. Ibid.
121. *Izvestiia*, November 21, 1917.
122. *Izvestiia*, November 30, 1917.
123. Ibid. A report in *Izvestiia* erroneously cites the ministry of labor instead of the commissariat.
124. Kaktyn', "Kak Il'ich uchil nas revoliutsionnoi taktike" ("How Lenin Taught Us Revolutionary Tactics") in *Lenin v 1917 godu*, p. 330.

125. Ibid., pp. 330-31.
126. J. L. H. Keep, ed. and trans., *The Debate on Soviet Power. Minutes of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of Soviets, Second Convocation: October 1917-January 1918* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), p. 172.
127. *Dekrety Sovetskoi vlasti*, vol. 1, p. 172.
128. *Pravda*, December 6, 1917. According to M. A. Savel'ev, one of the organizers of the VSNKh, prominent members of the CCFC—such as Skrypnik, Zhivotov, Chubar', and Antipov—took a very active part in creating the VSNKh (E. N. Gorodetskii, *Rozhdenie Sovetskogo gosudarstva, 1917-1918* [Moscow: Nauka, 1965], p. 241).
129. *Izvestiia*, December 2, 1917.
130. *Izvestiia*, December 7, 1917.
131. Ibid. Similar ideas were proposed by the representatives of the CCFC at the first meeting of the All-Russian Council of Workers' Control.
132. This title is very interesting in itself. According to the available information, the VSNKh never issued any decree on workers' control. Like the previous installment, these two installments made no mention as to who entrusted the CCFC with writing the regulations on workers' control.
133. *Izvestiia*, December 31, 1917. This last provision had also been included in the draft regulations by the All-Russian Council of Workers' Control published earlier on December 13.
134. The official title of the VSNKh was the Supreme (*vysshii*) Council of the National Economy, not All-Russian (*vserossiiskii*) Council of the National Economy, as the draft had it, even though the acronym in both cases would be the same.
135. *Izvestiia*, January 3, 1918.
136. The publication of all four drafts (three installments by the CCFC and the draft by the All-Russian Council of Workers' Control) created some confusion among Western students of revolutionary labor in Russia. In 1975 Chris Goodey and Maurice Brinton exchanged sharp polemics concerning the authenticity of all these regulations on workers' control. It appears that both authors were correct, except that they referred to different drafts (see Goodey's articles in *Critique*, no. 3 [Autumn 1974]; and *Critique*, no. 5 [Spring 1975]; and Brinton's reply in *Critique*, no. 4 [Spring 1975]). All drafts were subsequently reprinted in their entirety in the magazine *Narodnoe khoziaistvo*—a monthly periodical published by the VSNKh. All three installments by the CCFC were printed under one title as the draft regulations on workers' control by the CCFC (*Narodnoe khoziaistvo*, no. 1 [March, 1918], pp. 26-34).

137. One can surmise that the composition of workers' control committees would be broader than just members of factory committees. The draft stipulated, however, that the entire factory committee could be included into the committee of workers' control.
138. *Izvestiia*, December 13, 1917.
139. Solomon Schwarz, "Fabrichno-zavodskie komitety," a typescript copy in the Nikolaevsky Archive of the Hoover Institution, box 137, file 4, pp. 23-24.

NOTES 5

1. According to one speaker at the Sixth Conference of the Petrograd Factory Committees, held in January 1918, many plants still continued to produce artillery shells despite the fact that there was a supply of 25 million shells in the country (*Novaia zhizn'*, January 27, 1918).
2. See Lenin's article "Ocherednye zadachi Sovetskoi vlasti," *PSS*, vol. 36, pp. 177-79.
3. *Novaia zhizn'*, January 27, 1918.
4. Gessen and Gershenzon, eds., *Khrestomatiia po istorii rabocheho klassa*, pp. 342-43.
5. *Novaia zhizn'*, December 21, 1917.
6. TsGA SPb, f. 1192, op. 30, d. 8, l. 77.
7. TsGA SPb, f. 1547, op. 15, d. 10, l. 248 ob.
8. *Za god* (Petrograd: Kniga, 1919), p. 59.
9. L. Kritsman, *Geroicheskii period velikoi russkoi revoliutsii* (Moscow-Leningrad: Gosizdat, 1924), p. 41.
10. *Rezoliutsii Pervogo Vserossiiskogo s"ezda sovetov narodnogo khoziaistva* (Petrograd: izdanie zhurnala "Narodnoe khoziaistvo," 1918), p. 18.
11. Quoted from Brinton, *The Bolsheviks and Workers' Control*, p. 29.
12. *Za god*, p. 58-60, *passim*.
13. See the resolution "Economic Situation and Economic Policy" in *Rezoliutsii Pervogo Vserossiiskogo s"ezda sovetov narodnogo khoziaistva*, p. 18.
14. One delegate to the Sixth Conference of the Petrograd Factory Committees (January 1918) complained that factory committees sorely lacked experienced personnel (*Novaia zhizn'*, January 27, 1918).

15. *Protokoly Vserossiiskogo ucheditel'nogo s'ezda soiuzov rabochikh-metalistov, 18-19 ianvaria 1918 goda* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo TsK Vserossiiskogo soiuza rabochikh-metalistov, 1919), p. 50.
16. Grigorii Aronson, "Stranitsy proshlogo," *Protiv techeniia* (New York: n. p., 1952), p. 68.
17. *Cherezvychainoe sobranie upolnomochennykh fabrik i zavodov g. Petrograda*, no. 1-2 (18 March 1918), reprinted in *Kontinent*, no. 2 (1975), p. 397.
18. *Novyi put'*, January 26, 1918.
19. According to E. G. Gimpel'son, a Soviet economic historian, about half of the unemployed workers registered in 1918 were provided with jobs. This still leaves the rate of unemployment at over twenty percent (Gimpel'son, *Sovremennyi rabochii klass, 1918-1920* (Moscow: Nauka, 1974), p. 27.
20. S. G. Strumilin, *Statistiko-ekonomicheskie ocherki* (Moscow: Gosstatizdat, 1958), p. 258.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 273. It is worth mentioning that in order merely to maintain life functions, an adult person needs about two thousand calories.
22. Strumilin, *Statistiko-ekonomicheskie ocherki*, pp. 278-79.
23. *Izvestiia*, January 30, 1918. Also, on January 28, 1918, the committee of the Sestroretskii plant adopted a decision to lay off workers who had not been employed at the plant prior to the war (TsGA SPb, f. 1642, op. 14, d. 2a, l. 21). On March 10, 1918, the committee adopted another decision to lay off all workers who were not members of the trade union and who were considered "unnecessary" (TsGA SPb, f. 1642, op. 14, d. 2a, l. 138).
24. Gimpel'son, *Sovremennyi rabochii klass*, p. 27.
25. Strumilin, *Statistiko-ekonomicheskie ocherki*, p. 257.
26. *Za god*, p. 57.
27. *Pervyi Vserossiiskii s'ezd professional'nykh soiuzov, 7-14 ianvaria 1918 goda* (Moscow: VTSPS, 1918), p. 192.
28. See pp. 120-121 of this study.
29. V. Z. Drobizhev, *Glavnyi shtab sotsialisticheskoi promyshlennosti (Ocherki istorii VSNKh 1917-1932)* (Moscow: Mysl', 1966), p. 58.
30. *Novaia zhizn'*, November 18, 1917.

31. *Protokoly Vserossiiskogo uchreditel'nogo s"ezda soiuzov rabochikh-metalistov*, p. 87.
32. Alec Nove, *An Economic History of the USSR* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1972), p. 51.
33. Drobizhev, *Glavnyi shtab*, p. 63
34. S. R. Gershberg, "V. I. Lenin i sozдание VSNKh," *Voprosy istorii*, no. 7 (July 1958), p. 12.
35. Lenin, *PSS*, vol. 35, pp. 146-7.
36. TsGA SPb, f. 101, op. 1, d. 67, l. 2.
37. Lenin, *PSS*, vol. 36, p. 178.
38. Lozovskii was expelled from the Bolshevik party (which he had joined in August 1917) for the publication of two articles in the trade union journal *Professional'nyi vestnik* (see the draft resolution of the Bolshevik CC drawn up by Lenin that demanded the expulsion of Lozovskii in Lenin, *PSS*, vol. 35, pp. 213-14). In these articles ("K Vserossiiskomu s'ezdu professional'nykh soiuzov" ["Toward the All-Russian Congress of Trade Unions"] and particularly "Professional'nye soiuzy i Sovetskaia vlast'" ["Trade Unions and Soviet Power], *Professional'nyi vestnik*, no. 7 [1917], and no. 8 [December 20, 1917]), Lozovskii bitterly criticized Lenin's methods of suppressing democratic freedoms.
39. TsGA SPb, f. 1547, op. 15, d. 10, ll. 250 and 250 ob.
40. TsGA SPb, f. 1511, op. 163, d. 14, l. 64. In another episode, during the factory committee meeting at the Novyi Arsenal plant on June 27, 1918, a worker of the Novyi Arsenal plant, Mikhailov, referred to the factory committee as "*okhranka*" (secret police) (TsGA SPb, f. 1547, op. 15, d. 26, l. 291).
41. TsGA SPb, f. 1547, op. 15, d. 12, l. 44.
42. TsGA SPb, f. 101, op. 1, d. 67, l. 2.
43. See, for example, the speech by A. E. Vasil'ev during the factory committee meeting on December 11, 1917 (TsGA SPb, f. 101, op. 1, d. 62, l. 2).
44. See, for example, speeches by Egorov, Shvetsov, Vasil'ev (the committee's chairman), and Ogorodnikov at the meeting of the Putilov factory committee on November 27, 1917 (TsGA SPb, f. 101, op. 1, d. 15, ll. 163, 164, 165, 166).
45. The situation at the Novyi Arsenal plant provides a good illustration. The demand for additional payment was proposed originally by a Bolshevik member of the factory committee, Iakovlev, at the meeting of the plant's general

assembly on November 24, 1917, when the factory committees were in the process of gaining control over the plant (TsGA SPb, f. 1547, op. 15, d. 12, l. 36). However, at the December 22 meeting of the general assembly, the plant's committee suddenly reversed its position on this issue. The same member of the factory committee, Iakovlev, who had proposed the demand for additional payments in November, charged that the demand was illegal and disorganized the working class (TsGA SPb, f. 1547, op. 15, d. 12, l. 44). This change of attitude did not go unnoticed. One of the speakers at the meeting, Yevtushenko, observed that it had been Iakovlev who had originally pushed forward the demand and accused the latter of double dealing (TsGA SPb, f. 1547, op. 15, d. 12, l. 44 ob). One can explain this sudden reversal by political expediency. Moderate attitudes were quite strong at the plant after the October uprising. On October 28 and 31, meetings of the general assembly adopted resolutions in support of an all-socialist government (TsGA SPb, f. 1547, op. 15, d. 12, ll. 29 and 30). By encouraging workers to demand additional payments, the factory committee obviously tried to gain more support among workers, even when these payments were not economically justifiable. However, after it had established its control over the plant and no longer feared moderate influences, the committee, in accordance with the government's policy, withdrew

46. TsGA SPb, f. 1788, op. 33, d. 6, l. 6. The demand of the Putilov workers was not arbitrary. When trade unions began to negotiate new wage scales (*tarif*), they also stipulated that these wage scales will come into effect retroactively. For example, in the case of the metal workers' union the effective date of the new wage scales was to be March 7, 1917. (See, for example, the resolution of the meeting of shop committees together with representatives of the Central Bureau of the Metal Workers' Union and the factory committee, held at the Putilov plant on June 15, 1917 [TsGA SPb, f. 1788, op. 33, d. 6, l. 35].) In a way, the Bolsheviks, who had insisted throughout the pre-October period on improving workers' conditions, became victims of their own radicalism; now they had to satisfy the demand which they had supported throughout 1917 and now found impossible to fulfill.
47. TsGA SPb, f. 1788, op. 33, d. 6, l. 49.
48. See, for example, the resolution of the general assembly of the gun shop on December 8, 1917 (TsGA SPb, f. 1788, op. 33, d. 7, l. 90), resolutions of the same shop on December 16, 22, and 23, 1917 (TsGA SPb, f. 1788, op. 33, d. 7, l. 107), the minutes of the general assembly of February 5, 1918 (TsGA SPb, f. 1788, op. 33, d. 6, l. 20).
49. See the minutes of the factory committee meeting of the Peter the Great Arsenal plant on November 29, 1917, which refused to implement an earlier decision of the general assembly to pay increased wages (TsGA SPb, f. 1547, op. 15, d. 10, ll. 250 and 250 ob.). On December 1, the factory committee confirmed its opposition to wage increases (TsGA SPb, f. 1547, op. 15, d. 10, ll. 261 and 262 ob.). Also, see the minutes of the meeting of the general assembly of the Novyi Arsenal plant on November 24, 1917, which decided to follow other

- state plants in Petrograd in demanding wage increases (TsGA SPb, f. 1547, op. 15, d. 12, l. 36). This decision was confirmed at the December 4 meeting of the general assembly, which stressed that supplementary payments be made immediately (TsGA SPb, f. 1547, op. 15, d. 12, ll. 37, 37 ob., 38, and 38 ob.). There are numerous other resolutions regarding supplementary, severance, and other payments by various individual shops at the plant (TsGA SPb, f. 1547, op. 15, d. 12, ll. 137, 154, 155, 156; f. 1547, op. 15, d. 27, ll. 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197).
50. TsGA SPb, f. 101, op. 1, d. 15, ll. 161-71; and f. 1788, op. 33, d. 7, l. 85), especially the speech by Shvetsov and Grigoriev (TsGA SPb, f. 101, op. 1, d. 15, ll. 162, 163-64).
51. TsGA SPb, f. 101, op. 1, d. 15, l. 168.
52. See, for example, the speech by Glebov at the factory committee meeting on December 11, 1917 (TsGA SPb, f. 101, op. 1, d. 67, l. 7).
53. See, for example, the minutes of the factory committee meeting at the Peter the Great Arsenal plant on December 1, 1917 (TsGA SPb, f. 1547, op. 15, d. 10, l. 258), the minutes of the meeting of the factory committee at the Sestroretskii plant factory on January 11, 1918, and the order issued by the Sestroretskii factory committee at the end of March 1918 (TsGA SPB, f. 1642, op. 14, d. 2a, ll. 8, 60, 175).
54. TsGA SPb, f. 1642, op. 14, d. 2a, l. 157.
55. TsGA SPb, f. 1000, op. 2, d. 264, l. 291.
56. TsGA SPb, f. 1000, op. 2, d. 264, ll. 177-84.
57. See the letter from the Putilov worker, Sysoi Panenok, and the letter from Vasilii Kotoshkin, a delegate to the soviet conference of the Petrogradskaia Storona district (TsGA SPb, f. 1000, op. 2, d. 264, ll. 25 and 38).
58. TsGA SPb, f. 1788, op. 33, d. 16, l. 6.
59. TsGA SPb, f. 1788, op. 33, d. 6, l. 67 ob.
60. TsGA SPb, f. 1788, op. 33, d. 7, l. 157.
61. See, for example, the minutes of the two meetings at the Novyi Arsenal plant December 21 and December 23, 1918 (TsGA SPb, f. 1547, op. 15, d. 27, ll. 88 and 88 ob.); and the minutes of the meeting held at the Sestroretskii plant on January 19, 1918 (TsGA SPb, f. 1642, op. 14, d. 2a, l. 94). It is worth noting that at this last meeting, the chairman referred to the Red Guards as "enemies of workers." In their reports to the meeting of the general assembly of the Novyi Arsenal plant on June 19, 1918, workers who had been delegated to bring food to the plant complained that the roads were in terrible condition, that commis-

- sars demanded bribes, and the Red Guards robbed travelers (TsGA SPb, f. 1547, op. 15, d. 27, l. 63).
62. TsGA SPb, f. 1642, op. 14, d. 2, ll. 18, 19.
63. See TsGA SPb, f. 1547, op. 15, d. 26, l. 180. One can find a brief discussion of events in Kolpino in Brovkin, *The Mensheviks After October*, pp. 176-85.
64. See, for example, the health certificate no. 85 issued by the factory committee of the Novyi Parviainen plant to Ivanov who was in charge of food distribution at the plant (TsGA SPb, f. 1633, op. 14, d. 1, l. 14).
65. TsGA SPb, f. 1788, op. 33, d. 6, l. 13.
66. TsGA SPb, f. 1788, op. 33, d. 6, l. 14.
67. TsGA SPb, f. 1788, op. 33, d. 6, ll. 154 and 154 ob.
68. TsGA SPb, f. 1547, op. 15, d. 27, l. 23. Several subsequent meetings of the general assembly adopted anti-Bolshevik resolutions, for example, on April 25 and May 18, 1918 (TsGA SPb, f. 1547, op. 15, d. 27, ll. 36, 51-52 ob.). The meeting of the general assembly on May 23 rejected a pro-Bolshevik resolution (TsGA SPb, f. 1547, op. 15, d. 27, l. 56). The meeting of the general assembly on June 19, 1918, solidly defeated the Bolshevik platform for the elections to the soviets. The results of the voting were the following: 262 votes for the SR platform, 74 votes for the Bolsheviks, and 21 votes for the left SRs (TsGA SPb, f. 1547, op. 15, d. 27, l. 64 ob.). See also resolutions adopted on June 3, 1918 (TsGA SPb, f. 1547, op. 15, d. 27, ll. 72 and 72 ob.).
69. The resolution demanded the immediate abolition of the death penalty and the disarmament of the armed bands that robbed and shot workers and peasants; condemned the treaty of Brest-Litovsk and the presence at the Fifth Congress of Soviets (held in July 1918) of representatives of "Austrian, German, and Anglo-French capital"; protested the arrests of over half of the delegates to the Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, an unfair representation at this Congress, and the disbandment of the peasant soviets in the Novgorod, Pskov, Viatka, and other regions; demanded that the government terminate its policies designed to sow divisions between workers and peasants (TsGA SPb, f. 1788, op. 33, d. 7, ll. 157 and 157 ob.).
70. See, for example, the speech by a Bolshevik, Filippov, who argued that workers should not focus on the food issue and should not support the anti-Bolshevik resolution passed earlier by the Putilov workers (TsGA SPb, f. 1547, op. 15, d. 27, l. 38).
71. TsGA SPb, f. 1547, op. 15, d. 27, ll. 38-40.
72. TsGA SPb, f. 1547, op. 15, d. 27, ll. 13.

73. TsGA SPb, f. 101, op. 1, d. 45, l. 21.
74. TsGA SPb, f. 1547, op. 15, d. 29, l. 21.
75. TsGA SPb, f. 1642, op. 14, d. 2, ll. 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, and 24.
76. TsGA SPb, f. 1642, op. 14, d. 12, l. 74.
77. TsGA SPb, f. 1547, op. 15, d. 27, l. 41.
78. TsGA SPb, f. 1547, op. 15, d. 10, ll. 261 and 262 ob.
79. TsGA SPb, f. 1547, op. 15, d. 27, ll. 13 and 13 ob.
80. TsGA SPb, f. 1547, op. 15, d. 27, l. 16 ob.
81. TsGA SPb, f. 101, op. 1, d. 15, l. 166.
82. Ibid.
83. TsGA SPb, f. 101, op. 1, d. 67, l. 2.
84. TsGA SPb, f. 1788, op. 33, d. 16, l. 6.
85. Ibid.
86. TsGA SPb, f. 1511, op. 163, d. 15, ll. 140 and 140 ob.
87. TsGA SPb, f. 101, op. 1, d. 40, l. 36.
88. TsGA SPb, f. 1511, op. 163, d. 15, ll. 31, 44, 179.
89. TsGA SPb, f. 1192, op. 33, d. 8, l. 78.
90. TsGA SPb, f. 1788, op. 33, d. 15, l. 31.
91. TsGA SPb, f. 101, op. 1, d. 40, l. 53.
92. It is worth remembering that payment for the time spent at plant meetings was a major demand that was frequently advanced and successfully fought for by workers and factory committees during the pre-October period.
93. TsGA SPb, f. 1788, op. 33, d. 15, l. 13.
94. TsGA SPb, f. 1788, op. 33, d. 15, l. 27.
95. TsGA SPb, f. 1788, op. 33, d. 15, l. 62.
96. See, for example, the order sent by the commissar of labor, Shliapnikov, on March 6, 1918, via telegraph (TsGA SPb, f. 1788, op. 33, d. 5, l. 42), the order

issued by the All-Russian Metalworkers' Union on March 18, 1918, and the circular letter of the union leadership of April 1, 1918 (TsGA SPb, f. 1788, op. 33, d. 4, ll. 4 and 6).

97. TsGA SPb, f. 1192, op. 30, d. 8, l. 67.
98. See the committee's resolution of December 19, 1917 (TsGA SPb, f. 1192, op. 30, d. 8, l. 84).
99. TsGA SPb, f. 1788, op. 33, d. 16, l. 7.
100. TsGA SPb, f. 1788, op. 33, d. 15, l. 50.
101. TsGA SPb, f. 1788, op. 33, d. 15, l. 78.
102. TsGA SPb, f. 1547, op. 15, d. 26, l. 178.
103. TsGA SPb, f. 1642, op. 14, d. 8, l. 143.
104. TsGA SPb, f. 1511, op. 163, d. 15, l. 104.
105. TsGA SPb, f. 1788, op. 33, d. 16, l. 7.
106. TsGA SPb, f. 1788, op. 33, d. 15, l. 31.
107. *Cherezvychainoe sobranie upolnomochennykh*, pp. 391-92.
108. TsGA SPb, f. 1788, op. 33, d. 15, l. 34.
109. TsGA SPb, f. 1642, op. 14, d. 2a, l. 134.
110. TsGA SPb, f. 101, op. 1, d. 15, ll. 164 and 166.
111. See, for example, speeches by Egorov, Vasil'ev, Grigor'ev, and Baranovskii (TsGA SPb, f. 101, op. 1, d. 15, ll. 163, 164, 165, and 167).
112. TsGA SPb, f. 101, op. 1, d. 15, ll. 168 and 169.
113. TsGA SPb, f. 101, op. 1, d. 67, l. 10.
114. TsGA SPb, f. 47, op. 1, d. 4, l. 11.
115. TsGA SPb, f. 47, op. 1, d. 4, l. 14.
116. TsGA SPb, f. 1192, op. 30, d. 8, l. 62.
117. TsGA SPb, f. 1547, op. 15, d. 27, l. 41.

118. TsGA SPb, f. 1547, op. 15, d. 27, l. 20.
119. *Cherezvychainoe sobranie upolnomochennykh*, pp. 389-90.
120. Ibid., pp. 390-91, 407-09, passim.
121. Ibid., pp. 407-08.
122. Brovkin, *The Mensheviks After October*, pp. 249-53.
123. M. S. Bernshtam, ed., *Nezavisimoe rabochee dvizhenie v 1918 godu: dokumenty i materialy* (Paris: YMCA Press, 1981), pp. 113-14, 119-22.
124. Ibid., p. 32.
125. Soviet officials put the number of killed in this incident at twenty-one. The moderate socialists disputed this figure and claimed that the number was much higher (ibid., p. 30).
126. TsGA SPb, f. 1000, op. 2, d. 264, ll. 77-78.
127. See the minutes of the factory committee meeting of the Novyi Arsenal plant on May 10 and 13, 1918 (TsGA SPb, f. 1547, op. 15, d. 26, ll. 177, 177 ob., and 180).
128. TsGA SPb, f. 1547, op. 15, d. 27, l. 42 ob.
129. Bernshtam, *Nezavisimoe rabochee dvizhenie*, p. 32.
130. Ibid., pp. 28-30.
131. TsGA SPb, f. 1000, op. 2, d. 264, ll. 177-84.
132. TsGA SPb, f. 101, op. 1, d. 15, l. 166.
133. See Lenin's appeal "K naseleniiu" ("To the Population"), PSS, vol. 35, p. 66.
134. Ibid., pp. 192-93, passim (italics in the original).
135. Ibid., pp. 203-4, passim.

NOTES 6

1. In some instances the low morale resulted in incidents of anti-Semitism perpetrated by individual factory committees. *Novaia zhizn'* reported one such incident, which occurred at the leather factory in the city of Bobruisk where the factory committee decided to dismiss all Jews employed at that enterprise. Only the intervention of the city soviet prevented the implementation of this decision (*Novaia zhizn'*, January 5, 1918).

2. The integration of Red Guards into the Red Army started at the beginning of 1918. A new draft statute of the Red Guards, which had been promulgated in January, directed all Red Guard units "to reorganize immediately as units of the Red Army" (V. I. Startsev, *Ocherki po istorii petrogradskoi Krasnoi gvardii i rabochei militsii [mart 1917-aprel' 1918]* [Moscow-Leningrad: Nauka, 1965], p. 234). According to John Keep, by the spring of 1918 all Red Guard units had already been incorporated into the regular army units (Keep, *The Russian Revolution*, p. 284).
3. *Cherezvychainoe sobranie upolnomochennykh*, pp. 393-94.
4. Lenin, *PSS*, vol. 35, p. 274, *passim*.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 275-76. The congress took place on January 10-18, 1918.
6. Getzler, *Martov*, p. 158.
7. Ascher, *Pavel Axelrod*, p. 335.
8. Getzler, *Martov*, p. 158.
9. B. I. Nikolaevsky, *Men'sheviki v dni oktiabr'skogo pereverota*, paper no. 8 (New York: Inter-University Project on the History of the Menshevik Movement, June 1962), p. 3.
10. Haimson, ed., *The Mensheviks*, p. 47.
11. Nikolaevsky, *Men'sheviki v dni oktiabr'skogo perevorota*, p. 3.
12. Ascher, *Pavel Axelrod*, p. 325.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 335.
14. Nikolaevsky, *Men'sheviki v dni oktiabr'skogo perevorota*, pp. 4-5, 42. The fact that the party decided to participate in the *Vikzhel'* negotiations reflected the growing influence of this new majority.
15. Haimson, "The Mensheviks after the October Revolution: Part 1," pp. 458-59.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 463.
17. A good discussion of the congress's proceedings is in Haimson, "The Mensheviks after the October Revolution. Part 2: The Extraordinary Party Congress," *The Russian Review*, vol. 39, no. 2 (April 1980); and also in Vladimir N. Brovkin, *The Mensheviks After October*, pp. 39-48.
18. Haimson, "The Mensheviks after the October Revolution. Part 2: The Extraordinary Party Congress," pp. 193-94, *passim*; Brovkin, *The Mensheviks After October*, p. 46.

19. Grigorii Aronson, *K istorii pravogo techeniia sredi men'shevikov*, paper no. 4 (New York: Inter-University Project on the History of the Menshevik Movement, August 1960), p. 46.
20. Garvi, *Professional'nye soiuzy Rossii*, pp. 28-29, and 128-29.
21. See *Professional'nyi vestnik*, nos. 7 and 8 (December 1917).
22. Quoted from Brinton, *The Bolsheviks and Workers' Control*, p. 28. On Lenin's reaction see Lenin, *PSS*, vol. 35, p. 214.
23. *Pervyi Vserossiiskii s"ezd professional'nykh soiuzov*, p. 45.
24. Such assessment of the situation was quite common in the Menshevik party at the time. Axelrod, for example, considered that the life of the Bolshevik regime "will be short; its days or weeks are numbered" (Ascher, *Axelrod*, p. 333). Dan also concluded that "the Bolsheviks will either have to cease controlling the government, or—in one sense or another—stop being 'Communists'" (ibid., p. 374).
25. Cf. Brinton, *The Bolsheviks and Workers' Control*, p. 33.
26. *Pervyi Vserossiiskii s"ezd professional'nykh soiuzov*, p. 11.
27. Ibid., p. 80.
28. Milonov, ed., *Putevoditel'*, p. 93.
29. *Pervyi Vserossiiskii s"ezd professional'nykh soiuzov*, p. 11.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid., p. 72.
32. Ibid.
33. Milonov, ed., *Putevoditel'*, p. 92.
34. Ibid., pp. 91, 93.
35. Ibid., p. 103.
36. Ibid., p. 101. This particular paragraph was written by Lozovskii.
37. Ibid., p. 102.
38. Garvi, *Professional'nye soiuzy Rossii*, p. 43.

39. Ibid.
40. *Izvestiia*, January 21, 1918.
41. Cf. one of the more recent Soviet studies on the subject Blinov's *Tsentral'nyi sovet fabzavkomov Petrograda*.
42. *Protokoly Vserossiiskogo uchereditel'nogo s"ezda soiuzov rabochikh-metalistov*, p. 94-95.
43. Cf. Lenin's speech at the Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets on January 11 (Lenin, *PSS*, vol. 35, pp. 261-79).
44. On December 29, the CCFC elected its new presidium and Zhiotov became its new chairman (Blinov, *Tsentral'nyi sovet fabzavkomov Petrograda*, p. 197).
45. *Izvestiia*, January 25, 1918.
46. Ibid. (emphasis added).
47. *Novaia zhizn'*, January 26, 1918.
48. *Izvestiia*, January 28, 1918.
49. Pankratova, *Fabzavkomy v bor'be*, p. 264.
50. *Novaia zhizn'*, January 26, 1916. It is interesting that the account in the government newspaper *Izvestiia* toned down the radical response of the delegates. It reported that the conference merely directed local factory committees to discuss the subordination, when the delegates in fact rejected it (*Izvestiia*, January 28, 1918).
51. *Izvestiia*, January 28, 1918.
52. *Novaia zhizn'*, January 29, 1918.
53. *Novaia zhizn'*, January 26, 1918.
54. *Novaia zhizn'*, January 29, 1918.
55. Pankratova, *Fabzavkomy v bor'be*, p. 265.
56. Zhiotov, "Vladimir Il'ich i planovoe upravlenie promyshlennost'iu," *Lenin v 1917 godu*, pp. 267-68.
57. Lenin, *PSS*, vol. 37, p. 87.
58. Lenin, *PSS*, vol. 35, p. 282.

59. Lenin, *PSS*, vol. 36, p. 184.
60. *Ibid.*, p. 358.
61. See Lenin's letter "On Hunger" in *PSS*, vol. 37, pp. 357-64.
62. *Ibid.*, p. 189.
63. Lenin, *PSS*, vol. 36, p. 160.
64. *Ibid.*, p. 590.
65. Bataeva, et al., eds., *Profsoiuzy SSSR*, vol. 2, pp. 105-06.
66. *Leninskii sbornik*, vol. XXXVII, p. 72.
67. Lenin, *PSS*, vol. 35, pp. 274-76.
68. It is worth mentioning that by early 1918 there were not many entrepreneurs left to supervise; many of them found it completely impossible to operate under such difficult conditions and either fled the country or stopped managing their enterprises.
69. Dallin, "Narodnoe khoziaistvo i sotsializm," *Za god*, p. 58. This decision was later confirmed by the First All-Russian Congress of Councils of National Economy in May 1918 (see *Rezoliutsii Vserossiiskogo s"ezda sovetov narodnogo khoziaistva*, p. 18).
70. Gershberg, "V. I. Lenin i sozдание VSNKh," *Voprosy istorii*, no. 7 (July 1958), p. 12.
71. See the minutes of the Bolshevik CC meeting of January 24, 1918 (*Protokoly TsK*, p. 193).
72. *Sed'moi ekstrennyi s"ezd RKP(b). Mart 1918: stenograficheskii otchet* (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1962), p. 189.
73. *Ibid.* A note on the letter read: "two tickets, consultative" (*ibid.*).
74. *Ibid.*, p. 191. The decision was announced at the opening session of the congress on March 6 (*ibid.*, p. 3).
75. Pankratova, *Fabzavkomy v bor'be*, p. 266.
76. *Ibid.*, p. 266.
77. Blinov, *Tsentral'nyi sovet fabzavkomov Petrograda*, p. 218.

78. Ibid.
79. The following very brief account of the origin and early history of the shop steward assemblies disagrees with the interpretation of the origin of the movement in Vladimir Brovkin's book on the Mensheviks after the October takeover. Brovkin considers that assemblies emerged as a result of "the chaos during the evacuation of Petrograd industries at the time of the brief German offensive in February 1918" (Brovkin, *The Mensheviks After October*, p. 162). Not only does the available evidence disagree with this dating, but it is also hard to imagine that a major movement could emerge without any prior evolution.
80. See, for example, Grinevich, *Professional'noe dvizhenie rabochikh v Rossii*, p. 33, and Gessen and Gershenzon, eds., *Khrestomatiia po istorii rabocheho klassa*, vol. 2, p. 155.
81. Grinevich, *Professional'noe dvizhenie rabochikh v Rossii*, p. 33.
82. Schwarz, *The Russian Revolution of 1905*, pp. 136, 335-38.
83. Grinevich, *Professional'noe dvizhenie rabochikh v Rossii*, p. 82. It is worth noting that during that period many unions led a semilegal existence and could not organize general meetings of workers. Shop steward assemblies were a convenient way of circumventing the existing laws and establishing a link between union leadership and workers.
84. Ibid.
85. Bonnell, *Roots of Rebellion*, p. 240.
86. Grinevich, *Professional'noe dvizhenie rabochikh v Rossii*, p. 82.
87. Gessen and Gershenzon, eds., *Khrestomatiia po istorii rabocheho klassa*, vol. 2, p. 156.
88. Ibid.
89. Ibid.
90. A. Pankratova, *Fabzavkomy Rossii*, p. 117.
91. Victoria Bonnell categorically states that "only unionized workers in a single industry or occupation elected delegates to the city union councils" (Bonnell, *Roots of Rebellion*, p. 241). While such a procedure for electing shop stewards was certainly used in some unions (e.g., metal and textile workers' unions in Petersburg and Moscow), it was not used in others. For example, all workers employed at printing enterprises participated in elections of shop stewards. Bakers, tailors, shoemakers also elected delegates to their assemblies in a similar manner (Grinevich, *Professional'noe dvizhenie rabochikh v Rossii*, p. 83; cf. also Gessen and Gershenzon, eds., *Khrestomatiia po istorii rabocheho klassa*, vol. 2, pp. 157-8).

92. Grinevich, *Professional'noe dvizhenie rabochikh v Rossii*, p. 33.
93. See the "Statute on Factory Deputies" presented by the council of printers' deputies in Petersburg to employers and an account of the speech by a delegate from the Donets basin at the First Conference of Metalworkers of the Moscow Industrial Region, held in April 1906 (Pankratova, *Fabzavkomy Rossii*, pp. 113-14, 116-17).
94. Grinevich, *Professional'noe dvizhenie rabochikh v Rossii*, pp. 29, 33.
95. Cf. Bonnell, *Roots of Rebellion*, p. 242; Gessen and Gershenzon, eds., *Khrestomatiia po istorii rabocheho klassa*, vol. 2, p. 157.
96. Ibid., p 240.
97. Grinevich, *Professional'noe dvizhenie rabochikh v Rossii*, p. 83.
98. Ibid. (italics in the original).
99. Ibid. (italics in the original).
100. Pankratova, *Fabzavkomy Rossii*, p. 122.
101. Gessen and Gershenzon, eds., *Khrestomatiia po istorii rabocheho klassa*, vol. 2, p. 157.
102. Ibid., pp. 157-58.
103. *Delo*, no. 3 (April 14, 1918), p. 14.
104. G. Ia. Aronson, *Dvizhenie upolnomochennykh ot rabochikh fabrik i zavodov v 1918 godu* (New York: Inter-University Project on the History of the Menshevik Movement, 1960), p. 5.
105. S. Volin, *Deiatel'nost' men'shevikov v profsoiuzakh pri sovetskoii vlasti* (New York: Inter-University Project on the History of the Menshevik Movement, 1962), p. 56.
106. Aronson, *Dvizhenie upolnomochennykh*, p. 7.
107. Volin, *Deiatel'nost' men'shevikov v profsoiuzakh*, p. 56. Bernshtam cites a slightly larger figure of ten meetings altogether (Bernshtam, *Nezavisimoe rabochee dvizhenie v 1918 godu*, p. 95).
108. Volin, *Deiatel'nost' men'shevikov v profsoiuzakh*, p. 57.
109. G. Ia. Aronson, "Stranitsy proshlogo," *Protiv techeniia* (New York: n.p., 1952), p. 72.

110. Ibid., p. 71.
111. Volin, *Deiatel'nost' men'shevikov v profsoiuzakh*, p. 57.
112. *Delo*, no. 3 (April 14, 1918), p. 14.
113. *Cherezvychainoe sobranie upolnomochennykh*, no. 1-2, p. 411.
114. Volin, *Deiatel'nost' men'shevikov v profsoiuzakh*, p. 57.
115. *Cherezvychainoe sobranie upolnomochennykh*, no. 1-2, p. 409.
116. Ibid., p. 393.
117. Quoted in G. Ia. Aronson, et al., eds., *Martov i ego blizkie* (New York: n. p., 1959), p. 63.
118. *Cherezvychainoe sobranie upolnomochennykh*, no. 1-2, p. 413.
119. Ibid., pp. 400-01.
120. Ibid., p. 388.
121. Bernshtam, *Nezavisimoe rabochee dvizhenie v 1918 godu*, p. 153.
122. Aronson, "Stranitsy proshlogo," p. 71.
123. Ibid., pp. 71-72, passim.
124. Ibid., p. 72.
125. Bernshtam, *Nezavisimoe rabochee dvizhenie v 1918 godu*, p. 279.
126. V. I. Nosach, *Profsoiuzy Sovetskoi Rossii v gody grazhdanskoi voiny: 1918-1920* (Moscow: Profizdat, 1978), pp. 23-24.
127. Aronson, "Stranitsy proshlogo," p. 76.
128. See a statement by the Organizational Bureau in the newspaper *Edinstvo*, May 1, 1918. The idea of such a congress seems to be a revival of Axelrod's plan of 1906 for a workers' congress (cf. A. Ascher, ed., *The Mensheviks in the Russian Revolution* [London: Thames & Hudson, 1976], p. 19).
129. Aronson, "Stranitsy proshlogo," p. 76.
130. See the typescript copy of this letter in the Nikolaevsky Archive, box 44, file 33, p. 3.

131. See an open letter "K arestu rabochego soveshchaniia" written by the delegates who were confined to the Taganka prison (typescript copy, Nikolaevsky Archive, box 5, file 2, pp. 7-10).
132. See an open letter from the arrested delegates in Aronson, *Dvizhenie upolnomochennykh*, pp. 28-30; also Bernshtam, *Nezavisimoe rabochee dvizhenie v 1918 godu*, pp. 289-93.
133. Aronson, "Stranitsy proshlogo," p. 77. In his memoirs, N. Begletsov, a participant of the conference of shop stewards in Moscow, described the treatment of the arrested delegates by the Bolshevik security police (see Bernshtam, ed., *Nezavisimoe rabochee dvizhenie v 1918 godu*, pp. 295-305).
134. Aronson, "Stranitsy proshlogo," p. 76.
135. Volin, *Deiatel'nost' men'shevikov v profsoiuzakh*, p. 58.
136. Getzler, *Martov*, p. 173.
137. Ascher, *Pavel Axelrod*, p. 361.
138. Ibid., p. 361.
139. Ibid., p. 360.
140. *Vos'moi s'ezd RKP(b). Mart 1919 goda: protokoly* (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1958), p. 403.
141. *Rezoliutsii Vtorogo Vserossiiskogo s'ezda sovetov narodnogo khoziaistva* (Moscow: Redaktsionno-izdatel'skii otdel VSNKh, 1919), pp. 35-36.
142. Ibid., pp. 38-39, 41-42.
143. G. Ia. Aronson, "Sud'ba professional'nogo soiuz sluzhashchikh," Nikolaevsky Archive, box 174, file 10, pp. 20-21.
144. Resolutions proposed by the Bolshevik leadership at the Second All-Russian Congress of Trade Unions (January 16-25, 1919) were adopted by an overwhelming majority (see Milonov, ed., *Putevoditel'*, pp. 159-213).
145. In its 1923 communique to local party committees, the Menshevik Central Committee characterized the role of trade unions during the civil war as nothing short of "shameful" (see the typescript copy of the communique in Nikolaevsky Archive, box 5, file 12).
146. Ibid., pp. 159-60.
147. Aronson, "Sud'ba professional'nogo soiuz sluzhashchikh," Nikolaevsky Archive, box 174, file 10, p. 7.

148. Lenin, *PSS*, vol. 36, pp. 212-13.
149. *Ibid.*, p. 590.
150. *Leninskii sbornik*, vol. XXXVII (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1970), p. 72.
151. Lenin, *PSS*, vol. 37, p. 189.
152. Bataeva et al., eds., *Profsoiuzy SSSR*, vol. 2, pp. 105-6.
153. Lenin, *PSS*, vol. 36, p. 591.
154. See a typescript copy of the letter in Nikolaevsky Archive, box 44, file 30, p. 2.
155. *Ibid.*
156. *Desiatyi s"ezd RKP(b). Mart 1921 goda: stenograficheskii otchet* (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1963), p. 538.
157. *Ibid.*, pp. 617-18.

CONCLUSION

1. One should mention in this respect the seminal essay by Leopold Haimson "The Problem of Social Stability in Urban Russia." See also, Zelnik's *Labor and Society in Tsarist Russia*; Bonnell's *Roots of Rebellion*; Smith's *Red Petrograd*; Koenker's *Moscow Workers and the 1917 Revolution*; Henry Reichman's *Railwaymen and Revolution: Russia, 1905* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); and Tim McDaniel's *Autocracy, Capitalism, and Revolution in Russia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).
2. See, for example, John Keep's *The Russian Revolution*, Marc Ferro's *October 1917*, and Tim McDaniel's *Autocracy, Capitalism, and Revolution in Russia*.
3. McDaniel, *Autocracy, Capitalism, and Revolution in Russia*, p. 402.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 335 and 337.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
6. Cf. Sheila Fitzpatrick's critique in her "New Perspectives on the Civil War" (Diane Koenker et al., eds., *Party, State, and Society in the Russian Civil War. Explorations in Social History* [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989]).
7. Among the studies that point to diverse interests, political sophistication, and even literary talent of "conscious" workers are Reginald Zelnik's *A Radical Worker in Tsarist Russia. The Autobiography of Semen Ivanovich Kanatchikov* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986); Victoria Bonnell, ed., *The Russian*

Worker. Life and Labor under the Tsarist Regime (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); and Michael Share, *The Central Workers' Circle of St. Petersburg, 1889-1894: A Case Study of the "Workers Intelligentsia"* (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1987).

8. McDaniel concludes that the labor movement was dominated by "the sentiment in favor of a unitary will" of the working class, which helps to explain the desire on the part of the unions (McDaniel, *Autocracy, Capitalism, and Revolution in Russia*, p. 395-6). Yet one should be cautious in applying this view to the rivalry between the factory committees and the trade unions since the former—except maybe for a small group of anarcho-syndicalists—did not seem to have had a similar desire to "devour" the trade unions.
9. A similar line of analysis is suggested in Hasegawa's *The February Revolution*, Rex Wade's *Red Guards and Workers' Militias in the Russian Revolution* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984), and Keep's *The Russian Revolution*.
10. See, for example, studies by Sylvana Malle, *The Economic Organization of War Communism*; Thomas Remington, *Building Socialism in Bolshevik Russia*; and Carmen Sirianni, *Workers' Control and Socialist Democracy*.
11. Mandel writes: "... the working class had been eliminated as an independent political force by the economic crisis and civil war and the removal of its most vital elements to meet the needs of the new state apparatus. It was this development more than anything else that conditioned the rise of a new absolute state, against which the eventually reconstituted working class of the 1920s was unable effectively to assert itself" (Mandel, *The Petrograd Workers and the Soviet Seizure of Power*, p. 419). Smith has also argued that immediately following the October insurrection the Bolsheviks were "intent on creating democratic socialism" but that the need to rebuild the declining economy forced them to resort to the tried "capitalist methods" and eventually to the compulsion of workers by the centralized state (Smith, *Red Petrograd*, p. 264).
12. Smith asserts that "It was Lenin's draft which was taken as the basis for the decree on workers' control" (*Red Petrograd*, p. 210).
13. See Haimson's article "The Problem of Social Stability in Urban Russia," and the more recent contribution by Diane Koenker, *Moscow Workers and the 1917 Revolution*.
14. See Arthur Mendel "On Interpreting the Fate of Imperial Russia" in the volume edited by Theofanis Stavrou *Russia Under the Last Tsar* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971).
15. Cf. Jonathan Frankel's "1917: The Problem of Alternatives" in Edith R. Frankel et al., eds., *Revolution in Russia: Reassessments of 1917* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

16. See McDaniel, *Autocracy, Capitalism, and Revolution in Russia*, p. 7.
17. Ibid., p. 7. It seems that McDaniel's interpretation owes a lot more than he is willing to recognize to Haimson's insightful essay "The Problem of Social Stability in Urban Russia," where Haimson also talks about two types of antagonisms—social and political—as having a decisive impact on the course of the Russian revolution.
18. Ibid, p. 9.
19. Martov's letter to Axelrod suggests that such a course was not a farfetched possibility. In this letter Martov writes: "It is my deep conviction that if our influential leaders exerted just a little bit of pressure, the right SRs, the popular socialists (NS), and even Kerensky himself would agree to experiment with a purely democratic [all-socialist] government and a very simple program of the immediate opening of peace negotiations, the immediate convocation of the Constituent Assembly, and the fulfillment of the promise to transfer land to the land committees" (a typescript version of the letter from Iu. O. Martov to P. B. Axelrod, of November 19, 1917, in Nikolaevskii Archive of the Hoover Institution Archives, box 44, file 20, pp. 2-3).
20. Jean-Paul Sartre, "Materialism and Revolution," *Literary and Philosophical Essays* (New York: Criterion Books, 1955), pp. 185-239.

Selected Bibliography

PRIMARY SOURCES

1. Archives

- Boris I. Nikolaevsky Collection, Archives of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford, California:
- Aronson, Grigorii. "Sud'ba professional'nogo soiuza sluzhashchikh," box 174, file 10.
- "K arestu rabocheho soveshchaniia," box 5, file 2.
- Letters to P. B. Axelrod, box 5, file 32; and box 44, files 20, 21, 28, 33.
- "Mestnym komitetam RSDRP," a communique from the Menshevik Central Committee to local party committees, January 1923, box 5, file 12.
- Resolutions of the Menshevik Central Committee, box 5, files 2, 26, 53.
- Schwarz, Solomon. "Fabrichno-zavodskie komitety i profsoiuzy v Rossii v pervye gody revoliutsii," unpublished manuscript, box 137, file 4.
- . "Materialy o razvitií programmy ekonomicheskoi politiki v 1917-1918 godakh," box 137, file 3.
- "Zheleznodorozhniki v russkoi revoliutsii," box 137, file 6.
- Tsentrál'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Sankt-Peterburga:
fondy 47, 101, 1000, 1192, 1511, 1516, 1547, 1633, 1642, 1788, 1790, 1862, 2130, 4599, 4602, 7384

2. Documents

- Akhapkin, Iu. A., ed. *Dekrety Velikogo Oktiabria*. Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1977.
- Anikeyev, V. V., ed. *Perepiska sekretariata TsK RSDRP(b) s mestnymi partiinymi organizatsiiami: sbornik dokumentov (mart-oktiabr' 1917)*. Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1967.
- Ascher, Abraham, ed. *The Mensheviks in the Russian Revolution*. London: Thames & Hudson, 1976.
- Astrakhantseva, I. F., ed. *Dokumenty i materialy po istorii Velikoi Oktiabr'skoi sotsialisticheskoi revoliutsii*. Moscow: 1969.
- Baevskii, D. A. "Tsennaia publikatsiia o pervykh shagakh sotsialisticheskogo preobrazovaniia ekonomiki SSSR." *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, no. 3 (May-June 1955), pp. 213-17.
- Bataeva, T. V., et al., eds. *Profsoiuzy SSSR: dokumenty i materialy*. 4 vols. Moscow: Profizdat, 1963.
- Bernshtam, M. S., ed. *Nezavisimoe rabochee dvizhenie v 1918 godu: dokumenty i materialy*. Paris: YMCA Press, 1981.
- Bol'sheviki Petrograda v 1917 godu: khronika sobytii*. Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1957.
- Bone, Ann, trans. *The Bolsheviks and the October Revolution: Minutes of the CC of the RSDRP (bolsheviks): August 1917-February 1918*. London: Pluto Press, 1974.
- Broditskii, S. N., and Mitel'man, M. I., eds. *Rabochii kontrol' i natsionalizatsiia promyshlennykh predpriatii Petrograda v 1917-1919 godu*. Leningrad: n.p., 1947.

- Browder, R. P., and Kerensky, A. F., eds. *The Russian Provisional Government, 1917*. 3 vols. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961.
- Chugaev, D. A., et al., eds. *Petrogradskii voenno-revoliutsionnyi komitet. Dokumenty i materialy*. 3 vols. Moscow: Nauka, 1966.
- Daniels, Robert V., ed. *A Documentary History of Communism*. 2 vols. New York: Vintage Books, 1960.
- "Dekrety i postanovleniia po narodnomu khoziaistvu." *Narodnoe khoziaistvo*, no. 1 (Mart 1918), pp. 23-34.
- Dekrety Sovetskoi vlasti*. 9 vols. Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1957-1978.
- Desiatyi s"ezd RKP(b). Mart 1921 goda: stenograficheskii otchet*. Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1963.
- Dewar, Margaret, ed. *Labour Policy in the USSR: 1917-1928*. New York and London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1956.
- Drobizhev, V. Z., ed. *Upravleniie narodnym khoziaistvom SSSR: 1917-1940. Sbornik dokumentov*. Moscow: Ekonomika, 1968.
- Ekonomicheskoe polozhenie Rossii nakanune Velikoi Oktiabr'skoi sotsialisticheskoi revoliutsii: dokumenty i materialy. Mart-oktiabr' 1917 g.* Edited by A. L. Sidorov, et al. 3 vols. Moscow-Leningrad: Nauka, 1957-1967.
- Fabrichno-zavodskie komitety Petrograda v 1917 godu: protokoly*. Moscow: Nauka, 1979.
- Fabrichno-zavodskie komitety Petrograda v 1917 godu: protokoly*. Moscow: Nauka, 1982.
- Gessen, Iu., and Gershenzon, E., eds. *Khrestomatiia po istorii rabocheho klassa i professional'nogo dvizheniia v Rossii*. 2 vols. Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Lengubprofsoiuza, 1925.
- Keep, J. L. H., ed. *The Debate on Soviet Power. Minutes of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of Soviets: Second Convocation. October 1917-January 1918*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979.
- Korablev, Iu. I., ed. *Rabochee dvizheniie v Petrograde v 1912-1917 g.: dokumenty i materialy*. Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1958.
- Kostormarov G. D. and Malakhovskii, Vl., eds. *Iz istorii moskovskoi rabochei Krasnoi gvardii: materialy i dokumenty*. Moscow: Gosizdat RSFSR "Moskovskii rabochii," 1930.
- Lenin, V. I. *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*. 5th ed. 55 vols. Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1958-1965.
- Leninskii sbornik*. 39 vols. Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1924-1980.
- Listovki peterburgskikh bol'shevikov*. 3 vols. Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1939.
- Meller, V. L., and Pankratova, A. M., eds. *Rabochee dvizhenie v 1917 godu*. Moscow-Leningrad: Gosizdat, 1926.
- Milonov, Iu., ed. *Putevoditel' po rezoliutsiiam vserossiiskikh s"ezdov i konferentsii professional'nykh soiuzov*. Moscow: VTsSPS, 1924.
- Nivel'son, S., ed. *Moskovskii sovet professional'nykh soiuzov (protokoly)*. Moscow: Trud i Kniga, 1927.
- Oktiabr'skaia revoliutsiia i fabzavkomy*. Edited by P. N. Amosov et al. 2 parts. Moscow: VTsSPS, 1927.
- Osipov, V. A., and Sukhrev, G. I., eds. *1917 god v Saratovskoi gubernii. Sbornik dokumentov (fevral' 1917-dekabr' 1918 gg.* Saratov: Saratovskoe knizhnoe izdatelstvo, 1957.

- Pervyi Vserossiiskii s"ezd professional'nykh soizov, 7-14 ianvaria 1918 goda.* Moscow: VTSPS, 1918.
- "Protokoly i rezoliutsii Biuro TsK RSDRP(b) (mart 1917 g.)." Reprint. *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, no. 3 (1962), pp. 134-58.
- Protokoly Pervoi Vserossiiskoi tarifnoi konferentsii soiuzov metallistov i konferentsii soiuzov metallistov sovmestno s predstaviteliami zavodskikh komitetov.* Petrograd: Izdatel'stvo TsK (soiuz metallistov), 1918.
- Protokoly Tsentral'nogo komiteta RSDRP(b), avgust 1917-fevral' 1918.* Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1958.
- "Protokoly Vserossiiskogo (martovskogo) soveshchaniia partiinykh rabotnikov, 27 marta - 2 apreliia 1917 goda." Reprint. *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, no. 5 (1962), pp. 106-125; and no. 6 (1962), pp. 130-52.
- Protokoly Vserossiiskogo uchereditel'nogo s"ezda soiuzov rabochikh-metalistov, 18-19 ianvaria 1918 goda.* Moscow: Izdatel'stvo TsK Vserossiiskogo soiuza rabochikh-metalistov, 1919.
- Protokoly zasedanii VTsIK vtorogo sozyva.* Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Vserossiiskogo Tsentral'nogo ispolnitel'nogo komiteta sovetov rabochikh, soldatskikh i krest'ianskikh deputatov, 1919.
- Rabochii klass Rossii v pervyi god diktatury proletariata: sbornik dokumentov.* Edited by D. A. Chugaev. Moscow: Nauka, 1964.
- Revoliutsiia i VKP(b) v materialakh i dokumentakh (khrestomatiia).* 7 vols. Moscow: GIZL, 1925-1927.
- Rezoliutsii Pervogo Vserossiiskogo s"ezda sovetov narodnogo khoziaistva.* Petrograd: Izdanie redaktsii zhurnala "Narodnoe khoziaistvo," 1918.
- Rezoliutsii Vtorogo Vserossiiskogo s"ezda sovetov narodnogo khoziaistva.* Moscow: Redaktsionno-izdatel'skii otdel VSNKh, 1919.
- Sed'maia (Aprel'skaia) Vserossiiskaia konferentsiia RSDRP (bol'shevikov). Petrogradskaia obshchegorodskaia konferentsiia RSDRP (bol'shevikov). Aprel' 1917 goda: protokoly.* Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1958.
- Sed'moi ekstrennyi s"ezd RKP(b). Mart 1918: stenograficheskii otchet.* Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1962.
- Shestoi s"ezd RSDRP (bol'shevikov). Avgust 1917 goda: protokoly.* Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1958.
- Startsev, V. I. "Pervoe sobranie po organizatsii Krasnoi gvardii." *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, no. 6 (1961), pp. 178-79.
- Tret'ia Vserossiiskaia konferentsiia professional'nykh soiuzov 3-11 iyulya (20-28 iyunya st. st.) 1917 goda: Stenograficheskii otchet (Third All-Russian Conference of Trade Unions, 3-11 July [20-28 June Old Style], 1917: Stenographic Report).* Edited with introduction, notes, and index by Diane Koenker. Millwood, New York: Kraus International Publications, 1982.
- Velikaia Oktiabr'skaia sotsialisticheskaiia revoliutsiia: dokumenty i materialy. Oktiabr'skoe vooruzhennoe vosstanie v Petrograde.* Edited by G. N. Golikova, et al. Moscow: Nauka, 1957.
- Velikaia Oktiabr'skaia sotsialisticheskaiia revoliutsiia: dokumenty i materialy. Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v Rossii nakanune Oktiabr'skogo vooruzhennogo vosstania (1-24 oktiabria 1917 goda).* Edited by D. A. Chugaev, et al. Moscow: Nauka, 1962.
- Velikaia Oktiabr'skaia sotsialisticheskaiia revoliutsiia: dokumenty i materialy. Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v Rossii posle sverzheniia samoderzhaviia.* Edited by L. S. Gaponenko, et al. Moscow: Nauka, 1957.

- Velikaia Oktiabr'skaia sotsialisticheskaiia revoliutsiia: dokumenty i materialy. Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v Rossii v aprele 1917 goda: aprel'skii krizis.* Edited by L. S. Gaponenko, et al. Moscow: Nauka, 1958.
- Velikaia Oktiabr'skaia sotsialisticheskaiia revoliutsiia: dokumenty i materialy. Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v Rossii v avguste 1917 goda: razгром Kornilovskogo miatezha.* Edited by D. A. Chugaev, et al. Moscow: Nauka, 1959.
- Velikaia Oktiabr'skaia sotsialisticheskaiia revoliutsiia: dokumenty i materialy. Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v Rossii v iuile 1917 goda: iul'skii krizis.* Edited by D. A. Chugaev, et al. Moscow: Nauka, 1959.
- Velikaia Oktiabr'skaia sotsialisticheskaiia revoliutsiia: dokumenty i materialy. Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v Rossii v mae-iuune 1917 goda: iun'skaia demonstratsiia.* Edited by D. A. Chugaev, et al. Moscow: Nauka, 1959.
- Velikaia Oktiabr'skaia sotsialisticheskaiia revoliutsiia: dokumenty i materialy. Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v Rossii v sentiabre 1917 goda: obshchenatsional'nyi krizis.* Moscow: Nauka, 1961.
- Vos'moi s"ezd' RKP(b). Mart 1919 goda: protokoly.* Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1958.

3. Memoirs

- Aronson, G. Ia. *Dvizhenie upolnomochennykh ot rabochikh fabrik i zavodov v 1918 godu.* New York: Inter-University Project on the History of the Menshevik Movement, 1960.
- . *K istorii pravogo techeniia sredi men'shevikov.* Paper no. 4. New York: Inter-University Project on the History of the Menshevik Movement, 1960.
- . "Stranitsy proshlogo." *Protiv techeniia.* New York: n.p., 1952.
- Aronson, G. Ia., et al., eds. *Martov i ego blizkie.* New York: n.p., 1959.
- Chernov, Victor. *Pered burei: vospominaniia.* New York: Izdatel'stvo im. Chekhova, 1953.
- . *Rozhdenie revoliutsionnoi Rossii (Fevral'skaia revoliutsiia).* Paris, Prague, New York: Iubileinyi komitet po izdaniuu trudov V. M. Chernova, 1934.
- Dallin, D. *Menshevizm v period sovetskoi vlasti.* New York: Inter-University Project on the History of the Menshevik Movement, n.d.
- Dmitriev, N. "Petrogradskie FZK v 1917 godu." *Krasnaia letopis'*, no. 2 (1927).
- Garvi, P. A. *Professional'nye soiuzы Rossii v pervye gody revoliutsii (1917-1921).* Edited by G. Ia. Aronson. New York: Fond po izdaniuu literaturnogo naslediia P. A. Garvi, 1958.
- Gaza, I. I., ed. *Putilovets na putiakh k Oktiabriu. Iz istorii "Krasnogo putilovtsa."* Moscow-Leningrad: OGIZ, 1933.
- God russkoi revoliutsii (1917-1918). Sbornik statei.* Moscow: n.p., 1918.
- Kerensky, A. F. *The History of the Provisional Government.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961.
- Krivitskii, A. Iu. et al., eds. *Letopis' velikogo Oktiabria. April'-oktiabr' 1917 goda.* Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Sovetskaia Rossiia, 1958.
- Krupskaia, N. K. *Vospominaniia o Lenine.* Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1957.
- Lenin v 1917 godu: vospominaniia.* Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1967.
- Levin, V. M. *FZK.* Petrograd: Petrogradskii komitet partii sotsialistov-revoliutsionerov, 1917.
- Miliukov, P. N. *Istoriia vtoroi russkoi revoliutsii.* 2 vols. Sofia: Rossisko-Bolgarskoe knigoizdatel'stvo, 1921.

- Mukhtar-Londarskii, M. I. "Boevaia družhina Krasnoi gvardii Putilovskogo zavoda." *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, no. 1 (1957), pp. 205-13.
- Nabokov, V. D. "Vremennoe Pravitel'stvo." *Arkhiv Russkoi revoliutsii*. Vol. 1. Berlin: Slovo, 1922.
- Nikolaevsky, B. I. *Mensheviki v dni oktiabr'skogo perevorota*. Paper no. 8. New York: Inter-University Project on the History of the Menshevik Movement, 1962.
- Osipov, P. "Oktiabr' na Nikolaevskoi zheleznoi doroge." *Katorga i ssylka*, no. 11 (1930).
- Perazich, V. *Tekstili Leningrada v 1917 godu*. Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo gubotдела tekstil'shchikov, 1927.
- Sapronov, T. *Iz istorii rabocheho dvizheniia (po lichnym vospominaniiam)*. Reprint. Newtonville, Mass.: Oriental Research Partners, 1976.
- Shliapnikov, A. G. *Semnadtsatyi god*. 4 vols. Moscow: Gosizdat, 1923-1927.
- Shvarts, S. "Fabrichno-zavodskie komitety i profsoiuzy v pervye gody revoliutsii." Unpublished manuscript. Hoover Institute, Stanford, California.
- Sukhanov [Himmer], N. N. *The Russian Revolution*. Edited and translated by Joel Carmichael. 2 vols. New York: Harper and Row, 1962.
- . *The Russian Revolution 1917*. Translated by Joel Carmichael (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984)
- . *Zapiski o revoliutsii*, 6 books (Berlin: izdatel'stvo Z. I. Grzhebina, 1922-1923)
- Trotsky, Leon D. *The History of the Russian Revolution*. 3 vols. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1936.
- Tsereteli, I. *Vospominaniia o Fevral'skoi revoliutsii*. 2 vols. Paris: Mouton & Co., 1963.
- Tsyperovich, G. "Vospominaniia o Lenine." *Krasnaia letopis'*, no. 2 (1927).
- Vasil'ev, A. "Moe uchastie v Krasnoi gvardii i Oktiabr'skoi revoliutsii." *Katorga i ssylka*, no. 11-12 (1932), pp. 99-111.
- Velikaia Oktiabr'skaia sotsialisticheskaia revoliutsiia. *Sbornik vospominanii uchastnikov revoliutsii v Petrograde i Moskve*. Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1957.
- Volin, S. *Deiatel'nost' men'shevikov v profsoiuzakh pri sovetskoi vlasti*. New York: Inter-University Project on the History of the Menshevik Movement, 1962.
- . *Politicheskaiia reorientatsiia RSDRP. Partiinoe soveshchanie, dekabr' 1918 goda*. New York: Inter-University Project on the History of the Menshevik Movement, n.d.
- Voline, [V.M. Eikhenbaum]. *Nineteen-Seventeen. The Russian Revolution Betrayed*. Translated by Holley Cantine. Introduction by Rudolf Rocker. London: Freedom Press, 1954.
- . *The Unknown Revolution*. Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1974.
- Vospominaniia o Lenine*. 5 vols. Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1969.
- Za god*. Petrograd: Kniga, 1919.
- Za vlast' sovetov*. Moscow: n.p., 1954.

4. Periodicals

- Cherezvychainoe sobranie upolnomochennykh fabrik i zavodov g. Petrograda*, no. 1-2 (18 March 1918). Reprinted in *Kontinent*, no. 2 (1975), pp. 385-419.
- Delo truda-probuzhdenie*.

Istoriia proletariata SSSR.
Istoricheskii zhurnal.
Izvestiia.
Krasnaia letopis'.
Narodnoe khoziaistvo.
Novaia zhizn',
Novyi put'.
Pravda.
Professional'noe dvizhenie.
Professional'nyi vestnik.
Rabochii i soldat
Rabochii put'.
Vestnik truda.
Vestnik Vserossiiskogo soiuza rabotnikov pechatnogo dela.
Voprosy strakhovaniia.

SECONDARY SOURCES

1. Books

- Anskii, A., ed. *Professional'noe dvizhenie v Petrograde v 1917 godu*. Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo oblastnogo soveta professional'nykh soiuзов, 1928.
 Antropov, N. P., et al. *Istoriia professional'nogo dvizheniia v SSSR*. Moscow: Profizdat, 1961.
 Anweiler, Oskar. *The Soviets: The Russian Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers Councils, 1905-1921*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1974.
 Ascher, Abraham. *Pavel Axelrod and the Development of Menshevism*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972.
 Astrakhan, Kh. M. *Bol'sheviki i ikh politicheskie protivniki v 1917 godu*. Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1973.
 Avtorkhanov, A. *Proiskhozhdenie partokratii*. Vol. 1. Frankfurt: Possev-Verlag, 1973.
 Baevskii, D. A. *Rabochii klass v pervye gody sovetskoi vlasti (1917-1921)*. Moscow: Nauka, 1974.
 Balabanov, M. *Ot 1905 k 1917 godu. Massovoe rabochee dvizhenie*. Moscow-Leningrad: Gosizdat, 1927.
 Baron, Samuel H. *Plekhanov: The Father of Russian Marxism*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963.
 Basil, John D. *The Mensheviks in the Revolution of 1917*. Columbus, Ohio: Slavica Publishers, 1984.
 Blinov, A. S. *Tsentral'nyi sovet fabzavkomov Petrograda 1917-1918 g.g.* Moscow: Profizdat, 1982.
 Bonnell, Victoria E. *Roots of Rebellion: Workers' Politics and Organizations in St. Petersburg and Moscow, 1900-1914*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983.
 Brinton, Maurice. *The Factory Committees and Workers' Control*. Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1975.
 Brovkin, Vladimir. *The Mensheviks After October. Socialist Opposition and the Rise of the Bolshevik Dictatorship*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1987.

- Carr, Edward H. *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*. 3 vols. New York: Macmillan, 1951-1953.
- Chamberlin, William H. *The Russian Revolution*. 2 vols. New York: Macmillan, 1954.
- Dan, Fyodor. *Proiskhozhdenie bol'shevizma. K istorii demokraticheskikh i sotsialisticheskikh idei v Rossii posle osvobozhdeniia krest'ian*. New York: "Novaia demokratiia," 1946.
- Daniels, Robert V. *The Conscience of the Revolution: Communist Opposition in Soviet Russia*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969.
- . *Red October: The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967.
- Derni'tsyna, T. M. et al., eds. *Profsoiuzy Moskvy. Ocherki istorii*. Moscow: Profizdat, 1975.
- Dobb, M. *Soviet Economic Development Since 1917*. New York: International Publishers, 1968.
- Drobizhev, V. Z. *Glavnyi shtab sotsialisticheskoi promyshlennosti (ocherki istorii VSNKh, 1917-1932)*. Moscow: Mysl', 1966.
- . *Rabochii klass Sovetskoi Rossii v pervyi god proletarskoi diktatury: opyt strukturnogo analiza po materialam perepisi*. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1975.
- Egorova, A. G. *Partiia i profsoiuzy v oktiabr'skoi revoliutsii*. Moscow: Mysl', 1970.
- Elwood, Ralph Carter. *Reconsideration of the Russian Revolution*. Columbus, Ohio: Slavica, 1974.
- Engelstein, Laura. *Moscow, 1905: Working-Class Organization and Political Conflict*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1982.
- Fainsod, Merle. *How Russia is Ruled*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953.
- Ferro, Marc. *October 1917: A Social History of the Russian Revolution*. Translated by Norman Stone. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980.
- Fin, Ia. *Fabrichno-zavodskie komitety v Rossii. Kratkii ocherk ikh vozniknoveniia i deiatel'nosti*. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo VTSPS, 1922.
- Fitzpatrick, Sheila. *The Russian Revolution, 1917-1932*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985.
- Fleer, M. *Rabochee dvizhenie v gody voyny*. Moscow: Voprosy truda, 1925.
- Frankel, Edith Rogovin; Frankel, Jonathan; and Knei-Paz, Baruch, eds. *Revolution in Russia: Reassessments of 1917*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
- Galai, Shmuel. *The Liberation Movement in Russia, 1900-1905*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973.
- Galili y Garcia, Ziva. *The Menshevik Leaders in the Russian Revolution: Social Realities and Political Strategy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.
- Gaponenko, L. S. *Rabochii klass Rossii v 1917 godu*. Moscow: Nauka, 1970.
- Getzler, Israel. *Kronstadt 1917-1921. The Fate of Soviet Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- . *Martov: A Political Biography of a Russian Social Democrat*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1967.
- Gimpel'son, E. G. *Sovremennyi rabochii klass, 1918-1920*. Moscow: Nauka, 1974.
- Gladkov, I. A. *Ocherki Sovetskoi ekonomiki, 1917-1920*. Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1956.
- Gorodetskii, E. N. *Rozhdenie Sovetskogo gosudarstva, 1917-1918*. Moscow: Nauka, 1965.

- Grinevich, V. *Professional'noe dvizhenie rabochikh v Rossii*. Moscow: Krasnaia nov', 1923.
- Gritsenko, A. P. *Robitnychi fortetsi sotsialistychnoi revoliutsii: Fabzavkomy Ukrainy v period pidgotovky i provedennia Velykoi Zhovtnevoi sotsialistychnoi revoliutsii*. Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1965.
- Haimson, Leopold H., ed. *The Mensheviks: From the Revolution of 1917 to the Second World War*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974.
- Hammond, Thomas T. *Lenin on Trade Unions and Revolution*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1954.
- Harcave, Sidney. *The First Blook: The Russian Revolution of 1905*. New York: Macmillan, 1964.
- Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi. *The February Revolution: Petrograd, 1917*. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1981.
- Kaiser, Daniel H., ed. *The Workers' Revolution in Russia, 1917: The View from Below*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
- Kaplan, F. I. *Bolshevik Ideology and the Ethics of Soviet Labor: 1917-1920. The Formative Years*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1968.
- Karamysheva, L. F. *Bor'ba bolshevikov za Petrogradskii sovet (mart-oktiabr' 1917)*. Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1964.
- Keep, John L. H. *The Russian Revolution: A Study in Mass Mobilization*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1976.
- Koenker, Diane. *Moscow Workers and the 1917 Revolution*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981.
- Koenker, Diane P., and Rosenberg, William G. *Strikes and Revolution in Russia, 1917*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.
- Koenker, Diane P.; Rosenberg, William G.; and Suny, Ronald Grigor, eds. *Party, State, and Society in the Russian Civil War. Explorations in Social History*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989.
- Kritzman, L. *Geroicheskii period velikoi russkoi revoliutsii*. 2d ed. Moscow-Leningrad: Gosizdat, 1924.
- Larin, Iu. *Trudovaia povinnost' i rabochii kontrol'*. Petrograd: Kniga, 1918.
- Laverychev, V. Ia. *Tsarizm i rabochii vopros v Rossii 1861-1917 gg*. Moscow: Mysl', 1972.
- Liashchenko, P. I. *Istoriia narodnogo khoziaistva SSSR*. 2 vols. Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1952.
- Lur'e, M. *Petrogradskaia Krasnaia Gvardiia (fevral' 1917-fevral' 1918)*. Leningrad: n.p., 1938.
- McDaniel, Tim. *Autocracy, Capitalism, and Revolution in Russia*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988.
- Malakhovskii, Vl. *Iz istorii Krasnoi gvardii. Krasnogvardeitsy Vyborskogo raiona, 1917 god*. Leningrad: Gosizdat, 1925.
- Malashko, A. M. *K voprosu ob oformlenii odnopartiinoi sistemy v SSSR*. Minsk: Izdatel'stvo BGU im. V. I. Lenina, 1969.
- Malle, Silvana. *The Economic Organization of War Communism, 1918-1921*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
- Mandel, David. *The Petrograd Workers and the Fall of the Old Regime: From the February Revolution to the July Days, 1917*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983.

- . *The Petrograd Workers and the Soviet Seizure of Power: From the July Days 1917 to July 1918*. London and Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1984.
- Mawdsley, Evan. *The Russian Revolution and the Baltic Fleet: War and Politics, February 1917-April 1918*. London: Macmillan, 1978.
- Mel'gunov, S. *Kak bol'sheviki zakhvatili vlast'. Oktiabr'skii perevorot 1917 goda*. Paris: Editions la Renaissance, 1953.
- . *Martovskie dni 1917 goda*. Paris: n. p., 1961.
- Mendelsohn, Ezra. *Class Struggle in the Pale*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970.
- Michels, Robert. *Political Parties. A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*. Translated by Eden and Cedar Paul. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1949.
- Mints, I. I. *Istoriia velikogo Oktiabria*. 2 vols. Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1967-1968.
- Mitel'man, M.; Glebov, B.; and Ul'ianskii A. *Istoriia Putilovskogo zavoda 1801-1917*. 3rd ed. Moscow: 1961.
- Moore, Barrington. *Soviet Politics: The Dilemma of Power. The Role of Ideas in Social Change*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950.
- Nosach, V. I. *Profsoiuzy Sovetskoi Rossii v gody Grazhdanskoi voiny: 1918-1920*. Moscow: Profizdat, 1978.
- Nove, Alec. *An Economic History of the USSR*. Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1972.
- Ozerov, I. Kh. *Politika po rabochemu voprosu v Rossii za poslednie gody (po neizdannym dokumentam)*. Moscow: Izdanie T-va I. D. Sytina, 1906.
- Pankratova, A. M. *Fabzavkomy Rossii v bor'be za sotsialisticheskuiu fabriku*. Moscow: "Krasnaia nov'," 1923.
- . *Fabzavkomy i profsoiuzy v revoliutsii 1917 goda*. Moscow: Gosizdat, 1927.
- Pethybridge, Roger. *The Spread of the Russian Revolution: Essays on 1917*. London: St. Martin's Press, 1972.
- Pipes, Richard. *The Russian Revolution*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990.
- . *Social Democracy and the St. Petersburg Labor Movement, 1885-1897*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963.
- . *Struve: Liberal on the Left, 1970-1905*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970.
- Possony, Stefan T. *Lenin: The Compulsive Revolutionary*. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1964.
- Prokopovich, S. N. *K rabochemu voprosu v Rossii*. St. Petersburg: izdanie E. D. Kuskovoi, 1905.
- . *Soiuzy rabochikh i ikh zadachi*. St. Petersburg: izdanie E. D. Kuskovoi, 1905.
- Rabinowitch, Alexander. *The Bolsheviks Come to Power: The Revolution of 1917 in Petrograd*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1978.
- . *Prelude to the Revolution. The Petrograd Bolsheviks and the July 1917 Uprising*. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1968.
- Rabinowitch, Alexander; Rabinowitch, Janet; and Kristoff, Ladis, eds. *Revolution and Politics in Russia: Essays in Memory of B. I. Nikolaevsky*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972.
- Radkey, Oliver H. *Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism: Promise and Default of the Russian Socialist Revolutionaries*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1958.

- . *The Election to the Russian Constituent Assembly*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950.
- Raleigh, Donald J. *Revolution on the Volga: Revolution in Saratov*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986.
- Rashin, A. G. *Formirovanie ravochego klassa Rossii*. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi literatury, 1958.
- Reichman, Henry. *Railwaymen and Revolution: Russia, 1905*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987.
- Remington, Thomas F. *Building Socialism in Bolshevik Russia: Ideology and Industrial Organization, 1917-1921*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1984.
- Roobol, W. H. *Tsereteli—A Democrat in the Russian Revolution: A Political Biography*. Translated by Philip Hyams and Lynne Richards. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976.
- Rosenberg, William. *Liberals in the Russian Revolution. The Constitutional Democratic Party, 1917-1921*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974.
- Sablinsky, Walter. *The Road to Bloody Sunday: The Role of Father Gapon and the Assembly in the Petersburg Massacre of 1905*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.
- Saul, Norman E. *Sailors in Revolt: The Russian Baltic Fleet in 1917*. Lawrence, Kans.: Regents Press of Kansas, 1978.
- Schapiro, Leonard H. *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*. New York: Vintage Books, 1971.
- . *The Origin of Communist Autocracy: Political Opposition in the Soviet State: First Phase, 1917-1922*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1965.
- Schneiderman, Jeremiah. *Sergei Zubatov and Revolutionary Marxism: The Struggle for the Working Class in Tsarist Russia*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976.
- Schwarz, Solomon. *The Russian Revolution of 1905: The Workers' Movement and the Formation of Bolshevism and Menshevism*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967.
- Selitskii, V. I. *Massy v bor'be za rabochii kontrol' (mart-iiul' 1917)*. Moscow: Mysl', 1971.
- Shub, David. *Lenin: A Biography*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1948.
- Sirianni, Carmen. *Workers' Control and Socialist Democracy*. London: Verso, 1982.
- Smith, S. A. *Red Petrograd: Revolution in the Factories, 1917-1918*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- Sorenson, Jay B. *The Life and Death of Soviet Trade Unions: 1917-1928*. New York: Atherton, 1969.
- Spirin, L. M. *Krushenie pomeshchich'ikh i burzhuaiznykh partii v Rossii (nachalo XIX-1920 g.)*. Moscow: Mysl', 1977.
- Startsev, V. I. *Ocherki po istorii petrogradskoi Krasnoi gvardii i rabochei militsii (mart 1917-aprel' 1918)*. Moscow-Leningrad: Nauka, 1965.
- . *Revoliutsiia i vlast'. Petrogradskii sovet i Vremennoe pravitel'stvo v marte-aprele 1917 goda*. Moscow: Mysl', 1970.
- Stepanov, Z. V. *Rabochie Petrograda v period podgotovki i provedeniia oktiabr'skogo vooruzhennogo vosstaniia*. Moscow-Leningrad: Nauka, 1965.
- Strumilin, S. G. *Ocherki ekonomicheskoi istorii Rossii i SSSR*. Moscow: Nauka, 1966.

- . *Problemy ekonomiki truda*. Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1959.
- . *Statistiko-ekonomicheskie ocherki*. Moscow: Gosstatizdat, 1958.
- Suny, Ronald G. *The Baku Commune, 1917-1918: Class and Nationality in the Russian Revolution*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972.
- Timberlake, Ch., ed. *Essays on Russian Liberalism*. Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1972.
- Tsyppkin, G. A. *Krasnaia gvardiia v bor'be za vlast' sovetov*. Moscow: Nauka, 1967.
- Tsyppkin, G. A., and Tsyppkina, R. G. *Krasnaia gvardiia—udarnaia sila proletariata v Oktiabr'skoi revoliutsii*. Moscow: Nauka, 1977.
- Tugan-Baranovskii, M. *Russkaia fabrika v proshlom i nastoiashchem: istoricheskoe razvitie russkoi fabрики*. Moscow: "Moskovskii rabochii," 1922.
- Turin, S. P. *From Peter the Great to Lenin: A History of the Russian Labor Movement with Special References to Trade Unionism*. London: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1968.
- Ulam, Adam B. *The Bolsheviks: The Intellectual and Political History of the Triumph of Communism in Russia*. New York: Collier Books, 1968.
- Venediktov, A. V. *Organizatsiia gosudarstvennoi promyshlennosti SSSR*. Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1957.
- Verkhos', V. *Krasnaia gvardiia v Oktiabr'skoi revoliutsii*. Moscow: Mysl', 1976.
- Volobuev, P. V. *Proletariat i burzhuaizii Rossii v 1917 godu*. Moscow: Mysl', 1964.
- . *Ekonomicheskaiia politika Vremennogo pravitel'stva*. Moscow: Nauka, 1962.
- Wade, Rex A. *Red Guards and Workers' Militias in the Russian Revolution*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984.
- Weber, Max. *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*. Translated by A. R. Henderson and Talcott Parsons. Edited by Talcott Parsons. London: William Hidge & Co., Ltd., 1947.
- Wildman, Alan K. *The End of the Russian Imperial Army*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980.
- . *The Making of a Workers' Revolution. Russian Social Democracy, 1891-1903*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967.
- Wolfe, Bertram D. *An Ideology in Power: Reflections on the Russian Revolution*. New York: Stein and Day, 1969.
- Zagorsky, S. O. *State Control of Industry in Russia during the War*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1928.
- Zelnik, Reginald E. *Labor and Society in Tsarist Russia: The Factory Workers in St. Petersburg, 1855-1870*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971.
- Znamenskii, O. N. *Vserossiiskoe Uchreditel'noe sobranie: istoriia sozyva i politicheskogo krusheniia*. Leningrad: Nauka, 1976.

2. Articles

- Astrakhan, Kh. M. "Istoriia burzhuaiznykh i melko-burzhuaiznykh partii Rossii v 1917 godu v noveishei sovetskoi literature." *Voprosy istorii*, no. 2 (1975), pp. 30-44.
- Avrich, Paul H. "The Bolshevik Revolution and Workers' Control in Russian Industry." *Slavic Review*, vol. 22, no. 1 (March 1963), pp. 47-63.
- . "Russian Factory Committees in 1917." *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, no. 2 (June 1963), pp. 161-182.
- Brinton, M. "Factory Committees and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat." *Critique*, no. 4 (Spring 1975), pp. 78-86.

- Brovkin, Vladimir. "The Mensheviks' Political Comeback: The Elections to the Provincial City Soviet in Spring 1918," *The Russian Review*, vol. 42 (January 1983), pp. 1-50.
- Erykalov, K. F. "Krasnaia gvardiia v period podgotovki Oktiabr'skoi revoliutsii." *Istoricheski zapiski*, vol. 47 (1954), pp. 58-93.
- Fleer M. "Rabochaia Krasnaia gvardiia v Fevral'skoi revoliutsii." *Krasnaia letopis'*, no. 1 (16) (1926), pp. 23-43.
- Gershberg, S. R. "Bor'ba V.I. Lenina za demokraticeskii tsentralizm v khoziaistvennom stroitel'stve." *Voprosy istorii*, no. 3 (1957), pp. 53-72.
- . "V.I. Lenin i sozdanie VSNKh." *Voprosy istorii*, no. 7 (1958), pp. 3-25.
- Gessen, V. Iu. "Krasnaia gvardiia i petrogradskie promyshlenniki v 1917 godu." *Krasnaia letopis'*, no. 3 (27) (1928), pp. 52-91.
- Goodey, Chris. "Factory Committees and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat (1918)." *Critique*, no. 3 (Autumn 1974), pp. 27-47.
- . "Factory Committees and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. Additional Notes." *Critique*, no. 5 (1975), pp. 85-90.
- Haimson, Leopold H. "The Mensheviks After the October Revolution: Part 1." *The Russian Review*, vol. 38, no. 4 (October 1979), pp. 456-73.
- . "The Mensheviks After the October Revolution, Part II: The Extraordinary Party Congress." *The Russian Review*, vol. 39, no. 2 (April 1980), pp. 181-207.
- . "The Problem of Social Stability in Urban Russia." *Slavic Review*, vol. 23, no. 4 (1964), pp. 620-642, and vol. 24, no. 1 (1965), pp. 1-22.
- Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi. "The Formation of the Militia in the February Revolution: An Aspect of the Origins of Dual Power." *Slavic Review*, vol. 32, no. 2 (1973), pp. 303-22.
- . "The Problem of Power in the February Revolution of 1917 in Russia." *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, vol. 14, no. 4 (1972), pp. 611-32.
- . "The Bolsheviks and the Formation of the Petrograd Soviet in the February Revolution." *Soviet Studies*, vol. 29, no. 1 (1977), pp. 86-106.
- Itkin, M. L., et al. "Sovremennaia sovetskaia istoriografiia rabocheho kontroliia 1917-1918 godov." *Voprosy istorii*, no. 11 (November 1964), pp. 29-44.
- Itkin, M. L. "Tsentry fabrichno-zavodskikh komitetov Rossii v 1917 godu." *Voprosy istorii*, no. 2 (February 1974), pp. 21-35.
- Kovalenko, D. A. "Bor'ba fabrichno-zavodskikh komitetov Petrograda za rabochii kontrol' nad proizvodstvom." *Istoricheskie zapiski*, vol. 61 (1957), pp. 66-111.
- Lazarev, A. V. "Iz istorii razrabotki Leninskogo dekreta o rabochem kontrole." *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, no. 3 (1960), pp. 131-41.
- Nasyrin, V. P. "O nekotorykh voprosakh sotsialisticheskogo preobrazovaniia promyshlennosti v SSSR." *Voprosy istorii*, no. 5 (1956), pp. 90-100.
- Rosenberg, William. "Workers and Workers' Control in the Russian Revolution." *History Workshop*, issue 5 (1978), pp. 89-97.
- . "Workers' Control on the Railroads and Some Suggestions Concerning Social Aspects of Labor Politics in the Russian Revolution." *Journal of Modern History*, vol. 49 (1977), pp. D1181-D1219.
- . "The Democratization of Russia's Railroads in 1917." *American Historical Review*, vol. 86 (1981), pp. 983-1008.
- Rostov, N. "Vozniknovenie Krasnoi gvardii." *Krasnaia nov'*, no. 2 (1927), pp. 167-82.

- Shatilova, T. I. "Profsoiuzy i Oktiabr'." *Krasnaia letopis'*, no. 2 (1927), pp. 179-89.
- Smith, S. A. "Craft Consciousness, Class Consciousness: Petrograd, 1917." *History Workshop*, no. 11 (1981) pp. 33-56.
- Suny, Ronald Gregor. "Toward a Social History of the October Revolution." *The American Historical Review*, vol. 88, no. 1 (February 1983), pp. 31-52.
- Trifonov, E. "Kak vooruzhalas' Krasnaia gvardiia." *Katorga i ssylka*, no. 11-12, pp. 94-98.
- Tseitlin, D. A. "FZK Petrograda v fevrale-oktiabre 1917 goda." *Voprosy istorii*, no. 11 (November 1956), pp. 86-97.
- Tsybul'skii, V. A. "Rabochie Sestroretskogo zavoda v 1917 godu." *Istoriia SSSR*, no. 4 (1957), p. 141-55.
- Tsyperovich, G. "Vospominaniia o Lenine." *Krasnaia letopis'*, no. 2 (1927), pp. 229-36.
- Vasil'kova, A. "Rabochii kontrol' nad proizvodstvom (fevral'-oktiabr' 1917)." *Voprosy istorii*, no. 10 (October 1947), pp. 40-65.
- Verkhoven', V. G. "Leninskii plan pristupa k sotsialisticheskomu stroitel'stvu." *Proletarskaia revoliutsiia*, no. 1 (1940), pp. 45-81.
- Vinogradov, V. "Krasnaia gvardiia Petrogradskogo metallicheskogo zavoda." *Krasnaia letopis'*, no. 2 (23) (1927), pp. 162-73.
- Volobuev, P. V. "Leninskaia ideia rabocheho kontroliia i dvizhenie za rabochii kontrol' v marte-oktiabre 1917 goda." *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, no. 6 (1962), pp. 39-56.
- Von Laue, Theodor H. "Russian Labor Between Field and Factory, 1892-1903." *California Slavic Studies*, vol. III (1964), pp. 33-66.
- Wade, Rex A. "The Rajonnye Sovety of Petrograd: The Role of Local Political Bodies in the Russian Revolution." *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, vol. 20, no. 2 (June 1972), pp. 226-40.
- Znamenskii, O. N. "Stanovlenie sovetov i vopros ob Uchreditel'nom sobranii, mart-oktiabr' 1917 goda." *Istoriia SSSR*, no. 4 (iiul'-avgust 1977), pp. 3-20.

3. Dissertations

- Avrich, Paul H. "The Russian Revolution and the Factory Committees." Ph. D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1961.
- Devlin, Robert J. "Petrograd Workers and Workers' Factory Committees in 1917: An Aspect of the Social History of the Russian Revolution." Ph.D. dissertation, State University of New York at Binghamton, 1976.

Index

A

- Admiralteiskii plant, 8, 139, 150
- Aivaz plant, 4, 20
- All-Russian Central Executive Committee of Soviets (VTsIK), 91, 93-94, 103, 120-21, 125, 163
- All-Russian Council of Factory Committees, 111
- All-Russian Council of Workers' Control, 121, 125; composition of, 121-22, 243; creation of, 121; decline of, 129-30; and economic regulation, 123-24; and regulations on workers' control, 128-29; and VSNKh, 125
- All-Russian Democratic Council (Preparliament), 94, 99
- All-Russian Trade Union Council (VTsSPS), 90, 93, 94, 111, 164, 168, 174, 187-88; composition of, 69, 117; creation of, 67-68; and influence of "internationalists," 90, 94; and participation in ARCWC, 243; and workers' control, 187
- All-Russian Union of Railroad Workers (Vikzhel'), 84, 103, 113-14, 115
- Amosov, Pavel, 29, 47, 118, 123-24, 126
- April Conference, 20, 24, 36, 115; and Bolshevik policy toward Provisional Government, 35-36; and workers' control, 24
- April crisis, 2
- "April Theses," 24, 115
- arbitration boards, *see* reconciliation boards
- Arsenal plant, 4, 8, 133, 139, 140, 144
- Axelrod, Pavel, 161, 189

B

- Baltiiskii plant, 6, 38, 133, 148, 153
- Bolshevik Central Committee (CC), 99, 101, 102-3, 113, 115-16; and CCFC, 47, 136; and Kornilov affair, 54-55; and October insurrection, 99-100; opposition to Lenin, 113-14; and policy toward Provisional Government, 35-36; and "Red Guard attack against capital," 136; and support for Bolshevik dictatorship, 115-16; and

- Vikzhel' negotiations, 113-14
- Bolshevik party, ix, xiii, xiv, 11, 16, 19, 32, 41, 45-47, 71, 99, 140; and all-socialist government, 113-14; divisions in, 47, 112-13, 115-117; and economic regulation, 27-28; elections to Petrograd Duma, 45; influence among workers, 19-20, 35, 39-40, 58; influence in factory committees, 19-21, 24, 33-36, 43-45, 49-50, 58; influence in trade unions, 71, 86-96; and July Days, 32, 36-38; and moderate socialists, 40, 100; persecutions after July Days, 39-40; and plant seizures, 16-17; and policy toward Provisional Government, 35-36; political objectives of, 35-36, 38, 46; and Preparliament, 99; and reelections to soviets, 35, 44-45, 58; and subordination of factory committees to trade unions, 101-112, 167, 176-77; and support among workers, 19-21, 24, 39, 43-44; and tasks of factory committees, 28-29; and tasks of trade unions, 166-67; and Vikzhel' negotiations, 113-14; and workers' control, 22-26, 47-49, 109-10
- Brest-Litovsk Treaty, 139, 143
- Brinton, Maurice, xiii
- Brovkin, Vladimir N., xiii, 154

C

- Central Arbitration Board, 12
- Central Council of Petrograd Factory Committees (CCFC), 29, 33, 85, 91, 104, 106, 108, 118-19, 122, 125, 128, 132, 169, 171, 176; abolition of, 177; and all-socialist government, 101, 103, 119; composition of, 29; creation of, 29; and creation of VSNKh, xiii, 118-19, 170; and implementation of workers' control after October, 124-27, 132, 170; and June demonstrations, 33-34; and Kornilov affair, 54-56; and moderate Bolsheviks, 119; and "Red Guard attack against capital," 132-33; and support for Bolshevik dictatorship, 118-19, 144; and suppression of workers, xiii, 144
- Central War-Industries Committee, 3
- Cheka (Extraordinary Commission), 100, 151

Cherevanin, N., 26, 76, 161

Chernov, Victor, 3

Chubar', Vlas, 29, 118, 126

commissariat of labor, 119, 121; and "Decree on Workers' Control," 119-20; and opposition to Lenin, 119-20; and workers' demands for wage increases, 140

Council of People's Commissars (CPC), 116, 136; economic policy of, 138-39; and relocation of enterprises, 134; and support for "Red Guard attack against capital," 136

D

Dan, Fedor, 161-62, 181, 186

"Decree on Workers' Committees at Industrial Enterprises" (April 23), 13-14, 52

"Decree on Workers' Control," xxiii, 119-22, 127, 129, 172, 175; draft by commissariat of labor, 119-20; draft by Lenin, 118-19; draft by CCFC, 118

Defensists, 161

Democratic Conference, 93, 99, 112; and trade unions, 93-95

Derbyshev, Nikolai, 29, 107, 117

E

extraordinary shop steward assemblies, see shop steward assemblies

F

factory closures: after October, 134-35; prior to October 40-41, 46, 60, 85

factory committees, xii, xvii, 3, 12; and all-socialist government, 123; and anarcho-syndicalists, 21, 109, 111, 167; Bolshevik influence in, 19, 21, 24, 33-36, 43-45, 49-50, 209; and Bolshevik press, 25; and closure of enterprises, 40-41; and Decree of April 23, 13-14; and dismissals of managers, 7-8, 60; during Stolypin era, 3; and elections to soviets, 26, 35, 44-45; emergence and early evolution of, 3-6; factions in, 4, 47; functions of, xvii, 12, 14, 17, 20, 41, 49; influence of moderate socialists in, 3, 20-21, 34-35; and interventions in management (see workers' control); and July Days, 38; and June demon-

strations, 33-34; and Kornilov affair, 54-58; and Provisional Government, 13-14, 18-19, 34-35, 42-43, 50-52, 56-57, 103; and reconciliation boards, 42; and "Red Guard attack against capital," 132-38; and Red Guards, xiii, 53, 55, 58, 101; and relocation of enterprises, 51-52, 56; and revolution of 1905, 6-7; and seizures of enterprises, 16-17, 132-34; and "Skobelev circulars," 56-57; and strikes, 17, 36, 60-62; and subordination to trade unions, 27-29, 50, 104-12, 167-69, 172, 176-77; and supervision over hiring and dismissals, 8; and support for Bolshevik dictatorship, xiii, 118; and support for transfer of power to soviets, 34, 38, 48, 51; and suppression of workers, xiii, 146-58; and workers' control, 34, 43, 130, 133, 171

factory elders, 5

Ferro, Marc, xv, xviii

Fifth Conference of Petrograd Factory Committees, 119, 122-23, 136

First All-Russian Conference of Factory Committees, 15, 108-12

First All-Russian Congress of Soviets, 34-35

First All-Russian Congress of Trade Unions, 132, 164-69

First Conference of Petrograd Factory Committees, 4, 14, 26-29, 33, 50, 105, 107; and workers' control, 26-27; and factory committee independence, 27, 29, 105; and tasks of factory committees, 28-29

G

Garvi, P. A., 104, 167-68

Gaza, Ivan, 19, 101

Glebov-Avilov, N. P., 74, 86, 92, 104

Grinevich, V. M., 73, 93, 94, 96

Guchkov, Alexander Ivanovich, 2

H

Haimson, Leopold H., 204

Hammond, Thomas T., 243

Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi, 19, 209

I

Industrial South, 58-63

"internationalists" (trade union faction),

71-72, 89-90, 94-95; and Bolshevik dictatorship, 95-96, 101-3; economic policy of, 75-76; influence in trade unions of, 72, 86-89; and Provisional Government, 74; and trade union policy, 73-74; and transfer of power to soviets, 73

Izhevskii plant, 9

Izhorskii plant, 9, 16, 18, 84, 144-45

J

July Days, 31-32, 35-40

June demonstrations, 33-34

K

Kabel'nyi plant, 4, 8, 9

Kadets (Constitutional Democrats): 31-32

Kaktyn', A. M., 124

Kanatchikov, Semen Ivanovich, xviii

Kamenev, Lev Borisovich, 39, 113, 116, 213-14

Keep, John L. H., xv

Kerensky, Alexander, 40

Kolokol'nikov, P. N., 57, 70

Kolpino, 155-56

Kornilov affair, 32, 54-56

L

Larin, Iurii, 15, 47, 109-10, 122-23

Lenin, V. I., xviii-xix, 16-17, 26, 27, 38, 45-46, 95, 112-13, 172; and all-socialist government, 115-16; attitude toward anarchists, 173; attitude toward trade unions, 118, 160, 173-74; and Bolshevik dictatorship, 95-96, 114-16; and creation of VSNKh, 125; and "Decree on Workers' Control," 118-19; and economic policy after October, 188-89; and economic regulation, 27; and Democratic Conference, 96; and factory committees, 24-25, 118-19, 159-60, 172; and implementation of workers' control after October, 118, 124-25, 130, 136-38; and moderate Bolsheviks, 115-16; on labor discipline, 172-74, 188; and plant seizures, 17; and slogan "Power to the Soviets," 27, 45, 49; and "Red Guard attack against capital," 131, 136-38; and subordination of factory committees, 24-25, 72, 115-17, 138; and suppression of

moderate Bolsheviks, 115-17, 138; and suppression of workers, 157-58; and transfer of power to soviets; and workers' control, 24-25; on workers' spontaneity, 120-21, 136, 159-60, 172

Levin, V. M., 8, 16, 28-29, 105

Lozovskii, S. A., 15, 71, 91-92, 96, 106, 116-17, 123, 133, 138, 164, 167

M

Maiskii, I. M., 78, 165

Martov, Iulii Osipovich, 71, 161-62, 165, 181, 185

McDaniel, Tim, 191, 200

Menshevik Internationalists, 101, 162-63

Menshevik party: and Bolshevik government, 163, 165-66; and coalition policy, 11, 160-62; divisions in, 161-62; Extraordinary Congress of, 163-64; and economic regulation, 26; and formulation of post-October political course, 162-63; and revival of factory committees, 3; and subordination of factory committees to trade unions, 26-27, 104; and trade union policy, 163-68; and workers' control, 11-12, 15, 21

metalworkers' union, 68, 70-71, 80, 84, 87, 92, 102, 107, 134, 137, 168, 178-79

Michels, Robert, xvi

Miliukov, Pavel Nikolaevich, 2

Miliutin, Vladimir, 47, 109-10, 116, 123

moderate socialists (Menshevik-SR bloc), xiv, 3, 31, 118; attitude toward workers' control, 11-12, 15, 21; and economic regulation, 26; influence among workers of, 19-20; influence in factory committees, 20-21; and March 10 Agreement, 12; and revival of factory committees, 3; and subordination of factory committees to trade unions, 26-27, 104, 167-68

moderate Bolsheviks, 47, 71, 110, 112, 118; and all-socialist government, 102-03; and factory committees' role, 48; opposition to dictatorship, 112-17, 119; political goals, 47-48, 101-3; and subordination of factory committees to trade unions, 48, 50, 104-5, 108-10, 167-68; and support

for transfer of power to soviets, 49;
and workers' control, 47-48, 109-10,
129

Moscow Central Trade Union Council,
67-68, 87, 92, 102, 164

Moscow State Conference, 32, 87-89,
166; trade unions' response to, 87-
88

N

"neutralists" (trade union faction), 71-
72, 93; economic policy, 76; influence
in trade unions, 72; and trade union
policy, 73

Novyi Lessner plant, 4, 19-20

O

Obukhovskii plant, 4, 20, 44, 58, 101,
134, 144, 155-56

Okhtenskii plant, 4, 43

Orudiinyi plant, 4, 101

P

Patronnyi plant, 3-4, 101, 156

Perazich, V., 3-4, 20, 102

Petrograd Central Trade Union Council,
28-29, 67, 70, 72, 85, 88, 91, 102,
106, 164

Petrograd Society of Factory and Plant
Owners, 12, 20, 52, 82; and March
10 agreement with Petrograd Soviet,
12, 20; and workers' control, 12, 52
printers' union, 65, 68, 71

Provisional Government, xii, 2, 5, 9, 10,
31, 42, 62-63, 112; and Decree of
April 23, 13-14; economic policy of,
40, 86-87; and factory committees,
42-43, 50-51, 56, 103; and relocation
of enterprises, 51-52; and "Skobelev
circulars," 52-53; and workers' con-
trol, 11, 13-14, 42-43, 57

Putilov plant, 4, 7-8, 18, 21, 38, 41, 43,
58, 83, 101, 134, 137, 139-43

R

Rabinowitch, Alexander, 37
reconciliation boards, 14, 81-82; failure
to mediate industrial disputes, 82-85
"Red Guard attack against capital,"
131-38, 175, 199

Red Guards, xix, xxi, 53, 55; creation of,
55; decline of, 159; and labor organi-
zations, 55, 58, 101; and suppres-
sion of workers, 145, 150, 153-55

relocation of enterprises, 51, 134

Riabushinskii, Pavel Pavlovich, 56

Riazanov, David, xvi, 17, 71, 91, 96,
105, 110, 116, 132

Rosenberg, William, xiii-xiv

Rykatkin plant, 17-18

S

Samoilova, K. N., 23, 47

Schwarz, Solomon, 104, 129, 182

Second Conference of Petrograd

Factory Committees, 46-50;

seizures of enterprises, 16, 132-34

Sestroretskii plant, 44, 142, 144, 151

Seventh Congress of Bolshevik party,
176

Shliapnikov, Alexander, xviii, 29, 69,
116, 119, 142, 190

Shmidt, Vladimir, xviii, 71, 88, 104, 110,
119

shop steward assemblies, xii, 134, 177;
composition of, 181; emergence and
early evolution of, 177-78, (after
October) 180-81; functions of, 178-
80; and moderate socialists, 181-82,
184; and opposition to Bolshevik
government, 183-84; politicization of,
181-84; suppression of, 184-85; and
workers, 183-84

Sixth All-Russian Congress of the Bol-
shevik party

Sixth Conference of Petrograd Factory
Committees, 169-72

Skobelev, Matvei Ivanovich, 15, 26, 52,
73, 105

"Skobelev circulars," 52-53; factory
committees' response to, 56-57

Skrypnik, N. A., 38, 106, 110, 111, 126

Smith, Steven A., xiii, xvi, xviii, 119

strike movement, 79, 84, 88-89; em-
ployers' response to, 84

Sukhanov (Himmer), Nikolai
Nikolaevich, 33

Suny, Ronald Grigor, 15

Supreme Council of National Economy
(VSNKh), xxi, 137, 174, 187; and
CCFC, 118; composition of, 125-26;
creation of, 125; Lenin's control of,
125; and "Red Guard attack against
capital," 137

Sverdlov, Iakov, 36, 37

T

textile workers' union, 3, 68, 70-71, 81, 84, 102-3, 178

Third All-Russian Trade Union

Conference, 67, 68, 70-79, 81, 84, 85

Third Conference of Petrograd Factory Committees, 56-57, 104

trade unions, xii, xvii; and all-socialist government, xii, 95-96, 101-3; central organizations of, 66-68; and control of economy, 186-89; and Democratic Conference, 93; emergence and early evolution of, 65-66; factions in, 71-72; functions of, xvii, 65-66; and Kornilov affair, 90-99; and labor discipline, 188-89; membership in, 66; and Moscow State Conference, 87-89; and opposition to Bolshevik dictatorship, xv; and Preparliament, 94; and Provisional Government, 74, 79, 97, 100; and reconciliation boards; and Red Guards, 91-92, 101; and strikes, 77-78, 84-85; and subordination of factory committees, 27-29, 104-12, 167, 169, 172, 176-77; and support for Bolshevik dictatorship, xiii, 187-89; suppression of, 190; and suppression of workers, 187; tasks of, 65-66, 76-79; trade union councils (bureaus), 66-67; and support for transfer of power to soviets, 87, 89-93, 94-95, 97; and *tsekhovshchina*, 69-70; types of, 68-69; and Vikzhel' negotiations, 103; and wage scale campaign, 78, 80-81, 84-85

Treugol'nik plant, 7, 8, 41

Trotsky, Lev Davidovich, 38, 40, 108

Trubochnyi plant, 4, 7, 154

tsekhovshchina, 69-70

Tsereteli, Iraklii, 3, 40

V

Vasil'ev, A. E., 4, 137, 139, 143, 145-46, 152

Vikzhel' negotiations, 113-14, 119

W

Weber, Max, xvi

Woodworkers' union, 80

workers: and anti-Bolshevik sentiments, xiv, 39, 44, 156-57; attitude toward

moderate socialists, 34; and conflicts with Bolshevik authorities, 139-143; demands for wage increases, 36, 59-60, 139-40; and food supply, 135, 141-143; layoffs of, 40-41, 134-135, 159; living conditions after October, 135-36; political apathy of, 182; and shop steward assemblies; and support for all-socialist government, 101-2; and support for Bolsheviks, 34-35, 44, 58, 63; and support for transfer of power to soviets, 37, 43-44, 51; and support for workers' control, 43-44; suppression of, 138-58, 187-88; violence against managers, 60-61
workers' control, xvii, 5, 8-10, 17, 21, 34, 41, 103; attitude of managers toward, 9-10, 18, 41-43; and Bolshevik party, 22-26; and Bolshevik press, 25; definition of, xvii, 15, 204; dismissals of administration, 7-8; emergence and early evolution, 5-9; interpretation of, 15-18; and moderate Bolsheviks, 48-49; attitude of moderate socialists toward, 11-12, 15, 18, 20-21; and organizations of employers, 12, 42, 52-54; and Provisional Government, 10, 13, 42-43, 57; and transfer of power to soviets, 43-44; supervision over hiring and dismissals, 8;
workers' militia, xvii

Z

Zelnik, Reginald, xvi

Zhivotov, Matvei, 27, 29, 105, 118, 122-23, 169-71

Zhuk, Iustin, 109

Zinov'ev, Grigirii Evseevich, 26, 37, 38, 76-77, 154-56, 166

Zubaton, Sergei, 5-6

Gennady Shkliarevsky

is assistant professor of history at Bard College. He was born in Russia and received his Ph.D. from the University of Virginia. His articles, reviews and translations have appeared in *Russian History/Histoire Russe*, *The Journal of Modern History*, and *The Journal of International Studies in Management and Organization*.

Jacket design by Judith Schwartz

St. Martin's Press
175 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10010

PRINTED IN THE U.S.A.

ISBN 0-312-09119-2